UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
AT  LOS  ANGELES 


UNIVERSITY  of  CALIFORNIil 

AT 

LOS  ANGELES 

LIBRARY 


^.CS  AMGELES,  CALIF. 

STANFORD  UNIVERSITY  PUBLICATIONS 
UNIVERSITY    SERIES 

HISTORY,  ECONOMICS  AND 

POLITICAL  SCIENCE 
Volume  I  Number  1 


THE 
GERMAN  REVOLUTION 

1918-1919 


RALPH  HASWELL  LUTZ 

Associate  Professor  of  History 


STANFORD    UNIVERSITY,  CALIFORNIA 

PUBLISHED  BY  THE  UNIVERSITY 

1922 


60097 


Stanford  University 
Press 


<   O 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I. 
The  Collapse  of  the  German  Empire 


PAGE 


1.  The  Military  Defeat 7 

2.  The  Internal  Collapse 15 

3.  Prince  Maximilian  of  Baden  Attempts  To  Save  the  Empire 22 

CHAPTER  H. 

Beginnings  of  the  Revolution 

1.  Naval   Mutiny   28 

2.  The  Bavarian  Revolution  35 

3.  The  Spread  of  the  Revolt 37 

CHAPTER  HI. 
The  Ninth  of  November 

1.  Abdication  of  the  Kaiser 39 

2.  Revolt  of  Berlin 44 

3.  Formation  of  the  Revolutionary  Government 53 

4.  The  Fall  of  the  Princes 56 

CHAPTER  IV. 
Socialism  and  Socialization 

1.  The  Social  Democratic  Party  During  the  War 58 

2.  The  Independent  Socialists 63 

3.  The  Spartacans 64 

4.  Theories  of  Socialization 66 

5.  The  Opposition  to  Socialization 69 

CHAPTER  V. 
The  Struggle  of  Parties  for  Power 

1.  The  Six  Commissioners 72 

2.  The  Return  of  the  National  Forces  after  the  Armistice 74 

3.  The  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Councils 78 

4.  The  First  Congress  of  the  Councils 85 

5.  The  January  Spartacan  Uprising 88 


CHAPTER  VI. 
The  Convocation  of  the  National  Assembly 

PAGE 

1.  The  Political  Parties 99 

2.  The  National  Election 105 

^  3.  The  Presidency  of  Ebert 109 

4.  The  Scheidemann  Ministry 109 

CHAPTER  Vn. 
Revolutionary  Problems 

1.  The  Economic  Reorganization Ill 

2.  Food 114 

3.  Bolshevism  119 

CHAPTER  Vni. 
Consolidation  of  the  Republic 

V  1.  The  March  Rebellion 125 

2.  The  New  Army 130 

3.  Minor  Communist  Uprisings 135 

4.  The  Munich  Commune 139 

CHAPTER  IX. 
The  Acceptance  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace 

1.  The  German  Attitude  Toward  Peace 143 

2.  The  Question  of  German-Austria 144 

3.  Peace  Plans  and  Negotiations 146 

4.  Reaction  to  the  Conditions  of  Peace 148 

5.  Acceptance  of  the  Allied  Ultimatum 155 

CHAPTER  X. 
The  Adoption  of  the  Republican  Constitution 

1.  The   Provisional  Constitution 159 

2.  Constitutional  Problems  161 

3.  The  Economic  Council  System 163 

4.  Results  of  the  Compromises 164 

After  the  Revolution. 


PREFACE 

The  German  revolutionary  movement  of  1918  and  1919  not  only 
destroyed  the  Bismarckian  Empire  but  fundamentally  altered  the  life  and 
institutions  of  the  German  people.  Although  it  has  as  yet  received  little 
attention  from  historians,  a  knowledge  of  the  revolution  is  essential  to  an 
understanding  of  contemporary  Germany  and  of  those  economic  and 
political  problems  resulting  from  the  defeat  of  the  German  Empire  in  the 
World  War. 

This  monograph  is  a  study  of  the  origins,  events,  tendencies,  and 
results  of  the  German  Revolution  based  upon  personal  observations  and 
an  examination  of  the  documentary  and  other  printed  materials  available. 
As  a  member  of  the  American  Military  Mission  in  Berlin  under  the 
command  of  General  George  H.  Harries,  from  March  to  August,  1919, 
the  author  had  opportunities  to  observe  the  revolutionary  struggles  in 
the  capital  as  v^^ell  as  in  the  several  states. 

The  principal  sources  of  authority  for  this  work  are,  however,  the 
materials  in  the  German  section  of  the  Hoover  War  Library,  and  include 
the  collection  of  German  Government  Documents  and  Delegation  Propa- 
ganda secured  from  the  Berlin  Foreign  Office  in  August,  1919,  by  Pro- 
fessor E.  D.  Adams.  In  addition  this  collection  contains  books,  pamph- 
lets, newspapers,  periodicals,  posters,  and  manuscripts  all  of  exceptional 
value  for  a  study  of  the  German  Revolution. 

R.  H.  L. 


THE  COLLAPSE  OF  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE 
The  Military  Defeat 

The  belief  in  her  imperiahstic  mission  was  the  fundamental  error  which 
caused  the  tragic  fate  of  modern  Germany.  After  three  years  of  success- 
ful but  indecisive  warfare,  the  German  empire  at  the  close  of  the  campaigns 
of  1917  was  confronted  with  a  new  enemy,  America,  which  hastened  to  the 
aid  of  England,  France,  Italy,  and  Belgium.  The  sudden  collapse  of 
Russia  appeared,  however,  to  give  Germany  the  means  of  ending  the  war 
in  the  west  before  the  arrival  of  large  American  forces.  The  disastrous 
defeat  of  the  Italian  army  by  the  central  powers  in  the  autumn  of  1917 
seemed  the  prelude  to  the  final  military  tragedy.^ 

Throughout  the  winter  of  1917-18  every  preparation  was  made  by  the 
German  General  Stafif  to  bring  the  war  on  the  western  front  to  a  victorious 
conclusion.  Veteran  German  divisions  were  brought  from  Russia  to  re- 
enforce  the  imperial  armies  in  France  and  Belgium.  Tactical  and  strate- 
gical plans  for  the  German  troops  were  perfected  in  the  training  areas 
behind  the  front.  Field  Marshal  von  Hindenburg  and  General  Ludendorfif 
were  at  the  head  of  the  German  forces.  Covered  by  the  authority  of  the 
Kaiser  as  Supreme  War  Lord  of  Germany,  they  were  the  absolute  masters 
of  the  army  and  nation,  exercising  a  military  dictatorship  which  was 
unparalleled  in  the  course  of  modern  history.  They  were  confident  of  the 
success  of  their  military  plans  and  believed  in  a  decisive  victory  which 
would  end  the  war.  Nevertheless  they  realized  the  seriousness  of  the  mili- 
tary and  political  situation  of  Germany,  and  they  neglected  no  opportunity 
to  raise  the  morale  of  the  troops  and  the  home  population.  Propaganda 
against  defeatists,  profiteers,  and  agitators  was  carried  on  in  the  interior 
of  Germany,  while  morale  officers  and  civilian  speakers  and  workers,  all 
organized  under  the  Fatherland  Instruction  System,  were  used  to  strengthen 
the  morale  of  the  army  and  the  will  to  victory.-  In  a  confidential  order  of 
July  29,  1917,  General  Ludendorfif  wrote:  "The  German  army  is,  through 
the  spirit  which  inflames  it,  superior  to  its  enemies  and  a  strong  support  for 
its  aUies."  '' 

The  decisive  blow  to  the  Entente,  which  was  to  give  Germany  victory, 
commenced  the  twenty-first  of  March.     General  Pershing  has  stated  that 


Freytag-Loringhoven,  "Politik  und  Kriegfiihrung,"  251. 

Nicolai,  "Nachrichtendicnst  Presse  und  Volkstimmung  im  Weltkrieg,"  113-136. 
'  Ludendorfif,  "Urkunden  der  Oberstcn  Heeresleitung,"  271. 


8  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

the  German  army  which  began  this  series  of  attacks  on  the  AlUes  was  the 
mightiest  force  which  the  world  had  ever  seen.*  As  the  first  offensive  drove 
the  British  back  upon  Amiens,  a  wave  of  enthusiasm  swept  over  Germany. 
The  morale  of  the  advancing  army  was  at  its  height,  and  the  ranks, 
stiffened  by  the  veteran  eastern  troops,  were  confident  of  ultimate  success. 
The  second  offensive  west  of  Lille  on  April  9  brought  the  Germans  to  the 
heights  dominating  the  channel  ports.  In  May  the  army  group  of  the  Ger- 
man Crown  Prince  advanced  over  the  Chemin  des  Dames,  and  on  June  9 
an  attack  on  the  Compiegne  front  widened  the  sector  there.  On  June  15 
the  Germans  commenced  their  decisive  offensive  on  the  western  front  by 
striking  at  Rheims  and  the  Marne.  In  the  second  battle  of  the  Marne  the 
German  empire  put  forth  its  utmost  strength.  The  allied  line,  despite  local 
reverses,  held  while  Marshal  Foch  swiftly  and  secretly  prepared  for  a 
counter  offensive,  which,  opening  on  the  eighteenth  of  July,  marked  the 
turning  of  the  tide.  After  four  years  of  war  the  German  empire  was  con- 
fronted with  inevitable  military  defeat.® 

As  early  as  May,  1918,  General  Ludendorff  must  have  known  that  a  vic- 
torious peace  was  impossible.  The  failure  to  reach  a  decision  in  the  first 
offensive  made  a  definitive  victory  problematical.®  By  the  first  of  June  the 
Bavarian  Crown  Prince  was  convinced  of  the  seriousness  of  the  military 
situation  and  wrote  to  the  imperial  chancellor  urging  immediate  action  to 
save  the  empire.'^  Possessing  supreme  military  power  and  exercising  at  the 
same  time  a  virtual  dictatorship  over  the  empire,  Ludendorff  nevertheless 
continued  the  struggle  with  the  Allies.  He  trusted  to  the  fortunes  of  war, 
to  the  help  of  a  Deus  ex  machina,  and  to  his  ability  to  weaken  the  allied 
will  to  victory.  Ludendorff  also  underestimated  the  ever-increasing  strength 
of  the  American  Expeditionary  Forces.®  On  June  11  the  Prussian  Minister 
of  War  declared  in  the  Reichstag  that  the  Foch  reserve  army  did  not  exist 
any  more.® 

The  failure  of  the  Germans  in  the  second  battle  of  the  Marne  is  the  first 
cause  of  the  German  revolution.  The  reports  of  the  success  of  Marshal 
Foch  in  July,  1918,  reacted  upon  Germany  with  telling  force.^°    On  July  21 


*  Ibid.,  492-496,  contains  excerpts  from  the  report  of  General  Pershing. 

'  Helfferich,  "Der  Weltkrieg,"  3 :  522-526.  Von  Moser,  "Kurzer  Strategischer 
Uberblick  iiber  den  Weltkrieg,  1914-1918,"  110-120.  Stegemann,  "Geschichte  des 
Krieges,"  4:  634-637.    Valentin,  "Deutschlands  Aussenpolitik,  1900-1918,"  374. 

'  Von  Lerch,  "Kritische  Betrachtungen  iiber  die  letzten  Kaempf  e  an  der  Deutschen 
Westfront,"  4. 

'  Hertling,  "Ein  Jahr  in  der  Reichskanzlei,"  139. 

'  Ludendorff,  op.  cit.,  360-367,  contains  Ludendorff's  defense  of  his  intelligence 
reports. 

'  Menke-Gliickert,  "Die  November  Revolution,"  6. 

"Von  Zwehl,  "Die  Schlachten  im  Sommer  1918  an  der  Westfront."  Erzberger,. 
"Erlebnisse  im  Weltkrieg,"  313-326.  August  Failures.  Immanuel,  "Siege  und  Nie- 
derlagen  im  Weltkriege,"  133-134. 


THE  COLLAPSE  OF  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  y 

Ludendorff  announced  that  the  German  offensives  had  not  been  successful, 
but  that  the  high  command  was  confident.  On  the  first  of  August  the  Kaiser 
declared :  "We  know  that  the  hardest  part  lies  behind  us."  But  the  con- 
tinued successes  of  the  Allies  left  no  doubt  in  the  minds  of  the  German 
General  Staff  that  the  tide  had  turned.  On  the  thirteenth  of  August  the 
Emperor  of  Austria  appeared  at  German  General  Headquarters  and  dis- 
cussed the  terrible  situation  of  the  dual  monarchy,  which  was  unable  to 
continue  the  war.^^ 

Ludendorff  states  in  his  memoirs  that  after  the  successful  English 
offensive  on  the  eighth  of  August,  he  realized  that  the  front  of  his  armies 
might  be  broken  at  any  time.  From  this  day  he  traces  the  beginning  of 
the  final  collapse.  Yet  the  attack  of  August  8  was  but  a  single  phase  of  the 
general  allied  advance.  It  was  at  the  Marne  rather  than  before  the  Hinden- 
burg  line  that  the  German  General  Staff  and  armies  first  began  to  waver. 
Not  only  did  the  German  intelligence  section  fail  in  the  second  Marne  battle 
to  locate  the  reserve  army  of  Foch  in  the  Villers  Cotteret  Forest,  but  the 
Fatherland  Instruction  Service  also  failed  to  maintain  the  spirits  of  the 
troops.  After  the  eighteenth  of  July  the  morale  of  the  German  armies 
slowly  but  surely  declined,  because  the  promised  German  peace  now  seemed 
impossible.^-  Field  Marshal  von  Hindenburg  had  declared :  "The  army  will 
do  its  duty  and  conquer  for  the  German  people  and  Fatherland  a  founda- 
tion for  a  strong  and  lasting  peace.  Hard  are  the  times,  but  sure  is  the 
victory,"  ^^  Neither  the  army  nor  the  people  could,  however,  see  even 
one  possibility  of  success,  and  consequently  gradually  lost  the  power  to 
continue  the  unequal  struggle.  General  von  Freytag-Loringhoven  states : 
"Against  their  superiority  more  in  technical  means  of  warfare,  rather  than 
in  man  power,  our  west  army  was  unable  to  maintain  the  gains  of  the 
spring  of  1918."^*  Certain  German  writers  have  maintained  since  the 
armistice,  that  the  March  offensive  should  never  have  been  undertaken 
and  that  the  German  armies  should  have  stood  on  the  defensive  behind 
the  line  Antwerp-Metz.i^  Colonel  Bauer  stated  definitely  in  his  attempt  to 
explain  the  German  defeat  that  this  line  could  have  been  held  throughout 


"  Auswacrtiges  Ami.  Nachrichien-Abteilung  Wochenherichte  der  Auslandslek- 
torate,  1918,  Vom  24  bis  30  Juli,  Nr.  30,  3753-3754,  3810,  contains  excellent  summaries 
of  conditions  in  the  entente  states. 

"  Vorwaerts,  March  23,  1919.  Scheidemann,  in  "Der  Zusammenbruch,"  185,  cites 
a  Division  Order  of  the  Forty-first  Infantry  Division,  August  14,  1918,  as  evidence 
of  declining  morale.  Foerster,  in  "Zur  Beurteilung  der  deutschen  Kriegsfuehrung," 
vehemently  attacks  the  army  and  the  Prussian  propaganda. 

"  Stahlin,  "Hindenburg,"  32. 

"  Freytag-Loringhoven,  "Politik  und  Kriegfiihrung,"  251. 

"  Runkel,  "Deutsche  Revolution,"  4. 


10  TMK   r.F.RM  AN    KKVOLUTION  (^ 

the  winter."'  LiulciulortT.  however,  was  prepared  on  September  28,  1918, 
to  retreat  to  the  Clerman  borders  and  if  necessary  recommence  hostilities 
there.'"  Freytajj-Lorini;hoven  asserts  clearly  that  a  continuation  of  the  war 
was  imjiossihle."* 

The  fundamental  miscalculation  of  the  German  General  Staflf  was 
concernini;;  the  value  of  American  aid  to  the  Allies.^"  Unrestricted  sub- 
marine warfare  was  decided  ujion  by  the  high  command  only  after  careful 
and  deliberate  calculations  of  all  eventualities.  The  success  of  submarine 
warfare  was  exaggerated  and  the  German  leaders  asserted  that  only  a 
few  American  volunteer  corps  would  appear  on  the  western  front. ^° 
Hindenburg  stated  that  the  war  would  be  over  before  American  aid  could 
arrive,  while  Ludendorff  pinned  his  faith  to  submarine  warfare.  "The 
American  military  aid,"  the  General  Staff  announced,  "still  stands  in  the 
hazy  distance  and  if  it  should  really  come  some  time,  it  will  not  then  be  in 
a  position  to  alter  anything  in  the  situation  upon  the  European  battle- 
ground." Admiral  von  Tirpitz  exclaimed  in  January.  1918:  "America's 
military  help  is  and  remains  a  phantom."  -^  In  1917  the  German  General 
Staff  regarded  all  American  preparations  as  unimportant.  Ludendorff 
said:  "The  American  danger  is  not  great.  \Ye  will  conquer,  if  the  people 
stand  in  close  unity  behind  our  army."  On  July  2.  1918,  the  German 
General  Staff  reported  that  there  were  eight  American  divisions  on  the 
western  front  and  a  total  of  eighteen  in  Europe.  Ludendorff  admitted  at 
last:  "It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  will  of  America  is  to  place  its  entire 
strength  in  the  service  of  the  war."  ^- 

Another  factor  in  the  military  collapse  of  the  empire  was  the  weaken- 
ing of  the  morale  of  the  army  by  internal  and  foreign  propaganda.  Both 
the  Ciermans  and  the  Allies  had  since  1914  sought  to  destroy  the  fighting 
value  of  their  antagonists  by  clever  propaganda.  As  the  German  offen- 
sives failed  to  reach  a  decision  in  the  spring  of  1918,  the  enemy  propa- 
ganda lowered  their  morale.  In  May,  1918,  84.000  pamphlets  were  turned 
in  by  German  soldiers  to  their  officers,  while  by  July  the  number  had  risen 
to  300,000.  These  pamphlets,  gradually  improved  in  tone,  encouraged 
desertion.  Among  them  were  printed  letters  of  German  prisoners  in 
allied  prison  camps  describing  their  good  food  and  others  stating  that  the 
fight   was   hopeless.     Often   the   Allies   deluged   the   German   lines   with 


"  Bauer,  "Konnten  wir  den  Krieg  vermeiden,  gevvinnen,  abbrechen  ?"  53. 
"Ludendorff,  "Das  Friedens-und  Waffenstillstandsangebot,"  11. 
'*  Freytag-Loringhoven,  "Politik  und  Kricgfiihrung,"  252. 
"*  Bernstorff ,  "Deutschland  und  Amerika,"  11. 

"  Ludendorff,  "Urkunden  der  Obersten  Heeresleitung,"  323.     Binder,  "Was  wir 
als  Kriegsberichterstatter  nicht  sagen  durften,"  29-30. 
"  Gumbel,  "Vicr  Jahre  Luege,"  29. 
^  Ludendorff,  Supra,  365,  414. 


■■"  THE  COLLAPSE  OF  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  11 

reprints  of  German  and  Swiss  papers  and  pamphlets  attacking  the  Ger- 
man emperor  and  the  Junkers.  The  Kaiser  was  accused  in  French 
pamphlets  of  having  instigated  the  war,  and  the  Germans  were  there- 
fore encouraged  to  form  a  repuhlic.  Propaganda  pamphlets  stated  that 
whoever  surrendered  and  gave  the  word  "republic"  would  not  be  treated  by 
the  French  as  a  prisoner  of  war.-^  ._ 

More  important  than  the  enemy  propaganda  was  the  attempt  of  certain 
groups  of  Independent  Socialists  to  undermine  the  fighting  power  of  the 
army.  Since  the  failure  of  the  general  strike  in  Germany  in  January, 
1918,  these  groups  worked  systematically  for  the  overthrow  of  German 
militarism.  Thousands  of  strikers  who  were  sent  to  the  fighting  lines 
helped  to  spread  this  propaganda  among  the  troops.  Deserters  organized 
with  false  papers  worked  among  the  front-line  troops.-*  The  divisions 
which  were  brought  from  the  eastern  front  had  seen  the  Russian  army 
robbed  of  its  leaders  almost  over  night,  and  had  been  consequently  pro- 
foundly impressed  with  the  methods  of  the  Bolsheviki.  These  troops  as 
well  as  the  few  Bolshevist  agitators  set  a  bad  example  in  the  west  army. 
Ludendorff  exclaims :  "The  revolution  from  above  and  below  dealt  the 
German  army  the  death  blo^w,  while  it  fought  with  the  foe."  -^  The 
grievances  of  the  German  soldiers  against  their  officers  were  of  course 
heightened  both  by  enemy  and  Socialist  propaganda  until  the  hatred  of 
their  leaders  became  by  November,  1918,  one  of  the  characteristic  features 
of  the  German  army.  All  national  armies  are  of  course  incapable  of 
fighting  long  wars.  The  mere  presence  in  the  ranks  of  older  classes  of 
soldiers  ultimately  causes  general  discontent. 

Primarily,  because  of  the  continued  allied  victories,  the  declining 
morale  of  the  imperial  army,  the  collapse  of  Bulgaria,  and  the  imminent 
destruction  of  Germany's  other  allies,  the  General  Staff  by  September  28, 
1918,  came  to  regard  the  struggle  as  hopeless.-®  Ludendorff,  fearing  that 
his  front  would  be  broken  at  any  moment  and  the  entire  army  involved 
in  the  disaster,  suddenly  dispatched  an  ultimatum  to   Berlin  demanding 

"^  War  Information  Library,  British  Ministry  of  Information,  contains  an  excel- 
lent collection  of  allied  propaganda  literature  printed  in  the  German  language  for 
distribution  among  German  troops. 

*^  Freytag-Loringhoven,  "Was  danken  wir  unserem  Offizierkorps?,"  86. 

*°  Ludendorff,  "Urkunden  der  Obersten  Heeresleitung,"  581.  General  von  Wris- 
berg  in  "Der  Weg  zur  Revolution"  agrees  with  this  view  and  attacks  Edward  Bern- 
stein for  stating  in  "Die  dcutsche  Revolution"  that  the  imperial  army  was  not  affected 
by  the  revolutionary  movement.  Kantorowicz  in  "Der  Offiziershass  im  deutschen 
Heer"  states  that  the  so-called  revolution  was  a  general  mutiny  of  the  army.  "We 
call,"  states  Rathenau  in  "Kritik  der  dreifachen  Revolution,"  9,  "the  German  revolu- 
tion the  general  strike  of  a  defeated  army." 

^  Hindenburg,  "Aus  Meinem  Leben,"  392.  Ludendorff,  "Das  Friedens-und  Waf- 
fenstillstandsangebot,"  10-1 L 


12  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

that  the  civil  government  of  Germany  request  an  immediate  armistice  of 
the  AHies.-'  Tliis  demand  arrived  in  BerHn  in  the  midst  of  a  chancellor 
crisis.  Was  it  the  result  of  a  nervous  collapse  of  Ludendorff  ?  Since  the 
revolution  a  controversy  has  developed  in  Germany  over  the  significance 
of  this  move  of  Ludendorflf.  The  facts  are  that  before  Prince  Max  had 
actually  assumed  office.  Ludendorff  dispatched  this  demand  for  an  armis- 
tice to  Berlin,  and  that  on  the  afternoon  of  October  3  Hindenburg  and  a 
major  of  the  General  Staff  appeared  before  Prince  Max  and  explained  the 
precarious  condition  of  the  front.-^  Ludendorff  demanded  peace  because 
he  no  longer  trusted  the  powers  of  resistance  of  his  armies.  Frantically 
the  ministers  asked  for  time,  but  the  emphatic  answer  of  the  military  party 
was:  "No."  Under  the  pressure  of  the  army  solely,  the  German  civil 
government  began  the  armistice  negotiations.  The  dictatorship  of  Luden- 
dorff was  powerful  enough  to  force  his  will  upon  the  civil  government.^® 
Now  the  General  Staff  had  been  since  August  29,  1916,  not  only  the 
supreme  military  but  the  supreme  political  power  as  well.^°  It  had  directed 
the  war  on  all  the  fronts  and  time  after  time  made  important  political 
decisions.  In  the  last  analysis,  the  successors  of  Moltke  had  waged  a 
war  of  conquest.  Colonel  Bauer,  the  confidential  man  of  Ludendorff, 
states  that  the  supreme  command  rejected  the  idea  of  a  defensive  war  and 
changed  its  character  to  one  of  conquest. ^^  Admiral  von  Hintze  has  testi- 
fied that  even  in  August,  1918,  the  General  Staff  could  not  agree  to  the 
r  giving  up  of  its  annexionist  plans,  as  well  as  to  the  complete  restoration 
of  Belgium!  Just  before  the  breakdown  of  the  German  General  Staff, 
Hindenburg  said :  "The  peace  in  the  west  shall  not  also  be  a  weak 
peace."  ^^  Thus  the  policy  of  might  abroad,  coupled  with  unrest  at  home, 
hurled  the  empire  into  the  abyss.  As  late  as  October  17  Ludendorff  de- 
manded that  unrestricted  submarine  warfare  should  be  maintained  in  full 
force.^^ 

After  the  armistice  a  great  controversy  arose  in  Germany  over  the 
causes  of  the  imperial  military  collapse  and  the  outbreak  of  the  revolu- 


"  Von  Stein,  "Erlebnisse  und  Betrachtungen  aus  der  Zeit  des  Weltkrieges,"  192. 
Immanuel,  op.  cit.,  138-139,  173-174. 

^  Nowak,  "Der  Sturz  der  Mittelmaechte,"  252-254. 

"  Scheidemann,  "Der  Zusammenbruch,"  184.  Steinhausen,  "Die  Grundfehler  des 
Krieges  und  der  Generalstab,"  27.    Wrisberg,  "Heer  und  Heimat  1914-1918." 

*'  Berlin  Press  Review,  issued  daily  by  American  Military  Mission,  Berlin.  Letter 
of  Hindenburg  assuming  responsibility,  July  5,  1919. 

"  Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  August,  1919. 

"Frcih£it,  May  16,  1919. 

"  Vossische  Zeitung,  March  16,  1919,  Ludendorff's  letter  of  March  12,  1919,  to 
Scheidemann. 


THE  COLLAPSE  OF  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  13 

tion.^*  Ludendorff  and  many  militarists,  as  well  as  a  great  group  of 
Pan-Germans,  attempted  to  explain  away  the  military  debacle.  It  is  a  \ 
remarkable  characteristic  of  German  militarism,  that,  in  the  very  hour  of  ' 
its  final  defeat,  it  raised  the  cry  that  the  army  had  been  betrayed  in  the  rear 
and  stabbed  in  the  back.^^  The  Pan-Germans  audaciously  informed  the 
nation  that  the  demand  of  Ludendorff  for  negotiations  with  President 
Wilson  was  made  because  of  the  terrible  political  situation  of  Germany.^® 
They  scoffed  at  the  story  of  the  nervous  collapse  of  Ludendorff.  General 
von  Boehn,  commander  of  the  Seventh  Army,  published  a  declaration  that  '\ 
the  collapse  was  due  to  the  conspiracies  among  the  people  and  the  home 
front  and  not  to  the  defeat  of  the  front-line  troops.^^  Colonel  Bauer 
naively  states  that  it  was  necessary  to  make  the  peace  offer  in  order  to 
explain  to  the  people  that  the  Allies  would  not  grant  a  just  peace.^®  Luden- 
dorff also  makes  this  astounding  assertion.  Even  Freytag-Loringhoven 
stated  of  the  German  army :  *Tt  really  did  not  succumb  to  the  superiority 
and  to  the  armed  blows  of  its  enemies,  but,  as  is  well  known,  to  other 
attacks."  He  admits,  however,  that  the  German  people  curse  militarism 
as  the  cause  of  the  loss  of  the  war.^® 

After  the  armistice  Scheidemann  publicly  attacked  Ludendorff  for 
prolonging  the  war,  for  failing  to  agree  to  a  peace  of  justice,  and  for 
leading  the  army  like  a  gambler  to  final  defeat.  Ludendorff's  expression, 
"I  regard  myself  as  a  Hasardspieler" ,  was  hurled  against  himself.*"  The 
German  revolutionary  government  proved  to  the  satisfaction  of  all  but 
the  parties  of  the  right  that  Ludendorff  had  demanded,  on  the  afternoon' 
of  October  1,  the  commencement  of  peace  negotiations,  that  he  had  ad- 
mitted the  front  might  collapse  at  any  hour,  and  that  he  had  told  Minister 
Solf  that  he  could  not  hold  the  front  three  months  longer.*^  Hugo  Haase, 
leader  of  the  Independent  Socialists,  stated  that  Vice  Chancellor  von 
Payer  surprised  the  party  leaders  in  a  confidential  meeting  with  the  news 
that  the  German  army  stood  on  the  verge  of  collapse  and  that  the  army 
leaders,  Hindenburg  and  Ludendorff,  had  requested  the  government  to 


"  Schwarte,  "Die  Militaerischen  Lehren  des  Grossen  Krieges,"  459-477,  contains  a 
bibliography  of  this  literature. 

^  Balck,  "Entwickelung  der  Taktik  im  Weltkrieg,"  319.  Bauer,  "Der  Grosse  Krieg 
in  Feld  und  Heimat,"  285-294.  "Kritik  des  Weltkrieges,"  von  Einem  Generalstaebler, 
245.    Von  Zwehl,  "Der  Dolchstoss  in  den  Ruecken  des  Siegreichen  Heeres." 

'^Deutsche  Tageszeitiing,  August  2,  1919. 

*'  Von  Hoensbroech,  "Zurueck  zur  Monarchie,"  14. 

**  Bauer,  "Konnten  wir  den  Krieg  Vermeiden,  Gewinnen,  Abbrechen  ?"  54. 

*•  Freytag-Loringhoven,  "Was  danken  wir  unserem  Offizierskorps  ?"  1. 

*"  Berlin  Pr,fi»s  Review,  March  26,  1919. 

"  Berliner  Tagehlatt,  August  2,  1919. 


14  THE   r.KRMAX    RKVOr.UTION 

brin^^  about  an  armistice  without  delay.'-  Like  the  majority  parties,  even 
the  Independent  SociaHsts  were  totally  unprepared  for  the  news  of  the 
impending  military  disaster/^ 

In  the  summer  of  1919  the  German  government  finally  published  a 
White  Book  on  the  events  leading  to  the  armistice,  in  order  to  combat  the 
conservative  and  monarchist  propaganda  and  to  justify  the  action  of  the 
revolutionary  government  in  admitting  its  defeat  by  signing  the  armis- 
tice.** These  documents  reveal  the  utter  helplessness  of  the  German  High 
Command  in  the  face  of  the  continuous  allied  advances,  and  they  show 
clearly  that  only  the  armistice  saved  the  wreck  of  the  imperial  army  from 
a  disaster  which  would  have  been  unparalleled  in  history.  Only  the 
Athenians  before  Syracuse,  or  the  French  at  Moscow,  showed  the  indecision 
and  lack  of  appreciation  of  the  real  military  situation  which  the  Germans 
evinced  in  the  summer  of  1918. 

In  a  military  state  a  successful  revolution  is  only  possible  when  the 
army  is  permeated  with  the  spirit  of  revolt.  Otherwise  it  remains  a 
permanent  obstacle  to  a  violent  change  of  government  irrespective  of 
the  weakness  of  the  established  regime.  That  the  failure  of  the  German 
army  leaders  to  gain  the  promised  victory  would  bring  about  a  military 
revolution  was  clear  to  all.  The  collapse  of  the  army  meant  par  conse- 
quent the  collapse  of  the  bourgeois — liberal  order  of  life  and  the  emerg- 
ence of  the  fourth  estate  with  its  idea  of  socialism  from  political,  social 
and  economic  repression,  to  power. *^  The  German  soldiers,  deprived  of 
their  martial  spirit  of  1914  by  the  unsuccessful  peace  ofifensives,  the  mili- 
tary defeats  and  the  desperate  conditions  at  home,  had  lost  the  conscious- 
ness of  fighting  for  a  good  cause.*** 

Forced  by  military  necessity  to  sue  for  peace,  the  German  military 
leaders  turned  to  President  Wilson,  hoping  by  invoking  the  fourteen 
points  to  escape  from  destruction.*'  That  they  accepted  the  President's  con- 
ditions of  peace,  at  which  they  and  the  German  people  had  openly  scoffed, 
reveals  the  desperateness  of  their  position.  Concerning  this  appeal  to 
President  Wilson,  General  Groener  wrote :  "At  any  rate  we  did  not 
lighten  the  role  which  we  had  expected  of  him."*** 


**  Haase,  "Reichstagsreden,"  184. 

"  Vetter,  "Der  Zusammenbruch  der  Westfront,"  14. 

**  "Vorgeschichte  des  Waffenstillstandes."  British  official  translation,  "The  His- 
tory of  Events  Immediately  Preceding  the  Armistice."  Ludendorff  published  his  de- 
fense against  the  accusations  of  the  "White  Book"  in  three  pamphlets,  August-Sep- 
tember, 1919,  which  are  included  in  "Urkunden  der  Obersten  Heeresleitung." 

"  Moeckel,  "Das  Deutsche  Biirgertum  und  die  Revolution,"  16. 

*•  Nowak,  "Der  Weg  zur  Katastrophe,"  288-289. 

"  Valentin,  Supra,  375-383. 

**  Groener,  "Die  Liquidation  des  Weltkrieges,"  in  Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  Feb- 
ruary, 1920. 


the  collapse  of  the  german  empire  15 

The  Internal  Collapse 

As  the  powers  of  resistance  and  the  morale  of  the  German  armies  on 
the  western  front  collapsed  in  the  autumn  of  1918  before  the  steady  blows 
of  the  allied  armies,  so  the  internal  front  crumbled  when  the  German 
nation  gave  up  the  unequal  struggle  after  four  years  of  false  hopes, 
privations,  and  social,  economic,  and  moral  decay.*''  This  collapse  was  all 
the  more  dramatic  since  the  nation  had  entered  upon  the  war  with 
universal  enthusiasm  because  of  its  belief  that  it  had  been  attacked.  From 
the  Socialists  who  voted  the  war  credits,  to  the  Pan-Germans  who  joy- 
ously shouted,  "Vae  Victis",  the  entire  nation  had  united  about  the  person 
of  the  last  emperor  to  conquer  a  place  in  the  world  which  would  be  worthy 
of  Germany's  imperial  destiny. 

Notwithstanding  the  superiority  of  Germany's  war  preparations  over 
those  of  her  enemies,  innumerable  mistakes  were  made  at  the  outset.  The 
one-sided  adoption  of  the  Schlieffen  plan  of  crushing  France  while  Russia 
was  held  off  in  the  east  proved  a  failure,  not  due  to  the  fact  that  it  was 
carried  out  by  Epigoni,  but  to  the  lack  of  sufficient  military  strength  and 
to  the  unparalleled  resistance  of  the  French. ^°  Under  the  delusion  that  the 
war  would  be  a  short  one,  men  and  materiel  were  ruthlessly  wasted  during 
the  first  year  in  an  attempt  to  reach  a  quick  decision.  Neither  Austria, 
Bulgaria,  nor  Turkey  possessed  that  military  preparation  which  had  been 
indicated  by  German  General  Staff  reports. ^^ 

As  the  war  progressed  the  powers  of  the  General  Staff  increased, 
while  the  imperial  ministry  of  Chancellor  von  Bethmann-HoUweg  degen- 
erated into  a  secondary  government.  After  the  failures  at  Verdun  and 
the  Somme,  and  the  entrance  of  Rumania  into  the  war,  the  German 
General  Headquarters  became  the  supreme  military  and  political  power  in 
Mittel  Europa.  The  nation  lacked  at  this  crisis  a  Bismarck,  and  the 
results  were  far  reaching.  Political  life  suffered  under  the  military  dic- 
tatorship. Countless  sources  of  discontent  were  created  by  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  innumerable  war  measures  and  regulations,  while  the  varied 
policies  of  the  German  corps  district  commanders  destroyed  the  advantages 
of  this  devolution  of  military  authority. 

More  acute  than   the  gradual  political  and   military   degeneration  of^ 
the  empire  was  the  collapse  of  the  economic  life.     Moltke,  in  emphasizing 


"  Steinhausen,  "Die  Schuld  der  Heimat,"  56-79. 

°"  Ludendorff  and  von  Stein  are  largely  responsible  for  the  spreading  out  {Ver- 
wdsseruny)  by  the  General  Staff  of  the  Schlieffen  plan. 

"  Von  Loebell,  "Aus  Deutschlands  Ruinen,"  30-31.  The  military  and  economic 
value  of  the  German  alliance  with  these  states  was,  however,  emphasized  by  Nau- 
mann  in  "Mitteleuropa."  This  great  work  was  read  extensively  by  the  soldiers  at  the 
front.  Cf.  Oncken,  "Das  alte  und  das  neue  Mitteleuropa,"  for  an  excellent  discussion 
of  the  probable  relations  of  the  empire  with  the  great  powers  after  the  war. 


k)  THE    C.KRM  AN    RKNOI.ITTION 

tlie  inii)ortaiicc  of  agriculture,  said:  "The  German  empire  will  perish 
without  a  shot  being  fired  if  German  agriculture  collapses."  °"  Despite 
rigorous  laws  and  the  organization  of  a  central  food  control,  the  food 
supply  of  Germany  gradually  declined,  although  it  was  supplemented  by 
contributions  from  the  occupied  territory.  Contrary  to  official  reports, 
the  allied  blockade  and  insufficient  harvests  reduced  Mittcl  Eiiropa  to  the 
verge  of  starvation. 

As  the  war  progressed,  German  agriculture  JqIL  the  lack  of  agricul- 
tural laborers,  horses^,  fertilizing  material,  and  agricultural  machinery. 
Official  rules  hindered  rational  work,  while  the  maximum  prices  which 
were  enforced  throughout  Germany  only  encouraged  contraband  trade 
and  smuggling.  Critics  were  not  lacking  who  declared  that  the  conserva- 
tive agrarian  Pan-German  system  had  perhaps  failed  worse  in  the  field 
of  war  food  control  than  in  that  of  political  and  military  leadership. ^^  As 
the  allied  blockade  cut  off  the  supply  of  raw  materials  from  overseas,  and 
as  the  reserve  stocks  were  gradually  depleted,  the  effect  upon  German 
industry  became  noticeable.  This  was  partly  alleviated  by  the  rapid 
development  of  arms  and  munition  factories,  which  resulted  in  the  growth 
of  a  great  war  industry.  The  workmen  secured  higher  wages,  numerous 
strikes  added  to  the  seriousness  of  the  national  situation,  and  the  constant 
^  economic  agitation  stirred  up  class  hatred.^* 

From  an  economic  standpoint,  the  most  fatal  step  taken  during  the 
entire  war  was  the  adoption  of  the  Hindenburg  program.  This  aimed  to 
get  the  last  ounce  of  economic  strength  out  of  the  German  people,  and, 
although  for  a  time  it  seemed  to  place  the  war  industries  abreast  of  the 
demands  of  the  military  authorities,  it  ultimately  lead  to  economic  destruc- 
tion. Wages  were  raised  unnaturally  by  it,  while  the  erection  of  factories 
upon  non-economic  sites  lead  to  a  shift  of  population  and  the  creation  of 
altered  standards  of  life  which  produced  a  dangerous  reaction  upon  the 
w^orking  classes.^^ 

The  political  decline  of  the  empire  became  apparent  at  the  end  of  1916. 
The  peace  offensive  and  the  negotiations  with  President  Wilson  reveal  a 
political  incompetency  scarcely  equalled  in  the  annals  of  Modern  Europe. 
In  January,  1917,  only  a  portion  of  the  government  was  convinced  of  the 
necessity  of  a  peace  of  reconciliation.  Dr.  Solf  at  that  time  could  not 
agree  to  the  indemnification  of  Belgium,  which  he  finally  accepted  in 
August,  1918.    At  the  very  moment  when  President  Wilson  was  working 

^^         "  Braun,  "Kami  Deutschland  Durch  Hunger  Besiegt  Werden?" 

"Hoff,  "Am  Abgrund  Vorueber,  III." 
'^        "  Bauer,  "Konnten  wir  den  Krieg  vermeiden,  gewinnen,  abbrechen?"  40-43. 

"  Taegliche  Rundschau,  March  26,  1919.  Speech  of  Prussian  Finance  Minister 
Suedekum,  18-23. 


THE  COLLAPSE  OF  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  17 

for  "a  peace  without  victory",  a  settlement  which  would  have  maintained 
the  integrity  of  the  German  empire,  German  statesmen  through  their 
foreign  policy  were  destroying  the  moral  credit  of  the  nation  abroad.^^ 
On  January  29,  1917,  the  German  Chancellor  von  Bethmann-Hollweg, 
with  the  approval  of  Ludendorff  and  Hindenburg,  telegraphed  the  Ger- 
man terms  of  peace  to  Count  Bernstorff,  with  instructions  to  deliver  them, 
together  with  the  note  concerning  unrestricted  submarine  warfare,  to 
President  Wilson.  These  peace  terms  provided  for  German  annexations 
on  the  eastern  and  western  fronts  and  for  an  enlargement  of  the  German 
colonial  empire.  They  were  supported  by  the  German  political  parties, 
including  the  Social  Democrats.  Scheidemann  had  informed  Ludendorff 
that  he  was  not  opposed  to  the  necessary  annexations  of  territory  nor  to 
the  proposed  war  indemnities.^^  Thus  the  adoption  of  unrestricted  sub- 
marine warfare  at  the  behest  of  the  military  dictators  was  the  prelude  to 
the  general  pohtical  collapse  of  Germany. 

The  empire  was  hurled  to  destruction  primarily  by  the  Pan-Germans, 
the  politicians  of  the  Fatherland  party,  and  groups  of  annexationists  who 
developed  the  war  aims  of  the  empire  toward  the  goal  of  world  conquest. 
Gothein  asserts :  "The  blame  for  the  moral  collapse  rests  in  the  first 
instance  upon  those  who  sullied  the  pure  thought  of  the  war  of  national 
defense  with  demands  for  conquests."  ^**  From  the  first  days  of  August, 
1914,  until  the  November  revolution,  Germany  was  deluged  by  the  annex- 
ationists with  pamphlets  which  either  knowingly  or  unknowingly  falsified 
the  real  situation.  A  great  literature  sprang  up  about  the  causes  and  the 
beginnings  of  the  world  war.  To  conceal  the  character  of  the  fighting  on 
the  front  became  an  art  with  German  publicists,  while  the  beginnings  of 
unrestricted  submarine  warfare  and  the  entrance  of  America  were  hope- 
lessly distorted  for  the  benefit  of  the  German  public. 

As  early  as  1915  large  economic  groups  in  Germany  were  bent  upon 
annexations.  A  memoir  of  the  League  of  Landowners,  Central  Organ- 
ization of  German  Industry,  League  of  Industrials,  German  Peasant 
League,  and  National  German  Middle  Class  League,  which  was  presented 
to  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  demanded  annexations  to  secure  the  economic 
future  of  Germany.  Intellectuals  such  as  Meinecke,  Schaefer,  and  Schu- 
macher, later  gave  their  assent  to  this  plan.^"     These  demands  hastened 


°*  Baumgarten,  "Die  Schuld  am  Deutschen  Zusammenbruch,"  23.  That  a  secretary 
of  state  for  foreign  affairs  in  the  midst  of  negotiations  with  a  friendly  power  should 
have  written  such  a  document  as  the  Zimmerman  note  is  sufficient  evidence  of  the  real 
character  of  this  imperial  government. 

"  Ludendorff,  "Urkunden  der  Obersten  Heeresleitung,"  342-344,  416. 

"Gothein,  "Warum  Verloren  wir  den  Krieg?"  92. 

"Freiheit,  May  16,  1919. 


IS  Tlir:   GKRMAN    KKVOLUTION 

the  collapse.""  Among  the  German  publicists,  Harden  in  1915  demanded 
unrestricted  submarine  warfare  and  recommended  Tirpitz  for  the  post  of 
chancellor  of  the  empire."^  The  foremost  Pan-German  demands  were: 
unrestricted  submarine  warfare;  the  extension  of  the  frontiers  against 
Russia;  the  development  of  the  idea  of  Mittcl  Europa;.  the  collection  of 
huge  war  indemnities;  and  the  seizure  of  a  greater  colonial  empire. 
Belgium  was  not  to  be  allowed  to  regain  her  independence.  Economic 
control  by  Germany  was  declared  important  in  order  to  prevent  the 
exploitation  of  Belgium  by  her  former  allies.  Other  writers  maintained 
that  Flanders  and  IVallonicn  should  become  separate  protectorates  of 
Germany,  with  the  coast  of  Flanders  under  the  immediate  control  of  the 
empire."-  Meanwhile  the  failure  of  Germanization  in  Alsace-Lorraine 
was  noted,  and  fiery  demands  were  made  during  the  war  that  the  French 
influence  should  be  completely  uprooted.  The  brutal  tones  of  the  Pan- 
Germans  in  this  debate  are  characteristic  of  their  general  policy .^^  These 
groups  violently  denounced  the  peace  resolutions  of  the  Reichstag.  They 
accused  the  Internationale  of  being  a  tool  of  their  enemies.  In  September, 
1917,  Kapp,  von  Tirpitz,  von  Wangenheim,  and  others  founded  the  Ger- 
man Fatherland  Party,  destined  to  surpass  all  earlier  war  parties  in 
demands  for  annexations  and  indemnities.*^*  The  victory  course  of  this 
party  gained  for  it  many  adherents  among  the  educated  classes,  but  the 
great  middle  class  and  the  proletariat  were  unmoved  by  the  wild  projects 
of  the  Fatherland  group. 

Antithetical  to  the  Pan-Germans  were  the  Independent  Socialists. 
Their  steady  development  since  the  middle  period  of  the  war  was  one 
of  the  most  important  factors  in  the  fall  of  German  imperialism.  Their 
policy,  which  was  originally  one  of  strict  Marxism,  became  by  1918 
decidedly  revolutionary.  Developing  from  a  group  of  Social  Democrats 
who  in  1914  opposed  the  voting  of  the  war  credits  by  the  party,  the  Inde- 
pendent Socialists  became  an  organization  which  regarded  the  war  as 
ruinous  for  Germany.  Since  the  summer  of  1917  their  leaders  had 
planned  to  overthrow  the  empire  by  a  revolution.*'^  In  this  year  the 
beginnings  of  revolutionary  agitation  are  noticeable  among  strikers,  partic- 
ularly the  metal  workers.  In  1917  the  seceding  Social  Democrats  met  at 
Gotha  and  founded  the  Independent  Social  Democratic  Party  of  Germany. 


"'  Lehmann-Russbueldt,  "Warum  Erfolgte  der  Zusammenbruch  an  der  Westfront?" 

'^'  Preiissische  Jahrbiicher,  December,  1919. 

''  Zitelmann,    "Das    Schicksal    Belgiens   beim    Friedensschluss."     Wintzer,    "Das 
neue  Belgien." 

"  Berger,  "Die  Ursachen  des  Zusammenbruchs  des  Deutschtums  in  Elsass-Loth- 
ringen";  Hoppe,  "Elsass-Lothringen,"  Preussische  Jahrbuecher,  January,  1919,  110. 

•*  Deutsche  Vaterlands-Partei,  "Deutsche  Ziele." 
y  **  Menke-Gliickert,  "Die  November  Revolution,"  14. 


THE  COLLAPSE  OF  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  '     19 

It  rapidly  became  the  Radical  Socialist  Party  and  attacked  the  Majority 
Socialists  as  the  servants  of  the  expansionists.  The  leaders  of  the  party 
were  active  in  the  great  general  strike  of  January,  1918.  Their  failure 
upon  this  field  resulted  in  redoubled  activity  against  the  empire.  The 
Independents  declared :  "Whoever  protested  against  the  German  policy 
of  force  during  the  war  was  sent  to  prison,  the  penitentiary,  or  the 
trenches."  *^^ 

The  January  strike  was  ruthlessly  suppressed  by  the  government  with 
the  effective  aid  of  the  majority  parties,  which  then  believed  in  a  German 
victory.  Thereupon  the  Independents  concluded  that  only  the  armed 
rising  of  the  workers  would  free  the  nation  from  the  menace  of  imperial- 
ism and  capitalism.  Emil  Barth,  one  of  their  leaders,  organized  a  revolu- 
tionary committee,  purchased  arms,  and  secured  the  cooperation  of  Joffe, 
the  soviet  ambassador  to  Germany.  Barth  declared  on  the  ninth  of  No- 
vember: "Through  my  hands  went  for  revolutionary  propaganda  and 
preparation  several  hundred  thousand  marks,  which  I  received  solely  from 
comrades." 

The  Independent  leader  Vater  of  Madgeburg  immortalized  himself 
in  Germany  by  boasting  that  the  revolution  had  been  systematically 
planned  since  January  25,  1918.  Although  the  conservatives  maintain 
that  a  widespread  conspiracy'  existed  against  the  empire,  there  is  little 
evidence  to  support  this  view.**^  The  Independent  Socialists  as  a  party 
failed  to  commence  organized  revolutionary  activity  until  the  outbreak 
was  inevitable.  According  to  Haase's  statements,  he  first  learned  on 
November  9  that  Barth  had  purchased  weapons  for  the  expected  revolu- 
tion of  the  proletariat.  The  national  committee  of  his  party  had  no 
connection  with  Joffe  and  was  engaged  only  in  the  spreading  of  its  own 
propaganda."^  As  late  as  the  October  23  meeting  of  the  Independent 
Socialists  of  Berlin  the  question  of  preparations  for  the  coming  revolution 
was  discussed  and  several  leaders  protested  against  a  policy  which  steered 
toward  revolution."'' 

It  is  clear  that  the  Pan-Germans  by  their  wild  demands  for  more 
sacrifices  upon  the  altars  of  conquest  were  driving  the  nation,  already 
weary  of  imperialism,  to  desperation.  The  Independent  Socialists  hoped 
after  the  failure  of  the  January  strikes  to  overthrow  the  empire  by  force. 
However,  the  definite  collapse  of  the  internal  front  was  not  due  to  the 
machinations  of  either  party,  but  to  other  causes. 

f  Public  opinion  gradually  turned  against  the  imperial  government  as 
the  nation  entered  the  fourth  year  of  the  war.     The  middle  class,  the 


"Freiheit,  March  24,  1919. 
*'  Taeyliche  Rundschau,  December  15,  1918. 
"  Zimmermann,  "Der  Zusammenbruch,"  7-8. 
'*  Daumig,  "Das  Raetesystem,"  23-24. 


20  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

'^^  small  officials,  and  the  iiulustiial  workers  lead  a  precarious  existence  in 
the  cities  and  towns.  Owing  to  the  breakdown  of  transportation,  difficul- 
ties in  supplying  the  population  with  coal  became  universal.  There  was 
lack  of  electric  light  and  power  in  the  cities  and  a  scarcity  of  petroleum 
in  the  country.  In  1918  the  government  established  the  meatless  weeks, 
which  heightened  the  effect  of  food  control.  To  add  to  the  general  bitter- 
ness, contraband  trade  flourished,  and,  although  the  imperial  currency 
depreciated,  the  wealthy  class  and  the  bureaucrats  of  the  cities  secured 
butter,  eggs,  and  flour  from  the  country.  Hatred  of  the  rich  developed 
from  month  to  month.  The  denunciation  of  war  societies  was  general ; 
they  were  accused  of  working  only  for  themselves  and  their  friends.  The 
war  orders  were  so  numerous  and  conflicting  that  they  were  generally 
violated.  Public  morality  and  general  moral  standards  declined.  The 
most  striking  phase  of  the  internal  collapse  was  the  degeneration  of  the 
efficient  and  honest  Prussian  and  German  official  class.  Bribery  developed 
in  a  bureaucracy  which  before  the  war  was  impeccable. 

While  the  great  industrial  corporations  were  declaring  large  dividends, 
the  Social-Democratic  press  in  ironical  phrases  was  calling  attention  to 
the  increasing  misery  of  the  masses.  Many  articles  of  household  necessity 
were  confiscated  during  the  w^ar.  A  petty  bitterness  was  aroused  in  the 
middle  class  by  the  confiscation  of  door  knobs,  lightning  rods,  brass  cur- 
tain-poles, and  copper  utensils.  In  agricultural  regions  the  peasant  houses 
were  searched  and  articles  of  necessity  taken  away.  As  in  all  the  warring 
countries,  profiteers  flourished ;  graft  and  greed  for  wealth  were  every- 
N  where.'*' 

Although  the  nation  had  borne  these  hardships  with  fortitude  in  the 
days  of  victory,  it  became  exhausted  when  the  military  situation  began  to 
change.  Realizing  the  danger,  the  imperial  government  endeavored  by 
skillful  propaganda  to  raise  the  declining  national  morale.  The  great 
speakers'  offensive,  commenced  in  the  summer  of  1918,  is  the  final  effort 
of  militarism  and  imperialism  to  save  itself.  Undersecretary  of  State  Solf 
on  the  twentieth  of  August,  1918,  spoke  on  German  war  aims  and  the 
restoration  of  Belgium.  On  August  22  Prince  Max  of  Baden  delivered 
an  able  address  to  the  chambers  of  Baden  upon  the  celebration  of  the 
hundredth  anniversay  of  the  constitution  of  that  grand  duchy. 

Meanwhile  the  allied  advances  in  the  west  had  revealed  to  the  nation 
the  extent  of  the  military  danger.  The  English  successes  against  Cambrai 
caused  Hindenburg  to  issue  the  pronouncement  of  September  4,  warning 
against  enemy  propaganda  and  stating  that  he  could  force  peace  in  the 
west  in  spite  of  the  Americans.  "Defend  thyself,  German  army  and 
German  native  land",  was  the  new  order  of  the  day.  On  September  5 
Ludendorff  declared  that  he  could  handle  the  Americans,  while  the  Crown 


'Giesecke,  "Im  Kampf  an  der  Inneren  Front." 


THE  COLLAPSE  OF  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  21 

Prince  stated  that  the  word  victory  meant  that  Germany  would  maintain 
itself  and  not  be  overpowered.^^ 

That  the  internal  situation  was  indeed  precarious  was  revealed  by  the 
speech  of  William  II  to  the  v/orkmen  of  the  Krupp  factories  at  Essen. 
In  an  address  full  of  pathos,  the  Kaiser  called  upon  the  workers  to  rally 
around  him,  but  the  assent  of  the  Essen  workmen  was  not  the  "yes"  of 
the  German  proletariat.  Vice  Chancellor  von  Payer  then  declared  on 
September  12  at  Stuttgart  that  there  would  be  no  internal  collapse  and 
that  the  democratic  reform  of  Prussia  would  be  energetically  carried  out. 
The  hour  was  past,  however,  when  Germany  would  be  satisfied  with  the 
abolition  of  the  Prussian  three-class  electoral  system.  The  Junkers  and 
conservatives,  who  had  blocked  the  Easter  Program  announced  by  the 
Kaiser  in  1917,  were  now  in  the  hour  of  peril  scarcely  willing  to  make  even 
these  long-promised  concessions.  The  demand  therefore  grew  that  a  new 
ministry  should  assume  power  and  commence  the  belated  work  of  democ- 
ratizing Germany.  The  movement  was  developed  rapidly  by  the  Austrian 
Peace  Offensive  of  September  14,  which  depressed  Germany  tremendously 
and  opened  up  the  question  as  to  whether  or  not  the  German  government 
had  been  informed  of  the  real  situation  of  its  allies.  The  Chancellor's 
position  became  untenable  under  the  attacks  of  the  conservatives  as  well 
as  the  majority  parties. 

As  soon  as  the  imminent  collapse  of  the  western  front  became  known 
to  the  party  leaders,  the  downfall  of  the  old  monarchical  system  in  Ger- 
many was  certain.  If  the  nation  by  fresh  sacrifices  were  to  continue  the 
struggle,  it  must  be  given  a  share  in  the  government.  Eucken  states, 
however,  that  the  root  of  all  evil  was  the  lack  of  a  strong  national  will 
and  inner  steadfastness. " 

The  destruction  of  the  military  dictatorship  of  General  Headquarters, 
and  the  parliamentarization  of  the  empire  and  the  federal  states  became 
the  program  late  in  September  of  the  Liberals  and  Catholics.  These 
parties  invited  the  Socialists  to  join  them  and  to  assume  a  share  of  the 
burden  of  government.  The  Socialists  accepted,  provided  that  Paragraph 
Nine  of  the  Constitution,  which  forbade  membership  in  Reichstag  and 
Bundesrat  at  the  same  time,  be  abolished,  and  that  they  be  given  a  port- 
folio. Vorwacrts,  the  official  organ  of  the  party,  then  published  as  their 
minimum  demands :  the  recognition  by  the  -imperial  government  of  the 
Reichstag  resolution  of  July  19,  1917 ;  the  unequivocal  declaration  of  a 
Belgian  policy ;  the  revision  of  the  treaties  of  Brest-Litovsk  and  Bucha- 
rest ;  complete  autonomy  for  Alsace-Lorraine  ;  universal  direct  and  secret 
suffrage;  dissolution  of  the  Prussian  Parliament;  representative  govern- 
ment by  the  majority  of  the  Reichstag;    abolition  of  Paragraph  Nine  of 


"  Menke-GliJckert,  "Die  November  Revolution,"  18. 
"Eucken,  "Was  Bleibt  Unser  Halt?"  9-10. 


22  TFIF.   (U'RMAN    RKVOI.HTION 

the  Constitution;  freedom  of  assembly  and  the  jiress ;  and  the  restriction 
of  censorship  to  mihtary  alTairs.'-' 

This  demand  created  a  chancellor  crisis,  since  the  conservative  Chan- 
cellor von  Hertling  had  previously  declined  to  grant  autonomy  to  Alsace- 
Lorraine  or  to  abrogate  Paragraph  Nine  of  the  Constitution.  He  had 
also  procrastinated  in  the  question  of  Prussian  reforms.  The  Cologne 
Socialist  editor  and  deputy,  Mierfeld,  declared  on  September  23,  that  as 
Hertling  was  not  the  man  to  break  with  the  old  state,  the  Socialists  would 
not  enter  the  government  under  him.  The  following  day  the  Chancellor 
discussed  the  general  situation,  but  failed  to  make  concessions.  On  Sep- 
tember 26  he  promised,  however,  that  at  the  next  session  complaints  would 
be  adjusted.  That  adjustment  never  occurred.  Foreign  affairs  now  dealt 
the  decisive  blow.  Suddenly  the  Macedonian  front  collapsed,  and  on 
September  25  the  Bulgarian  Minister-President  Malinoff  requested  an 
armistice  of  the  Allies.  The  blow  to  Austria,  Turkey,  and  Germany  was 
irreparable.  On  September  29  Bulgaria  signed  an  armistice  with  Ger- 
many's enemies.    The  empire  of  the  HohenzoUerns  was  doomed.'* 

Under  the  pressure  of  this  tremendous  weight,  and  conscious  of  the 
mortal  danger  of  the  empire,  the  majority  parties  of  the  Reichstag  agreed 
hastily  upon  a  common  program.  The  committee  of  the  majority  parties 
met  on  the  afternoon  of  September  28.  It  demanded  of  the  government : 
the  autonomy  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  the  abrogation  of  Paragraph  Nine 
of  the  Constitution.  The  Chancellor,  who  at  first  had  decided  to  go  to 
General  Lleadquarters  and  carry  through  the  new  program,  now  an- 
nounced that  he  would  resign.  On  September  30  he  was  dismissed  from 
office  after  recommending  the  cooperation  of  the  parties  in  the  govern- 
ment and  proposing  Prince  Max  von  Baden  as  his  successor .^^ 

Prince  Maximilian  of  Baden  Attempts  to  Save  the  Empire 
With  the  fall  of  Chancellor  von  Hertling,  the  Kaiser  and  the  military 
dictators  made  a  last  attempt  to  save  the  monarchy  by  liberalizing  the 
empire.  Two  candidates  had  been  proposed  for  the  post  of  chancellor. 
Vice  Chancellor  von  Payer  was  the  choice  of  the  majority  parties,  while 
Prince  Max  of  Baden  had  been  designated  by  the  retiring  chancellor. 
Both  men  were  acceptable  to  the  bloc  which  controlled  the  Reichstag. 
After  a  visit  to  General  Headquarters,  Prince  Max  was  offered  the  chan- 
cellory by  the  Emperor. 

Maximilian  of  Baden,  born  on  July  10,  1867,  was  the  nephew  of  the 
reigning  Grand  Duke  Frederick  II  of  Baden  and  heir  presumptive  to  the 
throne  of  that  grand   duchy.     A   liberal  in  politics  and  a  critic  of  the 


"  Vorwaerts,  September  24,  1918. 

'*  Nowak,  "Der  Sturz  der  Mittelmaechte,"  331-332. 

"  Hertling,  op.  cit.,  181-187. 


THE  COLLAPSE  OF  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  23 

former  government.  Prince  Max  was  considered  nationally  as  an  able 
and  sincere  statesman.  His  speech  of  August  22,  1918,  at  the  celebration 
of  the  one  hundredth  anniversary  of  the  Constitution  of  Baden,  had  found 
wide  acceptance  by  Democrats  and  Socialists.'^*'  Possessed  of  prestige  and 
ability.  Prince  Max  arrived  in  Berlin  determined,  with  the  consent  of  the 
Kaiser,  to  establish  a  liberal  monarchy  and  thus  avert  a  revolution.  "When 
I  was  called  to  Berlin",  he  stated,  "our  offensive  had  collapsed  and  the 
enemies  were  advancing  victoriously.  .  .  .  The  war  was  lost."  ''^ 

The  Prince  went  to  the  capital  and  commenced  negotiations  with  the 
party  leaders  before  his  appointment  was  announced.  Realizing  that  the 
empire  was  defeated,  he  wished  to  save  the  nation  from  unbearable  condi- 
tions of  peace  by :  internal  democratic  reorganization ;  a  clear  statement 
of  war  aims;  the  acceptance  of  the  idea  of  a  league  of  nations;  and  the 
opening  of  negotiations  with  the  enemy  states  before  the  western  front 
collapsed.  Thus  he  would  preserve  Germany  from  her  enemies.  In 
internal  affairs  he  wished  to  avert  a  revolution.  He  planned  to  carry  out 
the  political  reforms  demanded  by  the  masses  and  to  remove  thereby  the 
necessity  for  a  violent  overthrow  of  the  government.  The  Reichstag  was 
to  be  strengthened  and  the  military  dictatorship  was  to  be  abolished. ^^ 

Whatever  might  have  been  the  fate  of  his  original  policy,  which  at 
least  was  the  only  one  having  even  the  remotest  prospect  of  saving  the 
empire,  it  was  completely  ruined  by  the  dramatic  intervention  of  the 
military  dictator,  General  Ludendorff.  While  the  Prince  was  negotiating 
with  the  party  leaders,  Ludendorff  on  the  first  of  October  demanded  that 
a  request  for  an  armistice  should  be  sent  to  President  Wilson  within 
twenty- four  hours.  Prince  Max  was  filled  with  consternation  and  fought 
the  ultimatum  vigorously,  while  the  party  leaders,  although  prepared  for 
inevitable  defeat,  were  crushed  by  the  suddenness  of  the  military  capitula- 
tion. Above  all,  Prince  Max  saw  the  depressing  effect  of  a  request  for  an 
armistice  before  the  inauguration  of  his  peace  program.  He  made  the 
counter  proposal  to  General  Headquarters  that  a  detailed  peace  program 
should  be  announced  by  the  new  government.  Ludendorff  replied  that 
the  request  for  the  armistice  must  be  sent  off  within  twenty-four  hours — 
even  if  the  old  government  had  to  make  it.^"  The  Prince  was  forced  to 
yield,  the  new  government  was  hastily  formed,  and  the  first  note  was 
dispatched  to  President  Wilson.  "The  effect  of  the  request  justified  my 
worst  fears",  said  Prince  Max.  The  request  for  the  armistice  was  the 
signal  for  the  external  and  internal  collapse  of  the  German  empire. 

"Egelhaaf,  "Historisch-politische  Jahresucbcrsicht  fiir,"  1918. 
"  Prince  Maximilian,  in  Preussische  Jahrbucher,  December,  1918. 
"  Ibid. 
"Ibid. 


24  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

The  intervention  of  Ludendorff,  his  demand  for  an  armistice,  and  his 
repentance  a  week  later,  wlien  he  stated  that  he  had  been  deceived  in  his 
judgment,  ilhistrate  how  completely  the  military  dictators  at  German 
Headquarters  had  lost  their  heads.  The  action  of  Ludendorfif  was  un- 
worthy of  a  great  military  leader.  It  reveals  him  as  a  political  general  and 
proves  to  what  extent  German  mihtarism  was  capable  of  ruining  the 
German  people.*" 

On  the  afternoon  of  October  2  the  armistice  was  discussed  in  a  crown 
council.  The  Prince  opposed  it,  for  he  saw  its  fatal  effect  more  clearly 
than  the  military  leaders.  Owing  to  the  masterful  retreat  of  the  German 
armies,  their  demoralization  had  been  partially  concealed  from  the  Allies, 
and  neither  the  Entente  nor  the  Germans  themselves  were  prepared  for 
this  confession  of  weakness.''*  On  October  3  Prince  Max  was  named 
Chancellor  of  the  German  empire  and  under  the  threat  of  a  military  dic- 
tatorship the  note  requesting  an  armistice  was  sent  through  the  Swiss 
government  to  President  Wilson. 

Not  even  the  military  defeats  on  the  western  front  demoralized  the 
nation  as  much  as  did  the  publication  of  the  first  note  to  President  Wilson. ^^ 
^^  storm  of  protest  arose  against  the  German  militarists,  who  were  accused 
of  deceiving  the  nation  for  years  concerning  the  real  military  situation. 
Other  groups  declared  that  the  German  military  leaders  were  incompetent. 
Germany's  confession  of  defeat  strengthened  the  war  parties  of  her  ene- 
mies. All  talk  of  a  peace  of  justice  vanished  from  the  Entente  press,  while 
in  America  the  demand  for  unconditional  surrender  was  almost  universal.^^ 
On  October  9  the  President's  reply  was  known  to  the  German  people. 
In  questioning  the  character  of  the  government  of  Prince  Max,  the  Presi- 
dent threw  an  internal  question  into  the  international  exchange  of  notes, 
and  from  then  on  the  abdication  of  the  Kaiser  was  freely  discussed  in 
Germany. 

Meanwhile  the  allied  advances  had  not  broken  through  the  German 
armies,  which  continued  to  withdraw  in  fairly  good  order.  Ludendorff 
attempted  therefore  a  second  time  to  influence  the  internal  situation  by 
declaring  that  he  could  hold  out  until  winter  on  the  western  front.  He 
sought  to  prevent  further  negotiations  with  President  Wilson,  but  the 
Social  Democrats  countered  his  blow.  Prince  Max  decided  to  continue 
the  negotiations.  He  states  that  after  the  receipt  of  the  first  two  notes 
he  received  reliable  information  from  President  Wilson  that  he  would  be 
satisfied  with  the  restriction  of  the  Kaiser's  authority  to  the  position  of 
the  English  King.** 


"  Valentin,  Supra,  384-385. 

"  Hindenburg,  "Aus  Meinem  Leben,"  389. 

■^  Miihsam,  "Wie  wir  belogen  wurden,"  9-25. 

**  Ausu'oertiges  Amt.  Wochenherichte,  Nr.  42,  5018. 

"  Prince  Maximilian,  in  Preussische  Jahrbuecher,  December,  1918. 


THE  COLLAPSE  OF  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  25 

The  democratic  reorganization  of  Germany  proceeded  rapidly  apace 
with  the  armistice  negotiations.  On  October  15  the  Bundesrath  agreed 
to  alter  Article  II  of  the  Constitution  so  that  in  the  future  Bundesrath  and 
Reichstag  were  to  give  their  consent  to  declarations  of  war  and  conclu- 
sions of  peace.  The  same  day  the  Kaiser  placed  the  military  forces  under 
the  control  of  the  Chancellor.  The  reform  movement  resulted  in  demands 
in  Bavaria,  Baden,  and  Saxony  for  alterations  of  the  state  constitutions. 
On  October  26  the  amendments  to  the  imperial  constitution  were  adopted 
by  the  Reichstag  and  the  last  session  under  the  empire  came  to  an  end. 

The  failure  of  the  internal  policy  of  Prince  Max  was  due  largely  to 
the  armistice  negotiations  with  President  Wilson.  After  Ludendorff  had 
been  defeated  by  Prince  Max  and  the  civil  authority  had  been  made 
supreme  within  the  empire,  the  abdication  of  the  Kaiser  was  prevented  by 
powerful  conservative  influences,  which  prevailed  upon  William  II  to 
remain  at  the  head  of  his  armies.  President  Wilson's  reply  of  October  8 
to  the  German  note  seemed  to  demand  the  abdication,  although  the  gov- 
ernment sought  to  evade  it  by  explaining  the  democratic  character  of  the 
new  government.  On  October  22  Prince  Max  stated  in  the  Reichstag 
that  if  the  Allies  wished  to  continue  the  war  Germany  must  fight  to  the 
last.  But  already  the  belief  was  gaining  ground  in  Germany  that  all 
obstacles  to  an  early  peace  must  be  removed  and  the  conditions  of  Presi- 
dent Wilson  accepted. 

The  crisis  occurred  when  the  President's  note  of  October  24  once 
more  raised  the  question  of  the  Kaiser's  abdication.  The  conservatives 
favored  a  rejection  of  Wilson's  terms  and  issued  a  manifesto  calling  for 
national  resistance  to  the  Allies.  Hindenburg  declared  that  he  favored 
either  an  honorable  peace  or  resistance  to  the  last.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
radical  elements  pressed  for  acceptance  of  the  American  conditions.  The 
Poles,  Danes,  and  Alsatians  in  the  Reichstag  talked  quite  openly  of  the 
dismemberment  of  the  German  empire  in  accordance  with  the  fourteen 
points  of  Wilson.  Ludendorff  now  intervened  for  the  last  time,  demand- 
ing that  no  reply  be  sent  to  President  Wilson.  Friday,  October  25,  the 
Cabinet,  supported  by  the  Emperor,  decided  against  LudendorfT.  That 
day  he  signed  the  German  army  reports  for  the  last  time.  On  the  twenty- 
sixth  of  October  he  was  dismissed  from  the  virtual  command  of  the 
imperial  forces.*^  His  removal  meant  the  defeat  of  the  war  party  and  the 
fall  of  military  Prussia.  Until  his  removal  he  was  a  dictator  possessing 
almost  imperial  powers,  and  his  dismissal,  although  his  nominal  chief. 
Field  Marshal  von  Hindenburg,  remained  at  the  head  of  the  General  Stafif, 
meant  the  end  of  the  monarchy  and  the  great  German  military  system. 
On  the  twenty-seventh  of  October  the  German  empire  capitulated  to  the 
Allies  in  a  note  addressed  to  President  Wilson. 


Ludendorff,  "Meine  Kriegserinnerungen,"  616-617. 


26  THE   GERMAN    RKVOI.UTION 

An  imperial  pr.u-lamation  dated  October  28.  but  not  piiblisbed  until 
November  3.  announced  to  tlie  nation  tbe  formation  of  the  liberal  empire. 
The  Kaiser  proclaimed  that  "tbe  imperial  office  is  service  to  the  people". 
Prince  Max  bad  ended  the  personal  rc^-ime  and  given  Germany  its  first 
parliamentary  government,  but  bis  entire  policy  collapsed  when  his  im- 
I^erial  master  refused  to  alidicate.  The  rapid  march  of  foreign  events 
made  this  delay  fatal.  Austria  broke  out  in  revolution  and  on  October  28 
declared  herself  ready  to  negotiate  with  Italy.  The  next  day  Vienna 
dispatched  parliamentarians  to  Italian  Headquarters,  but  the  Austrian 
front  broke  before  an  armistice  could  be  signed.  The  collapse  of  the 
Hapsburg  throne  foreshadowed  the  end  of  the  reign  of  William  II. 

The  overthrow  of  the  government  of  Prince  Max  was  caused  by  the 
general  rebellion  of  the  nation  against  a  system  which,  although  it  had 
been  amended  and  altered,  still  seemed  to  perpetuate  imperialism,  mili- 
tarism, and  the  bureaucracy.  On  November  4  Prince  Max  learned  of 
the  revolt  of  the  German  navy  at  Kiel.  Soon  tidings  of  revolts  in  southern 
Germanv,  the  Rhineland  and  the  Hanseatic  towns  indicated  that  the 
empire  was  doomed. 

A  proclamation  was  issued  on  November  4  enumerating  as  the  achieve- 
ments of  the  new  government:  the  abolition  of  the  Prussian  electoral 
law;  parliamentary  government  in  the  empire;  sanction  of  war  and 
peace  by  the  Reichstag;  control  of  military  administration  by  the  Chan- 
cellor; an  amnesty  for  political  prisoners;  freedom  of  the  press  and 
assembly;  development  of  Germany  into  a  democratic  state.  The  proc- 
lamation also  stated  that  the  replacements  for  the  front  were  necessary 
because  the  German  borders  must  be  protected  until  the  enemy  agreed 
to  an  honorable  peace.  Meanwhile  employment  was  to  be  provided  for 
workers  and  support  was  to  be  given  to  the  unemployed.  The  housing 
regulations  would  be  improved.  The  proclamation  concluded:  "The 
secured  future  of  Germany  is  our  guiding  star."  An  increase  of  the 
bread  ration  was  then  announced  for  December  1.  These  proclamations 
failed,  nevertheless,  to  quiet  the  growing  discontent.  The  majority  of  the 
German  press  now  favored  the  immediate  abdication  of  the  Kaiser. 

As  a  last  efifort  Prince  Max  determined  after  the  Kiel  revolt  to  go  to 
General  Headquarters  and  secure  the  voluntary  abdication  of  the  Kaiser. 
Ebert  promised  to  do  his  best  to  control  the  Socialists  until  the  negotiation 
was  completed.  However,  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day  Ebert  and 
Scheidemann  delivered  an  ultimatum  to  Prince  Max,  making  their  con- 
tinuance in  the  government  dependent  upon  the  Kaiser's  abdication. 
Prince  Max  later  said :  "This  ultimatum  forced  me  to  resign.  It  meant 
the  collapse  of  my  policy,  which  was  one  of  conviction,  not  of  force." 

Replying  to  the  final  note  of  capitulation  dispatched  from  Berlin, 
President  Wilson  on  November  5  informed  Prince  Max  that  Marshal 


THE  COLLAPSE  OF  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  27 

Foch  had  been  authorized  to  conckide  an  armistice  with  the  representatives 
of  Germany.  On  the  following  day  the  German  delegation,  headed  by 
Minister  Erzberger,  left  Berlin  for  the  front.  It  was  not  until  the  night 
of  the  eighth  that  the  delegation  reached  the  French  lines  and  was  con- 
ducted to  the  station  of  Rethondes,  six  miles  east  of  Compiegne.  There 
an  armistice  was  finally  signed  by  the  Germans  and  the  Allies  which 
resulted  in  the  ending  of  the  world  war.  The  armistice  was  signed  by 
Germany  because  her  army  was  defeated  and  incapable  of  further  resist- 
ance. A  military  dictatorship  of  the  Pan-Germans,  a  Bolshevist  dictator- 
ship of  the  Independents,  or  the  government  of  Prince  Max  would  equally 
as  well  as  the  coalition  Socialist  government  have  been  forced  to  order  the 
signing  of  the  armistice.  Although  Erzberger  was  covered  with  abuse 
by  conservatives  and  liberals,  the  blame  for  the  debacle  rested  upon  the 
shoulders  of  the  militarists,  and  not  upon  those  of  the  diplomats  and 
politicians.^** 


**  Erzberger,  in  "Erlebnisse  im  Weltkrieg,"  326-340,  has  written  a  detailed  account 
of  his  negotiations.  Von  Liebig,  "Der  Betrug  am  Deutschen  Volk,"  45-52,  is  a  violent 
attack  on  the  peace  negotiations.  Valentin,  Supra,  390-411,  is  a  comprehensive  study 
of  the  ministry  of  Prince  Max. 


28  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 


II. 

THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  THE  REVOLUTION 
Naval  Mutiny 

The  prelude  to  the  German  revoUition  was  the  revoh  of  the  High 
Seas  Fleet.  That  great  naval  power,  which  in  the  battle  of  Jutland  threat- 
ened the  supremacy  of  the  British  Grand  Fleet,  was  the  first  force  within 
the  empire  to  turn  against  German  imperialism  and  hasten  its  overthrow. 
The  causes  of  this  remarkable  naval  mutiny  reach  back  to  the  early  days 
of  the  war  and  are  in  part  traceable  to  the  defensive  naval  policy  adopted 
by  the  German  strategists,  and  to  the  demoralization  of  the  fleet  by  con- 
stant drafts  for  submarine  warfare.  Although  the  morale  of  the  navy 
was  at  its  height  in  1916,  it  declined  rapidly  after  Jutland  when  the  chief 
naval  energies  of  Germany  were  directed  toward  the  development  of  a 
submarine  force. ^^ 

The  lack  of  a  naval  tradition  as  in  the  American  and  British  navies, 
the  enervating  character  of  the  monotonous  work  of  guarding  the  German 
coasts,  and  finally  tlie  failure  of  the  provisioning  system  for  the  fleet, 
resulted  in  1917  in  a  serious  mutiny  on  the  German  battleships.  While 
conditions  on  the  light  cruisers  and  destroyer  flotillas,  which  came  in 
contact  with  the  enemy,  were  excellent,  the  battle  fleet  presented  a  terrible 
picture  of  systematic  oppression.  On  the  larger  ships  of  the  fleet  the 
relations  between  officers  and  men  reflected  the  caste  spirit  of  German 
navalism,  which  had  been  modelled  on  Prussian  militarism.  That  food 
conditions  were  improved  in  the  summer  before  the  outbreak  does  not 
detract  from  the  value  of  the  general  statement  that  the  mutiny  was 
caused  by  improper  provisioning,  combined  with  oppression.^®  Several 
officers  were  killed  in  the  1917  riots,  but  the  outbreak  was  suppressed 
promptly  with  an  iron  hand.  Forty  sailors  were  condemned  by  general 
courts  martial,  and  of  this  number  sixteen  were  shot.  That  greater 
severity  was  not  exercised  by  the  naval  authorities  was  due  to  the  personal 
intervention  of  the  Kaiser,  who,  alarmed  by  the  justice  of  the  men's  griev- 
ances, ordered  Admiral  Scheer  to  deal  mercifully  with  the  rebels.  To 
satisfy  the  Emperor's  demands,  fourteen  of  the  condemned  men  were 
pardoned.  Historic  precedents  for  this  policy  were  found  by  the  German 
authorities  in  the  British  treatment  of  their  mutineers  at  Spithead  and 
the  Nore. 


Cf.  von  Tirpitz,  "Erinnerungen,"  337-339. 
Schaefer,  "Der  Krieg,"  1914-1919,  3:  130-138. 


BEGINNINGS   OF  THE   REVOLUTION  29 

Among  the  rioters  of  1917  were  a  number  of  Independent  Social 
Democrats.  Evidence  was  found  that  sailors  returning  from  furloughs  in 
the  interior  had  spread  their  propaganda  among  the  enlisted  personnel. 
The  admiralty  promptly  accused  the  Independent  party  leaders  of  aiding 
and  abetting  the  revolt.®^  In  the  Reichstag,  Admiral  von  Capelle,  secre- 
tary of  state  for  the  navy,  formally  charged  Dittmann,  Vogtherr  and 
Haase  with  fomenting  the  disturbances  in  the  fleet.  In  an  able  speech  on 
October  9,  1917,  Haase  cleared  himself  of  this  charge.^** 

The  Pan-Germans  covertly  attacked  the  Kaiser  for  his  interference 
with  the  punishment  of  the  1917  mutineers.  Admiral  Foss  and  Captain 
von  Forstner  state  that  it  was  the  imperial  amnesty  which  broke  down 
the  discipline  on  the  ships.^^  Propaganda  against  the  Pan-Germans  was 
certainly  disseminated  throughout  the  fleet,  especially  after  many  strikers 
were  sent  in  January,  1918,  to  the  coast  with  naval  replacements.  As  a 
large  percentage  of  the  navy  was  drawn  from  the  Socialist  districts  of 
Germany,  the  efforts  of  agitators  to  revolutionize  the  sailors  were  con- 
siderably lightened.  Russian  methods  were  freely  imitated  and  pamphlets 
were  smuggled  aboard  ships  in  ever-increasing  numbers.  The  corre- 
spondence of  sailors  with  their  families,  although  censored,  kept  the 
former  in  touch  with  the  revolutionary  movements  of  1918.'*- 

Although  the  morale  of  the  German  submarine  forces  was  high  in  jj 
spite  of  losses  and  failures,  that  of  the  battle  fleet  declined  rapidly  after  /\ 
America  entered  the  war.  The  failure  of  the  submarine  campaign  and 
the  collapse  of  the  great  offensive  of  the  German  army  in  the  west  com- 
pleted this  demoralization.  As  the  end  of  the  war  approached  it  became 
apparent  to  the  navy  and  the  nation  that  England  would  demand  the 
surrender  of  the  German  fleet  as  a  condition  of  peace.  By  October,  1918, 
the  Pan-Germans  advocated  the  sending  of  the  fleet  out  to  fight  a  decisive 
battle  with  the  Allies.  While  the  armistice  negotiations  were  taking  place, 
they  demanded  that  the  fleet  allow  itself  to  be  annihilated  rather  than  to 
surrender.  Agitators  told  the  sailors  that  it  would  be  a  national  dishonor 
to  give  up  the  fleet  without  a  battle,  and  the  commander  of  the  Markgraf 
advocated  blowing  up  the  fleet  rather  than  handing  it  over  to  the  Allies. 

The  naval  crisis  was  finally  brought  about  by  a  decision  of  General     ^ 
Headquarters  and  Admiral  Scheer  that  the  fleet  must  be  used  to  relieve    / 
the  military  situation  in  Flanders.     On  October  28  the  admiralty  issued 
orders  to  Admiral  von  Hipper  to  proceed  with  the  fleet  to  the  Belgian 


**  Scheer,  "Deutschlands  Hochseeflotte  im  Weltkriege,"  412-415. 
""Haase,   "Reichstagsreden "   110;   Verhandlungen   des   Reichstages,   October  9, 
1917. 

"  Von  Forstner,  "Marine-Meuterei,"  26.     Foss,  "Enthiillungen  iiber  den  Zusam- 
menbruch,"  27. 

**  Von  Altrock,  "Deutschlands  Niederbruch,"  42. 


30  Till':  (;i:r.m.\x   Kiaoi-irrioN 

coast  in  onlcr  to  protect  the  right  flank  of  the  retreating  German  army.®^ 
Persius  maintains  that  the  instructions  issued  to  von  Hipper  would  have 
lead  to  the  desired  decisive  l)attle  and  to  the  useless  sacrifice  of  thousands 
of  German  lives."' 

The  plan  of  operations  had  indeed  been  worked  out  in  advance,  and 
the  fleet  commander  assembled  his  squadrons  in  the  Aussenjade,  while 
the  submarines,  which  were  to  cover  the  dash  to  the  Flanders  coast,  were 
sent  to  their  stations.  Scarcely  was  the  fleet  concentrated  in  the  Schillig 
roadstead  when  the  rumor  ran  through  the  ships  that  the  admiral  was 
about  to  give  battle  to  the  Grand  Fleet  in  order  to  prevent  the  surrender 
of  the  ships  at  the  armistice.  The  mere  painting  of  the  afterstack  of  the 
battle  cruiser  Moltkc  red,  a  German  battle-sign,  seems  to  have  terrified 
the  heroes  of  Jutland.  Socialist  agitators  on  the  ships  declared  that  an 
attack  on  the  English  would  hinder  international  Socialist  aspirations  and 
that  Admiral  Scheer  was  trying  to  prevent  the  signing  of  peace.®^  The 
overwhelming  majority  of  the  sailors  at  once  refused  to  fight,  since  the 
war  was  to  end  in  any  event.  Secret  signalling  informed  every  crew  of 
the  determination  of  the  men  not  to  sail.""  When  the  first  order  to  pro- 
ceed to  sea  was  issued,  the  crews  of  the  Thiiringcn  and  Helgoland  refused 
to  weigh  anchor.  The  stokers  in  other  ships  mutinied,  declaring:  "If  we 
steam  farther  than  Helgoland,  the  fires  will  be  put  out."  "^  Although  sev- 
eral attempts  were  made  by  the  admiral  to  take  the  fleet  out,  they  all  failed. 

The  sailors  had  won  their  first  victory,  but  with  the  achievement  of 
their  aims  a  semblance  of  order  and  discipline  was  restored  throughout 
the  fleet.  Many  naval  officers  had  sympathized  with  the  views  of  their 
men.  Although  the  sailors  did  not  seize  control  of  the  ships  from  their 
officers,  they  formed  sailors'  councils,  issued  red  brassards  to  the  crews 
and  continued  preparations  for  a  general  revolt  at  a  more  propitious 
moment.  It  was  therefore  not  until  the  morning  of  November  6  that 
the  naval  rebellion  broke  out  in  the  city  of  Wilhelmshaven. 

The  mutiny  of  the  fleet  in  the  Schillig  roadstead  was  merely  the  prel- 
ude to  the  revolution,  because  the  mutineers  lacked  a  political  program 
and  were  simply  attempting  to  defend  themselves  against  a  supposed  plan 
to  sacrifice  the  fleet.  However,  the  success  of  the  first  efforts  of  the 
sailors  quickly  led  to  the  formulation  of  political  and  revolutionary  poli- 
cies. When  the  leaders  of  the  mutiny  were  arrested,  secret  plans  were 
made  for  a  general  revolt  on  November  S.'-*** 

"Kuttner,  "Von  Kiel  nach  Berlin,"  10-11. 

**  Persius,  "Wie  es  Kam,"  14.    Cf.  Scheer,  "Deutschlands  Hochseeflotte  im  Welt- 
krieg,"  494.     Tirpitz,  op.  cit.,  338. 
"Kuttner,  op.  cit.,  12. 
**  Forstner,  op.  cit.,  8.    Foss,  op.  cit.,  27. 
'"  Deutscher  Geschichtskalender,  3. 
"Foss,  op.  cit.,  31. 


BEGINNINGS   OF  THE   REVOLUTION  31 

After  the  failure  of  the  Flanders  operation,  the  fleet  was  dispersed. 
The  first  squadron  was  ordered  to  the  Elbe  River  and  the  fourth  squadron 
proceeded  to  the  Jade.  The  third  squadron,  which  was  sent  to  Kiel,  led 
there  the  revolt  which  destroyed  the  imperial  system  on  the  sea  coast  of 
Germany.^®  On  Sunday,  November  2,  sailors  from  this  squadron  assem- 
bled in  the  Trades  Union  House  at  Kiel  and  voted  to  effect  the  release  of 
their  imprisoned  comrades.  Although  the  squadron  commander  ordered 
the  alarm  siganls  blown,  no  one  returned  to  the  ships.  That  night  a 
demonstration  was  held  on  the  exercise  square  and  a  procession  of  sailors 
marched  into  the  inner  city,  where  it  was  fired  upon  by  the  watch.  Imme- 
diately the  sailors  proceeded  to  arm  themselves,  and  by  the  morning  of 
November  4  they  were  in  possession  of  the  railway  station,  which  they 
held  against  the  infantry  regiments  of  the  garrison.  The  governor  of 
Kiel  was  powerless  to  stop  the  movement,  which  soon  spread  to  all  the 
ships  in  the  harbor.  Socialist  shipyard  workers  joined  the  rebels  and  a 
delegation  of  their  leaders  accompanied  the  sailors  to  the  governor's 
office.  There  the  mutineers  presented  an  ultimatum  containing  fourteen 
points :  the  release  of  all  political  prisoners ;  complete  freedom  of 
speech ;  abolition  of  the  naval  censorship ;  appropriate  treatment  of  the 
men  by  their  officers ;  a  general  amnesty  for  all  rioters ;  prohibition  under 
any  condition  of  the  sailing  of  the  fleet ;  avoidance  of  civil  war ;  with- 
drawal from  Kiel  of  all  troops  not  belonging  to  the  garrison;  recognition 
of  the  authority  of  the  sailors'  council  to  protect  private  property ;  ex- 
emption of  all  sailors  from  military  courtesies  when  off  duty ;  unlimited 
personal  freedom  for  all  enlisted  men  off  duty ;  dismissal  without  claim 
to  compensation  of  all  officers  who  do  not  accept  the  regulations  of  the 
sailors'  councils ;  exemption  of  all  members  of  the  council  from  any  duty 
whatsoever;  countersigning  of  all  future  orders  by  the  council;  recogni- 
tion of  these  demands  of  the  council  as  general  orders. ^°° 

Long  before  the  delegation  reached  Admiral  Souchon,  he  had  informed 
Berlin  of  the  revolt,  and  had  been  ordered  to  avoid  further  bloodshed. 
Meanwhile  the  imperial  ministry  had  sent  two  representatives  to  Kiel  to 
take  charge  of  the  situation.  On  this  account  the  governor  hesitated  to 
accept  the  demands  of  the  sailors,  stating  that  a  number  of  them  were 
purely  political  and  therefore  l;eyond  his  jurisdiction.  Finally  he  in- 
formed the  delegation  that  two  representatives  of  the  government  would 
arrive  that  evening  and   thus  scured  the  postponement  of  the   revolt.'"' 

After  a  preliminary  meeting  a  great  procession  of  mutineers  and 
Socialists  proceeded  to  the  railway  station  to  greet  ITaussmann  and  Noske-, 
the  two  government  representatives.     Immediately  after  their  arrival,  the 


"  Scheer,  "Deutchlands  Hochseeflotte  im  Weltkriege,"  497. 

"*  Kuttner,  op.  cit.,  14-17. 

""  Noske.  "Von  Kiel  bis  Kapp,"  10-12. 


Z2  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

latter  made  a  rapid  agreement  with  the  sailors'  council.  The  only  point 
of  difference  was  over  the  release  of  prisoners.  That  night  the  council 
issued  a  proclamation  stating  that  Haussmann  accepted  their  demands  and 
promised  their  prompt  execution  by  the  government;  that  the  military 
measures  directed  against  the  sailors  would  be  broken  up;  that  the  fleet 
would  be  controlled  in  cooperation  with  the  council;  and  that  the  council 
would  examine  the  documents  of  those  under  arrest  with  the  exception  of 
men  condemned  because  of  dishonorable  conduct. ^"^  Haase  and  Ledebour 
were  promptly  called  to  Kiel  to  take  part  in  the  examination  of  the 
arrested  sailors.  A  great  mass  meeting  was  addressed  on  the  evening  of 
November  4  by  Noske,  who  announced  that  the  armistice  would  be  signed 
shortly  and  that  the  sailors  must  maintain  order.  The  close  of  his  speech 
was  answered  by  cries  of :  "Long  live  the  republic."  ^°^ 
\^  Thus  the  naval  revolt  triumphed  at  Kiel.     Of  the  four  infantry  com- 

panies sent  against  the  sailors  on  November  4,  three  joined  the  rebels  and 
one  was  disarmed.  The  sailors  boasted  that  day  of  the  rout  of  the  Wands- 
becker  Hussars.  On  November  5  the  mutineers  took  possession  of  the 
ships  and  hoisted  red  flags.  A  few  light  craft  refused  to  join  the  rebels 
and  were  promptly  fired  upon.  The  captain  and  a  lieutenant  of  the  battle- 
ship Koenig,  which  was  in  the  dry  dock,  were  killed  while  defending  the 
imperial  ensign.  The  submarines  which  remained  loyal  to  the  Emperor 
escaped  from  the  harbor.  Officers  were  disarmed  and  red  cockades  were 
assumed  by  the  sailors.  The  brother  of  the  Emperor,  Prince  Henry  of 
Prussia,  fled  from  the  city.  On  the  morning  of  November  5  the  Prince's 
standard  no  longer  waved  above  the  tower  of  the  royal  castle.^*** 

What  had  been  originally  a  naval  mutiny  now  became  a  great  revolu- 
tionary movement.  In  the  coast  towns  the  proletariat  made  the  cause  of 
the  mutineers  their  own.  At  Hamburg  the  workmen  in  the  Vulcan  fac- 
tories decided  to  strike  on  the  morning  of  November  5.  Cooler  heads 
secured  a  postponement  until  all  Social  Democratic  leaders  could  decide 
upon  the  workers'  demands.  Nevertheless  on  that  evening  the  Independ- 
ent Socialists  held  a  meeting  before  which  a  deputation  of  soldiers  and 
sailors  appeared.  The  Independent  leader,  Dittmann,  recently  released 
from  prison  by  the  government,  was  the  principal  speaker.  He  declared 
that  the  Kaiser  would  of  course  abdicate,  that  the  coming  republic  would 
be  a  socialistic  one,  and  that  the  present  government  with  a  prince  at  its 
head  was  a  grim  joke.^°^  Duewill,  a  Hamburg  Independent,  demanded 
that  the  republic  be  proclaimed  at  once ;   that  an  official  paper  be  printed 

""  Kuttner,  op.  cit.,  14-17. 

"•Noske,  "Von  Kiel  bis  Kapp,"  11.    Kuttner,  op.  cit.,  17-20. 

'**  Menke,  "Die  November  Revolution,"  38-39.  Von  Forstner,  op.  cit.,  12.  Noske, 
"Von  Kiel  bis  Kapp,"  20-21. 

'"'  Runkel,  "Die  Deutsche  Revolution,"  95-97. 


BEGINNINGS   OF  THE   REVOLUTION  33 

for  the  revolutionists ;  and  that  a  sympathetic  strike  for  the  Kiel  workmen 
be  declared  at  once.^°^ 

That  night  a  procession  of  strikers  disarmed  officers  in  the  city, 
removed  insignia  from  soldiers,  and  prevented  furloughed  men  from 
returning  to  the  front.  On  November  6  w^ar  ships  arrived  in  the  harbor, 
whereupon  the  shipyard  workers  struck,  and  a  great  assemblage  was 
held  in  the  Holy  Ghost  Field.  A  soldiers'  council  waited  upon  General 
von  Falk,  but  that  official,  who  feared  to  use  force  against  the  rioters, 
fled  from  the  city.  Only  a  few  days  before  the  Kiel  outbreak,  he  had 
said :  "We  live  in  an  orderly  state ;  internal  disturbances  cannot  occur 
among  us."  ^°^  The  city  commandant  finally  accepted  the  demands  of  the 
soldiers'  council  in  the  Trades  Union  House.  A  revolutionary  military 
control  of  the  city  was  established,  and  the  Hamburger  Echo  appeared 
as  The  Red  Flag,  the  official  organ  of  the  workmen's  and  soldiers' 
council. ^°^ 

In  Bremen  the  revolution  triumphed  without  bloodshed.  For  weeks 
the  city  had  been  agitated  over  the  question  of  the  extension  of  the  suf- 
frage. After  the  sailors  revolted  at  Wilhelmshaven  the  Independent 
Socialists  decided  on  November  6  to  establish  universal  suffrage.  That 
morning  one  hundred  of  the  mutineers  arrived  under  guard  from  Wil- 
helmshaven on  their  way  to  the  prison  camp  at  Rethen  on  the  Aller. 
They  were  quickly  freed  by  the  workers,  who  were  joined  by  the  garrison 
of  the  city.  A  workmen's  and  soldiers'  council  was  formed  at  once. 
Colonel  Lehmann,  the  commander  of  the  garrison,  made  an  agreement 
with  the  rebels  by  the  terms  of  which  the  military  power  was  to  be  exer- 
cised by  the  Colonel,  two  officers,  and  four  members  of  the  soldiers' 
council.^"**  The  officers  retained  their  swords  and  insignia.  The  bells 
of  the  cathedral  were  rung  to  celebrate  the  victory,  and  on  November  7 
the  workers  paraded  through  the  city.  Guards  were  posted  to  protect  the 
town  against  a  government  invasion. ^^° 

On  November  5  the  revolution  broke  out  in  Luebeck,  the  third 
Hanseatic  republic.  Warships  and  destroyers  landed  detachments,  occu- 
pied the  railway  stations,  arrested  the  commandant  of  the  city  and  his 
principal  officers,  and  interned  them  in  a  hotel.  The  troops  joined  the 
sailors,  and  that  night  the  newly  formed  soldiers'  council  proclaimed : 
"From  this  hour  all  power  is  in  our  hands.  We  herewith  declare  that 
by  our  cause  our  comrades  at  the  front  as  well  as  at  home  are  aided.  The 
corrupt  conditions  and  the  military  dictatorship  of   yesterday  must  be 

'"•Menke,  op.  cit.,  11. 

""  Lambach,  "Ursachen  des  Zusammenbruchs,"  HI. 

""  Kuttner,  "Von  Kiel  nach  Berlin,"  19-20. 

"*  Ibid.,  20. 

"•  Menke,  op.  cit.,  12. 


34  THE   CRRNfAN    RF.VOHTTION 

thoroughlv  cleaned  up.  The  purpose  of  our  rising  is  to  secure  an  imtne- 
diate  armistice  and  jKMce."  '"  The  council  also  took  steps  to  maintain 
order  in  the  industries,  to  prevent  plunderings,  and  to  safeguard  the 
control  of  the  food  supi)lies,  which  it  left  in  the  hands  of  the  civil  author- 
ities. 

W^ilhelmshaven,  which  had  heen  the  scene  of  the  original  mutiny, 
finally  joined  the  movement  on  Novemher  6.  Over  sixty  thousand 
sailors  and  shipyard  workers  held  a  demonstration  that  day  and  the 
station  chief  negotiated  with  a  deputation  from  the  soldiers'  council 
which  was  formed  hy  the  rebels. 

Not  only  did  the  revolt  triumph  in  the  principal  German  coast  cities, 
but  it  also  spread  to  the  smaller  towns  and  naval  stations.  On  November 
5  the  men  of  the  battleships  Posen,  Ost  Friesland,  and  Nassau,  then  lying 
in  Brunsbuettel,  the  west  end  of  the  Kiel  canal,  joined  the  movement 
and  occupied  the  wireless  station  at  Ostmoor.  On  November  6  the 
towns  of  Cuxhaven,  Rendsburg,  Warnemuende,  Rostock,  Bremerhaven, 
and  Geestemuende  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  sailors.  At  Rostock  the 
workers  struck,  and  at  Schwerin  the  soldiers  of  the  Eighty-sixth  Ersatz 
Battalion  joined  the  men  of  the  Fokker  works  in  overthrowing  the  old 
order. ^^^ 

By  the  close  of  the  first  week  of  November  the  naval  revolt,  supported 
by  the  Radical  Socialists  of  the  Hanseatic  republics,  had  triumphed  along 
the  German  coasts.  Originally  without  political  aims  the  naval  mutiny 
became  a  general  revolt  against  the  liberal  empire  of  Prince  Max  of 
Baden.  When  the  success  of  the  coast  uprisings  became  known  in  the 
interior  there  followed  the  revolt  of  town  after  town.  In  many  cities  of 
northern  Germany  the  arrival  of  detachments  of  sailors  marked  the 
beginning  of  the  rebellions.  Although  the  Independent  Socialists  had  in 
many  instances  planned  uprisings  for  later  dates,  the  sudden  arrival  of 
armed  revolutionary  soldiers  and  sailors  furnished  the  leaders  and  the 
dramatic  moment  so  essential  to  any  revolt.  It  was  the  navy  which 
destroyed  the  imperial  rule  in  North  Germany.  When  on  November  9 
Admiral  Scheer  urged  the  Kaiser  to  remain  at  the  head  of  his  fleets,  the 
former  admiral  of  the  Atlantic  replied  in  a  disappointed  voice :  "I  no 
longer  have  a  navy."  "^  "The  German  people,"  states  Admiral  von 
Tirpitz,  "did  not  understand  the  sea.  In  the  hour  of  its  destiny  it  did 
•  not  use  its  fleet."  ^'* 


Runkel,  op.  cit.,  94. 

'  Menke,  op.  cit.,  45.    Kuttner,  op.  cit.,  19. 
'  Scheer,  op.  cit.,  499. 
'  Von  Tirpitz,  op.  cit.,  3S7. 


beginnings  of  the  revolution  35 

The  Bavarian  Revolution 

The  second  and  decisive  blow  which  overthrew  the  German  imperial 
system  was  the  revolutionary  outbreak  in  the  kingdom  of  Bavaria.  Here 
in  the  largest  of  the  South  German  states  the  revolutionary  movement 
had  found  fruitful  soil,  due  to  the  prolongation  of  the  war,  to  the  gradual 
economic  decline,  and  above  all  to  the  belief  that  the  Bavarians  were  being 
involved  in  Prussia's  guilt.  Since  the  failure  of  the  general  strike  of 
January,  1918,  revolutionary  plots  had  been  formed  in  Bavaria.  Hatred 
of  Prussia  had  increased  during  the  war,  and  popular  agitation  was 
directed  against  the  Bavarian  ruling  classes,  who  were  considered  the 
accomplices  of  Prussia.  The  Bavarian  monarch  had  failed  to  take  Bavaria 
out  of  the  war.  The  intellectuals  of  the  state  prepared  the  way  for  the 
revolution,  while  the  two  Socialist  parties  plotted  to  overthrow  the  mon- 
archy. Even  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  failed  to  check  the  revolutionary 
movement,  although  the  population  of  Bavaria  was  overwhelmingly 
Catholic. 

The  leader  of  the  Bavarian  revolutionists  was  the  venerable  Kurt 
Eisner,  an  Independent  Socialist  writer.  Of  Jewish  parentage,  he  was 
from  1898  to  1905  on  the  editorial  staff  of  the  Vorzvaerts,  but  had  been 
finally  dismissed  because  he  had  favored  revisionism  as  a  party  policy. 
On  account  of  his  participation  in  the  January,  1918,  strike,  he  had  been 
sentenced  to  imprisonment  and  was  released  only  after  the  general  am- 
nesty issued  by  Prince  Max.  Eisner  was  not  only  a  publicist  and  stylist, 
but  also  a  Socialist  with  statesmanlike  ability.  Convinced  of  Germany's 
guilt  in  starting  the  war,  and  of  Prussian  responsibility  for  its  prolonga- 
tion, he  advocated  the  overthrow  of  the  imperial  system  by  force.^^^ 

On  Sunday,  November  3,  Eisner  issued  a  call  for  a  meeting  to  demon- 
strate against  the  prolongation  of  the  war.^^"  Thousands  assembled  to 
denounce  the  reactionaries,  and  after  the  close  of  the  meeting  a  large 
crowd  went  to  the  Stadelheim  prison  to  free  those  who  had  been  arrested 
during  the  January  strike.  Toward  evening  these  men  were  actually 
released  on  telegraphic  orders  from  Leipsic  and  brought  back  in  triumph 
to  the  city.    Bold  spirits  cheered  that  day  for  the  republic. 

On  the  night  of  November  5  two  meetings  were  called  by  the  Socialists 
to  protest  against  the  Pan-German  demand  for  the  continuance  of  the 
war.  Unable  to  crowd  the  masses  into  the  two  halls,  the  leaders  adjourned 
the  meetings  to  the  Thcrcsienwiesse,  where,  under  a  clear  sky,  their 
orators  uttered  fiery  protests  against  the  robber  knights  who  had  ruined 
Germany.  Both  Socialist  parties  had  now  agreed  upon  joint  action  against 
the  royal  government,  which  was  too  weak  either  to  make  concessions  to 


Menke,  Gliickert,  "Die  November  Revolution,  1918,"  46-50. 
Eisner,  "Schuld  und  Siihne." 


36  THF   GERMAN    RF.VOI.UTION 

the  revolutionists  or  to  resist  their  deinamls  l)y  force.  The  Muenchener 
Post  tliereupon  issued  a  call  for  a  meetinjj:  on  November  7  on  the 
Thcrcsiora-icsc  of  the  entire  population  of  Munich  except  those  involved 
in  the  transportation  of  food  supplies.  The  chief  purpose  of  the  gather- 
ing was  to  demand  the  abdication  of  the  Kaiser.  On  Thursday  afternoon 
over  one  hundred  thousand  people  assembled  in  the  meadow  before  the 
colossal  statue  of  Bavaria.  Twelve  speakers  demanded  the  abdication  of 
the  Kaiser,  amid  the  plaudits  of  the  masses.  After  the  close  of  the 
meeting  the  civilians  marched  in  a  procession  to  the  Column  of  Peace, 
while  the  soldiers  present  moved  off  in  military  formation  to  the  barracks 
in  order  to  release  their  comrades,  who  had  been  confined  to  quarters  by 
the  commandant  of  the  city."^ 

The  moment  the  revolutionary  soldiers  reached  the  Guldin  School 
Barracks  their  comrades  opened  the  doors  and  marched  out.  Thus  the 
military  revolt  began  and  the  garrison  of  Munich,  after  deposing  its 
officers,  joined  the  republicans.  In  the  course  of  the  afternoon  the  revolu- 
tionists seized  the  Maximilian  II,  Marsfeld  and  Tuerken  barracks,  while 
two  hundred  and  fifty  soldiers  confined  in  the  military  prison  as  revolu- 
tionists were  released.  Soldiers  in  motor  trucks  with  red  flags  patrolled 
the  streets,  and  the  capital  passed  without  a  struggle  into  the  hands  of 
the  soldiers  and  workmen.  The  railroad  stations,  telephone  and  telegraph 
offices,  army  headquarters,  government  ministries,  and  the  newspaper 
offices  of  the  Muenchener  Neiieste  Nachrkhten  were  occupied  by  the 
rebels. 

Under  Eisner's  direction,  the  workmen  and  soldiers  elected  delegates, 
who  established  revolutionary  headquarters  in  the  Mathaser  brewery. 
That  night  this  revolutionary  government  occupied  the  Parliament  build- 
ing and  held  the  first  session  of  the  revolutionary  councils  in  the  Parlia- 
ment chamber.  Kurt  Eisner  presided  over  this  assembly  of  workmen, 
soldiers,  and  peasants,  which  promptly  proclaimed  Bavaria  a  People's 
State.     The  Munich  garrison  formally  adhered  to  the  republican  move- 

ment."« 

On  the  morning  of  November  9  Munich  awoke  to  find  the  walls  of 
the  city  placarded  with  the  proclamations  of  the  Council  of  Workmen, 
Soldiers,  and  Peasants  of  the  Free  State  of  Bavaria.  These  announced 
that  the  new  government  would  call  a  national  assembly ;  work  for  a  just 
peace ;  support  a  plan  for  a  league  of  nations ;  and  carry  out  fundamental 
social,  economic,  and  political  reforms.  At  the  same  time  a  proclamation 
was  issued  to  the  agricultural  population  of  Bavaria,  announcing  the 
formation  of  the  new  government  and  calling  for  cooperation  especially 
in  the  maintenance  of  better  food  conditions  in  the  cities.     Although  the 


"''  Deutscher  Geschichtskalender,  65-76. 
'"  Kuttner,  op.  cit.,  25. 


BEGINNINGS   OF   THE   REVOLUTION  ^7 

new  government  was  completely  Socialistic,  it  declared  that  at  a  time 
when  the  productive  powers  of  the  nation  were  exhausted  it  was  impos- 
sible to  place  the  Bavarian  industries  in  the  hands  of  the  commonwealth. 

The  fall  of  the  Bavarian  dynasty  illustrates  the  weakness  of  the  old 
government.  The  afternoon  of  the  revolution  King  Louis  III  was  walk- 
ing in  the  English  garden  with  his  daughters  when  a  private  citizen  ad- 
vised him  to  go  back  to  the  palace.  Scarcely  had  he  returned  when  his 
ministers  informed  him  that  the  republic  had  been  proclaimed  in  the 
streets.  The  royal  family  hastily  packed  their  hand  luggage  and  left  in 
an  auto  unattended.  No  effort  was  made  to  maintain  the  monarchy 
by  force,  and  on  November  13  the  King  formally  abdicated  the  throne. 
The  provisional  government  in  announcing  this  fact  in  a  proclamation 
stated  that  the  former  King  and  his  family  might  remain  in  Bavaria  as 
any  other  free  citizens  if  they  did  not  attack  the  new  state.^^" 

The  establishment  of  the  republic  of  Bavaria  on  November  8,  1918, 
signified  the  collapse  of  the  Bismarckian  empire  and  of  those  monarchial 
German  states  which  had  endured  since  the  Middle  Ages.  As  Eisner  had 
previously  denounced  the  government  of  Prince  Max  of  Baden,  his  coup 
d'etat  at  Munich  indicated  that  either  all  Germany  must, be  revolutionized 
or  Bavaria  would  conclude  a  separate  peace  with  the  entente.  Noteworthy 
is  the  success  of  Eisner,  the  idealist  and  foreigner,  who,  with  the  help  of 
the  Munich  Radicals,  seized  control  of  Catholic,  Bayaria.  His  dramatic 
success  electrified  all  Germany  on  the  morning  of  November  ninth.  It 
heralded  the  triumph  of  German  Radicalism  and  Socialism  over  the  Con- 
servative empire. 

The  Spread  of  Revolt 

The  mutiny  of  the  German  fleet  resulted  in  the  establishment  of  revo- 
lutionary governments  in  the  Hanseatic  republics  and  the  coast  towns  of 
Oldenburg,  Mecklenburg,  and  Prussia,  while  detachments  of  sailors  ad- 
vancing into  the  interior  set  up  workmen's  and  soldiers'  councils  in  the 
North  German  states.  In  the  Rhineland  the  great  city  of  Cologne  passed 
into  the  hands  of  mutinous  troops,  and  Hanover  and  Magdeburg  by 
proclaiming  council  republics  threatened  the  lines  of  communications  of 
the  imperial  armies.  However,  the  naval  revolt  and  its  repercussions 
were  limited  in  their  effect  and  alone  would  not  have  destroyed  the  liberal 
empire. 

It  was  the  overthrow  of  the  Bavarian  monarchy  by  the  coup  d'etat  of 
the  Munich  Socialists  which  gave  the  signal  for  the  German  revolution. 
On  November  8  the  ])rincipal  cities  of  Saxony,  Baden,  Wiirttemberg, 
Hesse-Darmstadt  and  the  Thuringian  states  were  in  open  rebellion.  One 
by  one  the  monarchical  federal  states  were  engulfed  by  the  rising  tide  of 

^^  Deutscher  Gcschichtskalendcr,  66-67.     Runkel,  op.  cit.,  98-104. 

900  97 


38  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

revolution.  Ministries  were  everywhere  powerless  to  maintain  the  old 
order.  The  reaction  from  the  military  defeat  of  the  empire  had  brought 
about  the  complete  collapse  of  the  Bismarckian  state.  Yet  the  administra- 
tive system  of  the  empire  and  the  several  states  continued  to  function  long 
after  the  monarchical  control  had  vanished.  By  the  ninth  of  November 
the  federal  empire  had  ceased  to  exist.  Revolutionary  plots  had  either 
overthrown  or  weakened  the  monarchical  states  to  such  an  extent  that 
Germany  only  awaited  the  signal  from  the  capital  to  abolish  entirely  the 
old  order  and  to  proclaim  the  Socialistic  republic.  Above  all  the  movement 
lacked  national  leaders  and  cohesion,  which  accounted  for  the  numerous 
delays  in  overthrowing  Kaiserism. 

In  Berlin  alone  the  liberal  empire  under  the  control  of  Prince  Max  of 
Baden  still  maintained  a  semblance  of  its  former  authority.  The  fall  of 
his  ministry  was,  however,  only  a  question  of  time,  since  the  maintenance 
of  the  empire  had  been  made  impossible  by  the  refusal  of  the  Kaiser  to 
abdicate.  In  a  single  day,  therefore,  Berlin  overthrew  the  empire  of 
the  Hohenzollerns,  as  Paris  had  once  shaken  ofif  the  yoke  of  Napoleon  III 
after  Sedan. 


THE    NINTH    OF    NOVEMBER  39 


III. 

THE   NINTH   OF  NOVEMBER 
Abdication  of  the  Kaiser 

When  William  H  was  at  the  height  of  his  power,  the  German  his- 
torian, Karl  Lamprecht,  wrote:  "The  best  source  for  a  knowledge  of  the 
personality  of  the  Kaiser  will  perhaps  always  be  his  speeches ;  other  infor- 
mation from  first  as  well  as  even  second  or  third  hand  is,  if  it  does  not 
originate  from  intimates,  to  be  received  with  pronounced  distrust.  How- 
ever, it  is  not  very  easy  to  acquire  an  understanding  of  the  speeches."  ^^" 
During  the  war  the  published  utterances  of  the  War  Lord  revealed  more 
and  more  that  he  was  incapable  of  great  military  or  political  leadership.^^^ 
Nor  did  he  show  himself  to  be  possessed  of  that  ability  and  spirit  of 
cooperation  which  had  enabled  his  grandfather  to  utilize  the  genius  of 
Bismarck  and  Moltke.  In  spite  of  many  attempts  it  was  even  impossible 
for  the  Kaiser  and  the  chiefs  of  his  military,  naval,  and  civil  cabinets  to 
maintain  the  fiction  of  the  Hohenzollern  genius.  An  excellent  example 
of  this  imperial  attitude  was  the  reply  which  the  Kaiser  made  on  Febru- 
ary 23,  1916,  when  Admiral  Scheer  asked  him  on  what  date  unrestricted 
submarine  warfare  could  be  commenced.  "To  my  question  the  Kaiser 
remarked  that  he  dared  not  make  the  decision  merely  in  accordance  with 
the  military  propositions,  whose  justification  he  thoroughly  recognized, 
since  he  had  to  bear  the  responsibility  not  only  as  supreme  war  lord,  but 
also  as  head  of  the  state.  If  he  were  to  order  the  immediate  commence- 
ment of  unrestricted  submarine  warfare,  it  probably  would  meet  with 
the  complete  approbation  of  the  widest  circles.  He  had,  however,  to 
take  care  that  the  advantages  of  unrestricted  submarine  warfare  would 
not  be  outweighed  by  the  results  of  the  entrance  of  America  into  the 
war  on  the  side  of  our  enemies."  ^"  Unfortunately  for  himself  and  his 
dynasty,  William  II  was  unable  to  assume  that  leadership  of  his  people 
which  he  so  proudly  proclaimed  in  this  instance  to  the  admiral  of  his 
fleets.  After  1916  the  Germans  realized  that  Ludendoriif  and  Hinden- 
burg  were  the  real  dictators  of  Mittcl  Europa. 

Surrounded  since  1914  by  a  succession  of  military  and  political  groups 
which  were  striving  continuously  to  formulate  war  aims  in  conflict  with  a 
considerable  portion  of  German  public  opinion,  the  Kaiser  failed  to  follow, 


^^°  Lamprecht,  "Der  Kaiser  Versuch  Einer  Charakteristik,"  49-50. 

"'  Rathcnau,  "Der  Kaiser,"  47. 

"'  Scheer,  "Deutschlands  Hochseeflotte  im  Weltkrieg,"  169. 


40  THE  GERMAN   REVOLUTION 

as  licad  of  the  state,  a  consistent  policy,  but  varied  from  one  extreme  to 
the  otlicr,  as  expechency  or  necessity  seemed  to  demand.  Those  very  quali- 
ties which  in  the  decade  before  the  war  had  made  him  prominent  as  a 
European  ruler,  now  aided  in  the  destruction  of  that  imperial  system  which 
he  sought  bravely  to  perpetuate.  After  the  revolution,  his  former  subjects 
accused  him  unjustly  of  lack  of  character,  timidity,  vanity,  unreliability, 
and  even  personal  cowardice.  In  their  rage  and  vindictiveness  the  German 
radicals  overdrew  the  picture,  as  formerly  the  Byzantine  flatterers  of  the 
Kaiser  had  magnified  his  virtues  and  genius.  At  its  best,  the  HohenzoUern 
monarchy  under  a  military  genius  would  have  been  unequal  to  the  test  of 
a  prolonged  modern  world  war.  For  that,  the  national  and  dynastic  tradi- 
tions were  lacking  in  Germany.  The  greatest  charge  that  can  be  brought 
J  against  the  Emperor  was  that  he  was  unable  to  direct  the  affairs  of  state 
at  the  crisis  of  the  nation's  history. ^-^  During  the  great  political  debate  in 
the  National  Assembly,  July  28,  1919,  on  the  causes  of  the  loss  of  the  war, 
Gothein  said  of  the  Kaiser :  "He  bears  a  substantial  part  of  the  blame  for 
our  misfortune."  ^^* 

The  publication  in  Germany  of  President  Wilson's  third  note  of  October 
23  made  the  abdication  of  the  Kaiser  a  political  necessity.  From  that  day 
the  monarch  was  doomed. ^-^  Socialist  and  enemy  propaganda  had  so  far 
undermined  the  position  of  William  II  that  only  a  voluntary  and  worthy 
renunciation  of  the  throne  would  have  halted  the  revolutionary  movement. 
In  reality,  what  the  enemy  propaganda  had  been  unable  to  accomplish  in 
Germany  was  achieved  by  Ludendorff  when  he  demanded  on  Sunday,  Sep- 
tember 29,  that  the  government  request  an  armistice  with  the  Allies.  From 
that  moment  President  Wilson  dominated  the  problem  of  ending  the  world 
war.  Prince  Max  said,  "Not  the  enemy  propaganda  nor  the  Independent 
Socialist  agitation,  but  the  war  policy  of  the  army  caused  the  psychological 
catastrophe  and  the  collapse  of  the  internal  front."  ^^® 

The  agitation  of  the  Socialists  for  the  abdication  of  the  Kaiser  was  by 
the  end  of  October  accepted  by  the  majority  of  the  nation  as  the  only  means 
to  escape  from  a  perilous  international  position  and  to  secure  bearable 
terms  of  peace. ^^^  Influenced  by  public  opinion,  the  Majority  Socialists 
were  forced  to  agitate  the  question  in  the  ministry.  The  policy  of  Prince 
Max  was  in  fact  directed  toward  convincing  the  Emperor  of  the  necessity 
of  abdication,  but  the  Prince  believed  that  only  a  voluntary  decision  of 
the  Kaiser  would  save  the  empire  from  destruction.     Scheidemann,  in  a 


'**  Foss,  "Enthiillungen,"  82. 
"*  Berliner  Tageblatt,  July  29,  1919. 
*"  Erzberger,  "Erlcbnisse  im  Weltkrieg,"  323. 

"*  Letter  of  Prince  Max  of  Baden  in  Berliner  Tageblatt,  August  9,  1919. 
*"  Deutscher  Geschichtskalender ,  I  Heft,  23-32.  Frankfurter  Zeitung,  October  24, 
1918. 


THE   NINTH    OF   NOVEMBER  41 

memoir  to  the  Chancellor,  had,  however,  insisted  upon  the  immediate  abdi- 
cation of  William  II.  In  an  effort  to  convince  the  Emperor,  Prince  Max 
sent  Drews,  the  Minister  of  the  Interior,  to  Spa,  but  the  Kaiser  declined  to 
renounce  the  thrones  of  Prussia  and  the  empire. ^-^ 

It  was  the  refusal  of  the  Kaiser  to  abdicate  after  the  seriousness  of  the 
situation  had  been  respectfully  laid  before  him  by  Drews  which  gave  the 
pretext  for  the  Berlin  revolution. ^^^  Max  was  unable  to  convince  the 
Kaiser,  but  the  Socialists  now  felt  themselves  strong  enough  to  force  the 
issue.  In  fact  the  agitation  of  the  Independents  and  the  disaffection  within 
their  own  ranks  really  forced  the  Majbrity  Socialist  leaders  to  take  such 
action  in  order  to  maintain  their  power  over  their  followers.  In  a  party 
caucus  the  Social  Democrats  supported  Ebert,  who  stated  that  the  Kaiser 
must  abdicate  in  order  that  Germany  might  secure  better  terms  of  peace. 
Then  followed  the  ultimatum  of  the  Socialists  to  Prince  Max.^^" 

Over  the  history  of  the  last  eight  days  of  imperial  rule  at  Spa  there  has 
raged  already  in  Germany  a  political  controversy  of  the  first  magnitude. ^^^ 
Field  Marshal  von  Hindenburg,  Generals  von  Plessen,  von  Marschall, 
Count  Schulenburg,  and  Admiral  von  Hintze  have  all  drawn  up  supplemen- 
tal reports  to  the  official  documents  bearing  upon  the  Kaiser's  abdication. 
Prince  Max  von  Baden  has  also  vigorously  defended  his  position.  The 
essential  facts  are,  however,  undisputed. 

As  late  as  November  1  the  Kaiser,  when  informed  by  Minister  Drews 
of  the  popular  demand  for  his  abdication,  instructed  that  official  to  notify 
the  chancellor  that  he  would  remain  at  his  post,  convinced  that  his  abdica- 
tion would  be  the  signal  for  the  triumph  of  Bolshevism."^  Both  Hinden- 
burg and  Groener  also  rejected  the  idea  of  abdication  at  that  time.  The 
Kaiser  believed  that  only  at  Spa  would  he  possess  complete  freedom  of 
political  action  and  that  there,  supported  by  his  loyal  troops,  he  could  main- 
tain his  crown. 

Meanwhile  the  agitation  for  abdication  increased  in  Germany,  even 
democratic  and  liberal  papers  supporting  the  movement.  The  navy  revolted, 
and  the  mutineers  as  well  as  the  Independent  Socialists  in  the  Hanseatic 
cities  demanded  a  republic. ^''^  General  Groener  visited  Berlin  on  Novem- 
ber 5  and  returned  to  Spa,  convinced  at  last,  as  was  the  civil  government 
there,  that  the  Kaiser  must  abdicate. 


"'Letter  of  Prince  Max  of  Baden  in  Berliner  Tageblatt,  August  9,  1919.    Runkel, 
"Deutsche  Revolution,"  57-61. 

"'Egelhaaf,  "Histor-polit.  Jahresbericht  fiir  1918." 

"°  Runkel,  "Die  Deutsche  Revolution,"  64. 

"'  Hindenburg's  attack  on  Schulenburg  in  Vossische  Zeitung,  April  7,  1919. 

"^Deutsche  Tageszeitiing ,  July  27,  1919. 

"•  Noske,  "Von  Kiel  bis  Kapp,"  7-8. 


42  THE   GF.RMAN    RF.VOLUTION 

Oil  the  morning  of  November  8  a  large  number  of  division,  brigade,  and 
regimental  commanders  from  tbe  front  were  assembled  at  Spa  to  report  on 
conditions  in  the  retreating  army.  Many  declared  that  the  veteran  troops 
could  be  relied  upon,  but  that  the  replacements  and  new  drafts  were  untrust- 
worthy. All  agreed  that  the  army  would  return  to  Germany  under  its  old 
leaders,  but  not  under  the  command  of  the  Kaiser.  Thereupon  the  Emperor 
ordered  General  Groener  to  prepare  a  plan  of  operation  to  maintain  the 
empire  by  force.  In  the  evening  a  war  council  discussed  the  proposed  plan, 
Hindenburg  and  Groener  agreeing  that  it  was  impossible  to  carry  it  out, 
Plessen  favoring  it.  That  night  the  soldiers  at  General  Headquarters,  who 
j  had  heard  of  the  revolts  in  Hamburg,  Hanover,  and  Cologne,  declared  they 
'  would  not  defend  the  lives  of  the  Kaiser  and  their  officers  against  the  Ger- 
man Republicans. 

Prince  Max  had  already  informed  the  Kaiser  on  November  7  of  the 
Socialist  ultimatum.  He  followed  up  his  report  by  telegraphing  the  Em- 
peror, advising  abdication  and  the  calling  of  a  constitutional  assembly  in 
order  to  destroy  Independent  and  Spartacan  propaganda.  In  reply  the 
Kaiser  telegraphed :  "His  Majesty  has  completely  rejected  the  recommenda- 
tion of  Your  Grand  Ducal  Highness  in  the  throne  question  and  considers  it 
now,  as  formerly,  his  duty  to  remain  at  his  post." 

As  the  republic  had  in  the  interval  triumphed  in  Bavaria,  and  as  the 
fate  of  the  empire  hung,  therefore,  in  the  balance,  Prince  Max  held,  on  the 
night  of  November  8,  a  twenty-minute  telephone  conversation  with  the 
Kaiser.  He  stated  bluntly  that  abdication  was  necessary,  that  the  military 
could  not  suppress  the  rising  tide  of  revolution,  and  that  he  recommended 
as  a  final  measure  the  naming  of  a  regent  and  the  calling  of  a  national 
assembly  before  the  Reichstag  demanded  it.  In  addition  he  informed  the 
Kaiser  of  a  second  plan  recommended  by  the  interfractional  committee  of 
the  Reichstag,  which  called  for  the  abdication  of  the  Kaiser,  the  renuncia- 
tion of  the  throne  by  the  Crown  Prince,  and  the  appointment  of  a  regency 
for  the  Emperor's  grandson.^''*  "I  believe,"  states  Prince  Max,  "that  if 
General  Headquarters  had  told  the  Kaiser  the  truth  about  the  army  on  the 
night  of  the  eighth,  he  would  have  abdicated  then."  ^"^ 

Advised  by  his  Chancellor  to  abdicate  while  there  was  yet  time,  the 
defeated  War  Lord  still  clung  tenaciously  to  his  crown  and  symbols  of 
former  authority.  At  ten  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  November  9  he  was, 
however,  at  last  told  the  truth  by  his  military  advisers.  Hindenburg  re- 
quested his  dismissal  because  of  the  plan  of  operations  against  the  interior, 
and  Groener  declared  that  the  field  army  could  not  be  marched  against  the 
nation.     Still  the  Kaiser  clung  to  his  plan  of  returning  at  the  head  of  his 


'  Letter  of  Prince  Max  of  Baden  in  Berliner  Tageblatt,  August  9,  1919. 
'  Idem. 


THE    NINTH    OF    NOVEMBER  43 

Prussian  troops.  Toward  the  close  of  the  miHtary  report  the  chancellery 
at  Berlin  telephoned  to  the  Emperor,  pressing  for  abdication. ^^^  Previous 
to  this  Admiral  von  Hintze  had  informed  the  chancellery  that  the  army 
would  wage  a  civil  war  for  the  Kaiser. 

While  the  generals  were  discussing  the  abdication  question  in  the  park 
of  the  Kaiser's  villa,  the  Crown  Prince  appeared  and  asked  his  father  not 
to  leave  the  army  but  to  return  to  Germany  with  his  army  group.  At  one 
o'clock  Colonel  Heye  arrived  with  a  report  of  the  conference  of  thirty-nine 
generals  and  regimental  commanders  held  at  Spa  that  morning.  Twenty- 
three  had  declared  it  impossible  for  the  Kaiser  to  reconquer  Germany  with 
the  army.  Fifteen  were  doubtful  of  the  success  of  the  operation.  And 
only  one  officer  believed  it  possible.  All  agreed  that  the  army  refused  to 
fight  longer  either  abroad  or  at  home.^^^ 

Thus  the  War  Lord  learned  the  truth  on  the  soil  of  that  gallant  country 
which  he  had  ruthlessly  invaded  five  years  before.  The  scene  was  dramatic. 
Suddenly  he  announced  that  the  Chancellor,  the  first  adviser  of  the  crown, 
as  well  as  the  army  and  navy,  had  deserted  him.  Even  when  he  was  told 
that  the  roads  to  the  front  and  to  the  interior  were  closed  by  mutinous 
troops,  he  could  only  bring  himself  to  agree  to  a  conditional  abdication  as 
Kaiser.  But  before  Berlin  could  be  informed  of  this  decision.  Prince  Max 
of  Baden  had  on  his  own  initiative  announced  the  Kaiser's  abdication  in 
Berlin.  "I  am  and  remain  King  of  Prussia  and  as  such  with  my  troops," 
the  Emperor  exclaimed,  when  told  of  the  action  of  his  Chancellor.^^®  That 
too,  however,  soon  proved  impossible. 

"Since  William  II  dismissed  Bismarck",  wrote  Baron  von  Wolzogen, 
"until  November,  1911,  when  he  was  politely  told  by  Biilow  of  the  discon- 
tent of  his  people,  he  had  often  enough  deserved  deposition."  ^^^  In  the  end 
the  action  of  Prince  Max  on  November  9  was  equivalent  to  deposing  the 
Kaiser.  When  the  Chancellor  of  the  empire  ordered  the  Counsellor  of 
Legation,  von  Schmidthals,  to  inform  the  German  press  of  the  Kaiser's 
abdication,  William  II  was  deprived  of  his  throne. ^*° 

In  the  eyes  of  the  Prussian  Monarchists,  Prince  Max  had  really  forced 
the  Kaiser  to  abdicate  and  then  advised  him  to  go  abroad  to  avoid  civil 
war.^*^  The  Prince  was  denounced  as  a  hypocrite,  swindler,  and  traitor, 
who  had  betrayed  the  Hohenzollerns  to  the  Socialists.  He  was  even  accused 
of  having  attempted  to  play  the  role  of  a  Louis  Philippe  in  order  to  make 
himself  regent  of  the  empire. 

"'Deutsche  Tagesscitung,  July  27,  1919. 

'"  Menke,  op.  cit.,  58-60. 

"^^  D  cuts  cite  Tageszeitung,  July  29,  1919. 

"*  Von  Wolzogen,  "Harte  Worte  die  Gesagt  Werden  Miissen." 

"°  Von  Liebig,  "Der  Betrug  am  Deutschen  Volke,"  51-52. 

'"  Krieger,  "Die  Wahrheit." 


44  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

On  account  of  the  revolutionary  outbreaks  in  the  rear  of  the  armies, 
a  peaceful  return  of  the  Kaiser  to  Germany  was  impossible.^*-  Hindenburg 
wrote  later  from  General  Headquarters  at  Kolberg  that  the  Kaiser  only 
had  three  possible  courses  of  action :  to  fight  his  way  back  to  Germany  with 
loyal  regiments ;  to  die  at  the  head  of  his  troops  on  the  front ;  to  go  abroad. 
That  he  chose  the  latter  policy  was  due  to  his  desire  to  spare  the  nation  the 
horrors  of  civil  war.  The  Field  Marshal  also  declared :  "He  had  gone  in 
order  to  spare  the  Fatherland  additional  sacrifices  and  in  order  to  secure 
for  it  more  favorable  conditions  of  peace. "^*^ 

On  the  night  of  November  9,  without  a  word  of  farewell  to  his  people, 
the  Kaiser  fled  in  his  special  train  to  the  Dutch  border.  It  was  not  until 
November  28,  1918,  that  he  wrote  a  formal  renunciation  of  the  throne. 
His  flight  was  followed  by  a  torrent  of  abuse  throughout  Germany.  Pub- 
licists proclaimed  his  guilt  and  called  his  desertion  infamous.^**  Others 
sought  after  the  German  collapse  to  excuse  his  going  abroad. ^*^  Von 
Plessen  was  accused  of  having  prevailed  upon  his  master  to  flee."®  Un- 
kingly,  unmanly,  the  deathblow  to  dynasty  and  monarchy  were  general 
accusations  brought  against  William  H."^  Many  declared  that  it  was  at 
least  cowardly  to  flee."^  Finally  the  absurd  cry  was  raised  that  the  Em- 
peror was  insane."^ 

Revolt  of  Berlin 

The  collapse  of  the  liberal  empire  established  by  Prince  Max  of  Baden 
was  not  due  to  a  lack  of  statesmanship  on  the  part  of  the  prince,  but  to  the 
sudden  breaking  up  of  the  inner  front  under  the  pressure  of  military 
defeat.  The  final  struggle  with  Ludendorff,  the  demands  of  President 
Wilson,  the  failure  of  the  Kaiser  to  abdicate,  and  finally  the  general  upris- 
ing of  the  German  radicals,  following  the  naval  mutiny,  all  brought  about 


'"  Nowak,  "Der  Sturz  der  Mittelmaechte,"  331-332. 

"'  Letter  of  Hindenburg  in  Berliner  Tageblatt,  March  19,  1919.  Hindenburg, 
"Aus  Meinem  Leben,"  401-402. 

'"  Binder,  "Die  Schuld  des  Kaisers,"  34. 

"*Krieger,  "Die  Wahrheit  iiber  die  Angebliche  Abdankung."  Hagenau,  Peter, 
"Ein  Wort  fiir  Wilhelm  H."  Grossmann,  Fritz,  "Was  Sind  Wir  Unserm  Kaiser 
Schuldig?"  (The  first  pamphlet  is  one  of  a  number  of  popular  defenses  written  by 
soldiers.  The  latter  are  typical  pamphlets  filled  with  fulsome  praise  which,  though 
naive,  is  sincere.) 

'**  Binder,  "Die  Schuld  des  Kaisers." 

"'  Die  Wahrheit,  I  Heft,  16.    Wulff ,  "Die  Personliche  Schuld  Wilhelms  H." 

'*'Von  Hoensbroech,  "Wilhelms  II  Abdankung  und  Flucht."  Rump,  "Paul 
Reichsgraf  von  Hoensbroech  als  Gefolgsmann  der  Hohenzollern." 

"*  Friedlander,  Prof.  Dr.,  "Wilhelm  II,  Eine  Politische-psychologische  Studie," 
Halle,  1919.  Kleinschrod,  Dr.  Franz,  "Die  Geisteskrankheit  Kaiser  Wilhelms  II?" 
Worishofen,  1919.    Tesdorpf,  Dr.  Paul,  "Die  Krankheit  Wilhelm  II,"  Munchen,  1919. 


I 


THE   NINTH    OF   NOVEMBER 


45 


the  overthrow  of  the  last  imperial  ministry.  Only  the  support  of  the  Ma- 
jority Socialists  enabled  this  government  to  exist  as  long  as  it  did.^^*^ 

The  fundamental  policies  of  the  ministry  of  Prince  Max  are  outlined 
in  a  proclamation  issued  November  4,  announcing  as  the  important  things 
accomplished  by  the  government :  equal  suffrage  assured  for  Prussia ;  a 
new  government  formed  from  representatives  of  the  majority  parties  of 
the  Reichstag ;  the  confidence  of  the  Reichstag  required  by  the  Chancellor 
and  his  co-workers  to  carry  on  their  administration ;  fundamental  powers 
transferred  from  the  person  of  the  Emperor  to  the  representatives  of  the 
people ;  the  approval  of  the  Reichstag  required  for  making  war  and  peace ; 
the  establishment  of  the  subordination  of  the  miUtary  to  the  civil  powers ; 
the  proclamation  of  a  general  amnesty  and  the  granting  of  freedom  of  press 
and  right  of  assembly.  Until  peace  was  signed  the  proclamation  stated 
that  the  people  must  maintain  order  and  assist  the  army  leaders  and  the 
government  to  protect  the  borders  of  the  empire  and  to  restore  the  economic 
life  of  the  nation  in  order  to  assure  the  existence  of  the  returning  soldiers 
and  sailors.  The  conclusion  was  worded  as  follows :  "Still  much  remains 
to  be  done.  The  transformation  of  Germany  into  a  people's  state,  which 
shall  not  stand  behind  any  state  of  the  world  in  political  freedom  and  social 
betterment,  will  be  firmly  carried  out.  .  .  .  The  assured  future  of  Ger- 
many is  our  guiding  star."  ^°^ 

This  proclamation  was  signed  by  the  Chancellor,  the  Vice  Chancellor, 
the  Vice  President  of  the  Prussian  Ministry,  the  Minister  of  War,  the 
Secretary  of  State  for  the  Navy,  and  Secretaries  Solf,  Count  von  Roedern, 
von  Krause,  Ruedlin,  von  Waldow,  Baron  von  Stein,  Scheidemann,  Groe- 
ber,  Erzberger,  Haussmann,  Bauer,  and  Trimborn.^^- 

To  accomplish  this  transformation  of  Germany,  Prince  Max  was  now 
ready  for  even  more  radical  measures.  The  idea  of  a  national  assembly, 
which  would  give  to  Germany  a  new  constitution  modeled  after  the  Eng- 
lish monarchy,  appealed  to  him.  He  negotiated  with  the  majority  parties 
and  attempted  by  this  policy  to  maintain  the  solidarity  of  his  ministry. 
The  question  of  the  abdication  of  the  Kaiser  now  predominated  the  politi- 
cal situation  at  Berlin.  On  November  6  Prince  Max  issued  another  proc- 
lamation to  the  German  people,  stating  that  the  entente  had  accepted  the 
fourteen  points,  excepting  freedom  of  the  seas,  and  that  Marshal  Foch 
would  make  known  to  the  German  plenipotentiaries  the  terms  of  the  armis- 
tice.^" 


"*Ahnert,  "Die  Entwickelung  der  Deutschen  Revolution  und  das  Kriegsende," 
and  Buchner,  "Revolutionsdokumente,  I,"  contain  collections  of  periodical  and  pamphlet 
literature  as  well  as  documents. 

"'  Runkel,  "Die  Deutsche  Revolution." 

'"  Deutscher  Geschichtskalcnder ,  I  Heft. 

'"Kuttner,  op.  cit.,  25.  Menke-Gluckert,  op.  cit.,  47.  Egelhaaf,  op.  cit.  Runkel, 
op.  cit.,  107. 


45  TIIK   (IKRMAN    KKVdI.l'l  ION 

Noteworthy  is  the  fact  that  until  the  final  collapse,  Berlin  contained  the 
strongest  forces  of  the  imperial  government.  The  Hohenzollern  dynasty 
had  raised  Berlin  from  a  provincial  town  to  the  rank  of  a  world  city,  the 
third  of  Europe.  The  capital  had  shared  generously  in  the  prosperity  of 
the  empire  after  the  Franco-Prussian  War  and  had  hecome  one  of  the 
greatest  manufacturing  centers  on  the  continent.  Art  and  science  had  given 
to  this  modern  city  a  peculiar  lustre. 

Its  population  of  almost  three  millions  had  accepted  the  empire  as  the 
source  of  its  wealth,  order,  and  fame.  To  the  nobles  and  bureaucrats, 
Berlin  was  the  capital  of  an  empire  destined  with  invincible  armies  and 
fleets  to  dominate  the  policies  not  of  an  entire  continent  but  of  the  world. 
To  the  middle  class  of  the  city,  Prussian  commerce,  industry,  and  finance 
proved  the  superiority  of  an  irresponsible  paternalism  over  the  democ- 
racies of  the  west.  Finally  the  working  classes,  disciplined  by  the  forces  of 
trade  unionism  and  social  democracy,  tool<  a  secret  pride  in  that  imperial 
government  which  had  elevated  the  city  to  such  a  commanding  position 
among  the  industrial  centers  of  the  old  world. 

It  required  four  years  of  war  and  blockade,  combined  with  the  military, 
diplomatic,  and  political  blunders  of  the  ruling  classes,  to  shake  the  loyalty 
of  the  Berlin  bourgeoisie  and  proletariat  to  the  empire. 

Since  the  summer  of  1916  revolutionary  plots  had  been  formed  in 
Berlin.  When  the  naval  mutiny  of  1917  occurred  there  were  not  wanting 
Socialist  conspirators  in  Berlin  to  take  advantage  of  a  possible  spread  of 
the  revolt.  In  January,  1918,  General  von  Kessel  suppressed  the  general 
strike  in  Berlin  with  efificiency  and  brutality.  But  from  that  time  on,  a 
definite  plan  was  worked  out  by  Independent  Socialists  to  overthrow  the 
empire.  The  Berlin  revolutionary  committee,  which  included  Barth  and 
Daumig,  established  connection  with  comrades  on  the  front  and  the  indus- 
trial workers  in  the  capital.  Although  surprised  by  the  request  for  an 
armistice,  these  revolutionists  planned  to  seize  the  opportunity  created  by 
the  military  defeat  and  loss  of  courage  at  home,  to  establish  the  Socialistic 
republic.  At  a  meeting  held  November  2  in  which  Haase,  Liebknecht, 
Dittmann,  Barth,  Daumig,  and  Ledebour  took  part,  the  question  of  strik- 
ing the  first  blow  was  discussed.  The  majority  were  in  favor  of  commenc- 
ing the  revolution  November  4,  but  Haase  and  Dittmann,  uncertain  of  vic- 
tory, had  the  uprising  postponed.  Among  these  revolutionary  conspirators 
was  a  certain  Lieutenant  Walz  of  the  Berlin  garrison.  He  was  arrested  on 
November  6  and  charged  with  treason.  In  order  to  save  his  life,  he  re- 
vealed the  plot  to  the  military  authorities.  Thus  the  government  learned 
of  the  extent  of  the  Independent  Socialist  agitation  for  the  republic. 

As  early  as  1916  a  section  of  the  German  General  Staff  had  found  time 
during  the  Verdun  and  Somme  battles  for  the  preparation  of  "a.  battle  and 
mobilization  plan  in  case  of  a  revolution."    General  von  Linsingen,  an  able 


THE    NINTH    OF    NOVEMBER  47 

general  from  the  eastern  front,  was  in  1918  Acting  Commander-in-Chief 
in  Berlin  and  prepared  to  carry  out  this  General  Staff  plan  to  the  last.  His 
military  measures  were  worked  out  in  detail  and  included  even  the  for- 
mation of  reliable  companies  of  citizens. ^°*  From  November  6  on  there 
was  a  general  tension  in  Berlin.  Except  for  incomplete  official  bulletins, 
the  censor  suppressed  all  news  of  the  naval  revolt  along  the  coasts.  Ru- 
mors, however,  only  exaggerated  the  extent  of  the  mutiny.  November  7 
was  the  anniversary  of  the  coup  d'etat  of  the  Russian  Bolshevists,  which 
the  Independents  prepared  to  celebrate.  Five  assemblies  were  scheduled 
for  that  night  in  Berlin,  but  Linsingen  forbade  their  meeting.  At  the  Koe- 
nigsbau  the  police  drove  the  Socialist  masses  from  the  hall. 

Linsingen  then  informed  Berlin  in  a  proclamation :  "In  certain  circles 
the  plan  exists  to  form,  in  violation  of  legal  regulations,  workmen  and  sol- 
diers' councils  after  the  Russian  model.  Such  organizations  violate  the 
existing  orders  of  the  state  and  threaten  public  security.  I  forbid  by 
authority  of  Paragraph  9b  of  the  Law  concerning  the  state  of  siege,  every 
formation  of  such  unions  and  participation  therein.  The  Commander-in- 
Chief  in  the  Marks,  von  Linsingen,  Major  General."  ^^^  A  second  order 
summoned  all  officers  on  leave  in  Berlin  to  report  at  headquarters  with  full 
field  equipment.  That  night  Linsingen  seized  at  the  Lehrter  Station  the 
first  small  columns  of  sailors  and  soldiers  arriving  from  Hamburg,  and 
confined  them  in  the  Moabit  prison.  The  gas,  electric,  and  waterworks 
were  occupied  by  troops,  and  the  telephone  and  telegraph  offices  were 
closed,  thus  cutting  off  all  communication  with  revolutionary  Germany. 
The  day  was,  however,  past  in  Prussia  when  the  militarists  could  overawe 
the  masses  with  paragraphs  of  the  law  or  bayonets  of  the  monarchical  guard. 
Linsingen  could  not  rely  upon  his  own  troops,  and  the  civil  government 
had  been  rendered  powerless  by  the  ultimatum  of  the  Socialists. 

After  his  resignation  Prince  Max  had  continued  in  office  by  direction 
of  the  Emperor,  seeking  to  maintain  the  popular  movement  in  democratic 
and  legal  channels.  The  majority  parties  were  in  a  panic,  and  on  the 
eighth  of  November  hurriedly  voted  to  extend  the  democratic  electoral  law 
to  all  federal  states  in  the  next  session  of  the  Reichstag.  By  an  almost 
unanimous  vote  the  government  decided  to  propose  abdication  to  the 
Emperor.    Meanwhile  the  entire  Prussian  cabinet  resigned. ^°*^ 

The  government  was  no  longer  mistress  of  the  situation  either  in  Berlin 
or  the  empire.  Its  plenipotentiaries  were  already  on  their  way  to  meet 
Marshal  Foch,  and  Plindenburg  was  certain  to  accept  the  allied  conditions 
irrespective  of  their  severity.     That  the  publication  of  these  terms  would 


Kuttner,  op.  cit.,  3-5. 
Kuttner,  op.  cit.,  26. 
'  Deiitscher  Geschichtskalender,"  I  Heft,  35. 


48  THE   HERMAN    REVOLUTION 

eiul  tho  reign  of  William  II  was  clear  to  all.  Prince  Max  wished  above  all 
to  preserve  the  unity  of  the  rcicJi,  to  save  the  monarchical  principle  and  to 
control  the  revolution  in  peaceful  channels.  lie  was  not,  however,  a  Louis 
Philippe,  and  was  unable  to  attempt  a  coup  d'etat  which  might  have  placed 
Germany  in  his  control  as  regent. 

The  stopping  of  railway  transportation  led,  on  November  8,  to  a  demon- 
stration of  furloughed  soldiers  who  were  thus  detained  in  Berlin.  They 
marched  from  their  barracks  to  the  commandery  in  order  to  secure  commu- 
tation of  rations,  but  were  joined  by  civilians,  who  thought  that  they  were 
demonstrating  out  of  sympathy  for  the  Kiel  revolt.  Before  the  Vorwaerts 
building  the  procession  cheered  for  the  republic.'" 

On  the  night  of  November  8  Berlin  appeared  to  be  on  the  eve  of  a 
serious  revolt.  Armed  revolutionists  had  succeeded  in  entering  the  city, 
while  the  Independent  Socialists  had  distributed  weapons  to  their  followers. 
A  large  majority  of  the  workingmen  were  fully  prepared  for  the  uprising. 
On  the  other  hand,  General  von  Linsingen  had  occupied  all  strategic  points 
with  troops,  fully  equipped  and  wearing  steel  helmets.  Armored  cars  and 
trucks  patroled  the  center  of  the  city.  The  party  office  of  the  Independent 
Socialists  was  closed  by  the  police,  who  arrested  Barth  and  Daumig. 
Trusted  Jaeger  Battalions  of  veteran  infantry  were  then  brought  in  haste 
to  the  capital.'^® 

These  last  efiforts,  however,  were  frustrated  by  an  order  from  Prince 
Max  to  the  commander  to  refrain  from  attacking  the  masses.  Thereupon 
General  von  Linsingen  resigned.  Aware  of  the  disaffection  among  his  own 
troops,  he  realized  that  even  Prussian  militarism  could  not  save  the  mon- 
archy in  Berlin.  Not  even  the  Independent  Socialists  had,  however,  be- 
lieved that  Prussian  militarism  in  the  hour  of  revolution  could  be  so  weak 
and  so  defenseless.  The  spirit  of  General  von  Prittwitz  no  longer  inspired 
the  Berlin  garrison. 

It  is  of  primary  importance  that,  after  the  Kaiser  bade  Prince  Max  to 
remain  in  office  until  he  had  made  a  final  decision  concerning  his  resigna- 
tion, the  Alajority  Socialists  still  supported  the  ministry.  During  a  con- 
ference with  Prince  Max  they  even  extended  their  ultimatum  until  the 
signing  of  the  armistice.  Here  is  an  indication  of  their  weak  and  vacillat- 
ing policy,  which  seemed  to  be  governed  by  political  expediency  and  by  a  due 
regard  for  the  plans  of  the  Independent  Socialists.  Handbills  distributed 
by  the  Majority  Socialists  on  the  evening  of  November  8  announced  that  a 
part  of  their  demands  were  accepted ;  that  equal  suffrage  would  be  estab- 
lished in  Prussia  and  all  other  federal  states  by  imperial  law ;  that  immedi- 
ate parliamentarising  of  the   Prussian  government  was  assured  with  an 

"'  Runkel,  "Die  Deutsche  Revolution,"  122. 

'"  Menke-Gluckert,  op.  cit.,  49.    Kuttner,  op.  cit.,  27. 


THE   NINTH   OF   NOVEMBER  49 

increase  of  Socialist  influence  in  the  imperial  government,  that  the  levee  en 
masse  had  been  given  up  and  that  the  settlement  of  the  question  of  the 
Kaiser's  abdication  had  been  extended  to  the  signing  of  the  armistice.^^® 

The  original  demand  of  the  Majority  Socialists  for  the  abdication  of  the 
Kaiser  had  been  made  in  the  hope  that  by  this  step  they  could  reach  the  goal 
of  democracy  without  a  civil  war.  After  the  sudden  increase  of  disorder 
in  the  empire,  the  Socialists  extended  their  ultimatum  until  the  signing  of 
the  armistice,  but  the  action  of  the  leaders  came  too  late.  The  German 
workmen  demanded  energetic  action;  the  Majority  Socialists  therefore 
withdrew  from  the  government  and  attempted  to  unite  with  the  Independ- 
ent Socialists. 

Early  Saturday,  November  9,  the  general  strike  broke  out  spontaneously 
in  the  Berlin  factories.  From  the  General  Electric  Works,  the  German 
Arms  and  Munition  Factory,  and  the  Schwartzkopf  and  the  Loewe  Works, 
the  strike  spread  to  almost  all  the  Berlin  industrial  plants.  Agents  of  the 
Independent  Socialists  were  active  everywhere.  At  10  a.  m.  a  workmen's 
council  of  the  Social  Democrat  party  officially  confirmed  the  strike,  and 
an  extra  edition  of  the  Vorwaerts  announced  it  to  the  masses.  As  the  fac- 
tories were  emptied  of  the  workmen  the  Independent  Socialists  prepared 
for  street  fighting. 

That  no  attempt  was  made  to  maintain  the  empire  was  due  first  to 
the  orders  of  Prince  Max  to  the  military  and  secondly  to  a  general  revolt 
of  the  garrison  of  Berlin.  The  center  of  the  city  was  held  by  strong 
military  forces,  while  a  northern  reserve  was  posted  in  the  Garde  Fusilier 
Barracks  and  the  Fourth  Guard  Regiment  Barracks  and  a  southern  reserve 
of  three  battalions  held  the  Augusta  Barracks. 

Early  in  the  morning  the  Fourth  Naumburger  Jaeger  Battalion 
mutinied,  deposed  its  officers,  and  elected  a  soldiers'  council.  It  then 
sent  delegates  to  the  Vorwaerts  building  to  declare  that  the  battalion 
would  not  fire  on  the  people,  but  would  aid  the  Socialist  leaders.  The 
Alexander  Regiment,  to  whom  the  Kaiser  had  once  said  that  in  case  he 
gave  the  order  they  were  to  fire  upon  their  own  fathers  and  mothers, 
joined  the  revolt,  and  was  harangued  by  the  Socialist  Deputy,  Wels. 
The  famous  Lehrregiment  and  the  First  Guard  Reserve  Regiment  muti- 
nied and  armed  the  people  at  their  barracks.  In  the  southern  portion  of 
the  city  the  Sixty-fourth  Reserve  Regiment  deposed  its  officers.  In  all, 
fourteen  units  of  the  Prussian  army  mutinied  on  November  9  and  refused 
to  fire  a  shot  for  King  and  Fatherland.  At  the  barracks  of  the  Guard 
Fusilier  Regiment  in  the  Chaussee  street,  the  loyal  officers  fired  upon  a 
procession  of  soldiers ;  otherwise  no  fighting  occurred  in  the  morning. 
,  The  entire  garrison  of  Berlin  simply  refused  to  maintain  the  empire  by 
f  force. 


'"*  Deutscher  Geschichtskalender,  I  Heft,  35. 


50  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

Although  the  Independent  SociaUsts  had  proclaimed  a  revolution,  they 
made  no  attack  upon  any  government  office,  nor  did  they  attempt  to  set 
up  a  provisional  government.  At  noon,  the  Majority  Socialist  newspaper 
Voni'acrts  issued  an  extra  sheet  stating :  "The  Workmen's  and  Soldiers' 
Council  of  Berlin  has  voted  for  the  general  strike.  All  factories  stand 
idle.  The  necessary  provisioning  of  the  population  will  be  maintained.  .  .  . 
A  great  part  of  the  garrison  in  closed  formations  with  machine  guns  and 
artillery  have  placed  themselves  at  the  disposal  of  the  Workmen's  and 
Soldiers'  Council.  The  movement  will  be  directed  in  common  by  the 
Social  Democratic  Party  of  Germany  and  the  Independent  Social  Demo- 
cratic Party  of  Germany.  .  .  .  Workmen  and  soldiers  provide  for  the 
maintenance  of  peace  and  order.     Long  live  the  Socialistic  Republic." 

Meanwhile  what  remained  of  the  imperial  government  of  Germany 
was  centered  at  the  chancellery  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse.  At  9:15  a.  m.  the 
Chancellor  was  informed  that  the  German  Field  Armies  would  no  longer 
recognize  the  Kaiser  as  commander-in-chief.  At  10  a.  m.  reports  reached 
the  chancellery  of  the  mutiny  of  the  x\lexander  Regiment,  Fourth  Naum- 
burger  Jaeger  Regiment,  and  Jueterbogker  Artillery.  As  the  Jaegers  were 
considered  the  most  reliable  troops  of  the  Berlin  Garrison,  their  revolt  was 
regarded  as  sealing  the  fate  of  the  Kaiser.  In  despair,  Wahnschaff  ex- 
claimed to  the  Prince  that  only  the  abdication  of  the  Emperor  could  save 
the  monarchy.  Prince  Max  spent  the  morning  in  frantic  efforts  to  secure 
the  Kaiser's  abdication,  but  it  was  not  until  11  o'clock  that  he  was  informed 
the  decision  had  been  made  and  that  the  formula  was  being  discussed. 

At  that  hour  the  strike  of  the  workmen  and  the  mutiny  of  the  troops 
had  become  general  throughout  the  capital.  At  any  moment  the  masses 
might  have  proclaimed  the  deposition  of  the  Kaiser  and  established  a 
provisional  government.  Prince  Max,  therefore,  determined  to  act  upon 
his  own  authority  in  a  last  desperate  efifort  to  give  the  crisis  a  constitutional 
solution.  He  accordingly  issued  the  following  decree :  "The  Kaiser  and 
King  has  decided  to  renounce  the  throne.  The  Imperial  Chancellor  will 
remain  in  office  until  the  questions  connected  with  the  abdication  of  the 
Kaiser,  the  renunciation  by  the  Crown  Prince  of  the  throne  of  the  German 
Empire  and  of  Prussia,  and  the  setting  up  of  a  regency,  have  been  settled. 
On  behalf  of  the  regency  he  intends  to  appoint  Deputy  Ebert  as  Imperial 
Chancellor,  and  he  proposes  that  a  bill  should  be  brought  in  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  law  providing  for  immediate  promulgation  of  universal 
suffrage  and  for  the  election  of  a  Constituent  German  National  Assembly 
which  will  finally  settle  the  future  form  of  government  of  the  German 
Nation  and  of  those  peoples  which  may  be  desirous  of  coming  into  the 
empire." 

The  news  of  the  Kaiser's  abdication  spread  like  wildfire  through  Berlin 
and  assured  the  strikers  and  soldiers  of  a  Socialist  victory.     Red  flags 


THE    NINTH    OF   NOVEMBER  51 

were  hoisted  over  the  Vorivaerts  building  and  other  SociaUst  headquarters. 
Agitators  harangued  the  mobs  which  surged  through  the  Unter  den  Linden 
from  the  Palace  to  the  Reichstag  building.  Cockades  and  insignia  van- 
ished from  the  uniforms  of  officers  and  soldiers. 

While  the  proletariat  demonstrated  against  the  empire,  the  Majority 
Socialist  leaders,  Ebert  and  Scheidemann,  commenced  negotiations  with 
the  Independents.  Ledebour,  Dittmann,  and  Vogtherr,  Independent 
leaders,  had  spent  the  night  in  the  Reichstag  building.  Their  party  had 
planned  to  seize  power  on  the  following  day,  but  the  Majority  Socialists, 
although  weakened  by  the  events  preceding  the  abdication,  were  still  in 
control  of  the  situation.  The  Independents  refused  to  accept  the  con- 
ditions of  the  Majority  Socialists  and  postponed  a  meeting  of  the  two 
parties  with  the  newly-formed  workmen's  and  soldiers'  council  ojf  Berlin. 

From  a  window  of  the  Reichstag  Scheidemann  read  the  Kaiser's 
abdication,  and  announced:  "The  monarchial  system  has  collapsed.  A 
great  part  of  the  garrison  has  joined  us.  The  Hohenzollerns  have  abdi- 
cated. Long  live  the  great  German  republic.  Ebert  is  forming  a  new 
government  to  which  both  Social  Democratic  parties  will  adhere.  Deputy 
Gohre,  who  has  been  assigned  as  adjutant  to  the  military  commander-in- 
chief,  will  attest  all  military  orders.  Nothing  dare  destroy  the  great 
victory  which  we  have  achieved.  Let  us  maintain  peace,  order  and 
security."^«° 

At  three  o'clock  Ebert,  Scheidemann  and  the  members  of  the  work- 
men's council,  Prolat  and  Heller,  went  to  the  chancellery  and  informed 
Prince  Max  that  only  the  formation  of  a  Socialist  government  could  save 
Germany.  In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  his  decree  Prince  Max 
thereupon  requested  Ebert  to  assume  the  office  of  imperial  chancellor. 

Only  in  a  nation  trained  by  an  autocratic  military  government  to  habits 
of  obedience  could  such  a  course  have  been  possible.  Prince  Max  repre- 
sented here  the  attempt  to  legalize  the  revolution  in  imitation  of  the  bour- 
geoisie of  France  in  1830.  Up  to  the  last  he  clung  to  the  monarchial  prin- 
ciple. Ebert  and  Scheidemann  sought  on  the  other  hand  to  establish  a 
democratic  republic  by  peaceful  means  and  with  an  avoidance,  if  possible, 
of  extra  legal  methods.  The  Independents  alone  wished  to  break  with  the 
past,  to  overthrow  by  force  the  capitalistic  and  bourgeois  state,  and  to  erect 
a  Socialistic  republic.  As  for  the  Pan-Germans  and  bourgeoisie  they 
played  a  miserable  part  on  this  day  of  proletarian  victory.  Those  who 
had  preached  world  conquest  as  the  goal  of  Germany  were  unwilling  to 
defend  even  the  capital  of  their  king  against  a  Socialist  rebellion. 

Ebert  actually  made  an  attempt  to  assume  the  office  of  Imperial  Chan- 
cellor. Immediately  after  assuming  office  he  issued  a  manifesto  to  his 
countrymen  worded  as  follows:    "Fellow  citizens!     The  former  Imperial 


'  Deutscher  Geschichtskalender,  I  Heft,  36. 


52  THE  GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

Chancellor,  Prince  Max  of  Baden,  has  with  the  consent  of  all  the  secre- 
taries of  state,  turned  over  to  nie  the  safeguarding  of  all  the  affairs  of  the 
Imperial  Chancellor.  I  am  about  to  form  a  new  government  in  agreement 
with  the  parties,  and  will  shortly  inform  the  public  concerning  the  result. 
The  new  government  will  be  a  people's  government.  Its  effort  must  be  to 
give  peace  as  quickly  as  jxissible  to  the  German  people  and  to  strengthen 
the  freedom  which  it  has  won."  To  all  the  officials  and  employees  of  the 
empire  Ebert  announced :  "The  new  government  has  taken  over  the  con- 
duct of  aft'airs  in  order  to  preserve  the  German  people  from  civil  war  and 
starvation  and  in  order  to  carry  out  its  just  demands  for  self  determina- 
tion." He  called  upon  all  administrative  officials  irrespective  of  their 
political  beliefs  to  remain  at  their  posts  in  order  to  save  the  Fatherland 
from  misery  and  anarchy.^^^ 

Even  before  the  announcement  of  the  Kaiser's  abdication  the  Majority 
Socialists  had  commenced  negotiations  with  the  Independents  for  the 
formation  of  a  united  Socialist  government.  The  Independents,  however, 
demanded :  the  establishment  of  a  Socialistic  republic  with  executive  and 
legislative  power  in  the  hands  of  trustees  of  the  proletariat  and  soldiers; 
the  exclusion  from  the  government  of  the  bourgeoisie,  with  the  exception 
of  technical  department  ministers  ;  an  agreement  merely  for  a  provisional 
co5peration  of  three  days  in  order  to  sign  the  armistice;  and  finally  com- 
plete equality  of  leadership  in  the  united  cabinet.  By  the  evening  of 
November  9  the  Social  Democrats  replied  to  the  six  points  of  the  Inde- 
pendents, stating :  that  the  constituent  assembly  must  decide  the  question 
of  a  Socialist  republic;  that  the  establishment  of  a  dictatorship  by  a 
portion  of  a  social  class  was  contrary  to  their  democratic  principles ;  that 
their  party  must  reject  the  demand  to  exclude  the  bourgeoisie  from  the 
government ;  that  the  Independents  must  remain  in  the  government  until 
the  meeting  of  the  National  Assembly ;  and  finally,  that  they  accepted  the 
demands  of  the  Independents  concerning  the  department  ministers  and 
the  principle  of  equality  in  the  cabinet.^^^  -phus  the  first  revolutionary 
day  passed  in  negotiations  between  the  Socialist  factions.  The  Majority 
Socialists  had  one  great  advantage:  they  were  in  possession  of  the  Reich- 
stag Building  and  Chancellery.  Both  parties  now  appealed  to  the  work- 
men and  soldiers  for  support  in  forming  a  provisional  government.  The 
fate  of  Germany  was  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  proletariat  of  the  capital.^**^ 

On  the  night  of  November  9  the  workmen's  and  soldiers'  council  of 
greater  Berlin  met  in  the  chamber  of  the  Reichstag.  Barth,  the  chairman 
of  the  assembly,  paid  tribute  to  the  victorious  revolution  of  the  Berlin 
proletariat  and  of  the  garrison.     The  meeting  then  decided  to  elect  on 

'"  DeutscJier  Geschichtskalender,  I  Heft,  36-37.    Bekanntmachungen,  1050. 

'"  Deutscher  Geschichtskalender,  I  Heft,  38. 

"*  Germanicus,  "Zum  9  November,"  is  a  typical  reactionary  account  of  the  revolt. 


THE    NINTH   OF   NOVEMBER 


53 


the  following  day  workmen's  councils  in  the  factories.  One  delegate  to 
the  council  was  to  be  elected  by  every  one  thousand  workmen,  the  smaller 
factories  uniting  to  elect  one  delegate.  Soldier  delegates  were  to  be 
elected,  one  to  each  battalion  or  independent  unit,  by  the  garrison  in  their 
respective  barracks  and  military  hospitals.  It  was  finally  voted  that  the 
elected  members  should  meet  in  the  Zirkus  Busch  at  five  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon  to  choose  the  provisional  government.  That  night  the  Work- 
men's and  Soldiers'  Council  issued  a  proclamation  calling  for  the  mainten- 
ance of  order  and  the  protection  of  the  provisioning  system  of  Berlin. 
It  was  signed  by  the  deputy  of  the  chancellor  and  the  minister  of  the 
interior,  by  representatives  of  the  people's  committee,  by  representatives 
of  the  soldiers'  council,  and  by  the  Berlin  commission  of  labor  unions. 

The  call  for  the  maintenance  of  order  was  not  unwarranted,  since 
street  fighting  broke  out  toward  evening.  Late  in  the  afternoon  Karl 
Liebknecht  and  his  Spartacan  followers  occupied  the  Palace,  hoisted 
the  red  flag,  and  ordered  the  bells  of  the  illuminated  cathedral  to  be  rung 
in  celebration  of  the  proletarian  victory.  The  soldiers'  council  occupied 
the  police  presidency  and  army  headquarters.^^*  At  night  street  fighting 
occurred  between  groups  of  loyal  officers  and  revolutionary  soldiers. 
Machine  guns  were  used  in  the  Friedrichstrasse  and  before  the  Library 
and  the  University  on  the  Unter  den  Linden. 

The  only  organized  resistance  to  the  revolution  was  made  by  a  group 
of  officers,  cadets,  and  palace  officials  who  gathered  in  the  royal  mews 
and  there  barricaded  themselves.  During  the  entire  course  of  this  revolu- 
tionary day  only  fifteen  people  were  killed.  To  these  martyrs  was  accorded 
on  November  20  a  public  funeral  and  they  were  buried  in  Friedrichshain 
beside  the  heroes  of  1848.^^^ 

Formation  of  the  Revolutionary  Government 

Berlin  awoke  on  the  morning  of  November  10  to  a  realization  of  the 
fact  that,  although  the  monarchy  had  been  overthrown  in  a  single  day, 
unless  a  coalition  Socialist  government  was  formed  at  once  civil  war 
would  break  out  between  the  Socialist  factions.  The  Vorwaerts  earnestly 
pleaded  for  a  union  of  all  Socialists  to  complete  the  victory  of  the  revolu- 
tion, to  prevent  the  self-destruction  of  the  proletariat  and  to  avert  a 
condition  of  chaos.  The  Independents  also  saw  the  necessity  of  a  compro- 
mise. Opposed  to  a  coalition  government  were,  however,  the  Spartacans, 
the  extreme  left  of  German  Socialism,  who  in  their  party  organization 
demanded:  the  disarming  of  the  police  and  royalist  military  and  the 
arming  of  the  people ;  occupation  of  all  civil  offices  and  commands  by 
commissioners  of  the  workmen's  and  soldiers'  council ;  seizure  of  all  arms, 

'"Runkel,  op.  cit.,  116. 
'"  Kuttner,  op.  cit..  28-29. 


54  THE   GERMAN    REV^OLUTION 

ammunition,  and  war  industries  by  the  councils;  control  of  transportation 
by  the  councils;  abolition  of  military  justice  and  establishment  of  voluntary 
discipline;  taking  over  of  the  government  by  the  Berlin  workmen's  and 
soldiers'  council  until  tlio  formation  of  a  national  council  of  workmen  and 
soldiers;  elections  of  workmen's  and  soldiers'  councils  with  full  legal  and 
executive  powers  by  the  entire  grown  working  people  in  city  and  country 
and  without  regard  to  sex ;  abolition  of  the  dynasties  and  states  and  forma- 
tion of  a  unified  Socialist  republic ;  immediate  resumption  of  relations 
with  brother  parties  abroad ;  immediate  recall  of  the  Russian  embassy  to 
Berlin. 

The  Independents  were  determined,  however,  to  unite  with  the  Major- 
ity Socialists,  and  on  November  10  a  deputation  arrived  at  the  chancellery 
with  the  ultimatum  of  their  party.  This  declared  that  the  Independent 
Social  Democratic  Party  was  ready  to  enter  the  cabinet  under  the  follow- 
ing conditions:  the  cabinet  to  be  composed  entirely  of  Socialists  who  will 
be  commissioners  of  the  people;  the  departmental  ministers  to  be  technical 
helpers  assisted  by  two  adjutants  chosen  from  the  Social  Democratic 
parties;  the  period  of  Independent  cooperation  not  to  be  limited;  the 
supreme  political  power  to  be  in  the  hands  of  the  workmen's  and  soldiers' 
councils,  which  are  to  be  summoned  from  all  Germany  to  a  general 
assembly ;  the  question  of  electing  a  National  Assembly  to  be  discussed 
after  the  consolidation  of  revolutionary  conditions ;  Haase,  Dittmann,  and 
Barth  to  be  delegated  by  the  party  to  the  cabinet."^ 

The  Majority  Socialists  had  already  formed  a  government  under  the 
leadership  of  Ebert  and  Scheidemann.  Their  followers  were  in  possession 
of  the  Reichstag  and  the  government  offices,  while  the  commander-in-chief 
in  the  ]\Iarks  had  been  appointed  by  them.  Hindenburg  at  General  Head- 
quarters recognized  their  authority.  Notwithstanding  the  opposition  of 
Independents  and  Spartacans,  the  Social  Democrats  formed  the  majority 
in  the  Berlin  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Council.  The  party  therefore 
might  have  ruled  alone  and,  by  convoking  at  once  a  National  Assembly, 
it  might  have  perpetuated  itself  in  power.  But  its  policy  had  been  since 
November  first  one  of  compromise.  A  proclamation  issued  by  Ebert  on 
November  11  stated:  "The  Kaiser  has  abdicated  and  his  eldest  son  has 
renounced  the  throne.  The  Social  Democratic  party  has  taken  over  the 
government  and  has  offered  entrance  into  the  cabinet  on  the  basis  of 
complete  equality  to  the  Independent  Social  Democratic  Party." 

The  Majority  Socialists  accepted,  November  10,  the  conditions  of  the 
Independents  and  a  revolutionary  cabinet  composed  of  the  Social  Demo- 
crats, Ebert,  Scheidemann,  and  Landsberg,  and  the  Independents,  Haase, 
Dittmann,  and  Barth,  was  immediately  formed.  This  government  was  at 
once  recognized  by  the  army,  the  bureaucracy,  the  principal  federal  states, 


'  Deutscher  Geschichtskalender,  I  Heft,  42. 


THE    NINTH   OF   NOVEMBER  55 

and  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  German  people.  Although  the 
Socialists  thus  seized  the  power  of  the  state,  they  did  so  with  the  con- 
sciousness that  they  were  the  only  class  which  had  opposed  that  policy 
of  conquest  which  had  ruined  Germany.  Within  a  day  the  monarchical 
German  people  acknowledged  this  government.^^^ 

"The  cause  of  freedom",  said  Ebert  at  the  close  of  the  events  of 
November  9,  "has  experienced  today  in  Germany  one  of  its  greatest  days 
of  victory.  The  German  people  have  conquered  and  the  old  established 
rule  of  the  Hohenzollerns,  Wittelsbachs,  and  Guelphs  has  been  over- 
thrown. Germany  has  completed  its  revolution.  After  the  abdication 
of  the  Kaiser,  Prince  Max,  who  had  already  handed  in  his  resignation, 
formally  bestowed  the  chancellorship  upon  me.  Actually  the  people  have 
by  their  will  made  me  chancellor.  .  .  .  Monarchism  and  imperalism  are 
gone  from  Germany.  The  constitutional  national  assembly  will  establish 
a  government  which  shall  represent  as  near  as  is  humanly  possible  the 
will  of  the  people.  Germany's  future  state  is  the  republic  and  the  free 
German  nation  will  regard  itself  as  fortunate  to  become  an  equally  re- 
spected member  of  the  international  league  of  free  nations."  ^^^  _, 

The  fundamental  characteristic  of  the  German  revolution  was  the 
efficient  control  of  the  movement  by  the  forces  of  the  barracks  and  the 
labor  unions.  Unsupported  by  the  intellectuals  and  lacking  therefore 
great  leaders,  the  revolution  developed  rapidly  and  overthrew  the  empire 
without  apparent  efifort.  The  explanation  of  this  success  is  of  course  1 
the  fact  that  the  imperial  s}'stem  had  ceased  to  be  recognized  by  the  people 
and  functioned  merely  as  an  apparatus.  Every  genuine  revolution  pos- 
sesses an  ideal,  uses  force  to  achieve  its  ends,  and  organizes  society  in 
conformity  with  its  principles.  In  Germany  the  ideal  of  political  and 
economic  democracy,  grasped  by  the  great  masses  of  the  nation,  over- 
threw the  power  of  the  imperial  government. 

Just  as  every  revolution  of  necessity  overthrows  the  decadent  political'    7 
structure  by  force,  so  every  revolution  develops  extremists  after  initial 
success  and  creates  thereby  the  possibility  of  anarchy.     There  has  never 
been  a  genuine  revolution  in  which  the  victory  of  the  revolutionists  over 
the  old  order  meant  the  final  possession  of  power.     No  sooner  is  the 
political  and  social  structure  weakened  by  the  fall   of  the  established    \ 
regime,  than  the  struggle  of  classes,  parties,  and  class  groups  for  power  ^. 
begins.    In  the  inevitable  internal  struggle,  only  a  decision  of  arms  brings 
the  capitulation  of  the  extremists.    The  history  of  the  German  revolution 
from  November,  1918,  until  the  adoption  of  the  constitution  is  that  of  a 
constant  struggle  of  radical  parties  for  power. 

^"'  Dclbriick,  in  Preussichc  Jahrbucher,  January,  1919. 
'•*  Runkel,  op.  cit.,  121. 


56  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

In  the  external  struggle  for  world  conquest  the  Pan-Germans  had 
ruined  the  empire  and  ultimately  suffered  defeat.  Now  in  the  internal 
conllict  the  Socialists  completed  the  military  defeat  by  adding  to  it  internal 
dissolution.^®® 

The  Fall  of  the  Princes 

The  practical  deposition  of  William  II  on  November  9  in  Berlin 
brought  to  an  ignominious  end  that  German  empire  which  Bismarck  had 
founded  with  blood,  iron,  and  secret  diplomacy.  In  the  second  week  of 
November  all  the  other  German  thrones  collapsed.  Although  the  Bavarian 
dynasty  and  the  Ilanseatic  oligarchies  had  capitulated  to  a  revolutionary 
democracy  before  the  ninth  of  November,  the  majority  of  the  German 
federal  princes  had  been  able  to  hold  their  thrones  until  the  Kaiser  abdi- 
cated. As  they  were  equally  involved  in  the  ruin  of  the  Hohenzollern 
empire,  the  lesser  monarchical  governments  collapsed  without  any  resist- 
ance to  revolutionary  Socialism. 

The  fall  of  the  Bavarian  monarchy  was  followed  by  that  of  the 
kingdom  of  Wiirttemberg.  Here  the  democratic  royal  house  was  quickly 
involved  in  the  general  monarchical  disaster.  In  forming  a  provisional 
government  on  November  9,  the  Wiirttemberg  Socialists  established  at 
Stuttgart  close  relations  with  the  rest  of  revolutionary  Germany.  The 
King  of  Wiirttemberg  abdicated  in  a  dignified  document  and  refused  to 
hoist  the  red  flag  over  his  palace  because  it  was  his  private  property."" 
So  weak  were  the  Socialists  in  Wiirttemberg  that  they  called  upon  the 
bourgeois  parties  to  form  a  coalition  government  with  them."^ 

The  grand  duchy  of  Baden,  under  the  rule  of  the  able  house  of 
Zahringen,  had  long  been  the  most  democratic  state  in  Germany.  Here, 
however,  in  the  most  liberal  of  the  monarchical  states,  the  revolutionary 
movement  began  with  the  revolt  of  the  soldiers,  the  formation  of  revolu- 
tionary committees,  and  the  resignation  of  the  civil  and  military  authori- 
ties. A  provisional  government  was  formed  on  November  10  and  on 
the  fourteenth  the  Grand  Duke  abdicated.  No  resistance  was  offered  by 
the  monarch  whose  nephew  had  deposed  the  Hohenzollern  Emperor.  Of 
all  the  German  princes,  Friedrich  von  Baden  played  the  worthiest  part  in 
the  revolution. 

On  November  10  King  Friedrich  August  III  of  Saxony  ingloriously 
renounced  his  title,  stating  that  he  would  allow  no  defense  of  the  throne 
and  that  the  people  could  get  along  by  themselves  in  the  future. 

The  Grand  Duke  of  Saxe- Weimar  offered  violent  resistance  to  those 
who  would  depose  him  until  he  was  promised  personal  security.     The 

^'•Lederer,  "Einige  Gedanken  zur  Soziologie  der  Revolution,"  11-20. 
"•  Runkel,  "Die  Deutsche  Revolution,"  134. 
*"  Menke-Gliickert,  op.  cit.,  66. 


THE   NINTH   OF   NOVEMBER  57 

Duke  of  Brunswick  was  forced  to  abdicate  to  avoid  deposition  and 
possible  assassination.  In  Oldenburg  the  Socialists  held  a  great  demon- 
stration on  November  7,  which  was  followed  shortly  afterward  by  the 
abdication  on  November  11  of  the  Grand  Duke,  Friederick  August.  The 
Grand  Duke  of  Hesse  abdicated  on  November  10,  as  did  also  the  Prince 
Heinrich  XXVII  of  Reuss  Younger  Line. 

The  Prince  of  Lippe-Detmold  abdicated  on  the  eleventh,  Adolf  of 
Schaumburg-Lippe  on  the  fifteenth,  and  Duke  Karl  Eduard,  formerly 
the  Duke  of  Albany,  on  the  thirteenth.  In  the  next  few  days  the  rulers  of 
Anhalt,  and  Altenburg  abdicated.  On  November  14  the  Grand  Duke, 
Friedrich  Franz  IV  of  Mecklenburg-Schwerin,  who  was  also  regent  of 
Strelitz,  issued  a  decree  renouncing  the  throne  for  himself  and  his  house. 
Thus  ended  the  ancient  Obotrite  monarchy. 

The  last  German  ruler  to  abdicate  was  the  Prince  of  Schwarzburg- 
Rudolstadt,  head  of  a  picturesque  district  in  the  forest  of  Thuringia.  He 
had  escaped  for  only  a  few  days  the  fate  of  his  royal  brothers.^'^^ 

The  war  destroyed  the  German  monarchies  which  were  not  strong 
enough  to  .survive  the  tasks  imposed  upon  them.^^^  They  blocked  the  reor- 
ganization of  Germany,  were  opposed  to  democracy,  and,  therefore,  fell. 
The  monarchical  ideal  was  damaged,  perhaps  permanently,  by  these  inglo- 
rious abdications.  The  red  flag  floated  over  the  palaces,  while  royal  mot- 
toes vanished  from  the  courts,  the  newspapers,  and  the  commercial  world. 
The  republican  spirit  of  1848,  which  had  been  crushed  by  the  reaction, 
was  indeed  avenged  in  1918.  Just  as  Versailles  stands  as  a  monument  of 
royal  extravagance  so  the  innumerable  royal  palaces  of  Germany  will 
remain  symbolical  of  an  era  of  political  tutelage.     ^^'  : 


^"  Deutscher  Geschiclitskalendey,  "Die  Deutsche  Revolution,"  I  Heft,  93-151,  con- 
tains the  important  acts  of  abdication  issued  by  the  German  rulers. 
"'  Naumann,  "Die  Demokratie,"  5-7. 


58  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 


IV. 

SOCIALISM  AND  SOCIALIZATION 
The  Social  Democratic  Party  During  the  War 

To  understand  the  history  of  the  November  revolution  it  is  necessary 
to  comprehend  the  tripartite  character  of  German  sociaUsm,  for  the 
history  of  the  revolutionary  movement  from  the  signing  of  the  armistice 
until  the  adoption  of  the  constitution  is  almost  entirely  that  of  the  struggle 
of  the  three  socialist  factions  for  controLof  tlie  state.  It  w^as  the  great 
tragedy  of  the  German  proletariat  that  at  the  moment  of  triumph  over 
the  autocratic  and  capitalistic  empire,  the  socialists  were  divided  into 
hostile  groups,  and  had  been  so  divided  since  the  beginning  of  the  war. 
'One  hundred  years  after  the  birth  of  Karl  Marx  the  German  proletariat 
seized  control  of  the  national  government,  but  were  unable  to  establish^ 
socialism.  Majority  Socialists,  Independent  Socialists,  and  Spartacans, 
all  considered  themselves  the  true  representatives  of  Marx  and  Engels, 
and  waged  a  fratricidal  war  with  one  another.  That  the  Marxian  teach- 
ing was  thus  capable  of  different  interpretations  emphasizes  its  inner 
contradictions  and  its  failure  to  remain  entirely  in  accord  with  the  reality 
of  historical  development.  Now  Marxism  is  not  only  an  economic  theory 
but  it  is  also  a  Weltanschauung.  As  an  economic  theory  the  teaching  of 
Marx  is  evolutionary,  but  as  a  political  and  historical  interpretation  of 
human  progress  it  is  distinctly  revolutionary.^'^* 

The  Communist  Manifesto  of  1847  prophesied  the  fall  of  the  existing 
economic  system,  the  supplanting  of  the  capitalistic  organization  of  society 
by  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat,  and  the  achievement  ultimately  by 
humanity  of  the  goal  of  stateless  communistic  society.'^^^  The  demand  for 
secularization,  for  the  expropriation  of  the  expropriators,  comes  first  from 
Marx.  Marx  erred  in  stating  that  the  increase  of  the  misery  of  the  masses 
would  be  the  result  of  the  development  of  capitalism.  Other  economic 
factors  have  distinctly  altered  this  conception.  Karl  Renner,  the  Austrian 
Socialist  and  statesman,  wrote  in  his  work,  "Marxismus  Krieg  und  Inter- 
nationale" :  "The  capitalistic  society,  as  Marx  experienced  and  described 
it,  does  not  exist  any  more."  Bernstein  sought  by  Revisionism  to  hold 
together  what  was  possible  of  Marxism  and  to  build  then  a  foundation  for 
new  evolutionary  tactics. ^^® 


"*  Gisbert,  "Von  Marx  bis  Lenin"  in  Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  September,  1919, 
391-400. 

'"  Weber,  "Der  Sozialismus,"  17. 

"*  Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  September,  1919,  400. 


SOCIALISM    AND    SOCIALIZATION  59 

Immediately  before  the  war  the  industrial  workmen  improved  the 
general  conditions  of  life  and  work  in  Germany.  Better  food,  clothing, 
dwellings,  heating,  lighting,  and  even  luxuries  were  secured  for  the 
proletariat  than  at  any  time  since  the  industrial  revolution.  In  opposition 
to  the  law  of  misery,  German  writers  now  spoke  of  the  law  of  social 
development  or  the  law  of  social  solidarity  of  interest.  Kumpmann 
asserted,  "As  long  as  the  national  economy  develops  the  standard  of  life 
of  the  employer  class,  so  long  will  that  of  the  workmen  improve."  ^^^ 

The  growing  Socialist  Party  of  Imperial  Germany,  conscious  of  the 
national  economic  development,  waited  therefore  quietly  to  take  the 
inheritance  in  accordance  with  this  evolutionary  theory ;  but  during  the 
war  the  inheritance  was  dissipated  by  the  economic  collapse  of  the  Father- 
Iand.i^« 

The  German  revolution  was  not  due  primarily  to  economic  causes. 
There  was  no  miserable  proletariat  which  rose  against  capitalism,  nor 
was  there  any  considerable  agitation  against  capitalists  and  employers. 
The  revolution  was  distinctly  not  the  fulfilment  of  the  economic  develop- 
ment prophesied  by  Marx.  When  millions  returned  from  the  fronts  and 
it  was  imperative  that  they  should  be  able  to  find  an  economic  field  of 
activity,  there  was  no  systematic  attempt  made  to  seize  the  industries  of 
the  nation.  It  is  especially  significant  that  the  hatred  of  the  revolutionary 
masses  was  directed  not  against  the  capitalists  and  factory  owners  but 
against  the  army  ofificers  and  bureaucrats. 

It  would  be  erroneous,  however,  to  conclude  that  the  socialistic  move- 
ment was  not  the  predominating  one  of  the  revolution  nor  socialism  the 
great  ideal  of  the  advancing  German  proletariat. ^^^  Orthodox  socialism 
struggled  for  power  in  Germany  against  liberalism,  anarchism,  and  state 
socialism.  The  parole  of  socialism  was  and  is  ''through  equality  to  true 
freedom,  I'egalitc  dcs  faits".  The  decline  of  Marxism  as  a  diagnosis  of 
history  and  as  a  prophetic  view  of  social  and  economic  development  has 
not  destroyed  the  value  of  socialism.^®"  To  the  masses  socialism  still 
appears  to  be  the  means  of  dividing  equally  the  Marxian  surplus  value 
among  the  entire  proletariat,  as  a  result  of  which  all  cares  will  disappear ; 
the  hours  of  work  will  be  reduced ;  the  years  of  labor  will  be  shortened ; 
and  misery  will  vanish. ^"^  Although  critics  have  pointed  out  the  limited 
character  of  this  annual  surplus  value  in  even  the  great  industrial  states, 
that   fact  has  not  diminished  the  belief  of  the  proletariat  in  socialism. 


'"  Kumpmann,  "Die  Neuere  Entwickelung,"  46. 

"'  Naumann,  "Die  Demokratie,"  14. 

*™Goetz,  "Deutsche  Demokratie,"  43. 

***  Kumpmann,  "Die  Bedeutung  der  Revolution,"  5. 

**"  Rathenau,  "Kritik  der  Dreifachen  Revolution,"  Zi. 


60  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

Ebert  said,  "Work  is  the  religion  of  socialism."  Scheidemann  declared, 
"Developed  from  scientific  principles,  socialism  is  the  highest  organiza- 
tion of  mental  and  manual  labor."  ^^^ 

This  organization  has,  how,ever,  a  negative  and  a  positive  side, 
evidenced  by  the  necessity  on  one  hand  of  dispossessing  the  bourgeoisie 
and  on  the  other  of  organizing  the  seized  possessions  for  higher  produc- 
tivity. Socialism  aims  positively  not  at  dividing  but  at  holding  together, 
substituting  for  individualistic  production  the  systematic  planned  produc- 
tion of  the  entirety.  The  earnings  from  capital  form  the  mass  w^hich  is 
divided ;  but  if  production  declines  the  profits  from  capital  become  of 
little  value  to  the  proletariat.  Kuttner  states:  "Socialism  is  only  capable 
of  existing  w^hen  it  makes  us  richer  as  a  whole — not  if  it  makes  us 
poorer.  ...  To  work  toward  that  conception  in  which  misery  and 
sufifering  are  past  and  forgotten  ideas,  in  which  the  people  are  not  only 
in  possession  of  political  rights  but  also  in  complete  possession  of  the 
cultural  achievements  which  have  come  down  to  us  in  ever  increasing 
manner  from  our  ancestors ;  to  work  toward  that  condition  in  which 
order,  well-being,  good  manners  and  contentment,  spiritual  striving  and 
robust  activity  form  the  normality  of  human  life,  that  is  the  most  beautiful 
and  the  finest  task  of  the  German  Republic."  "^ 

The  doctrines  of  socialism  had  been  fearlessly  advocated  in  imperial 
Germany  by  the  Social  Democratic  Party.  Notwithstanding  the  assaults 
of  the  government,  the  conservatives,  and  even  the  democratic  parties,  it 
had  grown  rapidly  as  a  revolutionary  group  from  the  end  of  the  Bis- 
marckian  era  until  the  outbreak  of  the  world  war.  It  had  built  up  a  party 
organization  and  a  party  machinery  unequaled  by  any  other  political 
group  in  the  Fatherland.  Although  in  the  first  decade  of  the  century  it 
had  produced  no  great  men  comparable  with  Lassalle,  Marx,  Engels, 
and  Bebel,  it  had  nevertheless  trained  able  organizers  and  efficient 
leaders.  The  party  had  survived  the  shock  of  revisionism,  and,  aided  by 
a  truly  Prussian  discipline  which  did  not  disdain  bureaucratic  methods,  it 
had  achieved  a  great  victory  in  the  Reichstag  elections  preceding  the  war. 
Refusing  to  play  practical  politics,  denouncing  parliamentarism,  and  ex- 
pecting confidently  the  revolution,  this  party  met  its  first  great  disaster  in 
the  outbreak  of  the  world  war.  Powerless  to  prevent  the  inevitable  world 
conflict,  the  party  found  its  millions  of  voters  involved  in  the  maelstrom 
^joi  war  and  nationalism.  The  German  rising  of  1914  with  its  nationalistic 
'  and  patriotic  fervor  threatened  to  destroy  the  doctrine  of  socialism  as 
the  ideal  of  the  Teutonic  proletariat. 

In  the  historic  session  of  the  Reichstag  in  the  palace  of  William  II, 
the  socialist  party  leaders  accepted  the  imperial  amnesty.     On  August 


"'  Vorwaerts,  December  25,  1918. 

"^  Kuttner,  "Von  Kiel  bis  Berlin,"  15. 


SOCIALISM    AND   SOCIALIZATION  61 

4,  1914,  they  voted  the  war  credits  and  thus  entered  the  field  of 
national  politics.  This  policy  of  August  fourth  was  supported  by  the 
overwhelming  majority  of  the  German  labor  unions  and  party  organiza- 
tions.^®* In  acting  thus  the  party  broke  with  all  its  traditions  and  appar- 
ently even  for  the  time  with  the  old  dogmatism  which  taught  that  all 
history  was  in  the  final  analysis  a  class  struggle.  That  materialistic  inter- 
pretation of  history  ceased  to  be  as  a  result  of  cooperation  with  chancellors 
and  military  authorities,  a  living  dogma  of  the  party. 

From  another  viewpoint  this  parliamentary  policy  of  the  socialists  was] 
a  direct  result  of  the  suspension  of  the  class  struggle  in  Germany  by  the 
war.  The  achievements  of  the  imperial  social  legislation  inaugurated  by 
Delbriick  and  Bethmann-Hollweg,  the  development  of  revisionism,  the 
influence  of  South  Germany,  and  finally  the  supremacy  of  the  labor  unions 
over  the  party  had  all  tended  by  1914  to  bring  about  closer  cooperation 
between  Social  Democrats  and  the  bourgeois  parties  of  the  left.^®^  

The  nationalistic  policy  of  the  unions  was  expressed  by  their  leader, 
Legien.  When  the  Socialists  adopted  on  August  4  the  policy  of  national 
defense,  they  were  enthusiastically  supported  by  the  overwhelming  ma- 
jority of  the  proletariat."®  It  was  not  until  the  allied  blockade  had  forced 
upon  the  nation  ration  systems,  contraband  trade,  and  wage  agitations, 
that  the  parliamentary  policy  of  the  leaders  was  questioned  by  the  masses. 
Defeatism  developed  then  throughout  Germany,  and  the  proletariat,  un- 
like their  leaders,  were  blind  to  the  social  and  economic  results  of  military 
defeat.  Yet  the  original  attitude  of  the  proletariat  toward  the  war  had 
been  nationalistic,  and  indeed  the  foundation  stone  of  German  unity  in 

1914187 

During  the  war  the  goal  of  the  Social  Democrats  was  the  control  of  the 
Reichstag.  Evolutionary  democracy  was  to  be  established  by  participation 
in  parliamentary  life.  Scheidemann  declared  in  1916  that  the  party  had 
become  strong  enough  to  look  forward  to  possessing  political  power."^ 
Succinctly  stated,  German  socialism  rejected  the  dogmas  of  the  past  in 
order  to  secure  an  immediate  parliamentary  success.  Since  1917  the 
Socialists  formed  one  of  the  three  majority  parties  of  the  Reichstag."" 


'"Jansson,  "Arbeiteriiiteressen  und  Kriegsergebnis. 

"'Legien,  "Warum  muessen  die  Gewerkschaftsfunktionaere  sich  mehr  am 
inneren  Parteileben  beteiligen?" 

"•  "Sozialdemokratie  und  nationale  Verteidigung,"  the  official  defense  of  the  social- 
ists' war  policy.    Kautsky,  "Die  Internationalitat  und  der  Krieg,"  34. 

'"  Heyde,  "Abriss  der  Sozialpolitik,"  52-55.  Lensch,  "Die  Deutsche  Sozialdemo- 
kratie und  der  Weltkrieg." 

"*  Scheidemann,  "Es  Lebe  der  Frieden." 

"•Delbriick,  in  Preussisclte  Jahrbiicher,  January,  1919,  142-143. 


62  THE   GKRMAN    REVOLUTION 

The  success  of  this  parliamentary  policy  was  not  achieved,  however, 
without  the  sacrifice  of  that  union  sacrce  of  all  German  socialists,  which 
had  existed  since  the  heroic  age  of  Marx  and  Lassalle.  Party  unity,  which 
had  survived  the  shock  of  revisionism,  was  destroyed  by  the  world  war 
and  the  success  of  Bolshevism.  Before  the  Social  Democrats  voted  the 
war  credits  on  August  4,  1914,  a  majority  of  the  party  voted  to  oppose  any 
attempt  on  the  part  of  the  imperial  government  to  give  the  war  a  character 
of  one  of  conquest.  In  that  fateful  party  caucus,  Hugo  Haase,  then  leader 
of  the  party,  with  thirteen  other  comrades  voted  against  any  support  of 
the  capitalistic  empire.  On  the  other  hand  patriotic  socialist  leaders,  as 
the  brilliant  Ludwig  Frank,  were  determined  in  any  event  to  support  the 
government.  Under  these  circumstances,  party  unity  was  in  a  precarious 
condition.  The  right  wing  of  the  party  was  frankly  nationalistic,  the 
center  was  determined  to  maintain  the  war  of  self-defense  as  proclaimed 
by  William  II,  while  the  left  wing  of  the  socialists  was  distrustful  of  the 
imperialists  and  opposed  to  any  sacrifice  of  socialist  principles  even  at  the 
expense  of  a  considerable  loss  of  followers.  The  party  discipline  of  the 
Social  Democrats  was,  however,  so  strong  and  the  influence  of  the  German 
rising  so  powerful  that  the  radical  minority  accepted  the  views  of  the 
majority  and  voted  for  the  war  credits.  Indeed  it  was  Haase  himself  who 
as  spokesman  of  the  party  uttered  those  famous  words :  "In  the  hour  of 
danger  we  will  not  desert  our  own  Fatherland."  ^^^  The  united  socialist 
support  of  the  war  was,  however,  of  short  duration.  With  the  develop- 
ment of  Pan-Germanism,  the  crisis  was  quickly  reached. 

The  victories  of  the  Central  Powers  in  1915,  which  profoundly  afifected 
the  German  proletariat,  were  received  by  the  Pan-Germans  with  jubilation 
and  led  to  an  enlargement  of  the  annexationists'  demands.  A  prominent 
socialist,  Wolfgang  Heine,  exclaimed  in  February,  1915,  that  the  defeat 
of  the  enemy  was  the  only  war  aim  of  the  German  Social  Democrats. ^^^ 
Eduard  David  wrote  about  the  same  period  a  pamphlet  entitled :  "Are  We 
Conducting  a  War  of  Conquest?"  ^^^ 

By  publishing  certain  French  plans  for  dividing  Germany,  which  were 
being  disseminated  in  the  Entente  states,  the  large  industrial  interests, 
financial  groups  and  patriotic  societies  sought  to  strengthen  their  propa- 
ganda campaign  for  the  annexation  of  Belgian,  French,  and  Russian  terri- 
tory. In  the  historic  Reichstag  session  of  December  9,  1915,  Chancellor 
von  Bethmann-Hollweg  finally  showed  that  the  imperial  government 
accepted  a  part  of  the  Pan-German  plan  of  conquest.    Speaking  of  eventual 


"*  Verhandlunyen  des  Reichstags.    Dreizehnte  Legislaturperiode.     Zweite  Session, 
Aug.  4,  1914,  9. 

"'  Hildebrand  und  Heine,  "Zwei  Reden." 
'"David,  "Fiihren  wir  Einen  Eroberungskrieg?" 


SOCIALISM    AND   SOCIALIZATION  63 

terms  of  peace,  he  declared  that  Germany  must  have  a  guaranty  in  the 
Belgian  question.  After  describing  recent  German  victories,  the  Chan- 
cellor exclaimed :  "The  open  way  to  the  Near  East  marks  a  milestone  in 
the  history  of  this  v^ar.  .  .  .  Neither  in  the  east  nor  in  the  west  dare  our 
enemies  of  today  possess  gates  of  invasion  through  which  they  can  tomor- 
row threaten  us  again  and  sharper  than  before."  As  spokesman  of  the 
bourgeois  parties,  Deputy  Spahn,  a  Centrist,  demanded  that  the  necessary 
annexations  be  made.  Speaking  as  the  representative  of  four  million 
voters,  a  socialist  replied:  "We  request  the  renunciation  of  all  plans  of 
conquest."  On  December  21,  1915,  the  government  asked  the  Reichstag 
for  additional  war  credits. ^''^ 

The  Independent  Socialists 

The  newly  announced  but  long  suspected  imperial  policy  led  to  an 
immediate  split  in  the  socialist  ranks.  By  a  narrow  vote  of  66  for  to  44 
against  the  voting  of  the  credits,  the  party  caucus  agreed  to  support  the 
government.  From  then  on  Hugo  Haase  became  the  leader  of  those  social- 
ists who  denounced  the  truce  with  the  capitalistic  empire  and  the  aban- 
donment of  the  dogmatisms  proclaimed  at  Erfurt  in  1891.  In  an  able 
speech  in  the  Reichstag  on  March  24,  1916,  Haase  reiterated  the  minority 
position.  At  this  time  David  accused  him  of  prolonging  the  war  by  his 
policy  of  oppOsition.^^* 

In  April,  1917,  these  secessionists  met  in  a  party  convention  and 
formed  the  Independent  Social  Democratic  Party  of  Germany.  They 
reaffirmed  the  fundamental  principles  of  Marxian  socialism,  denounced 
all  compromises  and  opportunism,  and  secretly  adopted  a  revolutionary 
policy. 

From  then  on  the  Independents  worked  to  overthrow  the  empire. 
By  seizing  a  portion  of  the  socialist  organization  and  by  rapidly  building 
up  new  party  machinery,  they  became  in  an  incredibly  short  time  politic- 
ally efficient  and  thoroughly  organized.  The  success  of  Bolshevism, 
despite  the  support  of  the  treaties  of  Brest  Litovsk  and  Bucharest  by  the 
Majority  Socialists,  encouraged  the  Independents  in  their  revolutionary 
policy.  Through  them  the  plan  of  establishing  revolutionary  workmen's 
and  soldiers'  councils  was  spread  throughout  Germany  and  even  to  the 
fronts.  Believing  in  the  possibility  by  means  of  the  dictatorship  of  the 
proletariat  of  a  quick  transformation  of  the  capitalistic  state  into  the  state 
of  the  future,  they  prepared  plans  for  the  immediate  socialization  of  the 
means  of  production  and  distribution  in  Germany. 

'^erhandlungen  des  Reichstags,  22  Sitzung,  9  December,  1915,  436-438. 
*•*  Verhandlungen  des  Reichstags,  37  Sitzung,  24  March,  1916. 


64  THE   (GERMAN    REVOLUTION 


TiiE  Spartacans 


Scarcely  were  the  Independent  Social  Democrats  organized  as  a 
minority  party,  than  there  appeared  upon  their  left  a  revolutionary  and 
communistic  group  of  extremists  calling  themselves  the  Spartacan  Alli- 
ance. Karl  Liebknecht,  son  of  William  Liebknecht,  was  the  founder  of 
this  section  of  socialists  which  ultimately  became  the  Communist  Party 
of  Germany.  The  development  of  this  new  school  of  thought  with  its 
exotic  interpretation  of  Marx  is  the  direct  result  of  the  world  war  and 
the  rise  of  Bolshevism.  It  is  the  most  significant  fact  in  the  recent  history 
of  German  socialism. 

The  first  German  to  recognize  the  empire's  responsibility  for  the  out- 
break of  the  war,  and  to  denounce  the  moral  guilt  of  the  German  and 
Austrian  leaders,  was  Karl  Liebknecht.  Within  the  first  year  of  the  war 
he  refused  to  support  the  nationalistic  policy  of  his  party.  On  May  1, 
1916,  he  delivered  on  the  Potsdam  Square  in  Berlin  a  revolutionary  speech 
against  the  empire. ^''^  For  his  opposition  to  the  traditional  solidarity  and 
discipline  of  the  Socialists  he  was  expelled  from  the  party.  For  sum- 
moning the  masses  to  overthrow  the  criminal  government  of  Germany 
he  was  promptly  arrested  and  imprisoned.  Nevertheless  his  protests 
against  the  nationalistic  war  policy  of  the  Social  Democrats  were  sup- 
ported by  Rosa  Luxemburg,  the  ablest  personality  of  the  women's  socialist 
movement.  As  a  result  of  the  work  of  these  leaders,  a  group  of  com- 
munists without  representation  in  the  Reichstag  began  advocating  the 
adoption  of  the  Russian  revolutionary  methods  of  1905,  the  immediate 
socialization  of  industry,  and  the  beginning  of  a  world  revolution  of  the 
proletariat. 

On  the  fifty-seventh  birthday  of  William  II  the  first  of  a  series  of 
open  political  letters,  signed  Spartacus,  appeared  in  Germany.  They 
were  addressed  to  the  leaders  of  the  Social  Democracy  and  advocated 
the  reorganization  of  all  socialistic  groups  upon  an  international  basis. 
Spartacus  declared  that  the  establishment  of  a  permanent  socialistic  society 
was  only  possible  in  case  the  entire  European  continent  was  revolutionized. 
National  revolutions  were  to  be  regarded  as  a  means  to  achieve  this  end. 
A  letter  entitled  "Retrospect  and  Prospect",  published  August  12,  1916, 
revealed  Liebknecht  as  the  author  of  most  of  the  Spartacan  letters.  These 
communications  circulated  throughout  Germany  and  were  even  sent  to 
the  fronts.  After  September  20,  1916,  the  letters  were  no  longer  hecta- 
graphed,  but  printed.^®®  Notwithstanding  police  and  censors,  the  Spar- 
tacan   literature    denouncing    the    war    and    advocating    the    cause    of 


'*"'Ein  Jahr  Sozialdemokratischer  Reichstagsarbeit  im  Kriege,"  8-12,  contains  the 
official  Social  Democratic  report  of  the  Liebknecht  affair. 
^"Tdgliche  Rundschau,  March  4,  1919. 


SOCIALISM    AND   SOCIALIZATION  65, 

communism,  continued  to  be  read  in  the  interior  of  Germany.  Wide 
publicity  was  also  given  to  certain  Spartacan  letters  by  the  Chemnitz 
V olksstimme .  This  socialist  paper  published  the  bitter  attacks  which 
accused  Haase  and  the  Independents  of  timidity  and  lack  of  vision.  "Our 
goal  is  communism",  Spartacus  declared,  "Freedom's  golden  land  of  j 
anarchy."  ^®^  J 

Although  the  deeds  of  the  Roman  gladiator  who  had  lead  his  com- 
panions and  slaves  in  the  great  uprising  were  unknown  to  the  German 
proletariat,  the  classic  name  of  this  new  communistic  group  nevertheless 
aided  the  spread  of  its  propaganda.  With  characteristic  German  thor- 
oughness, publicists  noted  that  as  early  as  1849  the  poet  and  revolutionist, 
Gottfried  Kinkel,  had  chosen  the  name  Spartacus  as  the  title  of  a  weekly 
paper.  Others  recalled  that  in  1877  Johann  Most,  publisher  of  the 
Freiheit,  before  his  flight  to  the  United  States,  declared  to  the  Berlin 
workmen  that  Spartacus  was  the  only  great  man  in  Roman  history .^^^ 

The  origins  of  Spartacism  are  traceable  to  the  communistic  movement  1 
within  the  German  social  democracy.  The  formulation  of  its  program  is, 
however,  the  result  of  the  success  of  Bolshevism.  Lenine's  interpretation 
of  Marx  was  readily  accepted  by  the  Spartacans,  and  the  soviet  system 
adopted  as  the  fundamental  part  of  their  program.  Karl  Liebknecht  and 
Rosa  Luxemburg  sought  to  raise  the  masses  at  once  against  the  bourgeois 
state.  Blindly  convinced  of  the  truth  and  practicality  of  their  ideas,  they 
prepared  a  fanatical  rising  of  the  German  proletariat.  The  Bolsheviki 
evinced  a  keen  interest  in  the  Spartacans  as  true  exponents  of  their  own 
ideals,  and  they  financed  the  Spartacan  efforts  to  overthrow  the  German 
empire. 

"All  power  to  the  workmen's  and  soldiers'  councils"  became  the 
slogan  of  the  Spartacans.  Rosa  Luxemburg  prepared  a  consistent  and 
clear  political  program  modelled  largely  on  Bolshevism.  She  drew  the 
line  sharply  between  the  communistic  Spartacans  and  the  Social  Demo- 
crats and  Independents.  The  Majority  Socialists  were  denounced  as 
practical  politicians,  opposed  to  immediate  socialization  and  advocating 
bourgeois  doctrines  of  democracy  and  the  rule  of  the  majority,  while  the 
Independent  Socialists  were  scorned  as  opportunists  who  had  abandoned 
the  true  gospel  according  to  Marx.  Spartacus  declared,  "The  workman 
has  no  Fatherland  to  defend."  ^^^ 

Although  small  in  numbers,  the  Spartacan  Alliance  was,  long  before 
the  November  revolt,  the  revolutionary  party  of  Germany.  Its  ideology 
was  that  of  the  Bolsheviki  and  its  goal  was  the  world  revolution.  "All 
reason  is  on  the  side  of  communism",  wrote  a  Spartacan  sympathizer. 


""  Wolffheim,  "Knechtschaft  oder  Weltrevolution." 

"' Lentulus,  "Wer  war  Spartakus?",  4 

'"Von  Altrock,  "Deutschlands  Niederbruch,"  46. 


66  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

"for  tlie  decision  of  the  communist  to  emerge  from  the  world  of  this  war 
gives  to  him  such  a  moral  superiority  that  nothing  on  earth  can  stand 
beside  him."  -°°  When  the  November  revolution  delivered  Germany  into 
the  hands  of  the  socialists,  the  Spartacans  were  one  of  three  factions 
capable  of  establishing  a  provisional  government. 

Theories  of  Socialization 

As  the  German  socialists  differed  in  their  interpretations  of  Marxism, 
so  too  they  were  at  variance  concerning  the  character  of  that  transition 
economy  or  period  of  socialization  which  was  to  precede  the  establishment 
of  "stateless  communistic  society".  In  the  same  manner  that  the  doctrine 
of  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  appealed  to  the  political  ideals  of  the 
Republican  Revolutionists,  the  doctrine  of  socialization  fired  the  imagina- 
tion of  those  who  believed  themselves  to  be  enmeshed  in  economic  slavery. 

During  the  world  conflict  the  failure  of  German  capitalism  had  become 
apparent  to  the  proletariat  and  a  return  after  the  war  to  the  old  economic 
conditions  was  considered  impossible.-"^  The  problem  of  socialization 
was  one,  therefore,  with  w^hich  the  German  socialists  were  concerned 
before  the  armistice.  According  to  Karl  Kautsky,  the  proletariat  in  this 
transition  period  must  consider  the  welfare  of  all  classes,  must  maintain 
international  relations  with  the  proletariat  of  all  lands,  and  must  prevent 
an  international  economic  war.  He  concluded :  "The  day  of  victory 
depends  upon  great  historic  factors  which  afifect  large  masses  of 
humanity."  ^°^ 
'—  Socialization  is  defined  by  the  socialists  as  the  ultimate  taking  over 
by  the  people's  state  of  all  the  means  of  production  in  the  hands  of 
private  capital. ^°^  This  had  been  promised  by  all  socialists  as  the  first 
fruits  of  the  revolution  which  was  to  usher  in  economic  freedom.  Social- 
ization was  to  elevate  at  once  the  economic  and  the  idealistic  situation  of 
the  working  class  to  a  place  of  equality  in  the  process  of  production ; 
and  to  increase  the  national  wealth  by  raising  the  powers  of  production 
and  distribution. ^°*  A  large  portion  of  the  German  workmen  were 
obsessed  with  the  naive  thought  that  socialization  meant  the  possession 
of  all  factories  by  the  employees  and  the  seizure  of  the  much  prized 
"surplus  value"  by  simply  raising  wages.^"^  The  belief  that  the  logical 
way  to  distribute  the  surplus  value  was  by  wage  increases  resulted  in 


^  Erhart,  "Dieser  Friede  wird  kein  Brest-Litovsk,"  15. 
*"  Froelich,  "Der  Weg  zum  Sozialismus." 
*°^  Kautsky,  "Sozialdemokratische  Bemerkungen,"  157. 
"*  Karl  Buecher  in  Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  May,  1919. 

^  Heinemann,  "Ziele  und  Gefahren  der  Sozialisierung."     Stroebel,  "Die  Soziai- 
isierung." 

"•  Heuss,  "Deutschlands  Zukunft." 


SOCIALISM    AND   SOCIALIZATION 


67 


hundreds  of  revolutionary  strikes,  riots,  and  local  revolts.  Although  all 
three  socialist  sections  agreed  in  their  definition  of  socialization,  they 
differed  on  the  question  of  the  method  of  carrying  it  out. 

Of  all  the  internal  problems  which  confronted  the  Majority  Socialists 
in  the  revolution,  none  gave  it  more  difficulty  than  that  of  socialization. 
To  establish  a  strong  revolutionary  democratic  government  for  the  entire 
Reich,  to  preserve  order,  to  maintain  the  national  economic  life,  to  con- 
clude a  just  peace  with  Germany's  enemies — these  were  the  aims  of  the 
Social  Democrats.  These  factors  therefore  vitally  affected  the  policy  of 
socialization  which  had  been  the  goal  of  the  party  since  its  foundation. ^''^ 

Addressing  the  Berlin  socialists,  Hermann  Mueller  said:  "It  is  a 
misfortune  that  our  party  received  the  portfolios  of  office  at  a  time  which 
is  as  unfavorable  as  possible  for  socialization.  The  entire  economic  life 
has  collapsed.  Almost  all  assumptions  for  socialization  are  lacking.  .  .  . 
We  do  not  dare  experiment ;  we  must  proceed  cautiously."  ^°^ 

That  which  the  undoubted  majority  of  the  proletariat  demanded  as 
their  revolutionary  right  was  now  impossible  unless  Germany's  economic 
life  was  to  be  reduced  to  the  level  of  Russia's.  Credit,  food  supplies,  raw 
materials,  transportation,  markets,  all  were  essential  to  socialization,  and 
all  were  wholly  or  partially  lacking.  Party  leaders  therefore  cautioned  the 
masses  that  .progress  toward  socialization  would  be  slow.  Even  Inde- 
pendent publicists  informed  the  proletariat  that  socialization  was  a  matter 
of  decades,  and  not  of  days.  Promises  were  made  to  the  people ;  commis- 
sions were  appointed  to  study  ways  and  means;  laws  were  prepared  to 
carry  out  the  beginnings  of  factory  councils  and  special  socialization ;  but 
the  old  economic  order  remained  virtually  intact. 

Yet  the  socialists  realized  that  certain  industries  could  be  immediately 
socialized  without  damage  to  themselves  or  to  the  state.  But  the  ability  of 
the  party  to  carry  through  such  a  measure  was  lacking.  Opposed  to 
socialization  was  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  bourgeoisie,  and  to 
establish  socialism  meant,  therefore,  to  adopt  dictatorial  methods  toward 
a  majority  of  the  nation.  The  socialist  statesmen  were,  however,  in  this 
instance,  consistent,  for  they  recognized  that  principle  of  majority  rule 
which  they  formerly  championed  against  the  imperial  autocracy. 

Socialist  writers  also  pointed  out  certain  limitations  to  the  general 
process  of  socialization. ^^^  The  principle  of  rentability  demanded  Ihat  no 
industry  should  be  socialized  which  would  require  extensive  subsidies 
from  the  state.  Other  industries  possessing  peculiarities  of  shop  tech- 
nique, such  as  the  constant  introduction  of  new  methods,  were  not  suited 


^'^Deutscher  Geschichtskalender,  II  Heft:  "Die  Deutsche  Revolution,"  50  Liefe- 
rung,  11-12. 

=»'  Vorwaerts,  7  April,  1919. 

***  Staudinger,  "Profitwirtschaft  oder  Versorgungswirtschaft." 


68  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

to  immediate  socialization.  As  a  general  rule  all  industries  which  had 
shown  a  tendency  to  concentrate,  such  as  the  electrical,  iron  and  chemical 
industries,  were  considered  to  be  in  an  economic  condition  suitable  to 
state  control.  Another  immediate  group  comprised  the  transportation 
system,  and  the  lumber  industry.  "The  chief  thing  in  socialization",  said 
Eduard  Bernstein,  "is  the  placing  of  production  and  our  economic  Ufe 
under  the  control  of  the  commonwealth."-"^ 

The  Independent  Socialists,  the  only  Reichstag  party  which  had 
actively  prepared  for  the  revolution,  regarded  the  socialization  of  the 
means  of  production  and  distribution  as  its  final  goal.  When  on  the  ninth 
of  November  they  sought  to  safeguard  the  revolution  by  presenting  their 
minimum  demands  to  the  Social  Democrats,  it  was  partly  due  to  the  fear 
that  those  practical  politicians  would  liquidate  rather  than  finish  the  revo- 
lution. The  Independents  regarded  the  National  Assembly  as  an  institu- 
tion which  would  enable  the  bourgeoisie  to  regain  control  of  Germany. 
Their  demand  that  the  supreme  political  power  should  rest  with  the 
Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Council  was  not  an  attempt  to  imitate  Soviet 
Russia,  but  to  safeguard  socialism  against  the  inevitable  reaction. 

Determined  to  complete  the  revolution  by  the  progressive  socialization 
of  the  means  of  production,  the  Independents  wished  this  work  to  be 
carried  out  solely  by  the  proletariat.  Once  socialization  was  well  under 
way  the  other  revolutionary  questions  could  be  easily  solved.  Their 
slogan  was:  "The  working  classes  alone  can  estabhsh  socialism."  The 
two  great  tasks  were:  the  abolition  of  private  ownership  of  industry  and 
the  establishment  of  the  socialistic  order  in  production  and  distribution.-^" 

Unlike  the  Spartacans,  the  Independents  did  not  believe  in  immediate 
socialization  as  a  political  rather  than  as  an  economic  measure.  Their 
program  called  for  a  gradual,  progressive,  and  consistent  carrying  out  of 
the  Marxian  theory.-^^  The  council  system  was  emphasized  as  necessary 
to  socialization  because  it  alone  was  able  to  supplant  the  administrative 
apparatus  of  the  capitaUstic  state.  The  Independents  realized  that  certain 
industries  could  be  quickly  socialized,  while  others  could  not  be  taken 
over  by  the  state  without  an  economic  disaster.  They  recognized  also  the^ 
-■danger  of  state  socialism  to  the  movement  and  strenuously  opposed  the 
taking  over  of  single  factories  by  the  workingmen.  The  Independents 
found  it  difificult  to  convince  the  radical  workers  that  socialism  was  not 
the  taking  over  of  the  industries  by  groups  of  workers  in  factories,  but  by 
the  entire  proletariat.  Above  all  they  emphasized  the  necessity  of  con- 
trolling the  banks  and  the  system  of  credit;  the  necessary  raw  materials; 
_and  the  sources  of  food  supply  in  order  to  make  socialization  possible. 


'"  Das  Neue  Reich,  Nr.  2,  8. 

""  Frolich,  "Weg  zum  Sozialismus,"  2. 

*"  Prussische  Jahrbiicher,  March,  1919,  343. 


SOCIALISM    AND   SOCIALIZATION 


69 


Their  program  was  therefore  similar  to  that  of  the  Majority  Socialists 
except  that  they  did  not  believe  in  a  ix)licy  of  socialization  which  required 
cooperation  with  the  boiirg-eois  parties  of  the  National  Assembly.^^^ ..- 

During  the  period  of  the  war  and  revolution,  a  fourth  and  non- 
socialistic  theory  of  socialization  was  propounded  by  Walther  Rathenau, 
head  of  the  General  Electric  Company.  Author  of  numerous  pamphlets, 
his  doctrines  commanded  national  attention  and  evolved  a  storm  of 
criticism  and  denunciation.  Rathenau,  however,  defended  his  theories 
with  unusual  ability. 

Analyzing  Germany's  situation,  he  wrote:  ''Before  us  is  the  lion, 
Lenine ;  at  our  left,  the  dragon  of  world  competition ;  in  our  midst,  the 
chimera,  Spartacus."  -^^  Rathenau  attacked  the  socialist  doctrine  of  the 
"equalization  of  goods".  The  theories  that  if  all  surplus  values  were 
divided  equally  the  general  well  being  would  be  assured,  and  that  if 
capitalism  were  abolished  poverty  would  disappear,  are  erroneous.  While 
socialism  demands  equality  and  well  being,  "organized  economy"  demands 
the  increase  and  cheapening  of  production.  By  means  of  social  legisla- 
tion, Rathenau  would  establish  a  national  control  of  industry.  His 
reformatory  aims  are :  national  economic  unification ;  the  ennobling  of 
work;  the  shortening  of  the  hours  of  labor;  the  equality  of  standards  of 
life;  the  abolition  of  proletarian  conditions;  the  responsibility  of  the 
individual  to  the  commonwealth  and  of  the  commonwealth  to  the  indi- 
vidual; the  change  of  rule  into  leadership  and  of  submission  into  self- 
determination.  "Economic  anarchy"  would  then  be  supplanted  by  organ- 
ization;  education  would  become  the  highest  duty  of  the  state;  class 
differences  would  be  abolished,  and  political  responsibility  would  be 
assured  by  the  establishment  of  socialization  and  the  creation  of  the 
council  form  of  government.^^* 

The  Opposition  to  Socialization 
Although  a  vociferous  and  insistent  minority  of  Germans  demanded 
immediate  socialization,  the  voices  of  the  critics  of  this  panacea  were 
even  louder.  Criticism  of  socialization  came  from  socialists,  labor  union- 
ists, economists,  intellectuals,  the  middle  class,  and  finally  the  capitalists. 
The  socialist  leaders  were  convinced  that  socialization  was  a  slow  process 
and  criticised  the  impatience  of  their  followers  with  the  government's 
policy.-^^  They  were  supported  by  the  majority  of  the  labor  unions, 
which  declared  that  the  first  year  of  the  revolution  was  not  the  time  for 
socialization  and  that  the  process  in  any  event  would  be  a  slow  one.    The 

^^Fr6Hch,"  o/>.  cit.,  20-22. 

"'  Rathenau,  "Nach  der  Flut,"  7. 

"*  Rathenau,  "Kritik  der  Drcifachen  Revolution." 

"'  Hoffmann,  "Sozialismus  oder  Kapitalismus,"  14. 


70  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

unions  also  protested  against  the  interference  of  the  workmen's  councils 
in  economic  disputes,  and  arrogated  to  themselves  the  control  of  the 
socialization  movement  in  Germany.  Their  goal  was  the  securing  of 
favorable  tariffs  in  all  industries,  and  as  they  were  bound  to  carry  out 
the  wage  and  labor  contracts  made  with  employers,  they  exercised  a 
conservative  influence  upon  the  proletariat.  Bernstein,  one  of  the  greatest 
socialist  theorists,  had  stated  that  a  long  reform  work  was  necessary 
before  the  general  socialization  of  production  could  take  place.  In  this 
he  was  supported  by  the  unions.-^*'  Kautsky  declared :  "The  difference 
between  the  establishment  of  the  republic  and  socialism  becomes  here 
apparent ;  the  former  under  favorable  conditions  can  be  carved  out  in  a 
few  hours,  while  the  erection  of  socialism  demands  decades  of  work."  ^^^ 

To  the  intellectuals  and  economists  socialization  was  either  "a  leap  in 
the  dark"  or  "Herumexperimentieren  am  siechcn  IVirtschaftskoerper". 
Publicists  wrote  that  where  competition  ends,  there  progress  ceases. 
Eucken  assailed  the  scheme  of  socialization  as  oppression  in  the  guise  of 
social  freedom.^^^  Democrats  asserted  that  the  nation's  industries  could 
not  recover  and  provide  work  for  the  returned  soldiers,  if  the  blind  cry 
of  socialization  continued. ^^^  Naumann  boldly  announced  that  although 
the  socialists  had  complete  political  power,  socialization  would  prove  to 
be  impossible.--"  Even  socialists  realized  the  difficulty  of  socialization,  due 
to  the  federal  character  of  Germany.  It  was  this  fact  for  example  which 
vitally  affected  the  socialization  of  Saxony."^  Jesuit  writers  attacked 
socialization  as  well  as  other  revolutionary  doctrines,  and  presented  a 
Catholic  plan  for  the  reconstruction  of  German  economic  life."2 

Other  publicists  pointed  out  that  even  if  the  coal  mines,  iron  and  steel 
works,  chemical  plants,  insurance  companies,  and  electrical  corporations 
were  nationalized  the  problem  of  socialization  would  be  still  unsolved. 
By  estimating  the  national  wealth  at  three  hundred  billion  marks  and  the 
amount  invested  in  stock  companies  at  twenty-one  billions,  these  critics 
showed  that  only  seven  per  cent  of  the  entire  wealth  of  the  German  people 
was  invested  in  the  shares  of  corporations.  As  it  was  obviously  impossible 
for  all  the  German  factories  and  corporations  to  become  communal  or 
state  property  without  economic  disaster,  socialization  would  have  to 
proceed  deliberately,  if  at  all.     As  Kautsky,  Bernstein,  and  Cunow  all 

"*  Preussische  Jahrhiicher,  March,  1919,  343-345. 

'"  Die  Freiheit,  December  6,  1918. 

"'  Eucken,  "Deutsche"  Freiheit,"  33. 

""  Cohn,  "Die  Zukunft,"  9. 

^  Naumann,  "Die  Demokratie,"  14. 

™  Neurat,  "Die  Socialisierung  Sachsens." 

^  Pesch,  "Socialisierung."    Pesch,  "Neubau  der  Gesellschaft." 


SOCIALISM    AND   SOCIALIZATION 


71 


noted  the  necessity  of  compensation  for  the  owners  of  nationalized  indus- 
tries, this  factor  presented  a  further  complication  to  the  problem  of 
socialization.  Minister  Simon  announced  on  behalf  of  the  government 
that  there  would  be  no  confiscation  of  property  by  the  republic,  but  that 
the  owners  of  nationalized  property  were  to  be  fully  compensated."^ 

Finally,  critics  declared  that,  with  the  elimination  of  the  acquisition  of 
private  property,  the  technical  and  organizing  processes  in  industry  would 
cease,  and  production  would  decline.  Nationalization  would  create  a 
group  of  contented  workmen  as  a  result  of  the  first  steps  toward  socializa- 
tions; but  it  would  inevitably  lead  to  diminished  production.  Kautsky 
believed,  however,  that  custom,  discipline,  and  attraction  would  keep  the 
proletariat  at  work  after  the  social  revolution.  The  general  conclusion 
of  the  non-socialist  critics  was  that  only  a  small  portion  of  the  means  of 
production  could  be  socialized,  while  the  rest  must  be  left  under  private 
ownership  and  control. 

The  November  Revolution  failed  to  carry  out  the  socialist  ideal  of 
.the  nationalization  of  industries.  German  socialism  was  frankly  unequal 
to  the  task  and  was  forced  to  attempt  the  solution  of  the  larger  problems 
of  the  reconstruction  of  the  state  and  the  recognition  of  its  international 
obligations  as  a  result  of  the  war.  For  years  the  German  socialists  had 
cried:  "Proletarians  of  all  lands  unite";  but  they  themselves  remained 
hopelessly  divided.  This  disunion  caused  the  failure  of  the  German 
attempt  to  establish  a  socialist  state.  Socialization  was,  however,  the 
great  ideal  of  the  November  Revolution,  and  a  rational  socialization  re- 
mains the  one  hope  of  the  German  proletariat. 


May  in  Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  March,  1919. 


72  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 


V. 

THE  STRUGGLE  OF  PARTIES  FOR  POWER 
The  Six  Commissioners 

The  Majority  Socialists  and  Independent  Socialists  had  seized  power 
in  Germany  with  the  consent  of  the  nation,  becanse  they  were  the  only 
parties  which  had  opposed  the  ruinous  policy  of  the  Pan-Germans.  In 
imitation  of  this  revolutionary  federal  government,  since  Germany  re- 
mained a  federal  republic,  the  two  Socialist  parties  established  coalition 
governments  in  the  several  states.  Everywhere  the  Socialists  had  political 
power  in  their  own  hands.  The  old  imperial  system  with  its  twenty 
monarchies  and  autocratic  methods  had  vanished  within  a  week,  and  the 
historic  German  monarchical  spirit  had  temporarily  disappeared.  The 
revolutionists  gained  at  once  for  Germany :  popular  sovereignty ;  a  gen- 
eral amnesty  for  political  prisoners  ;  the  eight-hour  day  ;  equal  suffrage  ; 
the  right  of  assembly;  freedom  of  the  press;  suppression  of  militarism; 
supremacy  of  the  trades  unions; 'and  abrogation  of  the  war  legislation 
afTecting  laborers.  The  triumph  of  these  ideas  proves  that  the  German 
revolution  of  November  was  a  genuine  one.--'* 

Yet  the  government  of  the  Six  Commissioners  was  hopelessly  dis- 
united; did  not  possess  a  program  and  was  confronted  with  the  gravest 
of  revolutionary  problems.  The  Majority  Socialists  wished  to  reestablish 
internal  order,  to  create  democratic  governments  in  the  several  states,  to 
convoke  a  national  assembly,  and  to  conclude  a  preliminary  peace  with 
the  Entente.  The  Independent  Socialists  desired  to  develop  the  political 
power  of  the  proletariat,  to  establish  the  council  system,  to  commence 
progressive  socialization,  and  to  prepare  the  nation  for  socialism.  Under 
the  immediate  pressure  of  the  general  collapse,  the  Independents  held 
back,  however.  The  well  grounded  fear  that  the  masses  of  returning 
soldiers  might  mutiny,  really  forced  the  Independents  to  accept  the  plans 
of  the  Social  Democrats.-^-''  Shall  socialization  of  the  means  of  produc- 
tion and  distribution  be  carried  out  at  once,  or  shall  only  those  industries 
be  socialized  which  have  shown  a  tendency  toward  centralization  ?  Shall 
a  national  assembly  be  convened  to  express  the  will  of  the  German  people, 
or  shall  the  revolution  be  developed  along  Russian  lines  ?  These  questions 
divided  the  provisional  Socialist  government  as  well  as  the  masses  of 
the  German  people.     Many  Socialists,  who  before  the  war  had  preached 

***  For  a  typical  revolutionary  pamphlet  see  Harz,  "Die  Revolution  als  Lehrerin 
und  Erloeserin." 

"*  DaiJmig,  "Raetesystem,"  16. 


THE  STRUGGLE  OF   PARTIES   FOR   POWER  73 

the  doctrine  of  the  unified  state,  chafed  at  the  delay  in  calHng  the  national 
assembly  together.  Others  attacked  the  provisional  government  for 
reorganizing  the  ministries  of  Prussia  and  other  states  and  thus  perpetuat- 
ing German  federalism.  The  Independents  denounced  the  Commissioners 
because  they  opposed  the  development  of  the  revolution  and  were  hostile 
to  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Berlin  Councils."*^  — ^ 

However,  from  November  10  to  December  29  the  Six  Commissioners    | 
completed  a  great  amount  of  constructive  work.     Their  common  activity 
began  when  they  agreed  to  the  terms  of  the  armistice.     On  November  12 
Ebert,  Haase,  Scheidemann,  Landsberg,  Dittmann,  and  Barth  issued  the 
following  proclamation  to  the  nation : 

The  government,  which  has  issued  from  the  revolution  and  whose 
political  control  is  purely  socialistic,  places  before  itself  the  task  of 
realizing  the  socialist  program.  It  proclaims  immediately  with  full  force 
of  law  the  following  decrees : 

1.  The  state  of  siege  is  aboUshed. 

2.  The  rights  of  union  and  assembly  are  under  no  restrictions.  Of- 
ficials and  state  employees  are  also  unrestricted  in  the  enjoyment  of  these 

rights.  1-  1    J 

3.  The  censorship  does  not  exist.    The  theatre  censorship  is  abohshed. 

4.  Expression  of  opinion  in  speech  and  in  writing  is  freed  from 
control. 

5.  Re^gious  freedom  is  guaranteed.  No  one  shall  be  forced  to  per- 
form any  religious  act. 

6.  An  amnesty  is  granted  for  all  political  crimes.  All  proceedmgs  on 
account  of  such  misdeeds  are  quashed. 

7.  The  law  concerning  the  Fatherland  Relief  Service  is  abolished 
with  exception  of  the  regulations  for  the  settlement  of  disputes. 

8.  The  domestic  servant  regulations  as  well  as  the  special  laws  against 
agricultural  laborers  are  annulled. 

9.  The  enactments  concerning  the  protection  of  labor,  abrogated  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war,  are  herewith  declared  again  in  force  and  effect. 

Further  social  and  political  ordinances  will  shortly  be  published.  Not 
later  than  January  1,  1919,  the  eight-hour  working  day  will  come  into 
force.  The  government  will  do  everything  within  its  power  to  provide 
sufficient  opportunity  for  work.  An  ordinance  has  been  drawn  up  con- 
cerning the  protection  of  those  without  means  of  support.  It  divides  the 
burdens  between  the  Reich,  state,  and  municipality. 

In  the  sphere  of  sickness  insurance,  the  obligations  of  working  men's 
insurance  will  be  increased  beyond  the  prevailing  limit  of  two  thousand 
five  hundred  marks. 

The  housing  problem  will  be  attacked  by  the  requisition  of  unusued 
dwellings. 

The  government  is  working  on  the  problem  of  national  food  admin- 
istration. 

The  government  will  maintain  established  production ;  will  protect 
property  against  interference  by  private  parties ;  and  will  preserve  the 
personal  freedom  and  security  of  the  individual. 

'^  Cohen-Reuss,  "Der  Aufbau  Deutschlands,"  3-7. 


74  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

y  All  elections  to  public  offices  are  henceforth  to  be  carried  out  according 

*  to  the  equal,  secret,  direct,  and  universal  franchise  upon  the  basis  of  the 

proportional  voting  system  for  all  male  and  female  persons  of  not  less 
than  twenty  years  of  age. 

This  electoral  law  is  valid  also  for  the  constitutional  assembly,  con- 
cerning which  further  regulations  will  be  issued.--^ 

This  proclamation  represents  the  first  democratic  victory  in  the  coali- 
tion government,  since  it  pledged  the  Socialists  to  call  a  constituent 
assembly.  The  fear  of  a  mutiny  of  the  army  or  the  apprehension  that 
the  general  strike  of  the  defeated  army  and  navy  would  spread  over  the 
Fatherland  and  produce  universal  anarchy  held  the  Independent  Socialists 
in  line  with  the  Social  Democrats.  German  democracy  was  saved  in 
November,  1918,  because  its  communist  opponents  failed  after  their  first 
defeats  to  unite  upon  a  practical  program  of  political  action. 

The  Return  of  the  National  Forces  After  the  Armistice 

During  the  general  rejoicing  of  the  proletariat  over  the  revolution,  the 
government  announced,  on  the  eleventh  of  November,  the  terms  of  the 
armistice.  The  evacuation  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  and  the  neutral 
zone,  the  loss  of  rolling  stock  and  materiel,  the  surrender  of  the  fleet, 
and  the  continuance  of  the  blockade,  appeared  especially  severe  to  the 
nation.  All  parties  regarded  the  returning  armies  as  a  possible  danger 
to  the  orderly  progress  of  the  revolution.  Grave  fears  were  felt  that  all 
discipline  would  disappear  and  that  the  mutinous  troops  would  sweep 
over  Germany,  destroying  local  governments,  disorganizing  transporta- 
tion and  the  system  of  food  control. 

Although  revolutionized,  the  German  military  organization  under 
Hindenburg  and  Groener  remained  practically  intact  on  the  western 
front.  Division,  corps,  army,  and  army  group  staffs  continued  to  func- 
tion, while  brigade,  regimental,  and  battalion  commanders  maintained  a 
semblance  of  discipline  in  their  units.  Even  in  defeat,  the  veteran  German 
infantry  diivsions  proved  loyal  to  their  leaders;  and,  counselled  by 
soldiers'  committees,  obeyed  orders.  Above  all  Hindenburg  remained  at 
his  post  in  Spa,  and  the  General  Staff  commenced  at  once  the  work  of 
moving  the  armies  and  their  supplies  into  the  interior  of  Germany.^-^ 
Contrary  to  the  accusations  of  its  enemies,  the  revolutionary  government 
made  an  effort  to  maintain  discipline  in  the  face  of  the  enemy  as  well  as 
j  at  home.  On  November  12  the  government  authorized  General  Head- 
quarters to  maintain  strict  discipline  in  order  that  the  army  might  be 


'^' Deutscher  Reichs-und  Staatsanzeiger  Nr.  269;  Von  Volkmann  und  Bottger, 
"Die  Rechtsverordnungen  des  Rates  der  Volksbeauftragten  vom  12  November, 
1918." 

"*  For  an  excellent  account  of  the  work  of  the  general  staff  in  connection  with  the 
return  of  the  armies  see  von  Kuhl  "Der  Deutsche  Generalstab,"  199-206. 


THE  STRUGGLE  OF   PARTIES   FOR   POWER 


75 


brought  home  safely.  The  proclamation  required :  the  relation  between 
officers  and  men  to  be  one  of  mutual  trust;  military  discipline  and  order 
to  be  maintained  under  all  circumstances ;  soldiers'  councils  to  have  a 
voice  in  the  regulation  of  the  commissary,  furloughs,  and  disciplinary 
punishment,  and  to  aid  in  preventing  disorder  and  mutiny ;  similar 
rations  to  be  issued  to  officers,  officials,  and  men ;  equal  increases  of  pay 
and  equal  extra  field  pay  to  be  given  officers  and  men ;  arms  to  be  used 
against  Germans  only  in  case  of  self-defense  or  to  prevent  plunderings.^^^ 

When  the  armistice  was  signed  the  German  armies  were  fighting  a 
series  of  battles  to  cover  thgir  retreat  to  the  Antwerp-Meuse  line. 
The  battles  on  the  Lys,  Aisne,  Meuse,  Scheldt,  and  in  the  Argonne,  indi- 
cated the  approaching  collapse  of  the  German  forces.  On  November  12 
the  evacuation  of  the  occupied  territory  and  the  march  into  the  interior 
of  Germany  commenced.  The  I,  II,  III,  IV,  V,  VI,  VII,  XVII,  XVIII, 
and  XIX  Armies  and  Army  Detachments  A,  B,  and  C  retreated  through 
Lorraine,  the  Rhine  Palatinate,  and  the  Rhine  Province  to  the  interior  of 
Germany. ^^" 

On  the  other  fronts  the  retreat  of  the  armies  was  not  carried  out  in 
such  a  systematic  manner.  At  the  conclusion  of  the  Palestine  battle  on 
October  30,  1918,  the  German  forces  there  were  in  full  retreat.  After 
September  15  German  troops  were  retreating  in  Macedonia  and  Serbia. 
On  September  29  there  occurred  the  action  between  German  forces  and 
Bulgarian  rebels  near  Sofia.  By  November  2  the  last  German  forces 
crossed  the  Save  and  Danube  rivers  and  entrenched  on  the  soil  of  the 
Dual  Monarchy.  The  German  troops  in  Asia  Minor  as  well  as  the  forces 
in  Syria  fell  back  on  Constantinople.  Other  detachments  from  the  Cau- 
casus marched  through  the  Ukraine  toward  the  German  frontiers. 

The  Army  Group  of  Mackensen  in  the  Balkans  consisted  of  the  XI 
Army,  the  forces  in  occupation  of  Rumania,  and  troops  from  Turkey  and 
the  Caucasus.  These  forces  commenced  on  November  12  to  retreat  to 
Germany  through  Hungary  and  Austria. 

The  evacuation  of  the  Ukraine  by  the  Army  Group  of  Kieff,  com- 
posed of  the  XX  Corps  Stafif  and  four  depleted  divisions,  was  commenced 
November  16,  1918,  and  was  not  completed  until  March  16,  1919.  Mean- 
while the  X  German  Army,  with  the  consent  of  the  allied  and  associated 
powers,  continued  to  occupy  Lithuania,  Latvia,  and  portions  of  White 
Russia.^^^ 


""Reichs-und  Staatsanzeiger,  Nr.  269,  November  12,  1918. 

**•  "Die  Riickf iihrung  des  Westheeres,"  3-10. 

*"  "Die  Schlachten  und  Gefechte  des  Grossen  Krieges,"  1914-1918.  "Quellenwerk 
.  .  .  vom  Grossen  Generalstab."  General  von  der  Goltz,  "Meine  Sendung  in 
Finnland  und  im  Baltikum,"  is  an  able  account  of  German  military  activities  in  the 
Baltic  states  after  the  armistice. 


76  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

The  last  great  achievement  of  the  Prussian  military  organization  was 
that  it  brought  the  armies  of  the  western  front  back  home  quickly  and 
without  mishap.  German  efficiency  and  the  praiseworthy  discipline  of 
the  veterans  kept  these  retreating  divisions  from  degenerating  into  mobs. 
The  old  Prussian  spirit  lasted  long  enough  to  march  the  troops  back  from 
the  west.  Although  Socialist  pamphlets  stated  that  the  soldiers'  com- 
missioners, without  silver  on  their  shoulders,  really  saved  the  wreck  of 
the  army,  these  assertions  were  true  only  in  isolated  cases. *^-  It  was  the 
Prussian  officer,  loyal  to  his  Fatherland  in  revolution,  who  was  resix)nsible 
for  this  success,  the  last  great  act  of  the  Army  of  Frederick,  Scharnhorst, 
and  Moltke. 

Grave  disorders  occurred,  nevertheless.  The  Soldiers'  Councils  in 
the  Rhineland  had  the  greatest  difficulty  in  maintaining  order.  Cordons 
of  troops  were  placed  at  all  the  Rhine  crossings  to  pick  up  stragglers  and 
deserters.  Along  the  lines  of  communication  mutinous  troops  lost  supplies 
amounting  to  billions  of  marks.  Here  the  collapse  was  worse  than  after 
Jena.  Officers  left  their  commands  and  soldiers  plundered  depots  and 
trains.  In  Belgium  the  soldiers  often  sold  or  abandoned  weapons  and 
supplies  to  the  population.  Yet  when  the  officers  fled  from  Belgium  the 
councils  saved  supplies  valued  in  millions.  So  serious  did  the  situation 
become  that  the  government  issued  a  proclamation  stating  that  the  com- 
missary of  the  comrades  on  the  western  front  was  in  danger  and  that  the 
plundering  and  confiscation  of  stores  in  depots  or  in  transit  must  be 
stopped. ^^^ 

On  November  28  Hindenburg  issued  a  general  order,  stating  that  all 
soldiers  were  to  remain  with  their  units  until  properly  demobilized,  and 
that  the  classes  of  recruits  of  1896  to  1899  would  be  released  as  quickly 
as  possible.  Efiforts  were  also  made  to  stem  the  tide  of  hatred  against 
the  officer  class.  This  hatred  of  the  officers  had  resulted  in  the  removal 
by  the  enlisted  men  of  many  regimental  and  company  commanders.  In 
many  instances  the  officers  were  deprived  of  their  side  arms,  epaulets  were 
torn  ofT,  and  infamous  treatment  was  accorded  to  those  who,  by  their 
arrogance  and  inability,  had  ruined  the  morale  of  the  army.  These  condi- 
tions were  more  general  among  the  reserves  and  line  of  communication 
troops  than  at  the  front.  Here  and  there  conflicts  broke  out  between 
stafifs  and  soldiers'  councils.  Generals  von  Boehn  and  von  Mudra  refused 
to  recognize  the  commands  of  the  councils.  At  other  demobilization 
points  the  councils  disarmed  the  veterans  and  deprived  them  of  their 
imperial   cockades.      In   Berlin   the  officers   shortly  after   the   revolution 


°^  Vetter,  "Der  Zusammenbruch  der  Westfront,"  14. 

"*  Bekanntmachungen  iiber  den  Ernteverkehr  nebst  den  anderweitigen  Gesetzen 
und  Verordnungen  wirtschaftlicher  Natur  aus  den  Jahren  1915-18,  24.  Nachtrag, 
1051. 


THE  STRUGGLE  OF   PARTIES   FOR   POWER  77 

formed  a  new  political  organization,  the  German  Ofificers'  Alliance,  for 
their  own  professional  protection.  This  was  followed  by  the  formation 
of  the  National  Union  of  German  Officers  by  a  few  political  malcontents."* 

While  many  soldiers'  councils  wasted  or  destroyed  great  quantities  of 
food  or  raw  materials,  the  majority  of  them  formed  useful  auxiliaries  to 
the  army  stafifs.  Mistakes  were  made  everywhere  and  the  maintenance  of 
order  was  always  difficult.  Thirty-nine  per  cent  of  the  German  regular 
officers  had  been  killed  in  battle,  yet  this  class  was  violently  attacked  by 
revolutionists.  However,  the  policy  of  the  army  leaders  was  supported  on 
the  whole  by  the  veteran  soldiers,  and  w]ienjthree  hundred  representatives 
from  the  soldiers'  councils  of  two  hundred  and  twenty  divisions  met  on 
December  first  at  Ems,  they  represented  an  almost  conservative  force  in  a 
period  of  anarchy. -^^ 

In  the  east  the  condition  of  the  German  troops,  which  were  as  a  general 
rule  inferior  to  the  western  units,  varied  according  to  locality.  The  army 
of  occupation  in  Poland,  especially  the  Lorraine  Landsturm,  hastily  evac- 
uated the  country,  abandoning  valuable  supplies.  Prussian  regiments 
actually  allowed  themselves  to  be  disarmed  by  Polish  legionaries,  while 
Polish  troops  in  Posen  and  portions  of  West  Prussia  and  Silesia  regarded 
those  territories  as  already  a  part  of  Poland.  As  the  thin  line  of  German 
troops  retired  in  the  Baltic  States,  notably  at  Minsk,  Lithuania,  and 
Courland,  they  were  followed  by  the  red  army  of  the  Soviets.  The 
Latvian  regiments  fled  before  the  Bolshevists.  The  army  of  Mackensen 
was  interned  by  the  Allies  in  Hungary.-^** 

The  naval  demobilization  did  not  present  such  difficulties,  although  the 
revolutionary  spirit  had  destroyed  the  morale  of  the  splendid  fleet  which 
fought  at  Jutland.  The  Berlin  government  issued  an  order  on  November 
12,  1918,  that  officers  were  to  wear  the  insignia  of  their  rank,  and  that  the 
councils  were  to  aid  them  in  maintaining  discipline.  All  damage  to  ships 
and  materiel  must  cease,  and  everyone  was  ordered  to  carry  out  the  terms 
of  the  armistice.  "We  will  have  peace  only  if  we  loyally  carry  out  the 
prescribed  terms  of  the  armistice",  the  government  declared. -^^  Difficulties 
were  experienced  in  surrendering  the  fleet.  Sailors  demanded  a  premium 
of  500  marks  to  make  the  voyage  to  the  British  internment  ports.  English 
naval  forces  entered  Kiel,  Wilhelmshaven,  and  Danzig,  to  observe  the 
carrying  out  of  the  armistice,  while  the  Allies  maintained  a  blockade  in 
the  Baltic  as  well  as  in  the  North  Sea. 


'  D.  O.  B.  Schriftcn,  Heft  I. 
^  Deutscher  Geschichtskalender,  190. 
'  Preiissische  Jahrbucher,  January,  1919. 
'  Reichs  und  Staatsanzeiyer,  Nr.  269. 


78  TUK    IIKRMAN    REVOLUTION 

The  general  result  of  the  demobilization  of  the  imperial  army  and  navy 
was  the  acceptance  of  the  revolutionary  conditions  by  the  overv^helming 
majority  of  the  enlisted  men.  It  was  a  naval  force  which  had  in  fact  first 
mutinied  against  the  empire.  As  a  general  rule  these  demobilized  forces 
formed  the  nucleus  of  a  military  support  which  was  far  more  conservative 
than  even  the  Social  Democrats  had  expected.  The  influence  of  the  German 
veterans  upon  the  course  of  the  revolution  was  destined  to  be  decisive; 
for  it  was  the  German  army  which  helped  in  a  large  measure  to  save  the 
nation  from  the  chaos  of  Bolshevism. 

The  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Councils 

The  most  characteristic  political  and  economic  development  in  the  first 
phase  of  the  revolution  was  the  formation  throughout  Germany  of  work- 
men's and  soldiers'  councils.  Everywhere  these  revolutionary  forces 
seized  local  power  and  arbitrarily  altered  the  established  political  and 
economic  life.  As  revolutionary  administrative  bodies,  they  brought  about 
the  radical  democratization  of  the  German  state  governments. 
^  The  council  system  owes  its  origin  to  the  Russian  Revolution  of  1905, 
which  developed  during  the  struggle  with  the  Czar  new  and  highly  efficient 
revolutionary  organizations  called  the  Workmen's  Deputies  Councils. 
These  were  created  in  the  large  Russian  industries  and  formed  the  back- 
bone of  the  revolutionary  movement.  They  failed  in  their  revolutionary 
efforts  because  of  the  loyalty  of  the  Russian  army  to  Czarism.  However, 
the  creation  of  soldiers'  councils  during  the  revolution  of  1917  formed 
the  basis  upon  which,  combined  with  the  workmen's  deputies  councils,  the 
Bolsheviki  erected  the  soviet  system.  Although  German  Socialists  had 
previously  sought  to  develop  the  English  shop  steward  system  into  a  rev- 
olutionary organization,  they  adopted  in  1917  the  Russian  methods. 
Viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  efficiency,  these  methods,  which  gave  the 
masses  active  participation  in  government,  were  better  suited  for  the 
establishment  of  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  and  ultimately  of 
Marxian  socialism  than  were  German  parliamentary  tactics.  Proletarian 
impatience  with  union  and  party  secretarial  methods  also  accounted  for 
the  spontaneous  adoption  of  the  council  system  in  November,  1918.f^® 

The  goal  of  the  councils  movement  was  the  completion  of  the  socialistic 
revolution  and  the  formation  of  communistic  society.  The  system  itself 
was  two-sided:  political  and  economic.  Politically  it  united  legislative 
and  administrative  power  in  the  councils,  discarded  periodical  elections, 
restricted  the  franchise  to  the  proletariat,  and  placed  the  political  power  of 
the  state  virtually  in  the  hands  of  the  workmen  of  large  industries.  Starting 
with  the  commune  the  industrial  workmen  formed,  according  to  occupation, 

"' Cohen-Reuss,  "Der  Aufbau  Deutschlands  und  der  Raetegedanke,"  8-16.  Feiler, 
"Der  Ruf  nach  den  Raeten,"  29-31. 


THE  STRUGGLE  OF   PARTIES   FOR    POWER  79 

councils  of  one  thousand  workers,  which  elected  leaders.  The  delegates  of 
all  the  communal  councils  then  formed  a  council  for  that  commune  which 
assumed  all  the  functions  of  government.  City  officials,  magistrates,  and 
police  were  displaced  by  the  council  and  its  committees.  Communes  were 
organized  into  districts  and  districts  into  provinces.  The  provinces  then 
were  subordinated  to  the  national  congress  of  all  councils.  This  congress 
was  to  choose  an  executive  council  which  was  to  be  elected  twice  a  year 
and  was  to  be  subject  to  recall.  It  was  to  exercise  the  supreme  power  of  the 
state.^^^ 

The  proletariat  demanded  active  participation  in  government  and  not 
merely  the  right  to  vote.  What  the  Socialist  party  organizations  and  labor 
unions  had  done  to  create  a  proletarian  bureaucracy  was  in  a  measure 
obverted  by  the  recall  provision  of  the  council  system.  There  again  the 
immediate  idea  was  Russian,  although  the  prototype  existed  in  the  Paris 
Commune  of  1871.  Actually  the  council  system  eradicated  this  evil  more 
effectually  than  syndicalism  or  the  shop  steward  plan.  The  best  answer 
to  the  charge  that  the  Germans  slavishly  imitated  what  Russia  had  produced 
is  the  history  of  the  council  movement  in  Germany  from  November,  1918, 
until  March,  1919. 

The  economic  side  of  the  council  system  aimed  to  bring  about  socialism 
by  the  aid  of  the  proletariat  and  to  create  an  economic  organization  in  which 
the  proletariat  would  have  complete  control  of  the  national  economic  life. 
Besides  the  political  councils,  shop  councils  were  to  be  organized  according 
to  industries.  They  were,  like  the  political  councils,  to  be  formed  into 
districts  and  provinces.  The  provinces  elected  delegates  to  the  Central 
Economic  Council,  which  exercised  the  supreme  power  of  the  state  in 
questions  of  economic  policy.  Conceived  as  a  bold  measure  to  carry  through 
the  economic  revolution,  the  chief  function  of  the  Central  Economic  Council 
was  to  be  the  maintenance  of  the  processes  of  production  under  socialism.^*" 
However,  from  an  economic  standpoint  this  organization  appeared  both 
dangerous  and  superfluous.  Claiming  to  protect  the  interests  of  the  work- 
ingmen,  the  strong  and  well  organized  lal)or  unions  were  already  in  the  field. 
Their  opposition  to  the  economic  councils  vitally  affected  the  development  of 
the  idea,  and  ultimately  the  government  took  a  middle  ground  in  preventing 
any  competition  between  the  shop  councils  and  the  unions.-*^ 

The  theory  of  the  council  system  was  by  November,  1918,  generally 
known  throughout  Germany.  Its  doctrines  had  been  spread  by  Russian 
propagandists.  Socialist  organizers,  and  even  by  bourgeois  publicists.     The 


'  Daiimig,  "Raetesystem." 
'  Frohlich,  "Der  Weg  zum  Sozialismus." 
Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  May,  1919. 


80  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

actual  workings  of  the  system  were,  however,  quite  at  variance  with  the 
general  theory."*- 

x-\lthough  the  workmen's  and  soldiers'  councils  of  the  Hanseatic  States 
and  South  Germany,  as  well  as  the  soldiers'  councils  on  the  fronts,  had  been 
the  bearers  of  the  revolutionary  standards,  it  was  not  until  the  revolt  of 
Berlin  that  the  national  triumph  of  the  council  idea  was  assured.  The 
meeting  of  the  first  workmen's  and  soldiers'  council  on  Red  Sunday,  Novem- 
ber 10,  in  the  Circus  Busch,  marked  the  beginnings  of  this  new  revolutionary 
system  for  Germany.  Over  three  hundred  delegates  were  present.  From 
the  start  the  meeting  was  divided  into  factions  of  Socialists,  Independents, 
Spartacans,  and  Bourgeoisie.  A  strong  soldier  sentiment  favored  a  com- 
promise, and  Ebert's  announcement  that  the  two  Socialist  parties  had  agreed 
to  work  together  was  loudly  cheered.  But  on  the  election  of  the  executive 
committee  the  Independents  and  Spartacans  sought  to  nominate  a  list  which 
contained  only  their  own  members.  At  once  a  violent  opposition  developed, 
which  resulted  in  the  election  of  a  committee  composed  of  six  Socialists  and 
six  Independents.  Thereupon  the  assembly  assumed  supreme  power  in 
Germany  until  the  meeting  of  an  all-German  council,  and  confirmed  the 
election  of  the  government  of  Six  Commissioners  already  installed  in  the 
Wilhelmstrasse.  A  proclamation  was  then  issued  to  the  proletariat  of 
Germany,  announcing  the  formation  of  the  Socialistic  republic.-*^ 

It  was  only  after  this  meeting  that  the  coalition  government  was  assured 
of  power.  That  night  a  conference  was  held  between  the  Six  Commissioners 
and  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Councils  and  a  serious  attempt  was 
made  to  define  the  powers  of  the  two  governing  bodies.  It  was  agreed  that 
the  Council  should  remain  in  permanent  session  in  the  former  Prussian 
House  of  Lords  and  that  it  was  to  be  the  real  governing  power.  The  pro- 
visional government  was  to  be  responsible  to  this  Berlin  Council.  While 
theoretically  this  conference  established  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat, 
actually  it  created  a  governing  organization  which  was  conservative  socialist 
in  character.  Thus  this  conference  strengthened  the  position  of  the  Majority 
Socialists.  On  November  12  the  Council  issued  a  proclamation  stating  that 
all  communal,  land,  national,  military,  and  administrative  authorities  were 
to  continue  their  regular  activities.  This  was  the  second  great  conservative 
step  of  the  Council  and  effectually  checked  the  demoralization  of  the  German 
administrative  system.  The  Berlin  Independents  on  November  14  issued 
placards  in  Berlin,  signed  by  Dittmann  and  Haase,  declaring  that  the  Coun- 
cils were  the  supreme  political  power  in  Germany,  and  that  the  Social 
Democrats  were  already  failing  to  develop  the  revolution.    This  attack  was 

*"  Geyer,  "Sozialismus  und  Raetesystem." 

'"  Poster  of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Council,  November   12 :   "Auf  ruf  an  das 
werktaetige  Volk." 


THE  STRUGGLE  OF  PARTIES  FOR  POWER  81 

followed  by  others  accusing  the  Socialists  of  supporting  the  military  author- 
ity of  the  bloodhound,  Hindenburg,  and  the  plan  of  calling  a  national 
assembly.  "If  the  Berlin  government  lifts  up  its  horn  on  high",  declared 
the  Independents,  "then  the  class-conscious  proletariat  will  raise  their 
weapons  in  order  to  sweep  away  the  traitors  to  the  revolution."  Yet  the 
Independents  wavered  in  their  opposition  and  actually  agreed,  after  pro- 
longed debate,  to  the  calling  of  the  National  Assembly  for  February  19, 
1919. 

The  second  important  meeting  of  the  Berlin  Councils  was  held  November 
19.  The  chairman  of  the  committee,  Richard  Mueller,  said  in  his  opening 
speech :  "We  will  not  have  a  democratic  but  a  socialistic  republic.  The 
way  to  the  constituent  assembly  goes  over  my  dead  body."  A  resolution 
providing  for  a  meeting  of  a  national  congress  of  workmen's  and  soldiers' 
councils  was  then  passed.  The  Independents  regarded  the  fall  of  the  pro- 
visional government  as  certain,  since  the  Berlin  Council  called  the  bourgeois 
demand  for  a  National  Assembly  an  attempt  to  rob  the  workers  of  the  fruits 
of  their  victory.  However,  on  the  same  day  that  the  councils  met,  the  city 
government  placarded  Berlin  with  the  announcements  of  voting  lists  for  the 
National  Assembly.^** 

Other  speakers  asserted  that  the  coming  congress  must  elect  an  authorita- 
tive control  council  and  that  it  must  give  Germany  a  constitution  adapted  to 
a  proletarian  democracy.  The  reality  of  the  situation  was  on  the  other  hand 
explained  by  Scheidemann,  who  stated  that  the  National  Assembly  was  not 
being  called  to  legalize  the  revolution,  but  to  lay  the  permanent  foundations 
of  the  future  national  state.  Only  thus  could  a  government  be  erected 
capable  of  negotiating  with  Germany's  enemies.  The  Entente  would  not 
recognize  a  dictatorship  nor  would  it  lift  the  "hunger  blockade"  for  such  a 
government.  If  Russian  aid  were  invoked  by  the  revolutionists,  German 
unity  would  collapse  and  the  Entente  would  occupy  Berlin  before  the 
Soviets  could  assist  the  German  proletariat. 

Meanwhile  the  rule  of  the  workmen's  and  soldiers'  councils  throughout 
the  empire  was  rapidly  reducing  Germany  to  a  condition  of  anarchy.  Mill- 
ions of  marks  were  squandered  by  these  revolutionary  organizations.  In 
hundreds  of  cities  and  towns  they  stopped  food  transportation,  confiscated 
supplies,  deposed  officials,  removed  directors  and  teachers  from  the  public 
schools.  The  general  orders  of  the  Berlin  government  were  disregarded  in 
many  instances  by  the  local  councils  which  considered  themselves  as  sov- 
ereign within  their  own  sphere  of  activity. 

The  division  of  power  between  the  government  and  the  Central  Council 
of  Berlin  caused  widespread  opposition  throughout  Germany.    The  assump- 

"*  Poster  of  Berlin  City  Council,  November  19 :  "Aufstellung  der  Waehlerlisten 
fiir  die  Nationalversammlung." 


82  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

tion  of  control  over  the  empire  by  the  Berlin  Council  aroused  general 
indignation  in  southern  Germany.  Bavaria,  Wiirttemberg,  and  Baden  de- 
nounced the  radical  terror  of  Berlin  and  openly  stated  that  the  necessity 
might  arise  for  the  South  to  take  its  fate  in  its  own  hands.  Throughout  the 
Rhineland  the  cry  of  "Away  from  Berlin"  was  raised.  Even  socialistic 
Saxony  opposed  the  arrogance  of  the  Berlin  councils  in  assuming  revolu- 
tionary control  of  Germany.  The  Minister-President  of  Hesse,  Ulrich, 
denounced  the  Berlin  authorities  because  of  their  failure  to  maintain  order. 

In  an  effort  to  remedy  these  intolerable  conditions,  the  provisional  gov- 
ernment called  on  November  22  a  conference  with  the  Executive  Council. 
The  result  of  this  meeting  was  an  agreement  that  the  executive  power  was 
to  be  vested  for  the  future  in  the  government,  while  the  councils  were  to 
act  as  "an  organ  of  control".  Until  the  meeting  of  an  all-German  congress 
of  workmen's  and  soldiers'  councils,  the  Executive  Council  of  Berlin  was 
to  exercise  supreme  power  in  Germany.  It  could  appoint  and  dismiss  the 
cabinets  of  the  Reich  and  Prussia.  It  could  also  give  its  opinion  on  the 
appointment  of  the  "technical  ministers".  On  November  23  an  official 
notice  of  this  conference  was  published,  and  the  Executive  Council  issued  a 
call  for  a  congress  of  delegates  to  meet  in  Berlin  on  December  sixteenth. 

In  the  proclamation,  the  Executive  Council  disclaimed  any  attempt  to 
assume  dictatorial  powers,  urged  the  maintenance  of  national  unity,  pointed 
out  the  dangers  to  peace  and  the  food  situation,  and  authorized  the  existing 
councils  to  send  delegates,  since  the  time  was  too  short  to  establish  an 
electoral  system  for  the  proletariat. 

On  the  same  day  the  Berlin  Executive  Council  issued  a  proclamation  to 
all  the  German  councils  warning  them  against  interferences  with  the  food 
administration,  the  control  of  raw  materials,  or  the  administrative  work  of 
officials  who  were  loyal  to  the  new  regime.  Confiscations  of  public  funds, 
interference  with  ship,  railway,  and  postal  transportation,  and  arbitrary 
arrests  without  the  consent  of  local  officials,  were  prohibited.  Finally  all 
councils  were  directed  to  alleviate  the  housing  situation,  to  conserve  the  food 
supplies,  to  maintain  the  health  regulations,  and  to  aid  the  transportation  of 
soldiers  from  the  fronts. 

This  November  conference  was  a  victory  for  the  Majority  Socialists  in 
the  government  as  well  as  evidence  of  the  ability  of  Ebert,  Scheidemann,  and 
Landsberg.  Scheidemann  showed  marked  sagacity  in  his  analysis  of  the 
political  and  economic  situation  and  in  his  determination  to  adhere  to  the 
democratic  program  of  his  party.  The  victory  of  the  government  was  made 
easier  by  the  strength  of  the  Majority  Socialist  group  in  the  Executive 
Council.  Not  the  arguments  of  the  majority  leaders,  however,  but  the 
fear  of  the  disunion  of  Germany,  forced  the  Councils  to  reach  an  agreement 
with  the  Six  Commissioners.^*^ 


Menke-Gliickert,  op.  cit.,  101. 


THE  STRUGGLE  OF  PARTIES  FOR  POWER  83 

Before  the  meeting  of  the  Congress  of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Coun- 
cils, the  provisional  government  of  Germany  called  a  conference  for  Novem- 
ber 25  of  the  representatives  of  the  revolutionary  federal  states.  The 
purpose  of  this  conference  was  to  establish  better  relations  between  the 
states  and  the  provisional  government  and  to  discuss  the  questions  of  peace 
and  national  reorganization.  Since  the  revolution  of  November  9  the 
national  unity  had  been  in  constant  danger.  Under  the  influence  of  Lauf- 
fenberg,  the  Hanseatic  Republic  of  Hamburg  had  attempted  to  negotiate 
with  Soviet  Russia.  Eisner  had  sent  Professor  Foerster  as  Minister  of 
Bavaria  to  Switzerland  and  opened  negotiations  directly  with  Clemenceau. 
Heads  of  governments  in  other  federal  states  had  publicly  denounced  the 
radical  misrule  in  Berlin. 

At  the  conference  which  was  held  in  the  Congress  Hall  of  the  Imperial 
Chancellery,  Kurt  Eisner  as  the  representative  of  Bavaria  attacked  two 
ministers  of  the  central  government,  Solf  and  Erzberger,  whom  he  de- 
clared to  be  compromised  by  their  activities  during  the  war.  He  announced 
that  the  Entente  would  not  negotiate  with  the  leaders  of  the  old  system, 
and  that  a  presidency  of  five  or  seven  uncompromised  men  should  direct 
the  negotiations  for  peace.^*^ 

Other  representatives  advocated  the  immediate  convocation  of  the 
National  Assembly.  All  recognized  the  necessity  of  concluding  peace, 
reorganizing  commerce  and  industry,  and  adopting  a  republican  constitu- 
tion for  Germany.  The  conference  resolved  finally  that  the  unity  of 
i  -  Germany  must  be  maintained ;  that  the  National  Assembly  was  to  be 
Q  convened  as  soon  as  possible;  that  in  the  interval  the  workmen's  and 
soldiers'  councils  were  to  be  the  representatives  of  the  will  of  the  people; 
and  that  the  provisional  government  should  attempt  to  bring  about  a 
preliminary  peace  with  the  enemies  of  Germany.^*^ 

The  summoning  of  a  congress  of  workmen's  and  soldiers'  councils  to 
meet  in  Berlin  was  the  first  great  step  taken  since  the  fall  of  the  empire 
to  reestablish  German  unity.  Although  a  proletarian  movement,  it  was 
hailed  by  the  bourgeoisie  as  the  first  serious  attempt  to  reestablish  order 
throughout  the  nation.  This  sentiment  was  voiced  by  Ebert  on  December 
first  in  a  speech  to  the  Berlin  Socialists  in  which  he  said  that  the  great 
German  revolution  would  not  found  a  dictatorship  or  an  enslavement  of 
Germany,  but  would  firmly  establish  German  freedom.  On  December  9 
the  Berlin  Council  drew  up  an  order  of  business  providing  for  a  discussion 
of  the  questions  of  the  National  Assembly,  the  socialization  of  the  economic 
life,  the  conclusion  of  peace,  the  erection  of  a  socialistic  republic,  and  the 
election  of  an  executive  council  for  all  Germany.^*^ 


'  Scheidemann,  "Der  Zusammenbruch,"  218,  221,  223. 
'  Deutscher  Geschichtskalender,  I  Heft,  58-63. 
'  Runkel,  "Die  Deutsche  Revolution,"  167. 


84  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

During  this  period  Liebknecht  at  the  head  of  the  Spartacans  attempted 
by  continuous  street  demonstrations  to  pave  the  viray  for  the  proclamation 
of  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat.  On  the  night  of  November  21  a 
mob  of  Spartacans  attacked  the  Police  Headquarters,  but  were  repulsed 
with  severe  losses.  That  day  Liebknecht  had  announced  to  his  followers 
that  when  the  world  revolution  was  completed,  the  proletariat  of  France, 
England,  and  the  United  States  would  feed  Germany. 

On  December  6  several  conservatives  in  the  Foreign  Office,  including 
Count  Matuschka,  Rheinbaben,  and  von  Stumm,  chief  of  the  intelligence 
department,  planned  an  anti-revolutionary  coup  d'etat.  At  the  head  of 
several  hundred  soldiers  and  students  these  precursors  of  the  counter 
revolution  marched  to  the  Chancellery,  proclaimed  Ebert  President  of 
Germany,  and  occupied  the  Prussian  House  of  Lords,  where  they  arrested 
the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Councils.  Although  order  was  soon 
restored  by  the  provisional  government,  the  report  spread  among  the 
workers  that  a  reactionary  conspiracy  had  deposed  the  people's  Commis- 
sioners. That  night  two  Spartacan  processions  attempted  to  reach  the 
Wilhelmstrasse,  but  were  repulsed  by  troops  of  the  guard  with  a  loss  of 
forty  killed.  At  this  time  Spartacan  attacks  took  place  at  Hamburg,  Halle, 
Duesseldorf,  Schwerin,  and  Dortmund.  On  December  6  the  Spartacans 
of  Munich  seized  the  principal  newspaper  offices  and  forced  the  Social 
Democrat  Auer  to  resign  from  the  ministry. -^^ 

Berlin  was  the  scene  on  Sunday,  December  8,  of  demonstrations  by 
the  Majority  Socialists,  Independents,  and  Spartacans.  That  night  Lieb- 
knecht proceeded  with  thousands  of  his  followers  to  the  Wilhelm  Plats, 
which  was  entirely  filled  with  Berlin  communists.  From  an  automobile 
Liebknecht  harangued  the  mob,  while  the  people's  Commissioners  stood 
silent  in  the  darkened  rooms  of  the  Imperial  Chancellery.  Pointing  to  the 
large  hall,  where  the  Congress  of  Berlin  had  met  in  1878,  Liebknecht 
shouted:  "There  they  sit,  the  traitors,  the  Scheidemaenner,  the  social 
patriots.  We  have  shown  that  we  have  power  to  take  the  whole  nest  of 
them,  but  I  demand  for  tonight  only  the  cry :  'Long  live  the  social  revolu- 
tion, long  live  the  world  revolution.'  " 

At  this  dramatic  moment  the  Independent,  Emil  Barth,  appeared  on 
an  illuminated  balcony  of  the  Chancellery.  He  had  been  one  of  the  revolu- 
tionary conspirators  who  had  planned  to  overthrow  the  empire,  but  the 
masses  greeted  him  with  shouts  of  derision  and  scorn.  Barth  boldly  de- 
nounced Liebknecht  for  his  opposition  to  the  Socialist  government,  and 
the  mob  dispersed  after  a  violent  debate  between  the  two  revolutionary 
leaders.  This  demonstration  was  not  without  its  effect  upon  the  Independ- 
ent leaders,  who  saw  that  their  cooperation  with  the  Majority  Socialists 


Scheidemann,  "Der  Zusammenbruch,"  230-231. 


THE  STRUGGLE  OF  PARTIES  FOR   POWER  85 

was  estranging  their  radical  followers  from  the  party.    The  left  wing  of 
the  Independents  now  openly  advocated  an  alliance  with  the  Spartacans."" 

The  First  Congress  of  the  Councils 

The  meeting  on  December  16  of  the  first  congress  of  German  work- 
men's and  soldiers'  councils  in  Berlin  was  the  most  important  event  since 
the  outbreak  of  the  November  Revolution.  The  future  of  Germany  was 
in  the  hands  of  this  assembly  of  the  victorious  proletariat,  and  for  the 
first  time  since  November  9  the  nation  had  an  opportunity  to  express  its 
opinion  upon  the  great  revolutionary  questions.  Liebknecht  correctly 
said  that  the  members  of  the  congress  had  to  decide  whether  they  would 
develop  further  the  revolt  begun  in  November  to  a  socialistic  revolution 
of  the  German  proletariat.  The  high  character  and  abilities  of  the  men 
attending  the  congress  was  an  indication  of  the  success  of  the  educational 
work  of  the  Socialist  party  during  the  last  decade  before  the  fall  of  the 
empire.  A  majority  of  the  members  were  earnest  and  politically  intelli- 
gent. They  were  also  aware  of  the  problems  facing  the  nation,  and  they 
were  determined  to  arrive  at  a  prompt  solution  of  these  difificulties. 

In  the  crowded  hall  of  the  Prussian  House  of  Deputies,  Richard 
Miiller  formally  opened  the  congress  with  an  address  of  welcome.  He 
pointed  out  the  necessity  of  consolidating  the  gains  of  the  revolution  and 
said  that  the  first  problem  was  to  decide  whether  or  not  the  proletariat 
should  maintain  the  dictatorship  until  the  end  of  the  revolution.  Stating 
that  the  workmen's  and  soldiers'  councils  were  the  only  achievement  of 
the  revolution,  he  added  that  their  relations  with  the  government  must 
be  altered  and  that  the  troops  must  take  an  oath  to  defend  them.  For  the 
government,  Ebert  said  that  there  was  only  one  source  of  law  in  Germany : 
the  will  of  the  people.  The  national  goal  was  the  erection  of  a  state  of 
law.  The  victorious  proletariat  would  overcome  first  the  political  class 
differences  and  then  the  economic  inequalities  until  finally  complete 
equality  would  be  established.  Democracy  would  form  the  rock  upon 
which  the  working  class  would  build  the  house  of  Germany's  future. 

Thus  the  great  question  of  the  revolution  was  brought  before  the 
congress  in  the  first  morning  session  at  the  very  moment  which  the 
Spartacans  had  chosen  to  assure  the  triumph  of  the  communist  cause. 
Great  crowds  of  striking  workmen  assembled  that  morning  in  the  Avenue 
of  Victory  near  the  statue  of  Otto  the  Lazy  and  marched  to  the  House  of 
Deputies.  Before  its  portals,  Liebknecht,  in  a  speech  to  the  strikers, 
denounced  the  idea  of  a  national  assembly,  demanded  the  disarming  of 
the  army  leaders  and  counter  revolutionists  and  the  arming  of  the  revolu- 
tionary working  classes.    To  the  armed  strikers  he  shouted :    "Whoever 


"*  Scheidemann,  "Der  Zusammenbruch,"  220-221.    Runkel,  "Die  Deutsche  Revo- 
lution," 168-170. 


86  THS   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

votes  for  the  National  Assembly,  votes  for  the  rape  of  the  working  class." 
Thereupon  a  deputation  of  these  Spartacans  entered  the  hall  and  de- 
manded in  the  name  of  two  hundred  thousand  workmen:  a  socialistic 
dictatorship  with  all  power  in  the  hands  of  the  councils ;  the  abolition  of 
the  present  government  and  the  old  administrative  system,  and  the_  forma- 
tion of  a  "red  army".  Their  petition  was  noted,  but  the  congress  refused 
to  allow  Karl  Liebknecht  and  Rosa  Luxemburg  to  attend  the  meeting 
with  full  voting  privileges.  Then  the  Spartacans  brought  a  procession  of 
youths  to  the  congress.  These  young  communists  demanded :  the  six- 
hour  day  for  workers  under  sixteen  years  of  age ;  abolition  of  military 
service,  and  the  enactment  of  a  law  establishing  the  age  of  majority  at 
eighteen.  Tumultuous  scenes  occurred  during  these  interruptions  and 
order  was  maintained  with  difficulty. 

Within  the  congress,  the  Majority  Socialists  defended  the  government 
against  the  assaults  of  the  Independents  and  Spartacans.  Landsberg  ac- 
cused Miiller  of  aiming  at  the  dictatorship,  and  said  that  just  before  the 
congress  met  the  Executive  Committee  had  debated  the  question  of  re- 
moving Ebert  from  the  government.  'Tf  the  Berlin  Executive  Council 
wished  to  defend  itself  against  the  suspicion  of  a  dictatorship,"  he  said, 
"it  should  have  called  this  congress  the  first  day  after  the  revolution." 
The  delegates  from  southern  and  western  Germany  supported  the  accusa- 
tions of  Landsberg. 

On  the  second  day  of  the  congress  George  Ledebour  accused  Ebert  of 
insincerity  in  declining  the  presidency  and  charged  him  with  the  fateful 
crime  of  December  sixth.  Boasting  that  the  Independents  had  planned 
and  organized  the  revolution  of  which  the  other  parties  now  enjoyed  the 
fruits,  he  shouted:  "Ebert  is  a  mark  of  infamy  for  the  government." 
During  the  afternoon  session,  thirty  soldiers  entered  the  meeting  bearing 
pasteboard  shields,  representing  the  units  of  the  Berlin  garrison.  They 
demanded :  the  formation  of  a  supreme  military  council  chosen  by  all  the 
soldiers'  councils  of  Germany ;  the  abolition  of  all  insignia  of  rank ;  the 
disarming  of  all  officers  and  returning  troops,  and  the  maintenance  of 
the  discipline  and  revolutionary  character  of  the  army  by  soldiers'  coun- 
cils. vSpeaking  from  various  parts  of  the  hall,  these  soldiers  required  the 
congress  to  debate  these  propositions  at  once.  A  violent  discussion  broke 
out  between  the  Independents  and  the  Majority  Socialists  over  the  ques- 
tion. Haase  himself  sought  to  have  this  ultimatum  laid  on  the  table  until 
the  following  day.  The  session  finally  ended  amid  scenes  of  tumult  and 
strife.  , 

The  third  day  of  the  congress  was  the  decisive  one  and  marked  the 
turning  point  in  the  history  of  the  German  revolution.  Amid  a  storm  of 
protests,  Cohen-Reuss  moved  that  the  elections  for  the  National  Assem- 
bly should  take  place  on  January  19,  1919.  Supporting  his  motion,  Cohen- 


THE  STRUGGLE  OF  PARTIES  FOR   POWER  ^7 

Reuss  made  a  masterful  speech,  describing  the  hopeless  condition  of 
Germany  which  was  drifting  toward  a  fearful  catastrophe.  In  the  course 
of  his  address  he  said :  "Only  a  strong  central  authority,  which  is  sup- 
ported by  the  sturdy  foundation  of  the  general  will  of  the  people,  can  save 
our  nation.  No  central  power  can  secure  authority  for  itself  either  at 
home  or  abroad  if  it  is  not  supported  by  the  overwhelming  majority  of 
the  German  people.  The  only  organization  which  can  carry  out  the  will 
of  the  people  is  the  German  National  Assembly  for  which  every  German 
can  cast  a  vote.  Workmen's  and  soldiers'  councils  can  never  be  the 
expression  of  the  universal  will  of  the  people.  Bolshevism  in  Russia  has 
discredited  socialism  for  decades.  The  Entente  will  occupy  this  city  if 
Germany  does  not  develop  order.  Bjorn  Bjornson  has  just  informed  me 
that  the  French  minister  in  Christiana  has  said  within  the  last  few  days : 
'Things  are  favorable  for  us  in  Berlin;  if  conditions  continue  thus,  we 
will  be  there  in  four  weeks.'  " 

The  great  majority  of  the  congress  accepted  this  view  of  the  necessity 
of  calling  a  National  Assembly.  Although  the  Independent  and  Spar- 
tacan  leaders  violently  attacked  the  motion,  they  could  not  even  control 
their  followers.  Dittmann,  one  of  the  Independent  leaders,  exclaimed : 
"The  masses  wish  the  National  Assembly ;  no  doubt  can  exist  concerning 
that;  the*  leaders  must  therefore  become  the  instruments  of  the  masses." 
Finally  the  question  was  put  to  a  vote  and  carried  by  400  to  75.^^^ 

It  was  then  moved  by  Luedemann  that :  "The  national  conference  of 
the  workmen's  and  soldiers'  councils  of  Germany,  which  represents  the 
entire  political  power  in  Germany,  transfers,  until  further  regulation  by 
the  National  Assembly,  the  legislative  and  executive  power  to  the  Council 
of  the  People's  Commissioners.  The  congress  authorizes  further  a  central 
council  of  the  workmen's  and  soldiers'  councils,  which  will  exercise  the 
right  of  watching  over  the  German  and  Prussian  cabinets.  This  council 
has  the  right  of  appointing  and  dismissing  the  Commissioners  of  the 
Reich  Sind  Prussia  until  the  definitive  regulation  of  the  relations  between 
the  central  government  and  the  several  states.  In  order  to  control  the 
conduct  of  business  in  the  offices  of  the  national  ministries,  assistants  to 
the  secretaries  of  state  will  be  designated  by  the  Council  of  the  People's 
Commissioners.  Two  assistants  who  will  be  chosen  from  the  two  social 
democratic  parties  will  be  placed  in  each  of  the  ministries.  Before  the 
appointment  by  the  Commissioners  of  all  technical  ministers  and  assistants, 
the  Central  Council  is  to  be  consulted." 

The  Independents  denounced  the  powers  given  by  this  resolution  to 
the  Central  Council  as  inadequate  and  demanded  explanations.  Landsberg 
declared  that  the  bill  would  establish  parliamentary  control  of  the  gov- 
ernment by  the  Central  Council.    The  Independents  then  moved  to  make 


Runkel,  "Die  Deutsche  Revolution,"  185-190. 


88  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

the  council  system  the  foundation  of  the  constitution.  This  was  defeated 
by  a  vote  of  344  to  48.  As  a  final  test  of  strength  the  Independents  moved 
to  allow  the  Central  Council  to  reject  or  accept  all  laws  before  they  were 
promulgated.  This  was  also  defeated,  and  the  motion  of  Luedemann  was 
then  adopted. 

Embittered  by  their  defeat,  the  Independents  now  demonstratively  left 
the  hall,  declaring  that  they  would  not  take  part  in  the  election  of  the 
Council.  This  was  the  first  great  mistake  which  the  Independents  made, 
since  the  list  of  candidates  of  the  Majority  Socialists  was  then  adopted 
and  the  control  of  the  revolutionary  government  passed  into  their  hands. 

The  other  work  of  the  congress  was  unimportant.  Numerous  radical 
measures,  advocating  the  abolition  of  state  elections,  the  formation  of  a 
unified  republic,  and  the  union  of  the  Socialist  parties,  were  rejected.  To 
the  attacks  of  the  Independents,  Scheidemann  replied  that  the  answer  of 
his  party  would  be  given  on  January  19,  1919. 

The  congress  of  the  revolutionary  proletariat  had  demonstrated  the 
'strength  of  the  Majority  Socialist  Party  and  the  desire  of  the  nation  to 
carry  out  its  democratic  policies.  It  was  the  German  proletariat  itself 
"which,  in  voting  to  call  a  national  assembly,  established  the  principle  of 
democracy  above  that  of  class  rule.  The  congress  demonstrated  also  the 
astounding  weakness  of  the  Independents.  It  brought  to  light  T:heir  lack 
of  parliamentary  leaders  and  m^de  their  position  in  the  provisional  gov- 
ernment precarious.  It  is  to  the  credit  of  the  German  councils  that  at  a 
time  when  anarchy,  starvation,  and  invasion  were  threatening  the  nation, 
they  took  the  first  steps  to  establish  order  and  democracy.^^-  In  the 
words  of  Ebert:  "The  dictatorship  of  the  Junkers  had  plunged  the 
German  people  into  the  deepest  misery  and  every  other  dictatorship  would 
be  for  the  people  equally  unbearable."  ^^^  Although  the  Central  Council 
of  the  German  Socialistic  Republic  announced  that  it  had  taken  over  the 
aflfairs  of  Prussia  and  the  empire,  the  nation  was  assured  that  democracy 
would  be  established.^^* 

The  January  Spartacan  Uprising 

The  decision  of  the  proletarian  congress  of  workmen's  and  soldiers' 
councils  to  convene  the  National  Assembly  and  thus  to  establish  democ- 
racy in  place  of  the  dictatorship  of  the  working  classes,  was  the  signal 
for  th€  attack  of  the  Independents  and  Spartacans  and  the  prelude  to 
civil  war.  Although  still  in  the  government,  the  Independents  planned  to 
overthrow  the  rule  of  the  Majority  Socialists,  while  the  Spartacans  aimed 


I 


"*  Daumig,  "Raetesystem,"  18. 

^Deutscher  Geschichtskalender,  "Die  Deutsche  Revolution,"  II  Heft,  200-259. 

*"  Official  Poster  of  Central  Council,  December  21,  1918. 


THE  STRUGGLE  OF   PARTIES   FOR   POWER  89 

at  the  immediate  establishment  of  communism  with  all  power  in  the  hands 
of  workmen's  and  soldiers'  comicils.^^^ 

Before  the  meeting  of  the  congress,  Rosa  Luxemburg  announced  that 
the  revolution  must  be  secured  from  lowering  enemies  ;  that  the  power  of  : 
the  national  and  local  councils  must  be  developed ;  that  a  red  guard  should 
be  organized;  that  dynastic  property  and  the  large  estates  should  be 
confiscated;  and  that  the  entire  administrative  system  of  the  old  police 
state  should  be  destroyed.  To  the  armed  Spartacans  she  exclaimed :  "The 
abolition  of  the  rule  of  capitalism,  the  realization  of  the  socialistic  order 
of  society,  this  and  nothing  less  is  the  historic  theme  of  the  present  revo- 
lution. Only  in  the  Internationale,  in  the  world  revolution  of  the  pro- 
letariat, is  the  German  revolution  anchored." 

In  the  same  manner  as  the  Parisian  mob  had  dominated  the  Conven- 
tion, the  Spartacans  of  Berlin  had  planned  to  control  the  congress  of 
councils.  Their  failure  aroused  them  to  political  frenzy.  To  the  Spar- 
tacans, the  convocation  of  the  National  Assembly  meant  the  creation  of 
a  bourgeois  counterweight  to  the  revolution,  the  perpetuation  of  the  old 
imperial  bureaucracy,  and  the  beginnings  of  a  counter  revolution.  Spar- 
tacus  demanded :  the  six-hour  day  in  order  to  have  time  to  educate  the 
workers ;  the  cancellation  of  all  war  bonds  excepting  those  held  by  small 
subscribers  and  saving  banks;  the  nationalization  of  all  banks,  large 
industries,  and  great  agricultural  estates;  and  the  exclusion  from  the 
sociaUstic  state  of  all  bourgeois  elements. 

Denouncing  the  bourgeois  democratic  aims  of  the  Majority  Socialists, 
Rosa  Luxemburg  exclaimed:  "The  national  assembly  is  an  obsolete 
inheritance  from  former  bourgeois  revolutions,  a  shell  without  contents, 
a  relic  of  the  period  of  narrow-minded  townsmen's  illusions  about  the 
united  people,  about  liberty,  equality  and  fraternity."  Karl  Liebknecht 
asserted  that  the  political  power  of  the  masses  was  declining  daily,  that 
bourgeois  elements  had  entered  the  councils,  and  therefore  that  the  work- 
ing classes  must  hold  fast  to  what  had  been  conquered,  drive  out  the 
ruling  classes  and  seize  power.  In  accord  with  the  Berlin  leaders  were 
the  Spartacans  of  the  other  German  industrial  centers.  In  Hamburg, 
Bremen,  Brunswick,  Magdeburg,  Leipsic,  Dresden,  and  Munich,  the 
communists  denounced  the  calling  of  the  National  Assembly  as  a  betrayal 
of  the  revolution  and  the  restoration  of  the  old  imperial  bureaucracy. 
To  gain  control  of  the  remnant  of  the  German  army,  the  Spartacans 
commenced  publishing  the  Rote  Soldaten,  the  official  organ  of  the  Red 
Soldiers'  Alliance.  Here  they  advocated  the  directing  of  the  military 
movement  into  proletarian  channels,  which  would  result  in  the  completion 

**  Bernstein,  "Die  deutsche  Revolution,"  100-161,  is  a  detailed  account  of  the 
collapse  of  the  coalition  socialist  government  and  the  course  of  the  Berhn  communist 
rebellion  of  January,  1919. 


90  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

by  force  of  arms  of  the  socialistic  revolution.  This  military  propaganda 
was  remarkably  effective,  winning  over  thousands  of  war  veterans  and 
republican  soldiers  to  the  Spartacan  cause. 

On  December  23  the  sailors,  who  had  occupied  the  Royal  Palace  and 
mews  of  Berlin,  attempted  a  revolt  when  they  were  ordered  by  the  gov- 
ernment to  evacuate  their  quarters.  Wels,  the  Conmiandant  of  Berlin, 
was  seized  by  them,  and  bands  of  mutineers  occupied  the  Chancellery  and 
the  central  telephone  and  telegraph  offices.  Ebert  and  Landsberg  were 
actually  confined  in  the  Chancellor's  palace  by  a  group  of  sailors  which 
had  occupied  the  Wilhelmstrasse.  Ebert  was  able,  however,  to  com- 
municate with  the  Minister  of  War,  Scheuch,  by  means  of  a  secret  tele- 
phone connecting  the  two  offices.  Scheidemann,  who  was  absent  from 
the  Chancellery  when  it  was  surrounded  by  the  sailors,  also  made  every 
effort  to  rescue  his  colleagues.  Toward  evening  the  veteran  troops  of 
General  Lequis,  who  remained  loyal  to  the  government,  advanced  from 
their  barracks  to  the  Chancellery.  Thereupon  the  sailors  abandoned  their 
effort  to  overthrow  the  government.^^^ 

Ebert  now  made  an  effort  to  secure  the  release  of  Wels,  who  was 
confined  in  the  cellar  of  the  Royal  Stables.  This  failed,  and  Radke,  leader 
of  the  sailors,  informed  the  government  that  he  could  no  longer  be 
answerable  for  the  life  of  Wels.  Therefore  the  government  ordered 
General  Scheuch  to  rescue  Commandant  Wels. 

After  fruitless  negotiations,  the  Guard  Cavalry  Division  commenced 
on  Christmas  morning  an  attack  on  the  palace  and  stables.  In  the  struggle 
for  the  possession  of  the  palace,  sixty-eight  combatants  were  killed.  The 
action  was,  however,  indecisive ;  the  government,  afraid  to  take  energetic 
measures,  compromised  with  the  sailors,  who  ultimately  evacuated  the 
palace. 

The  Independent  members  of  the  provisional  government  seized  upon 
this  opportunity  to  resign  and  to  denounce  the  Majority  Socialists  for 
ordering  reactionary  troops  commanded  by  veteran  officers  to  fire  upon 
the  people.  The  Central  Committee  of  the  workmen's  and  soldiers' 
councils,  however,  supported  Ebert,  Scheidemann,  and  Landsberg;  and 
on  December  27  it  confirmed  the  appointment  of  Noske  and  Wissel  to  the 
vacancies  created  by  the  resignations  of  the  Independents.^^^ 

Thus  a  Majority  Socialist  government  was  established  in  Germany 
with  the  consent  of  the  representatives  of  the  councils  of  workmen  and 
soldiers.  This  governing  body  was  supported  by  the  entire  bourgeoisie. 
Therefore  it  appeared  certain  that  the  forces  of  order  and  democracy 
would  triumph,   unless  a  communist   coup   d'etat   overthrew  the   Berlin 


"*  Scheidemann,  "Der  Zusammenbruch,"  233-234. 
*"  Egelhaaf ,  op.  cit.,  26. 


THE  STRUGGLE  OF   PARTIES   FOR   POWER  91 

government.  The  vacillating  policy  of  the  Independents  strengthened 
the  Spartacans,  who  continued  their  preparations  for  the  overthrow  of  the 
Social  Democrats.  With  the  Independents  in  opposition,  the  Spartacans 
believed  that  it  would  be  an  easy  task  to  raise  the  Berlin  masses  against 
the  government  and  to  establish  a  genuine  proletarian  rule.  The  central 
secretariat  of  the  Spartacans  sent  an  ultimatum  to  the  Independents,  de- 
manding the  calling  of  a  party  convention  before  the  end  of  December 
and  the  immediate  adoption  of  a  revolutionary  policy.  Although  the  left 
wing  of  the  Independents  was  in  favor  of  accepting  this  ultimatum,  the 
party  finally  rejected  it.  It  announced  as  its  reasons  for  this  action:  the 
difficulties  of  convening  its  representatives,  and  the  necessity  of  carrying 
on  an  active  campaign  for  seats  in  the  National  Assembly. 

Daumig,  a  radical  Independent,  later  expressed  his  views  of  the  dic- 
tatorship as  follows :  "Our  goal  is  the  realization  of  democracy,  namely, 
the  creation  of  economic  and  political  equality  as  well  as  the  equality  of 
rights.  Let  us  examine  the  world  democracies :  In  the  great  American 
democracy,,  the  dictatorship  of  the  trust  magnates  rules  the  land,  and  the 
American  workmen  can  tell  of  Pinkertons  and  other  oppressors.  A  dic- 
tatorship of  imperialists,  who  under  the  names  of  liberals  or  conservatives 
are  interested  in  colonial  policy,  rules  England  and  the  British  Empire. 
A  dictatorship  of  financiers  in  conjunction  with  professional  parliamen- 
tarians rules  France.  Why  should  we  be  afraid  of  the  dictatorship  of  the 
proletariat  ?"  ^ss 

Undaunted  by  this  refusal  to  cooperate  with  them,  representatives  of 
the  German  Spartacan  Party  met  on  December  30  in  convention  in  Berlin. 
Karl  Radek,  the  able  Russian  leader  and  propagandist,  appeared  secretly 
at  the  convention  and  pronounced  in  favor  of  civil  war  if  necessary  to 
establish  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat.  Liebknecht,  Rosa  Luxem- 
burg, Franz  Mehring,  and  Levy  also  spoke  in  favor  of  immediately  com- 
pleting the  work  of  revolution. 2^"  The  delegates  then  proceeded  to  draw 
up  a  party  program  and  to  formulate  twenty-four  military,  political, 
social,  and  economic  reforms  which  would  pave  the  way  for  communism. 
"The  sanguinary  hallucination  of  the  world  empire  of  Prussian  militar- 
ism", stated  the  preamble  of  the  party  platform,  "vanished  on  the  battle- 
fields of  France,  and  the  band  of  criminals  who  had  started  the  world 
war,  plunged  Germany  into  a  sea  of  blood,  and  deceived  her  for  four 
years,  were  decisively  defeated.  Society  was  thus  placed  before  the 
alternative  either  of  continuing  the  capitalistic  system  with  new  wars, 
chaos,  and  anarchy,  or  of  establishing  complete  socialism  as  the  only 
salvation  of  humanity." 


""Daumig,  "Raetesystem,"  24. 
»•  Runkel,  op.  cit..  191. 


92  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

Eight  immediate  measures  were  declared  necessary  by  the  platform  to 
safeguard  the  revolution :  the  disarming  of  the  police,  officers,  bourgeois 
soldiers,  and  all  members  of  the  ruling  class;  the  seizure  by  the  work- 
men's and  soldiers'  councils  of  all  arms  and  ammunition  as  well  as 
munition  plans ;  the  arming  of  the  entire  male  proletarian  population  as 
a  workers'  militia ;  the  formation  of  a  standing  red  guard  for  protection 
against  the  counter  revolution;  the  abolition  of  military  and  iron  dis- 
cipline and  the  adoption  of  the  principle  of  the  election  and  recall  of 
officers  by  their  enlisted  men ;  the  removal  of  all  officers  and  cadets  from 
the  soldiers'  councils ;  the  displacement  of  all  bureaucrats  of  the  former 
regime  by  trusted  men  of  the  councils;  the  formation  of  revolutionary 
tribunals  to  condemn:  those  guilty  of  starting  and  prolonging  the  war, 
the  two  Hohenzollerns,  Ludendorfif,  Hindenburg,  Tirpitz,  and  their  fellow 
criminals  as  well  as  the  counter  revolutionists ;  the  immediate  confiscation 
of  all  food  in  order  to  safeguard  the  ration  system. 

In  the  political  and  social  spheres,  the  program  contained  eight  min- 
imum reforms :  the  suppression  of  all  federal  states  in  order  to  create  a 
unified  Socialist  republic ;  the  removal  of  all  former  administrative 
officials  and  appointment  of  workmen's  and  soldiers'  councils  in  their 
stead ;  the  election  of  workmen's  councils  according  to  industries  by  the 
entire  agricultural  and  industrial  proletariat  of  both  sexes,  as  well  as  the 
election  of  soldiers'  councils  by  the  enlisted  men  with  the  exclusion  of  all 
officers  and  capitulants;  the  election  by  all  councils  of  delegates  to  a 
central  council,  which  shall  choose  an  executive  committee  to  act  as  the 
supreme  organ  of  executive  and  legislative  power;  the  control  of  the 
activity  of  the  executive  committee  by  the  central  council,  and  the  right 
of  recall  of  all  delegates  who  fail  to  act  according  to  instructions ;  the 
abolition  of  all  class  distinctions,  orders,  titles,  and  the  creation  of  com- 
plete judicial  and  social  equality  for  both  sexes;  incisive  social  legislation, 
shortening  of  the  hours  of  labor  because  of  the  enervation  due  to  the  war, 
and  establishment  of  the  six-hour  working  day;  prompt  and  thorough 
alteration  of  the  food,  health,  and  educational  systems  in  the  interests  of 
the  proletarian  revolution. 

The  immediate  economic  demands  were:  the  confiscation  of  all 
dynastic  property  and  incomes  in  the  interests  of  the  commonwealth ;  the 
annulment  of  all  state  and  other  public  debts  as  well  as  war  loans  except 
subscriptions  up  to  an  amount  to  be  established  by  the  councils ;  the 
expropriation  of  all  agricultural  estates  except  peasant  small  holdings  and 
the  formation  of  socialistic  agricultural  cooperative  societies ;  the  expro- 
priation by  the  socialistic  republic  of  all  banks,  mines,  metal  works,  and 
large  industrial  and  commercial  corporations ;  the  confiscation  of  all 
private  property  above  a  certain  amount  to  be  fixed  by  the  councils ;  the 
control  of  the  entire  means  of  transportation  by  the  councils,  the  election 


THE  STRUGGLE  OF  PARTIES   FOR   POWER  .        93 

of  shop  councils  in  all  factories  in  order,  by  agreement  with  the  work- 
men's councils,  to  control  the  internal  affairs  of  the  factories,  to 
regulate  the  conditions  of  labor,  to  control  production,  and  eventually 
to  take  over  the  direction  of  the  factories;  the  estabUshment  of  a  central 
strike  commission  which  shall  insure  to  the  growing  national  strike  move- 
ment a  uniform  socialistic  control. 

Finally  the  platform  advocated  active  preparations  for  the  revolu- 
tionary rising  of  the  world  proletariat,  and  asserted  of  Spartacus :  "He 
is  the  social  conscience  of  the  revolution.  Crucify  him,  yell  the  secret 
enemies  of  the  revolt  and  the  proletariat,  the  capitalists,  the  small  citizens, 
the  officers,  the  anti-semitic  press  lackeys  of  the  bourgeoisie,  the  Scheide- 
maenner,  who,  like  Judas  Iscariot,  sold  the  workmen  to  the  bourgeoisie. 
.  .  .  Spartacus  refuses  to  work  with  the  Scheidemaenner  or  the  bour- 
geoisie. Spartacus  will  seize  power  only  if  it  is  the  undisputed  wish  of  the 
great  majority  of  the  proletarian  masses  in  all  Germany,  who  must  first 
accept  the  aims  and  battle  methods  of  the  Spartacans.  The  victory  of  the 
Spartacan  Alliance  stands  not  at  the  beginning  but  at  the  end  of  the 
revolution;  it  is  identical  with  the  victory  of  the  millions  of  the  socialistic 
proletariat.    Thumbs  in  their  eyes  and  knees  on  their  breasts."  ^^° 

More  important  than  the  formulating  of  this  revolutionary  platform 
was  the  decision  concerning  the  immediate  policy  of  the  party  toward  the 
national  elections.  Although  at  the  last  moment  Liebknecht  and  Rosa 
Luxemburg  doubted  the  success  of  civil  war,  the  communist  party  voted 
63  to  23  to  prevent  the  election  of  a  National  Assembly.  They  were  con- 
vinced that,  if  the  assembly  once  met,  their  program  would  be  defeated 
and  the  revolution  would  be  over.  Many  of  the  communists  sincerely 
believed  that  a  civil  war  which  established  the  dictatorship  of  the  prole- 
tariat would  save  Germany  from  her  enemies  by  ushering  in  the  world 
revolution.  Radek  boasted  to  the  convention  that  the  Russian  proletariat 
would  join  with  their  class-conscious  German  brethren  to  fight  the  menace 
of  Anglo  Saxon  capitalism  on  the  Rhine.  Liebknecht  himself  stated  that 
the  party  goal  was  international  communism  and  could  be  reached  only 
by  destroying  the  capitalistic  classes  in  the  Entente  states,  which  alone 
barred  the  way  toward  the  world  revolution.  He  believed  that  it  would 
be  necessary  to  destroy  all  existing  conditions  in  order  to  establish  com- 
munistic society,  and  saw  in  the  coming  revolution  the  only  salvation  for 
Germany.  Clemenceau  had  stated  that  he  would  burn  Paris  if  it  would 
save  France;  and  the  Spartacans  now  announced  that  they  would  lay 
Germany  in  ruins,  convinced  that  from  the  ashes  of  the  empire  a  new 
and  greater  nation  would  arise. ^°^ 


^  Revoliitions-Bibliothek.  Nr.  3,  "Das   Programm  der  Kommunistischen  Partei 
Deutschlands   (Spartakusbund),"  47-111. 

'**  Lensch,  "Am  Ausgang  der  Deutschen  Sozialdemokratie,"  33. 


94  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

The  military  leader  of  the  Spartacan  revolt  was  Robert  Eichhorn, 
Police  President  of  Berlin.  Supported  by  Russian  propaganda,  gold,  and 
weapons,  he  prepared  at  the  Police  Presidency  to  arm  the  masses  of  the 
capital  and  to  overthrow  the  government.  Rifles  and  machine  guns  were 
supplied  to  workmen  from  the  Schwarzkopf^  and  Daimler  works  as  well 
as  other  factories,  and  instructions  were  issued  to  the  communist  guards 
to  disarm  those  hostile  to  Spartacus. 

The  Prussian  government  became  aware  of  Eichhorn's  activities  and 
ordered  him  removed  from  office.  On  Sunday  morning,  January  5, 
Eugen  Ernst,  the  newly  appointed  successor  of  Eichhorn,  and  Lieutenant 
Fischer  attempted  to  take  possession  of  police  headquarters,  but  the 
Spartacans  refused  to  surrender  the  building.  This  attempt  to  remove 
Eichhorn  from  office  was  the  signal  for  the  first  uprising  of  the  German 
communists.^®^ 

On  the  fifth  of  January,  1919,  the  Spartacan  rebellion  broke  out  in 
the  capital  of  Germany.  That  day  the  Spartacan  and  Independent  news- 
papers, Rote  Fahne,  and  Die  Freiheit,  called  for  demonstrations  in  the 
Siegesallee  against  the  Majority  Socialist  government.  Great  crowds 
were  addressed  by  Eichhorn,  Liebknecht,  and  Ledebour,  who  described 
the  Majority  Socialists  as  bloodhounds,  and  denounced  them  for  conven- 
ing the  National  x^ssembly  of  the  reactionaries.  Meanwhile  a  committee 
of  leaders  organized  the  revolt  and  prepared  to  occupy  the  principal  gov- 
ernment offices,  public  buildings,  the  Brandenburg  Gate,  and  the  barracks 
of  the  city.  i  : 

The  first  step  was  the  seizure  that  night  of  the  principal  newspaper 
offices  of  the  capital  with  the  object  of  preventing  the  appearance 
of  the  social  democratic  and  bourgeois  press.  The  Wolff  Telegraph 
Bureau,  and  the  Vorwaerts,  Mosse,  and  Ullstein  offices  were  promptly 
occupied.  At  the  Vorwaerts  building  eighty  men  of  the  security  police 
surrendered  without  a  struggle.  Everywhere  the  Spartacans  were  suc- 
cessful, and  their  leaders  believed  that  within  twelve  hours  the  govern- 
ment of  the  Majority  Socialists  would  cease  to  exist.  Liebknecht  and 
Eichhorn  prepared  to  assume  the  roles  of  Lenine  and  Trotzki. 

The  morning  edition  of  the  Vorzvaerts,  the  official  paper  of  the  Major- 
ity Socialists,  appeared  on  the  sixth  of  January  under  Spartacan  control 
and  printed  a  proclamation  demanding:  the  disarming  of  all  counter 
revolutionists ;  the  arming  of  the  proletariat ;  the  formation  of  a  red 
army;  the  union  of  all  revolutionary  troops  with  the  workers  for  joint 
action  ;  the  seizure  of  power  by  the  councils  ;  and  finally  the  overthrow  of 
the  traitors:  Ebert  and  Scheidemann.  In  conclusion  this  Spartacan  man- 
ifesto announced :     "You  have  now  reconquered  the  Vorzvaerts.    Hold  it 


"'  Noske,  "Von  Kiel  bis  Kapp,"  66-67. 


THE  STRUGGLE  OF  PARTIES  FOR  POWER  95 

and  fight  for  it  with  tooth  and  nail.  Do  not  let  it  be  snatched  from  you. 
Make  it  the  paper  which  it  should  be :  a  pioneer  on  the  road  to  freedom. 
Finally  show  your  bravery  in  further  battles  and  victories."  ^^^ 

With  the  seizure  by  the  Spartacans  of  the  Brandenburg  Gate,  the 
government  printing  offices,  the  provision  office,  several  barracks,  and 
railway  stations,  the  terror  began  in  Berlin.  Liebknecht,  Ledebour,  and 
Scholze  formed  a  provisional  communist  government  and  sent  a  detach- 
ment of  Spartacans  to  occupy  the  Ministry  of  War.""*  Three  hundred 
communists  under  the  command  of  a  sailor  actually  invaded  the  War 
Office  and  demanded  its  surrender.  Armored  cars  were  driven  by  the 
Spartacans  into  the  Wilhelmstrasse  and  fighting  broke  out  between  them 
and  the  loyal  troops  who  defended  the  government  in  the  Chancellery. 
Radek,  the  representative  of  the  Bolsheviki  in  Berlin,  drove  ostentatiously 
up  and  down  Unter  den  Linden  watching  the  progress  of  the  rebellion. 
At  night  the  Spartacans  captured  the  Railway  Building,  where  a  small 
detachment  of  government  troops  surrendered. 

During  the  day's  battle,  many  government  troops  gave  up  their  arms 
without  fighting,  and  the  marine  division  declared  its  neutrality.  Had 
the  Spartacans  possessed  able  military  leaders  and  abandoned  their  speech- 
making  for  fighting,  they  could  have  easily  overthrown  the  Socialist 
government  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse  and  established  the  soviet  system  in 
Berlin. 

At  last  the  vacillating  Socialist  government  acted  when  thousands  of 
Social  Democrats  assembled  before  the  Chancellery  and  asked  for  arms. 
To  this  living  wall  of  defense  Scheidemann  said :  "We  will  call  together 
the  entire  population  of  military  age,  and  it  is  self-understood  that  we 
will  not  place  umbrellas  in  their  hands. "-'^^  Noske,  the  revolutionary 
governor  of  Kiel,  was  appointed  on  the  night  of  January  6  Commander- 
in-Chief  in  the  Marks  and  Governor  of  Berlin.  At  that  moment  Eich- 
horn's  Security  Police  were  in  open  rebellion  and  the  Republican  Guards 
were  reported  by  the  Commandant  to  be  unreliable.  Colonel  Reinhardt, 
the  new  Minister  of  War,  announced  to  the  People's  Commissioners  that 
the  only  loyal  forces  near  Berlin  were  the  troops  of  Lieutenant  General 
von  Hoffmann.  Noske  therefore  accepted  the  advice  of  the  General  Staff 
officers  and  withdrew  to  the  little  village  of  Dahlem  on  the  road  to 
Potsdam,  where  he  established  his  headquarters.  Here  a  determined 
effort  was  to  be  made  to  organize  a  force  of  government  troops  capable 
of  defeating  the  Spartacans. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  only  an  able  and  energetic  Social  Democrat 
could  have  organized  the  scattered  forces  of  the  imperial  army  at  this 

'"^  Runkel,  "Die  Deutsche  Revolution,"  202. 

'^  Ledebour's  Testimony  in  Die  Freiheit,  May  22,  1919. 

'"  Menke-Gliickert,  op.  cit.,  131. 


96  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

crisis  of  the  revolution.  Under  Noske's  orders  the  troops  of  General  von 
Hoffmann,  the  units  near  Berlin  and  Potsdam,  the  Jaeger  of  General 
Maercker  in  the  camp  at  Zossen,  and  finally  the  Kiel  Marine  Brigade 
were  concentrated  for  action  against  Berlin.  To  protect  his  left  flank, 
Noske  occupied  the  government  munition  plants  at  Spandau,  v^hich  had 
been  seized  by  radical  workmen. 

Only  the  lack  of  military  leadership  had  prevented  the  Spartacans 
from  seizing  control  of  Berlin  on  January  6.  On  that  day  over  one 
hundred  thousand  armed  communists  and  Independents  had  occupied  the 
entire  Uiiter  den  Linden.  Unorganized  fighting  broke  out  in  various 
parts  of  the  city  between  the  Spartacans  and  detachments  of  soldiers.^*® 
In  an  effort  to  stop  the  bloodshed,  the  Independents,  Dittmann,  Kautsky, 
and  Breitsheid,  offered  to  mediate  between  the  Majority  Socialists  and 
the  Spartacans;  but  the  latter  refused  to  accept  the  government's  terms 
for  the  surrender  of  the  occupied  buildings.  The  fighting  therefore  con- 
tinued. All  transportation  ceased.  Liebknecht,  addressing  his  followers, 
said  that  the  fall  of  the  government  was  only  a  question  of  hours.  Yet 
he  narrowly  escaped  death  at  the  hands  of  an  enraged  mob  in  the  Leip- 
zigerstrasse.  Meanwhile  Noske  completed  his  preparations  to  occupy  the 
capital  with  the  skeleton  regiments  of  the  old  imperial  army,  which  were 
stationed  at  Dahlem  and  neighboring  camps.  On  January  8  he  announced 
in  a  proclamation  to  Berlin:  "Spartacus  fights  now  to  secure  complete 
power  over  the  state.  The  government,  which  will  bring  about  within  ten 
days  the  free  decision  of  the  people  concerning  their  own  fate,  is  to  be 
overthrown  by  force.  The  people  shall  not  be  allowed  to  speak.  Their 
voices  shall  be  suppressed.  You  have  seen  the  results.  Where  Spartacus 
rules  all  personal  security  and  freedom  are  abolished.  .  .  .  The  govern- 
ment is  therefore  taking  the  necessary  measures  to  suppress  the  reign  of 
terror  and  to  prevent  its  recurrence  once  for  all."  '*^^ 

The  government  counter-attack  on  the  Spartacans  began  January  ninth 
with  an  attempt  to  retake  the  Mosse  Publishing  House,  which  had  been 
converted  into  a  communist  stronghold.  Colonel  Reinhardt  and  Major 
von  Stephani  attacked  the  Vorwaerts  building  with  their  small  forces. 
Minenwerfer,  flame-throwers,  and  10.5  cm.  howitzers  were  used  against 
the  stronghold,  while  the  defenders  replied  with  machine  guns.  Unable 
to  withstand  this  attack,  three  hundred  Spartacans  finally  surrendered. 
The  other  newspaper  buildings  were  then  recaptured. 

On  Saturday,  January  11,  Noske  and  Colonel  Deetjen  entered  the 
Wilhelmstrasse  at  the  head  of  3,000  veteran  infantry.  The  week  of  terror 
was  over.  To  Colonel  Reinhardt  belongs  the  credit  of  holding  the  Spar- 
tacans at  bay  until  Noske  and  General  von  Luettwitz  mustered  sufficient 


'*'  Noske,  "Von  Kiel  bis  Kapp,"  68-74. 

'"  Runkel,  "Die  Deutsche  Revolution,"  202-211. 


THE  STRUGGLE  OF   PARTIES   FOR   POWER  97 

forces  to  occupy  the  capital.  The  unorganized  Spartacans  had  been  unable 
to  withstand  the  assaults  of  the  remnant  of  the  Prussian  army.  Eichhorn 
moved  his  headquarters  to  the  Boetzow  Brewery  in  north  Berlin,  while 
the  government  troops  surrounded  on  Sunday,  January  12,  the  principal 
Spartacan  stronghold,  the  Police  Presidency.  This  huge  building  was 
badly  defended  and  no  attempt  was  made  to  hold  the  Alexander  Square 
or  the  Subway  Station.  After  a  preliminary  bombardment  with  howitzers, 
the  Presidency  was  stormed  by  the  government  troops.  The  last  Spar- 
tacan command  was  then  defeated  at  the  Silesian  Railway  Station  and 
by  Wednesday,  January  15,  the  entire  city  was  in  the  hands  of  the  gov- 
ernment. 

The  first  great  rising  of  the  Berlin  communists  had  failed  and  the 
first  attempt  to  establish  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  had  collapsed. 
Lacking  proper  military  organization  and  unable  to  secure  the  support  of 
i  a  majority  of  the  revolutionary  troops  stationed  in  Berlin,  the  Spartacans 
\  were  defeated  by  small  but  disciplined  government  forces  equipped  with 
artillery  and  commanded  by  able  officers  of  the  old  army.  Nevertheless 
it  took  the  weak  Socialist  government  sixteen  days  to  put  down  the  rising. 
Reinhardt,  however,  was  constantly  hampered  by  the  soldiers'  councils, 
while  many  Berlin  troops  declared  themselves  neutral. -*^^  Berlin,  the 
former  capital  of  militarism,  presented  the  strange  spectacle  during  these 
days  of  a  remnant  of  the  Prussian  guard  fighting  under  the  banner  of 
the  Socialist  republic.  The  conclusion  is,  therefore,  that,  if  Liebknecht 
had  carefully  prepared  a  military  coup  d'etat,  Bolshevism  would  have 
been  established  in  January,  1919,  in  Berlin. 

After  their  final  defeat  the  Spartacan  leaders  disappeared.  Eichhorn 
and  Radek  fled  from  the  capital.  A  report  was  circulated  that  Liebknecht 
and  Luxemburg  had  gone  to  Holland.  Liebknecht,  however,  wrote  to 
the  Rote  Faline:  "We  have  not  fled,  we  are  not  defeated,  even  if  they 
throw  us  in  irons.  We  will  remain  here  and  victory  will  be  ours.  Spar- 
tacus  is  still  the  fire  and  spirit,  the  heart  and  soul,  and  the  indomitable 
will  of  the  proletarian  revolution.  Spartacus  represents  also  the  longing 
for  happiness,  and  the  readiness  for  battle  of  the  class-conscious  prole- 
tariat. For  Spartacus  is  the  personification  of  socialism  and  world 
revolution.  The  Golgatha  way  of  the  German  revolution  is  not  yet  ended, 
but  the  day  of  salvation  nears."  -^® 

Realizing  that  these  leaders  were  still  in  Berlin,  the  government  made 
every  effort  to  capture  them.  On  the  night  of  January  fifteenth  Karl 
Liebknecht  and  Rosa  Luxemburg  were  taken  prisoners  in  the  Wilmers- 
dorf  suburb   and   brought   to   the   headquarters   of   the  Guard   Cavalry 

^"'Delbrueck  in  Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  February,  1919. 

**  Cf.  Radek,  "Rosa  Luxemburg,  Karl  Liebknecht,  Leo  Jogiches." 


98  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

Division  in  the  Eden  Hotel.  Rosa  Luxemburg  was  brutally  murdered  by 
government  troops  and  her  body  thrown  into  the  Landwehr  Canal.  Karl 
Liebknecht  was,  while  being  taken  to  Moabit  prison,  shot  by  his  guards, 
ostensibly  because  he  tried  to  escape.  Thus  political  murder  ended  the 
revolt  which  a  remnant  of  the  old  imperial  army  had  suppressed.  Lieb- 
knecht and  Luxemburg  perished  not  at  the  hands  of  the  Majority  Social- 
ists, but  of  those  Prussian  militarists  whom  they  had  fought  all  their 
political  lives.  Their  murder  stamped  out  the  fiery  protests  of  communism 
against  democracy,  and  their  followers,  deprived  temporarily  of  leaders, 
were  promptly  scattered.  When  informed  of  the  murder  of  Liebknecht 
and  Rosa  Luxemburg,  Scheidemann  said :  "I  sincerely  regret  the  death 
of  the  two,  and  for  good  reasons.  They  have  day  after  day  called  the 
people  to  arms  and  ordered  a  violent  overthrow  of  the  government.  They 
have  now  become  themselves  the  victims  of  their  own  bloody  terroristic 
tactics.""*^  The  bourgeoisie  and  the  Social  Democrats  openly  rejoiced 
over  the  death  of  the  two  communist  leaders  who  had  threatened  the  peace 
of  the  defeated  and  exhausted  Fatherland  and  had  not  shrunk  from 
plunging  the  capital  of  Germany  into  civil  war.  The  failure  of  the 
German  communist  rising  was  the  signal  for  the  triumph  of  German 
\      democracy  in  the  national  elections  which  were  held  on  January  nineteenth. 

""  Scheidemann,  "Der  Zusammenbruch,"  238. 


THE   CONVOCATION   OF   THE   NATIONAL  ASSEMBLY  99 


VI. 

THE  CONVOCATION  OF  THE  NATIONAL  ASSEMBLY 

The  Political  Parties 

The  victory  of  the  Social  Democrats  over  the  Spartacans  and  Inde- 
pendents in  the  first  congress  of  the  workmen's  and  soldiers'  councils 
resulted  in  the  decision  to  hold  the  elections  for  the  National  Assembly 
on  January  19,  1919.  At  once  the  activities  of  the  political  parties  were 
revived  throughout  Germany.  The  November  revolution,  which  had 
swept  away  empire,  army,  thrones,  and  dynasties,  had  little  affected  the 
German  political  parties.  Party  organization  and  party  machinery  re- 
mained practically  unaltered  since  the  last  period  of  the  war.  The 
announcement  of  a  definite  date  for  holding  the  national  elections  served 
therefore  to  increase  the  activities  of  the  bourgeois  parties,  as  well  as  to 
call  to  arms  the  party  organizations  of  Majority  Socialists  and  Independ- 
ents. Even  the  Communists  were  affected  by  the  electoral  controversies 
in  the  great  industrial  centers,  and  in  certain  instances  took  part  in  the 
campaign. ^■'^ 

With  great  rapidity  the  old  monarchical  parties  reorganized  them- 
selves, abandoned  their  old  platforms,  adopted  new  party  names,  and 
advocated  democratic  measures  for  preserving  the  state  from  anarchy. 
The  old  conservative  party  of  Prussia  and  Germany  became  the  German 
National  People's  Party.  The  Conservatives,  the  Pan-Germans  (the 
Fatherland  group),  and  the  majority  of  the  Junker  class  joined  this  party. 
The  old  slogan  of  the  defense  of  throne  and  altar  had,  however,  become 
obsolete.  The  throne  had  been  swept  away ;  the  king  was  in  exile ;  and 
the  altar  had  taken  care  of  itself  even  in  a  socialistic  republic. 

As  the  champion  of  liberalism  in  the  new  state,  the  right  wing  of  the 
old  National  Liberal  Party  formed  the  German_PjO£le^sJParty.  It  attacked 
radicalism,  ultramontanism  and  internationalism,  and  advocated  a  political 
union  with  Austria  as  well  as  cultural  relations  with  the  Germans  beyond 
the  seas. 

The  Centre  Party  had  been  freed  from  the  menace  of  disintegration 
by  the  anti-clerical  policies  of  the  revolutionary  Prussian  government. 
During  the  revolution  a  witty  Liberal  proposed  that  the  Centre  should 
erect  a  monument  in  honor  of  the  Independent  Minister  of  Public  Wor- 
ship, Adolf  Hoffmann,   for  preserving  the  unity  of  the  Catholic  Party. 

"'  Bergstrasser,  "Geschichte  der  politischen  Parteien,"  109-125.  "Handbuch 
Deutscher  Zeitungen  1917  Bearbeitet  im  Kriegspresseamt"  contains  complete  infor- 
mation concerning  the  party  newspapers. 


100  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

The  party  now  assumed  the  name  of  Christian  People's  Party,  and,  under 
the  influence  of  the  Cologne  leaders,  sought  to  gain  non-Catholic  support. 
While  leaving  to  one  side  the  question  of  monarchy  or  republic,  the  party 
denounced  the  attacks  on  private  property  and  the  nationalizing  of  the 
means  of  production,  and  advocated  housing  reform,  the  improvement  of 
working  conditions  for  laborers  and  peasants,  religious  freedom,  and 
religious  instruction  in  the  schools. 

As  the  new  party  of  democracy,  the  left  wing  of  the  old  National 
Liberal  and  the  Progressive  People's -parties  united  to  form  the  German 
Democratic  Party.  Various  minor  groups  entered  the  political  arena,  not 
without  distinct  local  success.  Of  all  the  parties,  the  Social  Democrats 
and  Independents  alone  retained  their  old  party  names  and  platforms. 
The  Spartacans  were  the  only  party  which  refused  to  take  part  in  the 
election  campaign. 

The  German  Nationalists,  who  united  in  one  party  the  former  Con- 
servatrves,'~Free  Conservatives,  and  Christian  Socialists,  adopted  a  pro- 
gram which  was  almost  revolutionary  in  character.  It  championed  a 
strong  state,  with  authority  based  upon  the  free  will  of  the  people,  which 
should  improve  the  national  weal  and  social  welfare.  Specifically  the 
party  advocated :  parliamentary  government ;  freedom  of  speech,  person, 
and  conscience;  equal  suffrage;  security  of  private  property;  liquidation 
of  the  war  societies ;  a  solution  of  the  housing  problem ;  the  repopulation 
of  arid  districts ;  the  protection  of  officials,  teachers,  soldiers,  employees, 
and  the  war-wounded;  the  simplification  of  the  national  administration 
and  taxation;  and  the  cooperation  of  women  in  public  life.  Upon  the 
issue  of  socialization  the  party  declared  for  the  adequate  protection  of 
employees  and  workers  and  for  the  rational  socialization  of  the  means  of 
production. ^^^ 

This  remarkable  platform  was  a  direct  attempt  to  hold  the  party 
together  during  the  storm  of  revolution.  Because  of  its  championship  of 
the  Church,  the  evangelical  orthodox  groups  supported  the  party.  As 
the  campaign  progressed,  the  German  Nationalist  leaders  openly  avowed 
their  monarchical  sentiments  and  championed  the  rights  of  private  property 
and  inheritance.  They  accused  the  Democrats  of  being  under  the  control 
of  Jewish  capitalists,  and  attributed  the  revolution  to  the  treason  of  the 
Social  Democrats  toward  the  liberal  empire.-^-'  Throughout  Germany  the 
Nationalists  conducted  a  sharp  and  aggressive  campaign.-^*  Although 
many  of  their  leaders  had  supported  the  Pan-German  and  Fatherland 
movements,  they  boldly  accused  the  Socialists  of  being  the  cause  of  the 

"*  Runkel,  "Die  Deutsche  Revolution,"  224.     Menke-Gluckert,  op.  cit.,  125. 
^"  Laube,  "Das  Wahre  Gesicht  der  Parteien." 

'''A  typical  conservative  pamphlet  is  Captain  Karl  von  Mueller's  "Das  Betoerte 
Deutsche  Volk." 


THE  CONVOCATION   OF   THE   NATIONAL  ASSEMBLY  101 

ruin  of  Germany.  It  would  be  a  fatal  mistake  to  believe  that  the  millions 
of  German  monarchists  and  conservatives  had  been  converted  to  democ- 
racy by  the  November  revolution. 

The  second  great  movement  in  German  politics  was  toward  liberalism. 
The  new  German  People's  Party  appeared  here  as  the  heir  of  the  liberalism 
of  Benningsen  and  of  that  national  liberalism  of  the  Nineteenth  Century 
empire.  It  announced  that  the  way  toward  internal  peace  and  a  greater 
Germany  led  over  the  ground  of  republican  government.  Nevertheless 
the  party  denounced  the  revolution "arid^declared  its  achievements  to  be: 
national  economic,  financial  and  moral  collapse.  It  accused  the  Socialists  of 
proclaiming  a  new  commjindment :  "Thou  shalt  not  work  for  thy  employer, 
thou  shalt  thyself  have  a  share  in  the  profits  of  labor."  ^^^  Stresemann 
asserted :  "Whoever  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  ninth  of  November  created 
a  new  Germany  does  not  belong  in  our  midst;  his  political  conceptions 
are  far  removed  from  those  which  inspire  us."  ^'*' 

Leidig  declared  that  the  chief  characteristic  of  the  party  is  and 
remains  liberalism,  a  liberalism  which  is  not  afraid  to  take  a  definite 
stand  upon  the  issues  of  the  day.^"  Freedom,  justice,  and  national  unity 
were  indeed  the  great  ideals  of  the  German  People's  Party.  It  did  not 
"Hemand  that  all  its  members  should  become  republicans  at  heart,  but  it 
did  call  for  cooperation  and  united  efforts  to  reestablish  the  national  life. 
The  party  specifically  denounced :  all  class  rule,  strikes,  "levelling  democ- 
racy", socialization,  communism,  Spartacism,  Bolshevism,  and  anarchy.^^^ 

The  Centre,  the  great  Roman  Catholic  Party  of  Germany,  was  seriously 
affected  by  the  revolution.  Its  strongholds  in  southern  Germany  passed 
temporarily  under  the  control  of  the  Radical  Socialists,  while  the  advance 
of  the  allied  armies  into  Germany  placed  the  Catholic  Rhine  lands  under 
foreign  control.  This  latter  fact  was  destined  to  have  an  important 
bearing  not  only  upon  the  life  of  the  party  but  also  upon  the  course  of 
the  revolution  itself.  Erzberger's  connection  with  the  revolutionary  gov- 
ernment also  profoundly  influenced  the  policies  of  this  party. 

As  early  as  November  fifteenth  the  leaders  of  the  Centre  issued  a 
manifesto  denouncing  class  rule  and  demanding  the  convocation  of  a 
National  Assembly.  Until  then  the  party  declared  it  would  recognize 
only  the  Reichstag  as  the  sovereign  power  in  Germany.  When  the  execu- 
tives of  the  revolutionary  government  issued  on  November  30,  1918,  the 
electoral  regulations  for  the  coming  election  of  a  constitutional  conven- 


'  *"  "Bericht  Uber  den  Ersten  Parteitag  der  Deutschen  Volks  Partei." 
"'  Stresemann,  "Die  Politik  der  Deutschen  Volks  Partei." 
"'  Leidig,  "Liberalismus  und  Dcmokratie,"  13. 

"'  Steinmeyer,  "Neudeutschland  auf  der  Grundlage  von  Freiheit,  Recht  und  Einig- 
kiet."  16. 


102  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

tion.  the  Centre  Party,  already  menaced  by  the  disintegrating  influences 
of  the  revohition,  determined  to  pubHsh  a  statement  of  party  principles  to 
its  followers. 

On  December  30  the  national  committee  of  the  Centre  drew  up  a 
party  platform  which  recognized  the  new  democracy,  and.attacked  da*ss 
rule,  materialism,  mammonism,  and  anarchy.  Concerning  the  political 
reorganization  of  Germany  the  platform  advocated :  the  immediate  fram- 
ing of  a  constitution  by  the  National  Assembly  in  a  safer  place  than 
Berlin  ;  the  maintenance  of  the  unity  and  federal  character  of  the  Reich ; 
universal  suffrage  with  proportional  representation ;  popular  governments 
in  the  states  and  nation  ;  opening  of  all  offices  to  all  classes ;  and  the 
adoption  of  a  bill  of  rights. 

In  foreign  affairs  the  platform  read  as  follows:  the  immediate  con- 
clusion of  a  preliminary  peace ;  the  establishment  of  international  law ; 
the  creation  of  a  league  of  nations  with  obligatory  arbitration,  disarma- 
ment, and  abolition  of  secret  treaties ;  the  protection  of  national  and 
religious  minorities  in  all  nations ;  economic  freedom  of  development 
and  freedom  of  the  seas ;  international  regulation  of  labor  legislation  and 
insurance  law;  popular  education  for  the  understanding  of  foreign 
questions ;   and  the  maintenance  of  a  German  colonial  empire. 

The  internal  program  of  the  party  proposed:  the  maintenance  and 
strengthening  of  Christian  cultural  and  educational  ideals  in  the  soul  of 
the  people;  freedom  of  conscience  and  of  religious  exercises,  with 
cooperation  between  Church  and  State;  the  protection  of  the  religious 
character  of  the  marriage  relation  and  of  the  family ;  the  suppression  of 
immoral  art  and  literature;  the  maintenance  of  the  "confessional  public 
school"  and  of  sufficient  religious  instruction  in  all  schools ;  "a.  free  career 
for  the  advancement  of  the  efficient"  from  all  walks  of  life ;  and  equality 
of  opportunity  for  all  women. 

In  economic  and  social  affairs  the  party,  while  insisting  upon  the 
maintenance  of  the  right  of  private  property,  championed  the  develop- 
ment of  national  economy  in  the  service  of  social  justice.  It  insisted  upon 
the  effective  care  of  all' the  wounded  as  well  as  the  support  of  the  veterans 
of  the  world  war. 

In  financial  affairs  the  party  advocated :  the  division  of  taxes  in  accord- 
ance with  the  ability  of  the  citizen  to  pay ;  the  prevention  of  the  flight  of 
capital  abroad ;  and  the  prevention  of  the  depreciation  in  value  of  the  war 
loans."" 

As  a  political  measure  this  pronunciamento  was  of  tremendous  import- 
ance, for  it  served  as  a  rallying  point  not  only  for  those  Catholics  who_ 
opposed  the  excesses  of  the  revolution,  but  also  for  other  groups  inter- 


"'  Groeber  in  Das  Neue  Reich,  Nr.  8. 


THE  CONVOCATION   OF   THE   NATIONAL  ASSEMBLY  103 

ested  in  the  fight  for  Christian  ideals  of  life.  In  all  the  South  German 
"states,  the  party  under  its  new  name  made  rapid  strides  toward  the 
recovery  of  its  ante  helium  position.  In  the  Rhineland,  the  allied  occupa- 
tion aided  rather  than  hindered  the  triumph  of  this  conservative  and 
Catholic  program.^*" 

As  the  campaign  progressed  the  Catholic  Party  declared  that  the  chief 
tasks  of  the  National  Assembly  were  to  reestablish  peace  and  order  and 
to  provide  the  German  people  with  bread  and  work.  It  favored  the 
strictest  adherence  to  the  Fourteen  Points  and  denounced  the  surrender 
of  the  Saar  Valley  and  upper  Silesia  as  well  as  the  trial  of  the  Kaiser 
by  a  foreign  court.  Disapproving  of  the  November  revolution  as  neither 
a  necessity  nor  a  boon  to  German  political  development,  the  party  attacked 
the  political  activity  of  the  soldiers'  councils  and  all  attempts  to  establish 
a  socialistic  republic.  Although  opposed  to  the  waste,  extravagance,  and 
excesses  of  the  revolution,  the  party  supported  the  democratic  republic  and 
favored  the  admission  of  Catholic  Austria  to  the  union  of  German  states.^*^ 

The  first  bourgeois  party  to  organize  after  the  revolution  was  the 
German  Democratic  Party,  which  issued  on  November  15  a  declaration 
which  supported  the  republic  bust  maintained  that  a  National  Assembly 
should  decide  the  future  form  of  the  state.  This  platform  also  advocated : 
the  partial  socilization  of  industry,  especially  the  monopolies ;  the  parti- 
tion of  the  state  domains  ;  the  prosecution  of  war  profiteers  ;  the  adoption 
of  a  single  progressive  capital  tax;  the  legal  guarantee  of  the  rights  of 
workmen,  employees,  and  officials ;  the  protection  of  the  independent 
middle  class ;  and  the  carrying  out  of  an  international  social  and  political 
program. 

Meanwhile  the  party  council  of  the  old  Progressive  People's  Party 
had  voted  in  favor  of  the  formation  of  a  greater  party  based  upon  demo- 
cratic and  republican  foundations ;  and  on  November  16  it  began  nego- 
tiating with  the  national  committee  of  the  Democrats.  Stresemann,  Fried- 
berg,  and  Richthofen  favored  a  union  with  the  progressives.  Difficulties 
arose  over  the  attitude  of  the  progressives  toward  liberalism,  and  toward 
those  leaders  who  from  a  democratic  standpoint  had  compromised  them- 
selves during  the  war.  As  a  result  of  the  conferences,  the  right  wing  of 
the  National  Liberal  Party  broke  away  from  the  left  wing,  which  then 
united  with  the  Progressives  to  form  the  German  Democratic  Party. -^- 

The  complete  collapse  of  the  imperial  administration  and  the  impos- 
sibility of  ever  returning  to  the  old  conditions  were  factors  which  favored 
the  growth  of  German  democracy  and  caused  large  classes  to  adhere  to 


''*  Fassbender,  "Revolution  unci  Kultur." 

*•*  Groeber  in  Das  Neue  Reich,  Nr.  8. 

'"  Menke-Gliickert,  "Die  November  Revolution,"  122. 


104  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

this  new  party.  The  party  leaders  declared  that  democracy  was  a  culttitaJ 
movement,  tliat  it  would  destroy  class  dilYerences,  and  that  it  would  create 
equal  responsibility  or  equal  rights  and  equal  opportunities.^^*  Real 
democracy,  in  opposition  to  the  old  state  which  allowed  men  of  one  class 
to' govern,  was  to  be  the  rule  of  the  efficient,  chosen  from  all  classes  of 
the  people.'^* 

The  party  denounced:  the  theory  of  the  divine  right  of  kings  and 
the  "self  will"  of  princes;  the  "squirearchy";  the  legal  disqualifications 
of  large  classes ;  the  military  bureaucracy ;  and  bureaucratic  militarism. 
The  party  advocated:  equality  of  opportunity;  the  suppression  of  anti- 
semitism  ;  moral  standards  for  women ;  national  sports  ;  popular  schools  ; 
freedom  of  conscience;  the  improvement  of  industry;  and  the  improve- 
ment of  public  sanitation.-*^ 

During  the  campaign  the  Democrats  attacked  the  parties  of  the  left 
which  preached  the  class  struggle  and  the  parties  of  the  right  which 
idealized  the  old  form  of  government.  It  asserted  that  righteousness,  not 
might,  should  guide  the  internal  and  foreign  policies  of  the  state,  and 
that  the  entire  nation  should  direct  the  fate  of  Germany.-*^  Count  Bern- 
storflf  declared:  "Our  chief  aims  are:  the  unity  of  the  German  people 
in  internal  and  foreign  affairs ;  justice  in  all  public  and  private  relations ; 
economic  prosperity  upon  a  democratic  and  social  basis  as  well  as  the 
prosperity  of  art,  science,  and  literature."  -^^ 
■  Of  all  the  parties  in  opposition  to  the  provisional  government  of  the 
Social  Democrats,  the  Independents  conducted  the  most  bitter  campaign. 
They  attributed  the  failure  of  the  coalition  government  of  November  to 
the  treason  of  the  Majority  Socialists  toward  the  cause  of  sociaUsm.^*^ 
They  demanded  the  immediate  beginnings  of  socialization  and  the  quickest 
possible  transformation  from  the  old  class  state  to  socialistic  government. 
Although  the  left  wing  of  the  Independents  sympathized  with  the  Spar- 
tacans,  the  party  leaders  refused  to  indorse  the  "anti-parliamentarism"  and 
terrorism  of  the  German  communists.  Strikes  and  uprisings  were  de- 
nounced as  injurious  at  the  moment  to  the  proletariat.  Thus  the  Inde- 
pendent Party,  although  bitterly  opposed  to  the  Majority  Socialists,  became 
during  the  campaign  a  middle  party  between  evolutionary  socialism  and 
communism.    The  chief  strongholds  of  the  party  were  Thuringia,  Saxony, 

'"Bamberger,  "Demokratie,"  14.  Jordan,  "Die  Demokratie  und  Deutschlands 
Zukunft." 

'"  Goetz,  "Deutsche  Demokratie,"  10-45. 

*"  Abderhalden,  "Die  Hohen  Aufgaben  des  Deutschen  Demokraten  und  seiner 
Partei,"  4-10. 

^  Ibid. 

'"  Vossische  Zeitung,  March  10,  1919. 

*"  Moldenhauer,  "Von  der  Revolution  zur  Nationalversammlung,"  8. 


THE   CONVOCATION   OF   THE    NATIONAL  ASSEMBLY  105 

the  Ruhr  Valley,  Bremen,  and  Berlin,  and  its  entry  into  the  political  arena 
assured  it  of  representation  in  the  constitutional  convention. 

Finally  the  Social  Democrats,  who  had  guided  the  German  Republic 
since  November  and  saved  it  from  Bolshevism  almost  a  week  before  the 
election,  entered  the  political  arena  with  a  prestige  of  success  which 
attracted  millions  of  voters  who  were  not  Socialists.  Scheidemann,  Ebert, 
and  other  leaders  emphasized  in  the  campaign  the  revolutionary  program 
of  November,  1918,  rather  than  the  Erfurt  Program  of  1891.  Yet  the 
Majority  Socialists,  who  sincerely  wished  to  carry  out  the  political  pro- 
gram so  essential  to  Germany's  salvation,  found  it  difficult  to  free  them- 
selves from  the  dogmas  of  Marx.  The  party  opposed  all  attempts  to 
establish  Bolshevism  in  Germany;  rejected  the  Polish  claims  to  German 
lands ;  and  demanded  that  when  the  National  Assembly  was  elected  the 
workmen's  and  soldiers'  councils  should  cease  to  function  as  administra- 
tive organizations.  Especial  emphasis  was  given  by  Socialist  speakers  to 
the  socialization  of  production  and  distribution  by  means  of  a  slow  and 
protective  method  of  procedure.  Only  those  industries  which  were  ready 
for  nationalization  were  to  be  socialized ;  and  during  the  entire  process 
the  principle  of  the  indemnity  of  factory  owners  was  to  prevail.  By 
avoiding  the  extreme  socialistic  and  communistic  demands  of  the  Inde- 
pendents and  Spartacans,  the  Majority  Socialists  gained  the  support  of 
large  groups  of  the  bourgeoisie.  By  advocating  a  gradual  and  scientific 
socialization  of  the  means  of  production,  the  party  secured  the  votes  of 
a  considerable  portion  of  the  subordinate  official  class.  Behind  the  Social- 
ist Party  were  also  the  united  jorces  of  the  German  labor  unionists,  who, 
according  to  the  Liberal  Stresemann,  knew  more  about  politics  before  the 
war  than  the  university  graduates  of  Germany.^®" 

The  National  Election 
Not  since  the  election  of  the  French  National  Assembly  in  1871  had 
such  an  election  campaign  as  this  one  occurred  in  Europe.  The  loss  of 
the  war  and  the  revolution  had  rendered  the  platforms  of  the  old  imperial 
parties  obsolete,  so  that  they  differed  little  from  the  Socialists  in  their 
avowed  political  principles.  Hans  Delbriick  asserted  that  there  was  little 
to  choose  between  the  parties,  since  all  denounced  anarchy  and  cham- 
pioned democracy.'""  On  the  other  hand  Rudolf  Eucken  declared:  "As 
a  result  of  our  political  backwardness,  a  radical  democracy  and  socialism 
threaten  us  with  political  serfdom.     The  chief  task  of  the  future  is  to 


^^  Stresemann,  "Die  Politik  der  Deutschen  Volkspartei,"  6. 

'*"  Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  January,  1919.    Cf.  Becker,  "Deutschlands  Zusammen- 
bruch  und  Auferstehung." 


106  THK   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

develop,  under  the  complete  maintenance  and  deepening  of  internal  free- 
dom, genuine  political  freedom  in  our  Fatherland. "-^^ 

A  vital  factor  in  the  election  was  the  women's  vote,  since  they  were 
now  given  the  franchise  for  the  first  time.  Here  too  the  Socialists  gained 
an  additional  advantage,  because  they  had  for  years  advocated  women's 
suffrage  and  attempted  the  political  education  of  their  women  adherents. 
Among  their  candidates  for  the  convention  were  a  number  of  women. 
The  other  parties,  especially  the  Conservatives  and  Catholics,  were  quick 
to  appeal  to  the  women  voters.  Delbriick,  a  former  opponent  of  women's 
suffrage,  urged  women  to  patriotic  and  political  activity.^"-  Mueller- 
Meiningen  said  :  "Each  party  must  bring  the  women  as  quickly  as  possible 
into  political  life.  After  the  revolution  enfranchised  the  women,  we  were 
disappointed  in  their  lack  of  interest."  Other  leaders  recognized  this 
unpreparedness,  and  Richard  Miiller-Fulda,  a  Centrist,  in  combatting  it 
asserted  "this  new  right  is  a  duty".  Fehrenbach,  the  able  Catholic  states- 
man, also  expressed  a  hope  that  the  influence  of  women  would  ennoble 
and  enrich  the  political  life  of  the  nation.  Franz  Behrens  said  that  every 
woman  should  vote  because  she  was  i'nterested  in  the  weighty  questions 
of  the  home  and  the  family,  school  and  education,  law  and  charity,  work 
and  professional  activity.  Finally  the  Majority  Socialists  boldly  declared 
that  women's  suffrage  was  the  revolutionary  present  of  socialism  to  the 
nation.-^''  The  importance  of  this  vote  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  of  the 
thirty-eight  million  entitled  to  vote  approximately  twenty  million  were 
women. 

On  January  19,  a  dry  and  clear  winter-day,  the  national  elections  were 
held  throughout  Germany.  Minor  disturbances  occurred  at  Berlin,  Ham- 
burg, the  Ruhr,  and  Cassel,  but  the  Spartacans  made  no  concerted  efforts 
to  prevent  the  elections.  Over  30,500,000  men  and  women  voted  in  the 
first  election  under  the  system  of  universal  suffrage.  The  Majority 
Socialists  received  11,466,716  votes,  and  elected  one  hundred  and  sixty- 
three  deputies.  Their  opponents,  the  Independent  Socialists,  were  com- 
pletely defeated,  electing  but  twenty-two  deputies.  The  second  largest 
party  was  the  former  Catholic  Centre,  now  the  Christian  People's  Party, 
which  gained  six  million  votes  and  eighty-eight  seats.  The  Democrats 
polled  5,600,000  votes,  and  gained  seventy-five  seats.  The  German 
Nationalists  gained  3,199,573  votes  and  forty-two  seats,  while  the  German 
People's  Party  gained  1,240,303  votes  and  twenty-one  seats.  Of  the 
minor  parties  the  German  Hannoverian  Party  and  the  Bavarian  Peasant 
Party  each  secured  four  seats.    The   Schleswig-Holstein   Peasants  and 


^  Eucken,  "Deutsche  Freiheit." 

»*  Ibid. 

"*  "Frauen  !  Lernt  Wahlen  !" 


THE   CONVOCATION   OF   THE    NATIONAL  ASSEMBLY  107 

Farm    Laborers    Democracy    and    the    Brunswick    Election    Union   each 
gained  one  vote  in  the  assembly. 

The  state  elections,  held  at  approximately  the  same  time  as  the  national 
elections,  shov^ed  similar  results.  In  the  Bavarian  election  of  January  12 
the  Centre  or  Bavarian  People's  Party  gained  fifty-nine  seats ;  the  Social- 
ists fifty  seats;  the  Democrats  twenty-two  seats;  the  Bavarian  Peasants' 
Alliance  seventeen  seats ;  National  Liberals  five  seats ;  and  the  Inde- 
pendents three  seats. ^^*  In  Wuerttemberg  the  relative  gains  of  the  parties  J 
in  the  election  of  January  12  were  :  Socialists,  52  ;  Democrats,  38 ;  Centre, 
31 ;  German  Peace  Party  and  Wiirttemberg  Citizens'  Party,  11  ;  Peasant 
Alliance,  10 ;  Wine  Gardeners  and  Small  Proprietors,  4 ;  and  Independents, 
4.  In  the  state  election  in  Baden,  January  5,  the  Centre  secured  41,  the 
Socialists  35,  the  Democrats  24,  and  the  German  Nationalists  24  seats. 
The  results  of  the  Saxon  election  of  February  8  were:  Socialists,  42; 
Independents,  15;  Democrats,  22 ;  German  Nationalists,  13  ;  and  German 
People's  Party,  4  seats.  The  Prussian  election  was  held  on  January  26. 
The  results  were:  Majority  Socialists,  145;  Democrats,  65;  Catholics, 
55  ;  German  Nationalists,  48 ;  German  People's  Party,  24 ;  Independents, 
24 ;  Schleswig-Holstein  Democrats,  1 ;  Guelphs,  2 ;  and  United  Han- 
overian Party,  7 P^ 

The  national  elections  were  a  triumph  for  the  democracy  of  Germany 
and  proved  that  the  middle  class  was  far  stronger  politically  than  it  had  _ 
itself  suspected.     Although  certain   publicists   sought  to   show  that  the 
elections  proved  Germany  to  be  a  republic  without  republicans,  an  analysis 
of  the  results   indicates  that  the  revolutionary  parties  gained  an  over-     • 
whelming  majority.     The  two  Socialist  parties  alone  polled  13,298,745 
votes  as  opposed  to  14,775,174  votes  of  all  the  bourgeois  parties.-'^*'    The 
relative  strength  of  these  two  groups  in  the  National  Assembly  was  185 
to  236.     The  election  indicated  therefore  that  the  Majority  Socialists  did 
not  possess  a  majority  of  the  Assembly  and  would  consequently  have  to 
unite  with  their  previous  allies,  the  Democrats  and  Catholics,  to  form  a 
government.     The  nation,  however,  looked  with  confidence  to  the  pro- j 
visional  Socialist  government,  upon  whose  shoulders  now  fell  the  burden 
of  convoking  the  National  Assembly  in  a  place  of  comparative  security 
and  of  defending  it  from  a  communist  coup  d'etat. 

On  January  21  the  government  issued  a  decree  convoking  the  National 

Assembly  for  February  6  at  Weimar.     Yielding  to  the  demand  of  the 

"South  German  States  and  against  the  protests  of  the  Independents  and 

Spartacans,    the   government   planned   to   convene   the    Assembly   in  the 

'"  Eisner  states  in  "Schuld  und  Suehne,"   17,  that  the  Bavarian  proletariat  sup- 
ported the  Majority  Socialists. 

""  Menke-Gliickert,  "Die  November  Revolution,"  135. 
^  Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  February,  1919,  281. 


108  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

former  seat  of  German  culture.  The  majority  parties  of  the  Reichstag 
wished,  owing  to  the  internal  situation,  to  consolidate  as  quickly  as  possible 
the  gains  of  the  revolution.  Consequently  they  supported  the  plan  of 
meeting  in  Weimar.  To  guard  against  a  Spartacan  attempt  to  disperse 
the  National  Assembly,  Noske  concentrated  a  force  of  loyal  troops  in 
Saxe-Weimar  and  adopted  precautionary  measures  to  maintain  order. 

The  draft  of  a  new  federal  constitution  prepared  by  Professor  Preuss 
of  Berlin,  now  Minister  of  the  Interior,  had  already  profoundly  afifected 
the  political  situation.  The  chief  characteristic  of  the  proposed  constitu- 
tion was  the  enlargement  of  the  powers  of  the  federal  government,  which 
was,  in -addition  to  former  rights,  given  jurisdiction  over:  railroads, 
waterways,  schools,  and  land  legislation.  A  bill  of  rights  was  included  in 
the  constitution,  and  republican  constitutions  were  to  be  required  of  the 
several  states.  The  legislative  powers  of  the  Reich  were  to  be  exercised 
by  the  Reichstag  and  Staatcnhaiis.  Members  of  the  House  of  States  were 
to  be  chosen  by  the  diets  of  the  several  states. 

The  most  radical  measure  of  Preuss,  however,  was  the  proposal  that 
the  National  Assembly  of  Prussia  should  decide  upon  the  division  of  the 
former  kingdom  into  separate  republics.  Regarding  Prussia  as  a  menace 
to  German  unity,  Preuss  boldly  asserted  that  it  was  neither  culturally, 
economically,  nor  nationally  an  organic  whole.  If  Austria  were  to  enter 
the  new  democratic  Germany,  which  was  no  longer  held  together  by 
dynasties,  the  former  Prussian  monarchy  must  de  divided.  Although 
totally  unconnected  with  the  existing  separatest  movements  in  Prussia, 
the  Preuss  plan  was  a  stimulus  to  the  Hannoverian  and  Rhineland  move- 
ments.^" 

On  Thursday,  February  6,  in  the  New  Theater  of  Weimar,  the  German 
National  Assembly  was  formally  convened  by  the  head  of  the  provisional 
government.  In  an  address  of  welcome,  Ebert  declared  that  the  Assembly, 
as  the  only  sovereign  power  in  Germany,  had  to  restore  order,  to  revive 
the  economic  life  of  the  nation,  and  to  turn  Germany  from  imperialism  to 
idealism.  Their  goal  must  be,  in  the  words  of  Fichte,  "a  nation  of  law 
founded  on  equality".  On  February  7  the  Assembly  chose  as  its  president 
the  Socialist,  Dr.  David,  former  undersecretary  of  foreign  affairs  in  the 
government  of  Prince  Max.  Fehrenbach  was  then  elected  first  vice- 
president  and  Haussmann  of  the  Democratic  party,  second  vice-president. 

Having  duly  organized  and  elected  permanent  officers,  the  Assembly 
promptly  adopted  a  temporary  constitution  in  order  to  establish  a  legal 
government  which  could  act  with  authority  at  home  and  abroad.  Preuss 
defended  his  project  with  great  skill,  but  during  the  two  days'  debate  it 


"' Menke-Gluckert,  "Die  November  Revolution,"  138-139.  Reichs-Gesetzblatt 
Jahrgang,  1919,  Nr.  16;  Nr.  33,  Gesetz  iiber  die  vorlaufige  Reichsgewalt.  Vom  10, 
Februar,  1919. 


THE   CONVOCATION   OF  THE   NATIONAL  ASSEMBLY  109 

became   evident   that   particularism   would   prevent   the   formation   of    a 
unified  republic  or  the  redivision  of  historic  German  lands  into  new  states. 

The  Presidency  of  Ebert 

On  February  11  the  National  Assembly  elected,  by  277  to  102  votes, 
Friedrich  Ebert  President  of  the  German  Reich.  In  a  dignified  speech  of 
acceptance  he  said :  "To  protect  the  freedom  of  all  Germans  with  the 
utmost  exertion  and  devotion  of  which  I  am  capable  is  the  oath  which  I 
have  sworn  between  the  hands  of  the  National  Assembly."  Thus  a 
Heidelberg  saddler,  trained  in  the  school  of  socialism,  and  a  true  son  of 
the  workers,  became  the  successor  of  the  German  War  Lord. 

The  Scheidemann  Ministry 

With  the  adoption  of  the  temporary  constitution,  Scheidemann  had 
announced  to  the  Assembly  that  the  Council  of  the  People's  Commis- 
sioners, which  had  maintained  the  revolutionary  republic,  had  finished  its 
historic  mission  and  now  laid  its  powers,  derived  from  the  revolution, 
in  the  hands  of  the  National  Assembly.  After  the  election  of  Ebert, 
Scheidemann  commenced,  as  the  Socialist  Party  leader,  negotiations  with 
the  Christian  People's  Party  and  the  Democratic  Party  for  the  formation 
of  a  ministry.  The  task  was  not  difficult,  since  the  old  coalition  of  the 
Socialists,  Centre  and  Liberals  of  the  last  Reichstag  had  been  revived 
after  the  January  elections.  Party  bureaucracy  and  practical  politics  had 
demanded  these  party  alignments. ^^^  Scheidemann  was,  however,  as 
Minister-President,  not  in  a  position  to  choose  his  ministers  from  among 
the  coalition  leaders,  but  each  party  with  bureaucratic  thoroughness  nom- 
inated its  representatives  for  the  cabinet. -^^  Although  the  German  parties 
were  profoundly  affected  by  the  revolution,  their  procedure  here  shows 
j  that  party  bureaucracy  survived  the  empire. 
The  cabinet  was  as  follows: 

President  of  the  Ministry Scheidemann,  Majority  Socialist 

Finance  Minister Schiffer,  Democrat 

Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs Brockdorff-Rantzau,  Democrat 

Minister  of  the  Interior : Preuss,  Democrat 

Minister  of  Economics Wissel,  Majority  Socialist 

Minister  of  Food Schmidt,  Majority  Socialist 

Minister  of  Justice Landsberg,  Majority  Socialist 

Minister  of  Defense Noske,  Majority  Socialist 

Minister  of  Colonies Bell,  Centre 

Minister  of  Posts Giesberts,  Centre 

"*  Naumann,  "Die  Demokratie  in  der  Nationalversammlung,"  2-3. 
"•Feiler,  "Der  Ruf'Nach  den  Raeten,"  8. 


110  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

Minister  of  tlie  Demobilization  Office Koeth,  Non-partisan 

Ministers  without  Portfolio 

David,  Majority  Socialist;  Erzberger,  Centre;  Gothein,  Democrat 

On  February  13  Scheidemann  announced  to  the  Assembly  the  program 
of  his  ministry.  In  foreign  aflfairs  he  would  strive  for  an  early  peace,  the 
restoration  of  the  German  colonies,  the  return  of  the  prisoners  of  war,  and 
German  participation  in  the  league  of  nations  upon  a  basis  of  equality  with 
the  other  powers.  In  his  internal  program,  Scheidemann  advocated  a 
democratic  national  administration,  the  improvement  of  education,  the 
ceration  of  a  people's  army,  and  the  restoration  of  the  national  life. 

Such  were  the  beginnings  of  ministerial  government  under  the  Na- 
tional Assembly  at  a  time  when  Germany  was  confronted  with  internal  and 
foreign  problems  which  threatened  almost  daily  to  overthrow  the  republic. 
Food  conditions  were  precarious,  and  the  industrial  and  commercial  activ- 
ities of  the  nation  had  practically  collapsed.  The  great  Prussian  railway 
system  was  almost  in  ruins  and  transportation  had  broken  down  in  all 
parts  of  the  Reich.  The  Spartacans  were  still  attempting  to  gain  control 
of  the  workmen's  and  soldiers'  councils.  Of  the  Scheidemann  ministry 
they  wrote:  "A  half  century  of  education  of  the  German  workmen  to 
parliamentary  cretinism  by  the  social  democracy  expresses  itself  in  the 
existence  of  the  National  Assembly.  .  .  .  This  ghost  of  the  past  raises 
itself  to  strangle  the  organs  of  the  proletarian  revolution :  the  workmen's 
and  soldiers'  councils."""*  Many  soldiers'  councils  were  already  clamoring 
for  the  dismissal  of  Noske.  In  the  face  of  Spartacan  disturbances,  wild 
strikes,  and  political  riots,  internal  order  could  scarcely  be  said  to  exist. 
Seven  hundred  thousand  German  prisoners  were  still  in  France  as  hostages 
in  the  hands  of  the  Entente.  As  the  latter  had  increased  their  demands 
upon  Germany  since  the  armistice,  the  final  terms  of  peace  were  looked 
upon  as  certain  to  overthrow  the  ministry  of  Scheidemann. 


Rote  Fahne,  February  6,  1919. 


REVOLUTIONARY   PROBLEMS 


111 


VII. 

REVOLUTIONARY  PROBLEMS 

Economic  Reorganization 

Although  in  February,  1919,  the  majority  of  the  nation  looked  with 
confidence  to  the  National  Assembly  as  a  panacea  to  the  national  ills,  it 
soon  became  apparent  that  neither  the  ministry  of  Scheidemann  nor  any 
majority  of  the  National  Assembly  could  bring  about  the  reorganization  of 
Germany.  The  economic  consequences  of  the  world  war,  combined  with 
the  political  and  social  effects  of  the  November  revolution,  had  reduced 
Germany  to  a  condition  bordering  upon  ruin  and  anarchy.  There  was 
but  little  Realpolitik  in  the  fine-sounding  program  which  Scheidemann,  as 
head  of  the  coalition  of  Socialists,  Catholics,  and  Democrats,  had  an- 
nounced to  the  representatives  of  German  democracy.  Toward  the  close 
of  winter,  the  danger  of  national  starvation,  heightened  by  the  maintenance 
of  the  allied  blockade,  created  a  serious  problem.  Meanwhile  the  indus- 
trial life  of  the  nation,  threatened  by  strikes  and  riots,  gave  evidences  of 
a  coming  general  collapse.  Wide  classes  of  Germans,  confronted  with  a 
hopeless  international  situation  and  insoluble  internal  problems,  turned  to 
Bolshevism  as  a  philosophy  of  despair.  In  addition  the  revolution  had 
created  a  new  Germany.  New  issues  had  arisen  with  the  revolution,  and 
demanded  readjustment  with  old  conditions.  Society  was  in  a  ferment 
and  could  be  saved  only  by  the  regenerative  influences  of  a  strong  and 
far-sighted  government,  supported  by  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the 
nation. 

Of  the  internal  problems  none  were  more  serious  than  those  created 
by  the  general  collapse  of  German  economic  life.  This  condition  in  one 
of  the  foremost  industrial  states  of  the  world  was  the  direct  result  of  the 
economic  war  waged  for  four  years  by  the  Allies,  combined  with  the 
fatuous  economic  policies  of  the  last  three  imperial  ministries. 

During  the  war  the  Entente  systematically  destroyed  the  economic  posi- 
tion of  Germany  in  world  commerce  and  industry.  The  blockade  deprived 
her  in  a  large  measure  of  essential  imports  from  European  states  as  well 
as  from  America  and  the  Far  East.  By  the  seizure  of  the  German  cables 
the  Entente  deprived  the  central  powers  of  their  principal  means  of  com- 
munication with  non-European  countries.  The  forced  liquidation  of 
German  firms  in  enemy  countries,  the  confiscation  of  German  patent- 
rights,  and  the  blacklisting  of  German  firms  in  neutral  countries,  were 
other  potent  measures  taken  by  the  Entente  against  Germany.    The  Allies 


112  THE    GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

planned  by  their  blockade  to  cut  Germany  off  from  her  imported  supplies 
of  food  and  raw  materials,  and  thus  to  break  her  powers  of  resistance. 
The  moral  effect  of  these  allied  policies  was  heightened  by  a  campaign 
of  propaganda  which  was  waged  against  Germany  in  every  neutral  country 
of  the  world.  Germany  rendered  effective  aid  to  this  plan  to  gain  the 
support  of  the  neutrals  by  her  policy  of  "frightfulness"  in  BelgitLun, 
France,  and  on  the  high  seas.  Finally  the  recommencement  of  unrestricted 
submarine  warfare  in  February,  1917,  led  to  the  entry  of  America  into  the 
war.  and  to  the  economic  and  military  collapse  of  the  German  empire. 

\\'ithout  the  raw  materials  and  machinery  seized  in  the  occupied  ter- 
ritories, Germany  would  have  gone  to  pieces  earlier.  Before  the  war 
more  than  half  of  all  German  industries  had  worked  for  foreign  markets. 
During  the  struggle  these  industries  were  in  a  large  measure  converted  to 
war  uses.  Finally  the  Hindenburg  program,  although  it  was  a  military 
necessity,  brought  about  the  ruin  of  Germany.  Schiffer  said  of  it :  "Eco- 
nomically it  was  a  program  of  desperation.  Economically  it  created  such 
a  terrible  evil  that  we  still  have  to  bear  the  results  of  it."  ^"^ 

When  the  conflict  ended,  the  great  bulk  of  the  German  war  industries 
collapsed.  This  failure  of  production  in  almost  all  important  branches  of 
industry  created  over  four  million  unemployed  workers.  To  add  to  the 
general  confusion  caused  by  the  military  defeat,  the  revolution,  and  the 
industrial  crisis,  the  rapid  demobilization  of  the  imperial  armies  returned 
millions  of  German  workers  to  their  homes.  These  men  found  in  many 
instances  their  former  positions  occupied  by  others,  or  the  factories  where 
they  had  worked  before  the  war  closed  for  want  of  raw  materials.  In 
-those  industries  in  which  industrial  conditions  were  favorable,  the  work- 
men, confronted  with  the  increased  cost  of  living,  and  encouraged  by 
political  agitators,  initiated  wild  strikes  either  to  secure  increased  wages 
or  to  bring  about  the  immediate  socialization  of  industry.  As  early  as 
November  26,  1918,  the  German  Demobilization  Ofifice  declared :  "Above 
all,  everyone  must  work ;  otherwise  we  will  go  to  pieces.  .  .  .  Each  strike 
can  immediately  precipitate  the  catastrophe."  ^*'- 

Barth  said  of  the  crisis :  "The  greatest  problem  for  our  future  is,  next 
to  the  questions  of  how  we  can  raise  production  and  how  we  can  restore 
the  lowered  energies  of  workmen  ruined  by  four  years  of  unregulated 
army  life,  the  question  where  we  can  place  the  great  number  of  unem- 
ployed who  cannot  go  back  into  the  industries."  ^"^ 

Equal  to  the  crisis  in  industry  was  the  financial  situation  of  the  state 
after  the  war.     In  October,   1918,  the  empire  had  almost  exhausted  its 


Nationalversammlung,  8  Sitzung,  February  15,  1919,  93. 
'  Tafel,  "Arbeitszwang  und  Arbeitslust." 
'  Barth,  "Arbeitslosigkeit  und  Arbeitsnot,"  28. 


REVOLUTIONARY   PROBLEMS  113 

financial  resources  and  had  piled  up  loan  credits  to  the  amount  of  one 
hundred  and  forty  billion  marks.  The  effective  war  costs  without  regard 
to  interest  charges  had  reached  the  sum  of  one  hundred  and  si^cty-one 
billions.  Year  after  year  the  cost  of  war  had  increased,  rnounting^from 
23  billions  in  1915  to  48.5  billions  in  1918.  During  the  laSt  year  of  the 
war  the  daily  cost  was  135  millions,  and  in  November,  1918,  t,he  German 
government  expended  4,100,000,000  marks.  Even  after  the  revolution  the 
expenditures  did  not  materially  decrease.  In  January,  1919,  army  and 
government  expenses  amounted  to  3,500,000,000  marks. 

The  fundamental  cause  of  Germany's  financial  ruin  in  November, 
1918,  was  her  war  finance,  which  had  been  originally  organized  upon  the 
basis  of  a  short  war.  In  addition  to  this  false  method  of  financing  the 
struggle,  enormous  sums  were  wasted  in  the  manufacture  of  war  material. 
Corrupt  elements  were  in  control  of  certain  branches  of  war  industries, 
while  many  government  bureaus  proved  inefficient.  Prices  rose  steadily 
during  this  period.  Speculation  in  industrial  stocks  and  profiteering  could 
not  be  curbed.  Finally  the  Hindenburg  program  destroyed  the  moral  and 
financial  foundations  of  the  empire. 

Nevertheless  the  government  could  not  cancel,  after  November,  1918, 
its  orders  with  the  munition  factories,  since  such  a  procedure  would  have 
ruined  the  factories,  the  owners,  and  the  millions  of  men  employed  by 
them.  As  these  industries  did  not,  however,  manufacture  finished  prod- 
ucts, their  work  was  unproductive  and  a  total  loss  to  the  government. 
The  demobilization  of  the  army,  including  the  cost  of  clothing,  rationing, 
and  transporting  eight  million  men,  was  a  tremendous  expense  to  the 
republic.  The  increases  in  soldiers'  pay  added  nine  hundred  millions  to 
the  national  expenses.  After  the  war  an  average  sum  of  about  fifty 
million  marks  was  spent  monthly  by  the  state  in  the  support  of  the 
unemployed.  Another  source  of  the  deficit  was  the  expenditures  for  war 
welfare  work.  Including  the  support  of  the  textile  and  shoe  industries, 
and  the  care  of  invalids,  this  item  amounted  by  January  31,  1919,  to  one 
billion,  seven  hundred  million  marks.  For  family  support  during  the  war 
an  additional  1,998,000,000  marks  were  expended.  Finally  the  new  polit- 
ical machinery  of  the  revolution,  the  workmen's  and  soldiers'  councils,  was 
a  tremendous  expense  to  the  nation,  states,  and  communes. 

One  of  the  first  acts  of  the  coalition  ministry  was  an  attempt  to  organize 
the  nation's  finances  upon  a  sound  basis.  War-time  extravagance  was  to 
be  replaced  by  rigid  economy.  The  vast  army-stores  were  to  be  sold  at  a 
profit  to  the  state  of  three  billions.  The  Finance  Minister  announced  in 
the  National  Assembly  that  the  government  would  neither  annul  the  war 
loans  nor  confiscate  bank  values  and  private  property.  Although  the 
necessity  for  further  taxation  was  apparent,  he  announced  that  the  new 
schedules  would  be  drawn  up  in  agreement  with  the  several  states,  as  well 


114 


THE    GERMAN    REVOLUTION 


as  with  due  regard  to  the  general  economic  and  social  conditions.  Every 
effort  was  to  be  made  to  prevent  the  flight  of  capital  abroad. 

An  example  of  the  financial  situation  of  the  republic  is  found  in  the 
amount  of  paper  money  in  circulation  on  January  31,  1919.  In  July,  1914, 
the  circulation  of  Rcichshank  notes  amounted  to  two  billions,  and  in 
January,  1919,  to  twenty-three  and  a  half  billions.  The  total  of  Reichs- 
kasscnscheine  had  increased  from  139  millions  in  1914  to  352  millions  in 
1919;  the  private  bank  notes  from  115  millions  to  218  millions.  In  addi- 
tion there  were  ten  billion  Darlchenskassenscheine  in  circulation,  making 
a  total  of  34.5  billions.  The  German  cities  and  town  had  also  issued 
emergency  war  currency  to  the  value  of  one  billion  marks, '*°^ 

This  enormous  war  debt  of  the  empire,  as  well  as  the  costs  of  the  revo- 
lution, and  the  certain  prospect  of  an  unbearable  war  indemnity,  made 
national  bankruptcy  imminent.  On  all  sides  revolutionary  taxation  was 
demanded.  The  seizure  of  war  profits,  a  capital  tax,  an  income  tax,  and 
an  inheritance  tax  were  considered  necessary  measures.^°^  But  the  worst 
feature  of  the  financial  situation  was  the  prospective  war  indemnity,  which 
seemed  to  foreshadow  inevitable  national  bankruptcy.^"" 

Food 

Of  all  the  revolutionary  problems,  that  of  food  had  rendered  the  lot 
of  the  German  working  classes  desperate.  The  war,  the  allied  blockade, 
the  Ukraine  fiasco,  and  the  imperial  rationing  system  had  reduced  the 
nation  to  the  verge  of  starvation.  Although  the  government  of  Prince 
Max  had  sought  to  alleviate  the  food  situation,  it  became  worse  after  the 
armistice.  The  revolution,  with  its  resulting  crises  in  administration, 
transportation,  and  business,  had  brought  the  German  people  to  a  condition 
of  desperation. 

In  November,  1918,  the  revolutionary  government  was  forced  to  inform 
the  workers  that  the  supplies  of  fats  would  last  only  a  few  weeks,  the 
supplies  of  flour  three  months,  and  the  supplies  of  potatoes  five  months. 
Early  in  December  the  food  ministry  reported  that  a  considerable  part  of 
the  potato  crop  which  had  remained  in  the  ground,  had  been  destroyed 
by  the  early  frosts.  This  situation  was  due  largely  to  the  revolutionary 
unrest,  and  to  the  epidemic  of  influenza  which  had  reduced  the  number  of 
available  agricultural  laborers.  The  return  of  the  allied  prisoners  of  war 
had  also  deprived  the  nation  of  workers  who  had  helped  to  harvest  previous 
war  crops.  Even  the  existing  potato  supplies  could  not  be  distributed 
because  of  the  transportation  crisis.  Consequently  only  the  large  centres 
had  a  few  weeks'  supply  on  hand  in  December,  1918.     Confronted  with 


'^  Nationalversammlung,  8  Sitzung,  90-99. 

*"'  Keil,  "Die  Rettung  aus  dem  finanziellen  Elend,"  3-22. 

***  Manes,  "Staatsbankrotte." 


REVOLUTIONARY    PROBLEMS  115 

the  same  difficulty  in  the  grain  suppUes,  the  government  announced  that 
after  February  7,  1919,  the  daily  ration  of  flour  would  be  reduced  to  80 
grams  per  person,  or  one-third  of  the  existing  ration.  Until  April  1  the 
ration  of  milk  fat  and  margarine  products  was  to  be  maintained  at  3.3 
grams  per  person.  To  maintain  the  meat  ration  of  100  grams  per  week 
the  government  contemplated  importing  meat.  This  analysis  is  sufficient 
to  show  that  although  the  ration  system  of  the  government  was  effective 
during  the  war,  it  collapsed  immediately  after  the  revolution,  leaving  the 
nation  face  to  face  with  starvation  and  Bolshevism. 

By  the  terms  of  Article  26  of  the  Armistice  Convention  it  is  stated 
that  the  Allies  and  the  United  States  contemplated  the  provisioning  of 
Germany  during  the  period  of  the  armistice.  Nothing  was  done  up  to 
December  13,  when  at  the  time  of  the  extension  of  the  armistice  to  January 
17,  1919,  the  German  delegates  were  informed  that  twenty-one  million 
tons  of  German  shipping  must  be  surrendered  to  the  Allies  before  food 
would  be  provided  for  Germany.  The  delay  in  furnishing  food  created 
the  belief  among  large  classes  of  Germans  that  the  Allies  wished  to  drive 
Germany  into  a  condition  of  anarchy.  Erzberger,  while  admitting  on 
December  27  in  Berlin  that  Germany  was  prepared  to  pay  for  the  destruc- 
tion of  property  in  Belgium  and  France,  asked  the  Allies  for  a  preliminary 
peace  and  an  opportunity  to  secure  the  necessary  shipments  of  food. 

Article  8  of  the  Armistice  Convention  of  January  16,  1919,  provided 
for  the  surrender  of  the  German  ships  to  the  Allies  in  order  to  insure  the 
arrival  of  food  suppHes  at  the  Hanseatic  ports.  "To  assure  the  supply  of 
food  for  Germany  and  for  the  rest  of  Europe,  the  German  government 
will  take  all  necessary  measures  to  place  the  whole  German  commercial 
fleet,  during  the  period  of  the  armistice,  under  the  control  and  under  the 
flags  of  the  alHed  powers  and  the  United  States,  assisted  by  a  German 
delegate."  ^°^  At  Treves  the  Allies  also  informed  the  Germans  that  the 
delivery  of  the  fleet  was  a  condition  precedent  to  the  delivery  of  supplies, 
and  that  the  German  ships  were  to  put  to  sea  not  later  than  February  12, 
1919. 

The  allied  plan  did  not  meet  with  favor  in  Germany.  The  government 
was  opposed  to  giving  up  the  remainder  of  the  merchant  marine,  which 
was  so  essential  to  the  rehabilitation  of  German  commerce  and  industry. 
Several  subsequent  conferences  were  held,  and  on  February  6  the  Germans 
and  Allies  at  Spa  came  to  an  agreement  which  ultimately  lead  to  the 
Brussels  Convention. 

On  March  13  the  allied  and  German  delegates  met  at  Brussels  under 
the  presidency  of  Admiral  Sir  Rosslyn  Wemyss.  Herbert  Hoover,  Direc- 
tor General  of  Relief,  represented  the  Supreme  Economic  Council  of  the 


American  Relief  Administration  Bulletin,  No.  19,  July  25,  1919. 


116  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

Allies.  Herr  von  Braun  was  chairman  of  the  German  delegation.  Here 
in  the  capital  of  former  occupied  and  oppressed  Belgium,  the  German 
delegates  once  more  agreed  to  abide  by  the  terms  of  the  armistice  and  the 
subsequent  extensions.  Admiral  Wemyss  then  read  to  them  the  text  of 
the  memorandum  of  the  Supreme  Economic  Council  containing  the  condi- 
tions of  the  Allies  for  furnishing  food  to  Germany. 

By  the  terms  of  this  proposal,  food  was  to  be  supplied  to  Germany  as 
soon  as  her  merchant  fleet  had  put  to  sea,  and  the  necessary  financial 
measures  had  been  taken.  Secondly,  Germany  was  given  the  right  to 
purchase  monthly  until  September,  1919:  three  hundred  thousand  tons 
of  breadstufifs  or  their  equivalent,  and  70,000  tons  of  fats,  including  pork 
products, -vegetable  oils,  and  condensed  milk.  Third,  Germany  was  re- 
quired to  pay  for  these  supplies  by  exports,  sales  of  cargoes  in  neutral 
territories,  credits  in  neutral  states,  outright  sales  of  foreign  securities  and 
properties,  hire  of  ships  and  advances  against  the  use  of  foreign  securities. 
In  addition  gold  could  be  used  as  collateral  for  loans.  Fourth,  Germany 
was  permitted  to  export  commodities  to  neutrals,  but  the  proceeds  of  all 
sales  were  to  be  converted  into  payment  for  foodstuffs.  Finally  the  Allies, 
in  order  to  increase  the  German  exports  available  for  payments,  ordered 
"that  no  part  of  these  consignments  should  be  distributed  to  unemployed 
persons  who  by  their  own  fault  or  choice  fail  to  obtain  work." 

In  the  subcommittee  on  food,  the  Allies  declared  that  no  restrictions 
would  be  placed  on  the  importations  of  fish  caught  in  European  waters, 
nor  upon  vegetables  imported  from  neutrals.  Separate  regulations  were 
made  by  the  Allies  for  provisioning  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  while  the 
Germans  guaranteed  shipments  through  Germany  to  Czecho-Slovakia  and 
Austria,  provided  that  German  shipments  arrived  beforehand.  The  Allies 
also  agreed  to  facilitate  German  communications  with  foreign  countries 
for  trade  purposes  as  herein  provided,  and  appointed  a  standing  commis- 
sion to  meet  at  Rotterdam  in  order  to  discuss  with  the  Germans  the 
commercial  details  of  the  food  traffic  established  by  this  agreement. 

The  Brussels  Convention  was  a  belated  attempt  of  the  German  govern- 
ment to  improve  the  terrible  food  situation  produced  by  the  economic 
and  military  collapse.  The  single  fact  that  child  mortality  trebled  in  the 
three  months  following  the  armistice  indicates  the  gravity  of  the  crisis. 
While  the  shortsighted  policy  of  the  Germans  resulted  in  the  delaying  of 
food  supplies  for  three  months,  the  allied  and  associated  powers  failed  to 
pursue  a  wise  economic  policy  toward  a  defeated  nation  from  which  they 
were  forced  to  demand  an  unprecedented  war  indemnity.  The  Allies, 
emerging  from  a  war  unparalleled  in  history,  were  not  in  a  mood  to  make 
the  slightest  concession  to  Germany.  Public  opinion  in  France,  England, 
and  Belgium  rather  supported  a  jwlicy  of  revenge.  The  American  Con- 
gress had  specifically  prohibited  the  use  of  the  one  hundred  million-dollar 


REVOLUTIONARY    PROBLEMS  117 

fund  for  relief  work  in  enemy  states.  Yet  one  of  the  principal  objects  of 
European  relief  was  to  prevent  the  rise  and  spread  of  anarchy,  and  on 
the  other  hand  to  encourage  the  establishment  of  stable  governments. 

During  the  period  of  the  armistice  France  evinced  but  little  interest  in 
the  problem  of  relief  for  her  old  enemy.  She  was  determined  to  make  it 
impossible  for  Germany  again  to  attack  and  invade  her  territory.  France 
was  even  ready  to  subordinate  her  hope  for  German  reparations  to  assur- 
ances of  national  safety.  As  a  result  of  the  war  six  hundred  thousand 
French  homes  had  been  destroyed.  Thousands  of  peasants  were  living  in 
caves.  Throughout  the  invaded  departments  many  factories  had  been 
levelled  to  the  ground.  The  fertile  soil  of  large  agricultural  areas  had  been 
laid  waste.  Over  the  roads  from  the  battle  front  there  had  passed  since 
1914  two  millions  of  crippled  men.  Under  the  sod  lay  one  million  five 
hundred  thousand  Frenchmen. 

Just  as  public  opinion  among  the  Allies  opposed  any  economic  conces- 
sions or  the  lifting  of  the  blockade,  so  German  public  opinion  denounced 
the  barbarous  continuation  of  the  economic  war,  and  opposed  the  surrender 
of  the  merchant  fleet  as  the  price  for  food.^"^  When  the  government 
finally  ordered  the  ships  to  put  to  sea,  strikes  and  riots  broke  out  among 
the  sailors  at  Hamburg,  Bremen,  Stettin,  and  other  ports. ^"^  From  the  date 
of  the  Brussels  Convention,  however,  the  financial,  tonnage,  and  food 
agreements  were  loyally  carried  out  by  both  the  Allies  and  the  Germans. 

On  March  22  Germany  made  the  first  deposit  of  50  million  gold  marks 
at  Rotterdam,  and  the  first  German  merchant  ships  reached  allied  ports. "° 
Three  days  later  the  first  American  food  ship,  the  West  Carnifax,  reached 
Hamburg  with  6,627  tons  of  wheat  flour,  which  was,  according  to  the 
Berliner  Tagehlatt,  "of  faultless  quality  and  snow  white".  This  provision- 
ing of  Germany  by  the  Allies  had  begun  almost  simultaneously  with  the 
collapse  of  the  second  Spartacan  rebellion.''^^  For  the  remainder  of  the 
month,  28,616  tons  of  foodstuffs  were  sent  to  Germany.^^-  While  the 
allied  powers  furnished  considerable  supplies  to  German  relief,  the  bulk 
of  it  was  shipped  by  the  American  Relief  Administration.  From  the  be- 
ginning of  the  Brussels  agreement  until  July  31,  1919,  America  deHvered 
for  German  Relief : 


'"  Vossische  Zeitung,  March  13,  1919. 

"^  Berlin  Press  Review,  March  21,  1919. 

*'"  A.  R.  A.  Bulletins,  Nos.  5,  19. 

*"  Berlin  Press  Reviezv,  March  26,  1919;  A.  R.  A.  Bulletin,  No.  3. 

"M.  R.  A.  Special  Statistical  Bulletin,  No.  4,  Table  17. 


118  THE    GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

Amount  in  metric  tons  of 
Foodsfuffs.*"  1000  kilos  each,  or  2204.6  lbs. 

Wheat  flour 250,223 

Cereal  flour  58,853 

Grain  164,632 

Rice  29,926 

Peas  and  Beans 37,748 

Pork  24,700 

Lard  , 24,010 

Milk  11,060 

Miscellaneous  433 

In  addition  Great  Britain  delivered  179,571  tons  of  fats  and  cereals  valued 
at  8,200.000  pounds  sterling,  and  France  delivered  25,456  tons  valued  at 
$18,281,700.^^*  All  of  these  foodstuffs  were  paid  for  by  Germany  in  gold 
marks :  440  millions  being  deposited  in  Rotterdam  and  290  millions  in 
Brussels.  This  gold,  valued  at  $173,448,000,  was  sold  by  the  American 
government. ^^^ 

Not  only  were  the  German  ports  used  by  the  Allies  for  German  relief, 
but  they  also  became  the  bases  from  which  food  was  trans-shipped  to 
Czecho-Slovakia,  Austria,  and  Poland.  On  February  11  an  American 
Relief  Mission  was  established  at  Danzig,  and  within  a  week  the  first 
cargoes  of  flour  destined  for  the  relief  of  Poland  were  being  loaded  on 
trains  for  Warsaw.  Although  the  utilization  of  Danzig  by  the  Allies 
was  strictly  within  the  terms  of  Article  16  of  the  Armistice,  this  traffic  with 
Poland  soon  created  endless  difficulties.  The  Polish-German  frontier  war, 
the  question  of  Haller's  army,  and  the  general  problem  of  Danzig  and  the 
corridor  of  the  Vistula  caused  German  local  officials  to  obstruct  the  Polish 
relief.  Indeed  the  Polish-German  difficulties  were  characterized  by  petti- 
ness upon  both  sides.  The  Germans  arrested  leading  Poles  in  Silesia,  and 
the  Poles  retaliated  against  the  Germans  in  Posen.  In  transporting  sup- 
plies from  Danzig  and  interchanging  coal  and  potatoes,  the  Germans  often 
hindered  the  work  for  trivial  reasons  or  accused  the  Poles  of  confiscating 
railroad  equipment.  On  the  other  hand  the  Poles  delayed  barges  going  to 
Warsaw  and  subjected  the  crews  to  indignities.  All  the  frontier  railway 
lines  were  closed,  except  one  for  transporting  Haller's  army ;  one  for 
exchanging  coal  and  potatoes  between  Posen  and  Upper  Silesia ;  and  one 
to  Danzig.  For  military  reasons  the  Poles  closed  the  main  line  from  Berlin 


""A.  R.  A.  Special  Statistical  Bulletin,  No.  4:  Total  A.  R.  A.  Deliveries  for 
German  Relief. 

"*A.  R.  A.  Bulletin,  No.  19,  Nos.  6,  18. 
"M.  R.  A.  Bulletins,  Nos.  6,  18. 


REVOLUTIONARY    PROBLEMS 


119 


to  Poland  via  Bentschen.  As  a  frontier  war  was  carried  on  between  Ger- 
mans and  Poles  within  the  old  province  of  Posen,  the  above-mentioned 
conditions  are  comprehensible. 

The  action  of  the  German  military  authorities  in  prohibiting  the  trans- 
portation of  cotton  from  Danzig  to  Warsaw  is  an  illustration  of  the  temper 
of  East  Elbe  Germany.  In  June  the  American  Relief  Administration 
supplied  Poland  with  cotton  to  rehabilitate  the  textile  industry  and  to  fight 
typhus.  Germany  demanded  ten  per  cent  of  this  cotton  as  a  transportation 
charge,  and  held  up  the  shipments.  General  von  Biilow,  commander  of 
the  Danzig  district,  prohibited  the  shipments  on  the  additional  ground  that 
the  Poles  were  planning  to  use  the  cotton  for  manufacturing  war  material. 
The  Berlin  government  was  either  powerless  or  unwilling  to  order  the 
cotton  shipped,  and  it  was  not  until  the  German  Armistice  Commission 
gave  renewed  orders  to  the  East  Prussian  militarists  that  the  cotton  was 
transported  to  Warsaw.  A  week  later  the  Berlin  government  ordered  the 
German  authorities  to  release  the  cotton.  This  incident  was  a  violation  of 
Paragraph  16  of  the  terms  of  the  armistice ;  an  indication  of  the  old  mili- 
tary spirit ;  and  an  illustration  of  the  difificulties  with  which  the  central 
government  of  Berlin  was  confronted. ^^^ 

"It  is  significant  that  soon  after  the  first  food  ship  arrived,  the  political 
situation  made  a  decided  change  and  since  that  time  has  steadily  im- 
proved."^^^  While  the  beneficent  efifects  of  the  allied  economic  policy 
toward  Germany  have  certainly  been  exaggerated,  the  menace  of  Bol- 
shevism and  the  danger  of  the  spread  of  anarchy  from  Germany  to  the 
Allies  were  present  as  long  as  Germany  remained  unfed.  Not  only  had 
the  armistice  stated  by  implication  that  Germany  should  have  food,  but 
Germany  had  to  be  supplied  with  food  in  order  to  maintain  a  stable  govern- 
ment capable  of  concluding  peace.  Apart  from  all  humanitarian  reasons, 
it  was  necessary  that  Germany  should  return  to  production  in  order  to  pay 
the  damages  inflicted  upon  Belgium,  France  and  Great  Britain.  Summing 
up  the  answer  to  the  cjuestion  of  why  we  are  feeding  Germany,  Herbert 
Hoover  wrote  in  March,  1919:  "From  the  point  of  view  of  an  economist 
I  would  say  that  it  is  because  there  are  seventy  millions  of  people  who  must 
either  produce  or  die,  that  their  production  is  essential  to  the  world's 
future,  and  that  they  can  not  produce  unless  they  are  fed."^^^ 

Bolshevism 

Through  the  portals  of  Brest-Litovsk  the  Russian  revolution  had  hurled 
into  Germany  almost  as  potent  a  force  in  the  overthrow  of  the  Hohen- 


»'M.  R.  A.  Bulletin,  No.  15,  June  27,  1919.     On  June  11,  1919,  the  first  shipload 
of  cotton   from  the  United   States  since   1914  arrived   at  Hamburg,   Berlin  Press 

Review,  June  12,  1919. 

*"  A.  R.  A.  Bulletin,  No.  19. 

*"A.  R.  A.  Bulletin,  No.  3,  April  1,  1919. 


120 


THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 


'  zollerii  empire  as  were  the  armies  of  the  Entente.  After  the  November 
revohition,  the  German  attitude  toward  Bolshevism  continued  to  be  one  of 
the  persistent  problems  which  concerned  both  the  i^overnment  and  the 
masses  of  the  nation.  In  the  German  liberation  of  1919  these  influences 
are  everywhere  reflected.  The  activities  of  clubs,  societies,  and  official  and 
unofficial  organs  of  public  opinion  also  carried  the  problem  into  the  realm 
of  practical  politics.  In  a  campaign  of  propaganda,  which  was  often  dis- 
tinct from  Spartacan  and  Independent  agitation,  Bolshevism  attempted  to 
win  over  the  German  people  to  the  cause  of  the  Soviets. 

It  was  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  von  Belhmann-Hollweg,  who  per- 
mitted Lenine  and  thirty  of  his  comrades  to  cross  Germany  on  their  way  to 
Russia.  The  German  empire  is  responsible  therefore  for  the  creation  of 
that  government  with  which  it  signed  the  peace  of  Brest-Litovsk.  "Who- 
ever sets  fire  to  his  neighbor's  house,  dare  not  complain  when  afterward 
sparks  fly  over  on  his  own  roof."'''^"  Whether  or  not  a  portion  of  the  docu- 
ments published  by  the  American  Committee  on  Public  Information  are 
genuine  or  clever  forgeries,  the  fact  is  undisputed  that  the  German  General 
Stafif  as  well  as  the  civil  government  aided  the  Bolsheviki  against  the 
Kerensky  government.  Despite  the  denials  of  Scheidemann  and  the  Ger- 
man government,  wide  circles  in  Germany  still  believe  these  documents  to 
be  genuine.^-" 

To  Freytagh-Loringhoven's  accusation  of  arson  against  the  imperial 
government  may  be  added  that  of  stupidity.  After  the  peace  with  Russia, 
thousands  of  German  prisoners,  who  had  been  trained  as  proselytes  of 
Bolshevism,  returned  to  Germany.  Aided  by  the  army  of  discontented 
industrial  workers  and  the  shirkers  at  the  front,  these  war-weary  soldiers 
from  Russia  began  that  Bolshevist  agitation  which  undermined  the  dis; 
cipline  of  the  German  array  and  became  one  of  the  fundamental  causes  of 
the  revolution.  On  November  18,  1917,  Scheidemann  said  that  the  Bol- 
sheviki and  the  German  Social  Democrats  had  the  same  political  goal :  the 
ending  of  the  world  war.^-^  Finally  in  April,  1918,  Joffe  entered  the  Rus- 
sian embassy  at  Berlin  as  ambassador  of  the  Soviets.  From  then  on  he 
became  the  head  of  that  propaganda  which  aimed  at  the  overthrow  of 
imperial  Germany  and  the  ending  of  the  war  by  sabotage,  strikes,  and 
rebellions  in  accordance  with  the  plan  advocated  by  Radek  at  the  Kienthal 
Conference  of  1916.-''"  Thus  the  first  thrust  of  Bolshevism  was  planned 
to  inflict  a  mortal  wound  upon  the  German  empire.^-^ 


'"Von  Freytagh-Loringhoven,  Axel  Frh.,  "Geschichte  und  Wesen  des  Bolsche- 
wismus,"  30. 

""  "Die  Deutsch-Bolschewistische  Verschwoerung" :  Preface  to  the  translation. 
"'  Frenzel,  "Die  Bolschewiki  und  Wir,"  41. 
'^^  Fenner,  "Die  Despoten  der  Sowjetrepublik." 
'^Von  Altrock,  "Deutschlands  Niederbruch,"  36-41. 


REVOLUTIONARY    PROBLEMS 


121 


Long  before  the  November  Revolution,  the  German  proletariat  had 
been  profoundly  influenced  by  the  success  of  the  Bolsheviki.  The  Russian 
revolution  had  for  the  first  time  in  European  history  established  the  rule  of 
a  Socialist  party  over  a  great  power.  This  triumph  had  been  achieved  by 
the  use  of  dictatorial  methods.  Lenine  formally  denounced  the  democratic 
programs  of  the  two  German  Socialist  Parties  and  attempted  to  reestablish 
"the  true  teachings  of  Marx  concerning  the  state."-*  Kautsky  for  the 
Independents  rejected,  however,  the  methods  and  policies  of  Lenine, 
although  he  recognized  Bolshevism  to  be  the  most  radical  and  determined 
conception  of  the  socialistic  demands.  Otto  Braun,  a  Social  Democratic 
leader,  attacked  the  arbitrary  methods  of  Bolshevism,  and  declared  that  it 
was  neither  socialism  nor  democracy,  but  really  insurrectionism  and  an- 
archy.^-^  Lassalle  had  prophesied  that  the  freeing  of  the  proletariat  would 
occur  amid  universal  cries  of  love  and  fraternity.  German  critics  now 
pointed  out  that  this  prophecy  had  not  been  fulfilled,  at  least  in  the  Russian 
revolution. 

Bolshevism  was,  however,  in  the  eyes  of  the  German  proletariat,  a 
remarkable  political  and  social  system,  which  had  at  least  the  prestige  of 
temporary  success.  All  were  aware  that  this  Russian  communism  had 
developed  from  Marxian  thought  and  teaching,  and  that  its  fundamental 
conception  was  the  socialization  of  the  means  of  production  through  the 
dictatorship  of  the  proletariat.  As  in  the  modern  capitalistic  state,  even 
universal  suffrage  is  prostituted  by  the  gold  and  the  corrupt  press  of  the 
upper  classes,  Bolshevism  asserted  that  the  working  classes  must  assume 
a  dictatorship  over  the  nation  in  order  to  carry  out  the  work  of  socializa- 
tion. Not  only  does  this  dictatorship  suppress  the  capitalist  class  and  its 
supporters,  but  it  also  uses  force  to  put  down  crime  and  the  lawlessness  of 
the  masses. 

The  Bolshevist  principles  of  government  are  established  in  the  con- 
stitution of  the  Soviets.  This  creates  a  national  system  of  political  as  well 
as  economic  councils,  which  are  pinnacled  in  the  All-Russian  Central 
Council  and  the  Supreme  Council  for  Political  Economy.  As  each  Russian 
commune,  district,  province,  and  government  is  governed  by  a  council,  the 
soviet  system  is  built  up  like  a  pyramid.  Executive  and  legislative  powers 
are  united  in  the  councils,  and  all  members  have  definite  administrative 
duties.  The  government  represents  moreover  the  working  classes  and  not 
the  entire  people ;  and  the  principle  is  enforced  that  only  those  who  do 
useful  work  are  entitled  to  rule  the  state.  Bolshevism  established  there- 
fore a  despotism  of  the  proletariat  in  Russia.^^s 

'"  Kautsky,  "Die  Diktatur  des  Proletariats." 
''°  Frenzcl,  "Die  Bolschewiki  und  Wir,"  40. 

"' Eltzbacher,  op.  cit.,  20-31.  Gisbcrt,  "Die  Ideologie  des  Bolschewismus"  in  the 
Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  April,  1919. 


\22  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

After  the  November  revolution,  a  pamphlet  war  broke  out  in  Germany 
between  the  supporters  of  Soviet  Russia  and  their  opponents.^^^  Societies 
which  were  formed  for  the  study  of  Bolshevist  propaganda  published 
accounts  of  the  organization  and  methods  of  the  Soviets.^-*  Especially 
emphasized  was  the  oppression  of  the  lower  middle  class.^^"  Other  pam- 
phlets, as  for  example  those  published  by  the  Press  Counsellor  of  the  Ger- 
man Legation  in  Latvia  and  Esthonia,  gave  in  detail  the  atrocities  of  the 
Bolshevists  in  the  Baltic  States.^^"  Another  group  attacked  Radek  and 
Trotzki  as  the  renegade  Jews,  Sobelsohn  and  Bronstein,  and  naively 
declared  Lenine  to  be  incomprehensible,  because  he  was  a  real  Russian  of 
the  Simbirsk  noble  family  called  Uljanow.'"^  Thus  anti-Semitic  propa- 
gandists joined  in  the  crusade  against  Bolshevism  as  a  convenient  way  of 
continuing  their  agitation. 

On  the  other  hand  the  writings  of  Lenine,  Trotzki,  and  Radek  were 
translated  and  eagerly  read  in  Germany.  Lenine's  State  and  Revolution, 
an  analysis  of  the  Bolshevist  conception  of  the  state  and  the  dictatorship  of 
the  proletariat,  had  a  wide  circulation  among  the  German  masses.^^-  As 
the  result  of  the  spread  of  this  propaganda  literature,  Bolshevism  came  to 
be  regarded  as  a  fundamental  cause  of  the  German  revolution,  and  perhaps 
its  final  goal.^^^  The  German  revolution  appeared  to  prove  the  correctness 
of  the  theory  that  from  Russia  would  go  forth  the  triumphant  idea  of  the 
world  revolution.^2*  Under  the  banner  of  Bolshevism,  Germany  was  to 
become  the  organizer  of  a  new  world  which  would  accept  everywhere  the 
proletarian  rule.^-^^  The  German  agents  of  Lenine  and  Trotzki  reiterated 
the  dictum  of  their  masters:  "The  proletariat  must  rule  the  world. "^-^^ 
This  appealed  strangely  enough  to  a  nation  whose  Junkers  and  bourgeoisie 
had  pursued  Weltpolitik  with  such  fatal  consequences.  The  left  wing  of 
the  Independents  voiced  the  wishes  of  several  million  Germans  when  it 
demanded,  upon  the  meeting  of  the  National  Assembly,  the  resumption  of 
diplomatic  relations  with  Russia. 


32'  "Fiihrer  Durch  die  Bolschewistische  und  Antibolschewistische  Literatur." 

^^  Revolutions.      Flugschriften    des    Generalsekretariats   zum    Studium   und    zur 
Bekampfung  des   Bolschewismus ;   Revolutions   Streitf ragen ;   Vereinigung  zur   Be 
kampfung  des  Bolschewismus;  Beitraege  zu  den  Problemen  der  Zeit. 

'^  Sochaczewer,  "Biirgertum  und  Bolschewismus." 

^  Kohrer,  "Das  Wahre  Gesicht  des  Bolschewismus." 

^'  Fenner,  "Die  Despoten  der  Sowjetrepublik." 

^'  Lenin,  "Staat  und  Revolution,"  Berlin,  1919. 

'^  Kautzsch,  "Vom  Imperialismus  zum  Bolschewismus,"  113.    Von  Schilling,  "Der 
Imperialismu3  der  Bolschewiki." 

^*  Oehme,  "Mein  Ziel  ist  die  Weltrevolution,"  5. 

^°  Pratap,  "Deutschlands  Zukunft  unter  den  Grossen  Nationen." 

'"  Harald,  "Wer  war  Spartakus,"  contains  a  questionable  account  of  the  work  of 
Korsakoff,  one  of  Trotzki's  agents. 


REVOLUTIONARY    PROBLEMS  123 

Finally  Bolshevism  was  accepted  by  wide  classes  of  Germans  who 
rejected  both  the  doctrines  of  the  Independents  and  the  Spartacans.  This 
was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  only  escape  from  the  peace  terms  of  the  Entente 
seemed  to  be  in  the  acceptance  of  Bolshevism.  German  conversion  to  the 
soviet  system  would  be  the  fatal  spark  to  the  communist  fires  in  Italy, 
France  and  England ;  and  once  the  doctrines  of  Lenine  were  accepted  by 
the  western  powers,  Alsace-Lorraine  and  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  would 
return  to  Germany.  Many  Germans  proposed,  however,  that  the  Father- 
land should  merely  transplant  Bolshevism  to  France  and  England,  and  not 
accept  the  doctrines  of  Soviet  Russia.^^^ 

Due  primarily  to  the  high  standard  of  Germany's  economic  develop- 
ment, the  Russian  version  of  ]\Iarx  was  not  accepted  by  the  majority  of  the 
nation.^^^  For  every  pamphlet  favoring  Bolshevism,  two  at  least  appeared 
denouncing  it.  Conservatives,  Liberals,  Catholics,  and  Democrats  united 
against  Bolshevism,  while  the  two  Socialist  parties  assumed  a  varying  but 
critical  attitude.  Popular  writers  of  these  parties  asserted  that  Bolshevism 
endangered  the  peace  of  the  world  and  that  it  was  a  menace  to  the  Entente 
as  well  as  to  the  defeated  central  powers.  Stadtler  in  "Revolutionary 
Controversies"  said  that  the  only  possible  salvation  for  Europe  would  be 
an  alteration  of  the  peace  policy  of  the  Allies,  since  a  policy  of  force  toward 
Germany  would  plunge  humanity  into  the  abyss.^^^  Mette  exclaimed  in 
the  Prcussischc  Jahrhiichcr  that  the  fate  of  the  world  was  in  the  hands  of 
the  Entente ;  and  that  either  the  western  powers  must  unite  with  Germany 
in  a  real  constructive  league  of  nations  or  else  destroy  their  civilizations  in 
a  new  war  and  Bolshevist  terror.^*"  Germany  must  also  be  allowed  and 
encouraged  by  the  Entente  to  raise  a  new  and  formidable  army  in  order  to 
combat  the  rise  and  spread  of  Asiatic  Bolshevism.^*^ 

At  the  very  moment  when  many  Germans  were  frankly  asking  for  the 
support  of  the  western  powers  against  Bolshevist  expansion,  the  inspired 
press  of  the  government  was  assuring  the  Entente  that,  if  an  unbearable 
peace  were  dictated  to  the  Fatherland,  it  would  be  forced  to  unite  with 
Russia.  Finally  Hans  Delbriick  summed  up  this  doctrine  in  the  menace : 
"If  the  Entente  threatens  to  impose  terms  of  peace  upon  us,  which  will 
destroy  us  economically  as  well  as  nationally,  there  is  only  one  answer  for 
us  to  give :  'Come  on !  you  shall  at  least  plunge  with  us  into  the  abyss.'  "^*- 


"'  Eltzbacher,  op.  cit. 

'''  Hirschberg,  "Bolschewismus." 

''^  Stadtler,  "Der  Bolschewismus  und  Seine  Oberwindung" ;  "Der  Einzige  Wcg 
zum  Weltfrieden." 

'*^  Prcussischc  JahrlMuhcr,  March,  1919. 

"'  Antropow,  "Asiatischer  Bolschewismus."  Schiemann,  "Die  Asiatisierung  Eu- 
ropas." 

**'  Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  April,  1919. 


124  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

Meanwhile  Trotzki  was  assuring  the  Russian  people  that  the  hope  of 
European  civilization  lay  in  communism.  "For  my  report  it  will  suffice, 
when  I  say,  that  in  so  far  as  the  fate  of  the  Russian  revolution  depends 
upon  the  world  situation,  this  fate  is  united  with  that  of  the  European 
revolution.  If  the  revolution  does  not  break  out  in  Europe,  if  the  Euro- 
pean working  class  shall  prove  itself  incapable  of  rising  against  capitalism 
at  the  final  ending  of  this  war,  if  this  monstrous  assumption  should  become 
a  reality,  then  that  would  mean  the  doom  of  European  culture.  The 
failure  of  communism  means  that  Europe  relapses  into  barbarism. "^*^ 


'"  Trotzki,   "Arbeit   Disciplin   und    Ordnung   Werden  die   Sozialistische   Sowjet- 
Republik  Retten." 


CONSOLIDATION  OF  THE  REPUBLIC  125 


VIII. 

CONSOLIDATION  OF  THE  REPUBLIC 
The  March  Rebellion 

The  murder  of  Karl  Liebknecht  and  Rosa  Luxemburg  after  the  dis- 
astrous failure  of  the  January  revolt  of  the  Spartacans  did  not,  however, 
end  the  Spartacan  propaganda  in  Germany.  Although  the  death  of  the 
two  great  communist  leaders  was  a  terrible  blow  to  the  movement,  the 
Spartacan  league  continued  the  struggle  with  the  help  of  the  Russian  soviet 
leaders,  who  even  promised  to  send  a  Bolshevist  army  to  East  Prussia. 
Munich,  Duesseldorf,  Duisburg,  the  Ruhr,  Brunswick,  Wilhelmshaven, 
and  Bremen  contained  strong  groups  of  communists.  When  their  boycot- 
ting of  the  elections  failed,  the  Spartacans  determined  to  disperse  the 
National  Assembly  by  a  concentration  of  red  guards.  Their  sporadic  ad- 
vance on  Weimar,  February  8,  nevertheless  failed.  The  overthrow  of  the 
National  Assembly  and  the  reversal  of  the  elections  of  January  could  not 
be  accomplished  by  a  handful  of  unorganized  communists. 

In  order  to  assure  the  success  of  the  communist  movement,  the  leaders 
now  began  active  preparations  for  a  second  revolution,  which  had  for  its 
goal  the  overthrow  of  the  Assembly  and  the  establishment  of  the  dictator- 
ship of  the  proletariat.  Recognizing  but  one  sovereignty,  the  sovereignty 
of  the  revolution,  the  Spartacans  declared  that  the  power  of  capitalism  had 
falsified  the  elections  returns,  and  that  this  fact  alone  gave  them  an  ethical 
right  to  proclaim  the  second  revolution.  Spartacan  speakers  exclaimed  in 
the  words  of  the  historian  Mommsen :  "For  history  there  are  no  high  trea- 
son paragraphs."  ^■'^ 

The  internal  condition  of  Germany,  moreover,  rapidly  altered  the  situ- 
ation in  favor  of  Spartacism.  The  danger  of  national  starvation  was  immi- 
nent, the  industrial  life  had  collapsed,  wild  strikes  and  widespread  agitation 
created  economic  unrest,  the  National  Assembly  failed  to  bring  order 
out  of  chaos,  and  the  reports  from  Paris  indicated  that  the  final  terms  of 
peace  would  be  almost  unbearable.  Faced  by  these  dangers,  large  classes 
of  Germans  turned  to  the  Spartacans  and  Independents  for  salvation.^*° 
Intellectuals,  such  as  Hans  Delbrueck,  openly  threatened  the  Entente  with 
Bolshevism.  Lenine,  who  had  planned  to  make  Germany  the  first  link  in 
his  chain  of  world  revolution,  had  his  agents  in  Berlin  working  with  the 

'**  Feiler,  "Der  Ruf  Nach  den  Raeten,"  11-12.  Froelich,  "Der  Weg  zum  Sozialis- 
mus,"  3-5. 

'*' Stadtler,  "1st  Spartakus  Besiegt?" 


126  THE    GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

Spartacans.  Trotzski's  slogan,  "The  failure  of  communism  means  that 
Europe  relapses  into  barbarism,"  was  placarded  on  the  walls  of  the  capital, 
while  Lenine's  dogma.  "The  Bolshevist  theory  is  a  consistent  carrying-out 
of  Marxism  and  strives  to  reestablish  the  true  teachings  of  Marx  concern- 
ing the  state,"  won  many  converts  for  the  Spartacans  among  the  workers. 
Alarmed  at  this  propaganda,  the  German  Finance  Minister,  Schiffer,  ex- 
claimed in  the  National  Assembly :  "The  Russian  ruble  circulates  in  Ger- 
many not  because  of  economic  but  because  of  political  reasons."  Thus  the 
second  German  revolution  was  to  receive  thorough  Bolshevist  support,  and 
to  lead  to  that  social  revolution  which  Kautsky  had  predicted  as  a  natural 
consequence  of  the  world  war. 

By  the  end  of  the  winter  the  coalition  government  of  Majority  Social- 
ists, Catholics,  and  Democrats  found  it  increasingly  difficult  to  maintain 
order  in  Germany.  The  National  Assembly  was  unable  to  agree  upon  an 
economic  policy  which  would  restore  the  nation's  industrial  life.  The  Inde- 
pendents, enraged  by  their  recent  political  defeats  and  by  the  betrayal  of 
their  cause  at  the  hands  of  the  Majority  Socialists,  now  encouraged  "direct 
action."  The  Spartacans  determined  therefore  to  strike  once  more  for  the 
dictatorship  of  the  proletariat,  and  to  avenge  the  murder  of  their  former 
leaders.  They  were  encouraged  by  publicists,  such  as  Arthur  Feiler,  who 
asserted :  "When  the  government  suppresses  a  rebellion  with  free  corps, 
martial  law,  and  severity,  it  does  not  suppress  the  Spartacan  leaders  who 
bob  up  again."  ^*^  Aided  by  the  Bolshevist  agents  and  by  Russian  gold, 
they  planned  a  revolution  for  the  first  week  of  March,  1919.  While  their 
leaders  secretly  conspired  with  the  troops  of  the  Berlin  garrison,  the  Inde- 
pendent and  Spartacan  newspapers  openly  attacked  the  government.  The 
Rote  Fahne  of  March  fifth  announced  : 

"The  hour  has  come  again.  The  dead  arise  once  more.  Again  the  down- 
trodden ride  through  the  land.  The  followers  of  Ebert  and  Scheidemann 
believed  that  they  had  ridden  you  down  in  a  more  efifective  manner  than  that 
crazed  Hohenzollern  in  the  elections  of  January,  1907.  .  .  .  That  which 
Hindenburg  and  Ludendorff  committed  in  Belgium,  Northern  France, 
Poland,  and  Finland  amid  the  curses  of  an  entire  world  and  to  the  disgrace 
of  present  and  future  generations,  namely  the  thousandfold  murders  of  a 
foreign  proletariat,  that  is  repeated  today  by  Noske  against  German  work- 
men. The  Socialist  government  of  Ebert  and  Scheidemann  has  become 
the  general  hangman  of  the  German  proletariat.  They  lie  in  wait  for  the 
opportunity  to  establish  order.  Wherever  the  proletariat  raise  their  stand- 
ards, there  Noske  sends  his  mercenaries.  Berlin,  Bremen,  Wilhlemshaven, 
Cuxhaven,  Rhineland-Westphalia,  Gotha,  Erfurt,  Halle,  Duesseldorf :  those 
are  the  bloody  stations  of  the  crusade  of  Noske  against  the  German  prole- 
tariat." 2" 


*^  Feiler,  "Der  Ruf  Nach  den  Raeten,"  4. 
*"  Noske,  "Von  Kiel  bis  Kapp,"  101-102. 


i 


CONSOLIDATION   OF  THE  REPUBLIC 


127 


Jpnr  tVip  fiT^f  time  too,  the  Spartacans  dominated  the  BerUn  workmen's 
councils  and  had  the  support  of  the  soldiers'  councils.  On  the  morning  of 
March  fourth  a  complete  assembly  of  all  the  councils  met  in  the  Gewerk- 
schaftshaus  and  voted  for  a  general  strike.  This  proletarian  assembly  rep- 
resented theoretrcany~one  thousand  five  hundred  workmen's  councils  of  a 
thousand  members  each,  and  was,  therefore,  a  formidable  revolutionary 
body.  The  strike  was  voted  with  an  opposition  of  only  one  hundred  and 
twenty-five  votes  and  was  the  first  great  political  decision  ever  taken  by  the 
Berlin  proletariat.  That  it  was  the  prelude  to  revolution  was  the  unanimous 
conviction  of  both  the  bourgeoisie  and  the  Socialists.^*^  The  fact  that  the 
Unions  Commission  of  Berlin  and  vicinity  supported  the  general  assembly 
of  the  workmen's  and  soldiers'  councils  in  the  strike  question,  shows  the 
seriousness  of  the  situation.^""'  Proletarian  leaders  boasted  that  the  general 
strike  would  be  followed  by  "direct  action"  which  would  establish  socialism 
in  place  of  the  parliamentarism  of  the  Social  Democracy.^=° 

The  demands  of  the  strikers,  according  to  the  official  bulletin  of  the 
strike  committee,  were:  recognition  of  the  workmen's  and  soldiers'  coun- 
cils; immediate  enforcement  of  the  Hamburg  Points  concerning  military 
authority;  release  of  all  political  prisoners,  especially  Ledebour;  abolition 
of  military  justice;  immediate  formation  of  a  revolutionary  workmen's 
army;  dissolution  of  all  recruited  free  corps;  immediate  resumption  of 
political  and  economic  relations  with  the  Soviet  Government  of  Russia ;  and 
recognition  of  the  economic  rights  of  the  workmen's  councils.^^^ 

On  the  day  set  the  Spartacans  again  raised  the  red  flag  of  Bolshevism  on 
the  Alexander  Square  in  Berlin.  Active  preparations  for  the  uprising  had 
been  made  by  the  Red  Soldiers'  Alliance,  which  had  drawn  up  on  February 
15  a  secret  plan  for  seizing  the  principal  government  buildings  and  news- 
paper offices  of  the  city.^'^  During  the  night  of  March  3  groups  of  Sparta- 
cans attacked  and  captured  thirty-two  police  stations  in  the  eastern  sections 
of  Berlin.  The  fighting  was  especially  severe  at  the  Lichtenberg  Station. 
Bands  of  criminals  took  advantage  of  the  revolutionary  disorder  to  rob  and 
plunder  the  shops  and  warehouses  in  these  districts.  The  executive  com- 
mittee of  the  Berlin  workmen  which  was  directing  the  political  strike  de- 
nounced this  lichtscheue  Gesindel  as  "the  hyenas  of  the  revolution."  The 
Spartacan  attack  on  the  government  forces  began  with  the  seizure  of  the 
Police  Presidency  by  the  Marine  Division,  the  Republican  Guards,  and 
bands  from  the  criminal  classes.    Within  a  few  hours  of  the  commencement 


'**Daumig,  "Das  Raetesystem." 

"•  Vorwaerts  and  Berliner  Tagebhtt.  March  8,  1919. 

'"  Noske,  "Von  Kiel  bis  Kapp,"  105. 

*"  Roche,  "Organisierte  Direkte  Aktion." 

"'Berliner  Tageblatt,  March  15.  1919. 


128  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

of  the  attack.  30.000  arnietl  Spartacans  had  seized  control  of  the  eastern 
suburbs  of  Berlin.  The  police  headquarters  were  defended  by  a  cadre,  200 
strong^,  of  the  active  One  Hundred  Seventy-fourth  Lorraine  Infantry 
Regiment,  and  by  two  companies  of  the  Augusta  Regiment.  Possessed 
of  mine  thro-vvers  and  machine  guns,  this  small  force  was  able  to  defend 
the  government  stronghold,  which  was  located  in  the  heart  of  the  rebelli- 
ous district. 

During  the  night  of  March  3  the  Minister  of  National  Defense  Noske 
proclaimed  martial  law  in  Berlin  and  ordered  the  government  troops  which 
were  stationed  at  Potsdam  and  other  suburbs  to  march  into  the  capital.  As 
a  precautionary  measure  the  artillery  depot  at  Spandau,  which  contained 
quantities  of  machine  guns,  was  occupied  by  the  Luettwitz  Corps,  and  the 
unreliable  pioneer  battalion  of  Spandau  was  disarmed.  By  March  4  the 
government  offices  in  Berlin  had  been  reinforced  by  the  arrival  of  loyal 
troops. 

The  Spartacan  forces  after  attacking  the  Police  Presidency  attempted 
to  advance  their  lines  into  the  center  of  the  city,  and  for  a  time  they  seemed 
on  the  point  of  success.  Spartacan  patrols  and  bands  of  criminals  broke 
into  the  Tiergartcn,  and  even  penetrated  the  western  sections  of  Berlin, 
where  they  terrorized  the  inhabitants.  Heavy  fighting  continued  for  a 
week  between  loyal  government  troops  and  the  Spartacans.  Machine  guns, 
airplanes,  and  artillery  were  freely  used  on  both  sides.  Noske,  however, 
was  fully  prepared  for  the  uprising,  and  the  government  troops  were  equal 
to  the  emergency. 

To  inflame  the  people  against  the  communists,  Noske  falsely  accused 
them  of  a  general  massacre  of  prisoners  at  the  Lichtenberg  Police  Station, 
and  therefore  ordered  them  to  be  exterminated. ^^^  Noske's  military  procla- 
mation of  March  9  declared :  "Every  person  who  is  found  fighting  with 
arms  in  his  hands  against  government  troops  will  be  executed  at  once."  In 
a  four  days'  battle,  the  Spartacans  were  driven  back  from  the  line  Prenz- 
lauer  Allee,  Alexander  Square,  Jannowitz  Bridge,  Silesian  Railway  Station 
to  the  suburb  of  Lichtenberg.  There  the  communist  bands  were  defeated 
and  dispersed.  The  People's  Marine  Division,  which  had  been  a  thorn  in 
the  side  of  the  government  since  November,  1918,  was  driven  from  its  head- 
quarters in  the  Marine  House  and  later  broken  up.  Many  depots  of  the 
Republican  Soldatenwehr,  which  had  joined  the  Spartacans,  were  disarmed, 
and  this  force  was  reduced  to  6,500  men.=*^'' 

As  early  as  March  7  the  Unions  Commission  of  Berlin  called  off  the 
general  strike,  ostensibly  because  the  government  accepted  certain  of  their 

^Berliner  Zeitung  am  Mittag,  March  9,  1919,  and  Vorwaerts,  March  10,  1919, 
reported  the  details  of  this  massacre. 

^^  Nationalversammlung,  21  Sitzung :  Report  of  Noske,  March  13,  1919. 


CONSOLIDATION   OF  THE  REPUBLIC  129 

demands,  and  because  the  strike  had  endangered  food  control  as  well  as  the 
health  of  the  city !  In  reality  the  leaders  abandoned  an  unequal  revolution- 
ary struggle  with  a  government  which  was  ably  supported  by  a  remnant 
of  the  old  imperial  army  as  well  as  by  volunteers  from  the  middle  class. 
The  disappointment  of  the  Independent  Socialists  over  the  failure  of  the 
strike  and  uprising  was  expressed  in  violent  attacks  on  the  Minister  of 
National  Defense,  Noske. 

The  Guard  Cavalry  Rifle  Division,  the  Free  Corps  Huelsen,  and  the 
German  Rifle  Division  were  the  forces  which  by  March  14  were  able  to 
bring  the  armed  resistance  of  the  Spartacans  to  an  end.^®^  Over  one  thou- 
sand two  hundred  persons  had  been  killed  during  the  fighting,  and  prop- 
erty valued  in  millions  had  been  destroyed.  The  Spartacans  committed 
many  atrocities  against  the  government  troops  during  the  course  of  the  up- 
rising, while  the  latter  retaliated  against  their  enemies.^^®  Lieutenant  Mar- 
loh,  at  the  head  of  a  detachment  of  Noske's  forces,  brutally  murdered 
twenty-nine  men  of  the  People's  Marine  Division.^"  After  the  fighting 
stopped,  the  eastern  sections  of  the  capital  were  thoroughly  searched  for 
rebels  and  arms.  Hundreds  of  machine  guns  and  thousands  of  rifles  and 
side  arms,  together  with  ammunition  supplies,  were  found  in  these  quarters. 
As  a  result  of  the  demobilization  of  the  German  army  and  the  break-up 
of  discipline,  the  Berlin  proletariat  was  better  armed  than  the  populace  of 
any  European  capital  in  previous  revolutionary  uprisings.  The  failure  of 
the  March  rebellion  was  due  to  a  lack  of  leaders,  discipline,  and  coordina- 
tion of  plans.^^^ 

After  Noske  had  suppressed  the  general  strike  and  put  down  the  rebel- 
lion with  an  iron  hand,  the  political  leaders  of  the  Spartacans  and  Independ- 
ents made  desperate  efforts  to  disclaim  all  responsibility  for  the  miserable 
failure  of  the  uprising.  An  inspired  article  in  the  Independent  newspaper, 
Freiheit,  explained  the  rebellion  as  the  result  of  military  rivalries  between 
the  Reinhardt  Troops  and  the  Republican  Guards  and  the  People's  Marine 
Division. ^'^^  The  Central  Committee  of  the  Communist  Party  of  Germany 
issued  a  circular  which  denied  that  Spartacus  had  taken  part  in  the  unsuc- 
cessful rebellion.  It  gave  the  following  causes  for  the  March  uprising: 
"The  armed  conflicts  were  carried  on  by  the  People's  Marine  Division  and 
detachments  of  the  Republican  Guards.  Although  these  are  proletarian 
organizations,  they  are  not  closely  affiliated  with  our  party.     On  the  con- 


*"  Berliner  Tageblatt,  March  13,  1919.     Vossische  Zeitung,  March  18,  1919. 
*"  Herzf elde,  Schutzhaft  Erlebnisse  vom  7  bis  20  Maerz,  1919,  bei  den  Berliner 
Ordnungstruppen. 

"'Noske,  "Von  Kiel  bis  Kapp,"  110. 

"*  Georg  Schoeplin,  Governor  of  Berlin,  in  Berliner  Tageblatt,  April  2,  1919. 

"•Freiheit,  March  11,  1919. 


130  THE    GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

trary,  they  were  the  troops  who,  (hiring  the  January  rebelhon,  either  attacked 
our  forces  in  the  rear  or  at  least  remained  neutral  during  the  fighting.  Not 
only  that,  but  now  they  are  fighting  for  another  goal  than  the  one  toward 
which  the  Spartacans  are  striving.  We  are  struggling  for  socialism  against 
capitalism  and  its  representatives ;  they  are  fighting  for  their  military  posts 
against  their  mercenary  masters  with  whom  they  are  discontented.  All 
these  facts  divide  us  from  them.  We  are  therefore  able  to  console  our- 
selves with  the  statement :  There  is  no  political  union  between  these  fighters 
and  ourselves."  ^"° 

The  New  Army 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  world  war  German  militarism  exclaimed:  "If 
God  in  His  Grace  should  give  us  victory,  then  'Woe  to  the  conquered.'  "  *°^ 
At  its  close  these  same  militarists  led  home  a  defeated  and  disintegrating 
army  amid  allied  shouts  of  "Vae  victis."  The  demobilization  of  the  Ger- 
man armies  in  the  winter  of  1918-1919  marked  the  end  of  that  Prussian 
military  system  which  had  assured  internal  peace  to  Germany  since  1866 
and  had  finally  aroused  the  fear  and  hostility  of  an  entire  world.  During 
this  period  of  demobilization  the  defeated  imperial  forces  were  still  further 
demoralized  by  the  political  activities  of  revolutionary  soldiers'  councils 
and  by  the  collapse  of  the  authority  of  the  regular  officers.  The  revolution 
had  made  it  impossible  to  maintain  the  old  system  of  universal  military 
service  or  to  utilize  the  1920  class  for  garrison  duty.  On  the  other  hand 
the  original  revolutionary  project  for  forming  a  red  army  had  been  every- 
where abandoned.  The  need  for  a  new  national  army,  organized  upon  a 
diflFerent  basis,  became,  therefore,  apparent  to  the  provisional  government. 

On  December  12  the  Council  of  the  People's  Commissioners  issued  a 
decree  for  the  formation  of  a  Volunteer  People's  Army.  Among  the  radi- 
cal provisions  of  this  decree  were:  election  of  the  officers  by  the  men;  re- 
striction of  volunteers  to  men  twenty-four  years  of  age  with  service  at  the 
front;  and  maintenance  of  this  force  independent  of  the  regular  army 
organization.^'^-  This  military  reorganization  did  not,  however,  result  in 
the  formation  of  any  important  volunteer  units. ^"^  The  Minister  of  War, 
Scheuch,  who  had  supervised  the  work  of  demobilizing  the  old  army  since 
November  11,  resigned  on  December  15.  Although  he  had  approved  of 
the  appointment  of  Deputy  Goehre  as  Adjutant  of  the  Minister  of  War, 
Scheuch  in  his  letter  of  resignation  protested  against  the  hatreds,  suspi- 
cions, indignities,  and  insults  which  were  constantly  hurled  against  the 


"•Noske,  "Von  Kiel  bis  Kapp,"  110. 
'^  Militdr-Wochenblatt,  August  4,  1914. 

'^^  Kriegs-Gesetze-Verordnungen    und-Bekanntmachungen    6.    Band,    177.     This 
series  contains  the  important  military  decrees. 
»"  Noske,  "Von  Kiel  bis  Kapp,"  113. 


CONSOLIDATION   OF  THE  REPUBLIC  131 

war  ministry  and  the  officer  class  in  general.  He  correctly  stated  that  peace, 
freedom,  and  order  could  not  be  maintained  in  the  new  state  without  the 
aid  of  these  veteran  officers  and  their  disciplined  men.  Finally  he  recog- 
nized the  necessity  for  a  complete  reorganization  of  the  military  forces  of 
the  state.^''* 

A  decree  of  the  government,  issued  on  January  19,  reestablished  the  mili- 
tary power  of  the  army  and  paved  the  way  for  the  reorganization  by  the 
Minister  of  War  of  those  forces  which  had  defeated  the  Spartacans  in 
January.  Between  this  period  and  the  March  rebellion  the  demobilization 
of  the  old  army  was  completed  to  a  point  where  only  administrative  officers, 
training  schools,  hospitals,  and  sections  dealing  with  enemy  or  returning 
German  prisoners  were  left  intact.^"^  Exceptions  to  these  generalizations 
were  the  command  of  Hindenburg  on  the  Polish  front  and  the  frontier 
guards  in  the  Rhineland.  It  was  the  Reichswehr,  the  new  army,  which 
gained  the  March  victory  over  the  Spartacans,  and  so  from  then  on  became 
a  factor  in  the  maintenance  of  the  republic. 

To  designate  the  forces  under  Noske's  command  as  reorganized  is,  how- 
ever, to  overlook  the  almost  chaotic  condition  of  the  new  army.  Old  war 
units  existed  side  by  side  with  new  republican  formations.  Ersatz,  volun- 
teer, and  regular  forces  were  united  in  so-called  divisions  or  corps.  In 
certain  units  soldiers'  councils  were  in  control,  while  in  others  the  old  regu- 
lar officers  maintained  the  discipline  of  imperial  days.^^^  As  a  general  rule 
the  reserve  officers  corps,  which  had  been  called  to  active  service  during  the 
war,  had  failed  to  hold  the  confidence  of  the  troops.  After  the  creation  of 
the  Reichswehr,  the  officers  of  the  new  army  opposed  the  policies  of  the 
government  and  maintained  the  monarchical  traditions  of  Prussianism. 
While  their  love  of  country  kept  many  monarchical  officers  in  the  service, 
the  majority  remained  either  because  of  economic  reasons  or  because  of  the 
desire  to  participate  in  the  inevitable  coup  d'etat.^**^  Noske  was  able,  how- 
ever, to  control  even  the  monarchical  cliques  as  long  as  the  danger  from  the 
Spartacans  and  Independents  was  apparent. 

At  the  close  of  the  March  rebellion  the  capital  of  Germany  was  defended 
by  volunteer  corps  and  skeleton  formations  of  the  old  units,  which  in  many 
cases  occupied  their  former  barracks.  Practically  all  the  active  organiza- 
tions maintained  recruiting  offices.  General  von  Lettow-Vorbeck  raised  a 
force  called  Division  Lettow,  which  soon  rivaled  the  Reinhardt  Brigade,  the 
Liittwitz  Corps,  and  the  Huelsen  Free  Corps.     In  addition  the  Berlin  dis- 


***  Deutscher  Geschichtskalcnder,   173.     Macrcker,  "Vom  Kaiserheer  zur  Reichs- 
wehr" is  a  well  written  account  of  the  reorganization  of  the  German  army. 
"^Berlin  Press  Review,  June  6,  1919. 
'"  Boelcke,  "Deutschlands  Neue  Wehrmacht,"  5-14. 
*"  Preussische  Jahrbucher,  August,  1919. 


132  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

trict  contained  the  Guard  Cavalry  Rifle  Division,  the  German  Defense  Divi- 
sion, the  Land  Rifle  Corps,  and  the  Potsdam  Free  Corps.^^^ 

While  the  old  army  was  being  demobilized  and  the  evils  of  the  imperial 
military  system  were  being  eradicated,  frantic  efforts  were  made  to  organize 
security  police,  home  guards,  reserve  units,  volunteer  corps,  and  a  national 
guard.  To  the  Entente  demands  that  the  army  must  be  reduced  to  one 
hundred  thousand  men,  Germany  replied  with  the  assertion  that  a  much 
larger  force  of  organized  militia  was  needed  in  order  to  maintain  order  and 
to  repel  invasions.^"^  The  officer  class  still  clung  to  the  system  of  universal 
military  service.  Indeed  the  Socialist  government  did  not  hesitate,  during 
the  Polish  troubles,  to  enforce  the  old  imperial  universal  military  service 
law  in  the  eastern  provinces  in  order  to  raise  fresh  troops.^^°  America  was 
cited  as  the  classic  example  of  unpreparedness  in  1917,  and  the  organ  of  the 
German  Officers'  Alliance  asserted:  "A  peace-trained  American  army, 
despite  the  valor  of  the  one  which  did  fight  in  the  autumn  of  1918,  would 
have  been  irresistible  for  our  tired  troops."  ^^^  Militarism,  as  Kautsky 
boldly  asserted,  was  raising  its  head  again  and  was  gaining  support  too, 
because  of  the  Spartacan  excesses.^'-  Various  excuses  and  reasons  were 
given  for  a  strong  Germany  military  policy.  The  Junker  leader,  von  Kar- 
dorff,  blandly  declared  that  the  fourteen  points  of  Wilson  would  enable 
Germany  to  maintain  a  strong  army.^" 

With  the  exceptions  of  the  veteran  forces  on  the  Rhenish  and  Polish 
fronts,  the  German  troops  in  the  various  garrison  towns  of  the  interior 
were  similar  in  character  to  the  revolutionary  forces  of  Berlin.  Neither 
the  Prussian  ministry  of  war,  nor  the  ministries  of  the  other  federal  states 
possessed  complete  confidence  in  their  troops.  The  rebellious  influences  of 
Spartacism  and  Independent  Socialism  were  a  constant  menace  to  dis- 
cipline and  order.  Yet  these  scattered  military  forces  represented  the  last 
line  of  defense  for  a  new  democratic  republic,  which  was  subjected  to  a 
constant  attack  by  radical  Socialists  and  Communists. 

Since  the  organization  of  the  Reichszvehr  by  the  decree  of  March  6, 
1919,  there  has  been  an  almost  constant  interchange  of  notes  between  the 
aUied  powers  and  Germany  concerning  the  reduction  of  the  new  army,  the 
delivery  of  arms  and  material,  and  the  suppression  of  the  various  German 
police  forces.  By  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  the  German  army 
was  limited  to  one  hundred  thousand  men,  including  four  thousand  officers. 

^  Vorwaerts,  March  27,  1919;  Berlin  Press  Review,  April  16,  1919. 

''*  Mueller-Brandenburg,  "Die  Armee  des  Neuen  Staates,"  19. 

"'Noske,  "Von  Kiel  bis  Kapp,"  113. 

»"  D.  O.  B.  Schriften,  19. 

'"  Berliner  Tayehlatt,  March  29,  1919. 

'"  Vorwaerts,  March  27,  1919. 


CONSOLIDATION   OF  THE  REPUBLIC  133 

The  great  general  staff  and  universal  military  service  were  abolished — a 
fitting  tribute  to  their  military  efiiciency.  Finally  the  treaty  provided  that 
all  military  clauses  affecting  Germany  must  be  executed  by  April  10,  1920. 

According  to  the  German  Minister  of  National  Defense,  the  strength  of 
the  German  army  at  the  conclusion  of  peace  wzs  four  hundred  thousand 
officers  and  men.  About  half  of  these  forces  were  stationed  in  the  Baltic 
States  and  on  the  southern  and  eastern  frontiers  of  Germany.  After  the 
ratification  of  the  peace  treaty,  President  Ebert  ordered  both  the  Reisch- 
wehr  and  the  forces  under  the  command  of  General  Headquarters  at  Kol- 
berg  to  be  gradually  reduced.  As  late  as  March  18,  1919,  Field  Marshal 
von  Hindenburg  and  General  Groener  had  informed  Minister  Noske :  "The 
army  has  confidence  in  the  government,  limited  confidence  in  the  ministry 
of  war,  and  unlimited  confidence  only  in  the  Minister  of  National  De- 
fense." ^^*  This  is  sufficient  proof  of  the  existence  of  a  military  spirit  which 
hoped  to  maintain  the  army  at  a  greater  strength  than  that  provided  for  by 
the  treaty  of  peace.  Noske  was  unable,  however,  to  secure  any  important 
concessions  from  the  Entente,  and  he  therefore  attempted  to  carry  out 
gradually  the  reduction  of  the  army.  The  problem  was  still  further  com- 
plicated by  the  existence  of  police  forces,  such  as  Zeitfreiwilligen,  Sicher- 
heitspolisei,  and  Einwohncrzvchren,  which  were  regarded  by  the  Entente  as 
disguised  military  reserves  for  the  active  German  army.  The  Prussian 
militarists  were  accused  of  attempting  to  imitate  that  policy  which  Prussia 
had  pursued  so  successfully  after  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit. 

According  to  reliable  allied  information,  the  strength  of  these  German 
forces  on  February  1,  1920,  was  as  follows: 

THE  ACTIVE  ARMY 

Cadres  and  detachments  of  former  imperial  army  units.—     90,000 
Detachments  on  guard  at  the  camps  for  Russian  prisoners 

of  war  40,000 

Reichswehr,  or  new  army  comprising  30  brigades 300,000 

Total 430,000 

THE  POLICE  FORCES 

Zeitfreiwilligen,  or  emergency  volunteers 150,000 

Sicherheitspolizei,  or  security  police 120,000 

Einwohnerivchrcn,  or  civic  guards 100,000 

Orgesch,  or  Bavarian  home  guards 30,000 

Total 400,000 

'"  Noske,  "Von  Kiel  bis  Kapp,"  168-169. 


134  THE    GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

Germany  attempted  to  secure  permission  from  the  allied  conference  at 
San  Remo  to  maintain  the  strength  of  the  Rcichsivchr  at  200,000  men.  This 
was  refused.  By  a  decision  of  the  Allies  on  April  27,  Germany  was  allowed 
to  maintain  an  army  of  200,000  men  until  July  10,  1920,  when  her  forces 
were  to  be  reduced  to  100.000,  as  stipulated  by  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 
Meanwhile  a  German  decree  of  March  6,  1920,  established  a  new  table  of 
organization  for  an  army  of  transition  which  was  to  supplant  the  Rcichs- 
xcchr.  This  Uebergangszvehr  was  to  have  the  same  number  of  units  as  the 
future  army  in  its  final  form,  namely,  twenty  mixed  brigades,  three  cavalry 
divisions,  and  special  and  sanitary  troops.  At  the  Spa  conference  of  July 
7,  1920,  between  the  Germans  and  the  Allies,  General  von  Seekt,  speaking 
for  Germany,  asked  for  a  delay  of  fifteen  months  in  order  to  reduce  the 
army  from  two  hundred  thousand  to  one  hundred  thousand  men.  This 
request  resulted  in  fresh  negotiations  and  the  granting  of  further  delays  to 
Germany.  It  was  finally  agreed  that  by  January  1,  1921,  the  German  army 
should  be  reduced  to  100,000  men,  and  that  it  should  then  be  organized  in 
accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 

The  same  difficulties  were  experienced  by  the  Allies  in  reducing  the 
German  police  forces.  The  technical  and  emergency  volunteers,  civic 
guards,  and  volunteer  corps  were  gradually  disbanded  or  reduced  in 
strength  during  the  year  1920.  On  the  other  hand  the  security  police 
increased  in  numbers  as  the  other  organizations  were  broken  up.  The 
Berlin  government  was  also  unable  to  reduce  the  strength  of  the  Bavarian 
civic  guards.  At  the  allied  conference  of  Boulogne  on  June  22,  1920,  Ger- 
many was  ordered  to  reduce  gradually  the  strength  of  the  security  police 
and  to  increase  the  ordinary  police  forces,  which  existed  before  the  war, 
from  ninety-two  thousand  to  one  hundred  fifty  thousand  men.  It  was 
further  ordered  that  the  total  strength  of  both  organizaions  should  not  at 
any  time  exceed  150,000  men. 

Although  the  new  German  army  has  been  finally  reduced  to  the  table 
of  organization  provided  by  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  it  reflects  nevertheless 
the  best  work  of  those  German  military  leaders,  such  as  General  von  Seekt, 
who  have  since  the  November  revolution  devoted  all  their  energies  to  the 
military  reorganization  of  the  Fatherland.  As  a  result,  the  present  German 
ministry  of  war  is  perhaps  better  organized  than  the  war  ministries  of 
France,  England,  and  Italy.  It  incorporates  in  the  details  of  its  organiza- 
tion many  of  the  important  lessons  of  administration  and  instruction  which 
were  learned  during  the  world  war. 

This  new  military  organization  is  also  regarded  as  a  force  which  would 
bring  about  the  moral  regeneration  of  the  Fatherland.  At  the  close  of  the 
revolution  the  Reichswehr  was  composed  almost  entirely  of  regulars,  who 
had  served  in  or  belonged  to' the  imperial  army.     Supporting  this  force 


CONSOLIDATION   OF  THE  REPUBLIC  135 

were  the  majority  of  the  seven  milHon  veterans  who  had  participated  in  the 
war.  The  cadres  were  therefore  ready  to  marshal  the  national  army  of  the 
future.  The  former  leaders  and  writers  of  the  imperial  army  proclaimed 
their  belief  in  future  wars  and  announced  to  Germany:  ''Eiserne  Zeiten 
werden  wiederkommen." 

Minor  Communist  Uprisings 

Although  twice  defeated  in  the  winter  and  spring  of  1919,  the  Sparta- 
cans  did  not  abandon  faith  in  the  method  of  "direct  action".  After  their 
second  failure  in  Berlin,  they  planned  a  series  of  sharp  attacks  upon  the 
government  in  the  industrial  centers  of  the  nation.  Their  schemes  were 
aided  by  the  Independents,  who  in  various  parts  of  Germany  favored  the 
establishment  of  the  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat.  Almost  simultaneously 
with  the  March  uprising  in  Berlin,  disturbances  occurred  in  Koenigsberg, 
Breslau,  Upper  Silesia,  Hamburg,  Emden,  the  Rhineland,  Westphalia,  and 
Thuringia.  These  minor  uprisings  were  almost  all  checked  either  by  politi- 
cal concessions  to  the  soldiers'  councils  of  the  rebellious  districts  or  by 
granting  the  economic  demands  of  the  striking  workmen.^^^  They  illus- 
trate, however,  the  serious  situation  of  the  German  republic  during  the 
week  ending  March  12,  1919. 

The  establishment  by  Bela  Kun  of  the  soviet  system  at  Budapest,  and 
the  subsequent  formation  of  a  Bolshevist  Hungary,  created  a  profound  im- 
pression throughout  Germany.  The  government  adroitly  attempted  at 
this  juncture  to  consolidate  German  public  opinion  against  the  allied  peace 
demands,  which  now  included  the  surrender  of  the  merchant  fleet  and  the 
landing  of  Haller's  army  at  Danzig.  This  firmer  tone  of  the  Socialist- 
Catholic-Democratic  government  was  echoed  by  the  monarchists,  militarists, 
and  bureaucrats,  who  protested  violently  in  Berlin  against  the  allied  pro- 
posals concerning  Danzig.  In  the  streets  of  the  capital.  Citizen  Ludendorff 
was  given  an  ovation,  while  over  a  half  million  Germans  sent  greetings  to 
their  former  Emperor.  Many  Germans  believed  that  with  the  spread  of 
Bolshevism  into  Hungary,  democratic  western  Europe  would  be  engulfed, 
while  Germany,  protected  by  her  Junkers  and  bureaucrats,  would  escape 
from  the  red  flood. 

To  the  German  Communists  the  Bolshevist  revolution  in  Hungary  was 
merely  a  sign  of  their  approaching  triumph,  toward  which  events  appeared 
to  be  moving  rapidly  in  Germany.  Paid  Spartacan  agitators  had  supported 
the  seamen's  riots  in  Hamburg  and  other  German  ports.  The  argument 
that  the  Allies  planned  to  starve  Germany  into  submission  was  used  with 
as  great  success  by  the  communists  as  it  was  by  the  monarchists.^^^    Allied 


'A.  R.  A.  Bulletin,  Confidential,  No.  1. 
^  A.  R.  A.  Bulletin,  Confidential,  No.  2. 


136  THE    GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

agents  reported  in  March  from  various  districts  that  the  danger  of  a  Bolshe- 
vist Germany  was  a  real  one.^" 

On  April  7  soldiers  of  a  guard  regiment  at  Magdeburg  arrested  Minister 
of  Justice  Landsberg  and  General  von  Kleist,  commander  of  the  Fourth 
Corps,  because  of  the  imprisonment  of  certain  Independent  leaders  by  the 
government.  A  general  strike  was  then  organized  April  8  at  Magdeburg ; 
the  warehouses  of  the  American  Red  Cross  were  partially  looted ;  and  order 
was  not  restored  until  the  city  was  occupied  by  Noske's  government  troops. 
During  these  disturbances  Spartacan  aviators  had  dropped  propaganda  leaf- 
lets over  Magdeburg.'^^^ 

In  the  Ruhr  district  the  miners  and  industrial  workers  proclaimed  a 
general  strike.  Here  again  the  Spartacans  were  behind  what  appeared  upon 
the  surface  to  have  been  an  economic  rather  than  a  political  movement.  The 
decrease  in  production  in  the  Ruhr  reduced  the  monthly  output  of  coal  to 
100,000  tons.  Two  hundred  and  twenty-one  mines  were  shut  down  and 
about  372,000  miners  joined  the  strikers.  At  Essen  the  Krupp  workmen, 
railway  men,  electrical  workers,  and  others  had  joined  the  movement.  So 
serious  did  the  situation  appear  that  the  Congress  of  the  Workmen's  and 
Soldiers'  Councils  in  session  in  Berlin  urged  the  Ruhr  strikers  to  return  to 
work,  while  the  government  was  counseled  by  the  Congress  to  grant  the 
just  demands  of  the  miners.^" 

As  the  Ruhr  situation  was  attracting  the  attention  of  the  Allies,  Berlin 
adopted  an  energetic  policy  toward  these  strikers.  Martial  law  was  pro- 
claimed at  Essen  and  throughout  the  whole  Ruhr  district.  Announcing  the 
arrival  of  food  shipments  from  the  Allies,  the  government  stated  that, 
acting  under  instructions  from  the  allies,  it  would  give  nothing  to  those  who 
continued  to  strike.  From  then  on  the  revolutionary  movement  declined, 
although  general  conditions  had  been  favorable  to  a  successful  rising  of 
the  Rhineland  proletariat.  Nevertheless  the  Ruhr  district  was  destined  to 
become  the  stronghold  of  Spartacism. 

In  other  parts  of  western  Germany  strikes  and  revolutionary  movements 
broke  out.  Mannheim,  Karlsruhe,  Duesseldorf,  and  Frankfort  were  the 
scenes  of  strikes  or  uprisings.^®''  At  Wolfenbiittel  a  republic  of  councils 
was  organized  and  did  not  disband  until  attacked  by  government  troops. 
While  the  Allies  and  Germany  were  discussing  the  Danzig  question,  a  strike 
occurred  in  that  city  on  April  11.    The  presence  in  the  city  of  the  Bolshevist 


'''Ibid.,  No.  1. 

"^Berlin  Press  Review,  April  7,  10,  11;  A.  R.  A.  Bulletin,  Confidential,  No.  3. 
Maercker,  op.  cit.,  180-192. 

"'A.  R.  A.  Bulletin,  Confidential,  No.  4;  Berlin  Press  Review,  April  7,  11,  13. 
'^A.  R.  A.  Bulletin,  Confidential,  Nos.  3,  4. 


CONSOLIDATION   OF  THE  REPUBLIC 


137 


emissary,  Schleisstein,  and  three  hundred  Russians  indicated  the  political 
character  of  the  strike.^*^ 

Meanwhile  Spartacans  and  Independents  were  planning  a  general  strike 
in  Berlin  for  the  second  week  in  April.  Their  movement  was  well  adver- 
tised, and  the  jlist  economic  grievances  of  the  Berlin  workers  were  accentu- 
ated in  a  determined  effort  to  secure  Socialist  support.  The  government 
organ,  Vorwaerts,  attacked  the  plan  as  ruinous  for  the  workers,  who  would 
thus  prevent  the  arrival  and  distribution  of  the  purchased  foodstuffs.  The 
Executive  Committee  of  the  Social  Democratic  Party  of  Greater  Berlin  also 
issued  a  proclamation  to  the  workers  against  striking  at  this  time.^''  While 
these  attempts  were  being  made  to  quiet  the  Berlin  proletariat,  the  depart- 
ment-store clerks,  the  metal  workers,  and  the  bank  employees  of  Berlin 
created  another  menace  by  starting  new  strikes.  Bauer,  Minister  of  Labor, 
attempted  with  partial  success  to  mediate  between  the  employers  and  these 
employees.^*^ 

During  this  period  Berlin  was  almost  in  a  state  of  siege.  Military 
forces  guarded  the  Wilhelmstrasse  and  the  principal  government  buildings. 
On  April  9  the  Spartacans  and  strikers  planned  to  use  a  parade  of  wounded 
veterans  for  an  attack  upon  the  government.  Noske,  however,  stopped  all 
traffic  into  the  inner  city  and  closed  off  the  government  quarter  with  barbed 
wire  entanglements.^** 

Early  in  April  the  revolutionary  party,  supported  by  labor,  assumed  con- 
trol of  the  capital  of  Brunswick  and  proclaimed  a  general  strike.  The  radi- 
cals demanded:  proclamation  of  a  council  republic;  an  alliance  with  Hun- 
gary, Russia,  and  Bavaria ;  abolition  of  militarism  and  capitalism  through- 
out the  world;  overthrow  of  the  Ebert  government  and  dissolution  of 
the  National  Assembly.^"^  Whereupon  the  city  officials,  physicians,  and 
pharmacists  started  a  counter  strike.  Telephone,  telegraph,  and  post  offices 
were  promptly  closed,  and  the  railroads  stopped  all  traffic.  The  revolu- 
tionists, supported  by  a  people's  marine  division,  were,  however,  able  to 
maintain  their  soviet  government.  Noske,  who  had  previously  put  down  the 
Magdeburg  Communists,  now  ordered  General  Maerker  to  occupy  Bruns- 
wick, and  on  April  20  the  Majority  Socialist  government  of  that  state  re- 
sumed office.  To  maintain  democracy  in  this  hotbed  of  communism,  a  vol- 
unteer corps  was  formed.^*®  Meanwhile  the  Saxon  Spartacans,  together 
with  disgruntled  veterans  and  war- wounded,  had  murdered  the  Saxon  Min- 

'"  Berlin  Press  Rez'iew.  April  11,  1919. 

'"Berlin  Press  Review,  April  9,  1919. 

^  Berlin  Press  Review,  April  16,  1919. 

""  Berlin  Press  Review,  April  10,  1919. 

»"  Noske,  "Von  Kiel  bis  Kapp,"  128-129.    Maercker,  op.  cit.,  193-220. 

"*  Berlin  Press  Review,  April  9-20,  1919. 


lv^8  THE    GERMAN    RI^IVOLUTION 

ister  of  War.  Neuring,  on  April  12.-'*'''  Strikes  were  already  ordered  in  the 
Saxon  coal  regions,  while  at  Leipsic  the  Independents  had  actually  favored 
the  establishment  of  a  republic  of  councils.  The  Spartacans  too  had  planned 
a  general  revolt  of  the  Russian  prisoners  in  Saxon  prison  camps,  and  hoped 
to  form  a  red  guard  from  the  numerous  Bolshevists  among  these  prison- 
ers. By  proclaiming  martial  law  at  Dresden,  the  Socialist  government  was 
able  to  maintain  itself,  and  the  murderers  of  Neuring  were  promptly  dis- 
avowed by  even  the  Communists.  The  Independents,  however,  warned 
the  government  not  to  send  volunteer  troops  to  Dresden. ^'^^  Above  all,  the 
Dresden  Communists  had  acted  before  their  comrades  in  Leipsic  were  fully 
organized,  and  their  premature  rising  ruined  the  plans  for  a  general  Com- 
munist rebellion.  Once  more  Noske  sent  Maerker's  little  army  against  the 
Communists  and  Independents,  and  Leipsic  was  pacified.^^^ 

In  April  the  second  Congress  of  the  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Councils 
of  Germany  met  in  Berlin.  Four  terrible  months  had  elapsed  since  the  first 
proletarian  congress  had  summoned  the  National  Assembly,  and  the  Sparta- 
cans and  Independents  hoped  that  the  second  congress  would  denounce  the 
coalition  government  and  establish  a.  soviet  republic.^""  The  Majority  So- 
cialists, however,  had  controlled  the  elections  to  this  congress,  and  meant 
for  it  to  discuss  only  the  questions  of  shop  councils  and  the  socialization  of 
industry.  During  the  course  of  its  meetings  the  qongress  nevertheless  dis- 
cussed questions  beyond  its  competence,  such  as :  the  peace  terms,  the  state 
of  siege,  the  new  army,  and  the  Polish  problem. ^"^ 

Voicing  the  Independent  viewpoint,  Richard  Mueller  declared :  "The 
National  Assembly  has  completely  failed,  and  on  that  account  the  people 
are  enraged."  Daumig  asserted  that  the  radicalized  masses  must  establish 
the  soviet  system. ^^-  On  the  other  hand  the  Majority  Socialists  denounced 
the  Independents  for  supporting  the  Communist  uprisings  and  accused  them 
of  complicity  in  the  March  plunderings  in  Berlin. 

Concerning  the  military  policy  of  Germany,  unanimity  of  opinion  did 
not  prevail.  The  German  soldiers'  councils  favored  the  complete  demobili- 
zation of  the  old  imperial  army  and  the  establishment  of  the  Swiss  system 
of  military  service.  Many  Socialist  delegates  vigorously  assailed  the  new 
militarism.  Dr.  Steuber-Kassell,  a  reserve  lieutenant,  said:  "Does  Noske 
believe  that  with  the  aid  of  the  old  generals  he  can  remove  politics  from 

'^'Berlin  Press  Review,  April  13-14. 

^Freiheit,  April  13,  1919.    Maercker,  op.  cit..  233-260. 

^"^  Berlin  Press  Review,  May  12,  1919. 

"•Fm/t^i7,  April  8,  1919. 

*"  Berliner  Tageblatt,  April  12,  1919. 

'"  Freiheit,  A^vi\  13,  1919. 


CONSOLIDATION   OF  THE  REPUBLIC 


139 


the  army  ?    There  are  no  unpolitical  soldiers."  ^^^    After  adopting  general 
resolutions  concerning  the  problems  of  the  moment,  this  congress  adjourned.  ^ 
Its  meeting  had  been  without  important  results,  and  it  was  apparent  that  no  I 
revolutionary  group  could  count  upon  the  workmen's  and  soldiers'  councils j 
for  support. 

The  Munich  Commune 

Communism,  which  had  failed  in  its  efforts  to  establish  soviet  repub- 
lics in  North  Germany,  was  able  in  April,  1919,  to  succeed  temporarily  in 
Bavaria.  Here  the  results  of  the  January  state  election  had  convinced  the 
leaders  of  the  councils  and  the  radicals  that  the  deliverance  of  the  prole- 
tariat could  not  be  expected  from  a  democratic  republic  which  was  largely 
influenced  by  the  reactionaries  and  the  bourgeoisie.  Kurt  Eisner,  the  head 
of  the  revolutionary  government,  therefore  remained  in  office  after  the 
convocation  of  the  Bavarian  Assembly,  although  the  Independent  Socialist 
Party  was  barely  represented  in  the  constitutional  convention.  Realizing, 
however,  that  his  position  was  untenable,  he  was  about  to  give  up  his  office 
when  he  was  murdered  by  Count  Arco  on  February  21,  1919.  On  the  same 
day  his  Majority  Socialist  colleague,  Auer,  was  murdered  by  a  member  of 
the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Councils.  Mar- 
tial law  was  proclaimed  on  February  22  in  Munich ;  the  Munich  newspaper 
offices  were  closed  for  ten  days ;  the  assembly  was  placed  under  a  revolu- 
tionary guard ;  and  the  councils  assumed  for  the  moment  the  control  of  the 
provisional  government.  Nevertheless  a  new  ministry  was  soon  organized 
under  the  presidency  of  Hoffmann,  a  leader  of  the  Majority  SociaHsts. 
This  government  was  under  the  control  of  the  extremists,  and  was  forced, 
for  example,  to  undertake  under  the  direction  of  Dr.  Neurath  the  immediate 
socialization  of  the  Bavarian  newspaper  publishing  companies.^^* 

Despite  these  concessions  by  the  government,  the  opposition  of  the  Inde- 
pendents and  Socialists  increased.  Russian  agitators  appeared  on  the  scene, 
and  by  April  the  seizure  of  power  by  the  advocates  of  a  government  of 
workmen's  and  soldiers'  councils  was  imminent.  The  government  of  Hoff- 
mann was  helpless  to  prevent  the  catastrophe.^"'^  On  April  6  the  Central 
Council  of  Bavaria  proclaimed  to  the  people :  "The  decision  has  been  made. 
Bavaria  is  a  republic  of  councils.  The  working  people  are  masters  of  their 
fate.  The  revolutionary  proletariat  and  peasantry  of  Bavaria  as  well  as 
our  brother  soldiers  are  united  without  party  distinctions,  and  determined 
that  henceforth  all  exploitation  and  oppression  shall  cease  in  Bavaria.  The 
Landtag  is  dissolved.  The  councils  have  appointed  confidential  men  to 
govern  as  commissioners  of  the  people.     The  press  is  socialized.     A  red 

'«  Berliner  Tageblatt,  April  11,  1919. 

"*  Cf.  Schmitt,  "Die  Zeit  dcr  Zweiten  Revolution  in  Bayern." 

"'  Noske,  "Von  Kiel  bis  Kapp,"  134-136. 


140  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

armv  is  in  process  of  formation.  We  decline  to  cooperate  with  the  contemp- 
tible government  of  Scheidemann."  ^""  Munich  thus  passed  into  the  hands 
of  the  Communists,  and  the  movement  began  spreading  northv^ard.  Hoff- 
mann, head  of  the  republican  government,  fled  from  the  capital.  Ingol- 
stadt,  Ansbach.  Amberg.  and  Regensburg  were  among  the  first  Bavarian 
towns  to  set  up  Soviets  in  imitation  of  Munich.  A  council  republic  of  North 
Bavaria  was  formed  with  its  center  at  Nuremberg. 

The  Communists  began  their  rule  in  Munich  by  proclaiming  a  national 
holiday  and  commencing  a  campaign  of  propaganda.''''^  A  manifesto  of 
Erich  Muehsam.  published  on  April  8,  declared  that  the  new  government 
would  work  without  regard  to  the  interests  of  the  bourgeoisie  and  the  capi- 
talists; that  a  union  would  be  formed  with  Soviet  Russia  and  Hungary; 
and  that  henceforth  the  united  proletariat  had  but  one  common  enemy :  reac- 
tion, capitalism,  oppression,  and  special  privilege. ^"'^  Dr.  Tipp,  who  directed 
the  foreign  affairs  of  the  Bavarian  Republic  of  Councils,  solemnly  an- 
nounced to  the  other  commissioners  of  the  people:  "I  have  declared  war 
on  WiJrttemberg  and  Switzerland  because  these  dogs  have  not  at  once 
loaned  me  sixty  locomotives.  I  am  certain  that  we  will  conquer  them.  As 
an  additional  aid  to  victory,  I  have  asked  the  Pope,  with  whom  I  am  well 
acquainted,  for  his  blessing."  ^^®  All  publications  directed  against  the  dic- 
tatorship were  prohibited,  and  a  revolutionary  tribunal  was  appointed  to 
try  the  enemies  of  communism.  To  guard  against  the  counter  revolution, 
the  Bolshevist  Commandant,  Egelhofer,  ordered  on  April  14  the  surrender 
of  all  weapons  within  twelve  hours,  under  pain  of  death.  A  program  of 
action  for  the  immediate  success  of  the  revolution  called  for  the  seizure  of 
all  food  in  the  city  and  the  arming  of  all  proletarian  males.  Supported  by 
troops  from  the  Second  and  Third  Bavarian  Regiments  and  other  detach- 
ments of  the  Munich  garrison,  this  red  army  soon  became  a  reality.  Every 
effort  was  made  to  strengthen  this  force,  since  the  Communists  realized  that 
unless  they  could  control  the  agricultural  districts  of  Bavaria,  their  experi- 
ment in  government  would  fail.  On  Monday,  April  14,  Dr.  Levine  was 
proclaimed  head  of  the  Communist  government.*""  On  the  same  day  it  was 
overthrown  by  the  garrison,  but  restored  on  April  15.  In  order  to  provide 
funds  for  the  army,  Maenner,  the  Commissioner  of  Finance,  ordered  all 
safe  deposit  boxes  in  the  city  to  be  opened  and  the  currency  seized.  Elab- 
orate military  plans  were  made  to  defend  the  Communist  territory  of  Ba- 
varia from  the  gathering  forces  of  Hoffmann  and  Noske. 


'''Berlin  Press  Review,  April  8,  1919. 

'*'  For  a  general  account  of  the  communist  regime  see  Gerstl,  "Die  Muenchener 
Raete-Republik." 
""Ibid. 

'"  Noske,  "Von  Kiel  bis  Kapp,"  136. 
*~  Berlin  Press  Review,  April  16,  1919. 


CONSOLIDATION   OF  THE  REPUBLIC  141 

The  Communist  Commandant  of  Munich,  Egelhofer,  issued  on  April  16 
in  the  official  "Communications  of  the  Executive  Committee  of  the  Work- 
men's and  Soldier's  Councils"  the  following  proclamation:  "Proletarians 
of  all  lands  unite !  You  will  and  must  conquer !  Therefore  discipline  your- 
selves !  Choose  for  yourselves  able  leaders !  Obey  them  implicitly  but  re- 
move them  immediately  from  office  if  they  fail  in  battle !  Form  companies 
and  battalions !  Assemble  daily  at  the  designated  places  in  your  factories 
for  military  training.  These  places  should  serve  in  case  of  danger  as  your 
rallying  points,  where  you  can  receive  immediate  commands  and  instruc- 
tions. Practice  close  order  drill  daily  and  be  able  to  march  in  military  for- 
mation. March  through  the  city  in  close  formation  as  a  demonstration  of 
your  martial  strength.  Keep  your  arms  and  ammunition  and  do  not  let 
them  be  taken  from  you.  Discipline  and  proletarian  order  will  alone  save 
the  revolution  and  the  proletarian  republic  of  councils.  Long  live  the.prole- 
letariat  and  the  revolutionary  soldiers." 

Upon  the  proclamation  of  the  Bolshevist  rule  in  Munich,  Hoffmann, 
the  Minister-President  of  Bavaria,  had  retired  with  his  cabinet  to  Nurem- 
berg, which  he  proclaimed  the  seat  of  the  government  of  the  free  state  of 
Bavaria.  Unsettled  conditions  in  that  city  forced  him,  however,  to  remove 
his  government  to  Bamberg.  The  remaining  South  German  States — Baden, 
Wiirttemberg,  and  Hesse — recognized  the  Bamberg  government,  while  the 
Scheidemann  ministry  had  from  the  start  seen  the  necessity  of  suppressing 
the  Bavarian  Communists.  Only  the  danger  of  arousing  Bavarian  suscepti- 
bilities had  prevented  Noske  from  advancing  at  once  to  the  Danube  with 
Prussian  troops. 

After  a  conference  at  Weimar  between  Hoffman,  his  War  Minister, 
Schneppenhorst,  and  Noske,  Prussian  regiments  were  marched  into  Ba- 
varia. Wiirttemberg  troops  under  General  Haase  also  advanced  from  the 
western  border  and  gradually  Munich  was  surrounded  by  government 
forces.  The  towns  of  northern  Bavaria,  as  well  as  Augsburg,  were  reoccu- 
pied  and  the  local  Soviets  suppressed.*"^  The  Munich  Communists  fought 
desperately  against  the  advancing  government  forces.  Kempten,  Rosen- 
heim, and  Partenkirchen  were  the  scenes  of  heavy  fighting.  Many  Rus- 
sian prisoners  in  the  camp  at  Puchheim  joined  the  Communists.''^-  The 
Bolshevist  terrorists  were  unable,  however,  to  withstand  Noske's  Prussian 
troops,  and  on  the  night  of  May  1  Munich  was  at  last  occupied  by  govern- 
ment forces,  commanded  by  Lieutenant  General  von  Oven. 

The  brief  reign  of  terror  in  Munich  had  been  a  miserable  failure,  al- 
though Russian  methods  were  slavishly  imitated.  One  of  the  last  acts  of  the 
Communists  was  to  execute  a  number  of  hostages  at  the  Luitpold  Gymna- 


Berlin  Press  Retnew,  April  10,  12,  14,  19,  22,  1919. 
'  Berlin  Press  T<eview,  April  20-27,  1919. 


142  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

sium.  Among  those  murdered  were  Professor  S.  Berger,  Countess  Hilla 
von  Westharp,  and  a  Prince  von  Thurn  und  Taxis.*"^  Many  of  the  foreign 
intriguers  who  had  aided  in  estabhshing  the  proletarian  dictatorship  fled 
over  the  border.  The  overwhelming  majority  of  the  Bavarian  people  sup- 
ported the  Hoffmann  government,  which  at  once  set  to  work  to  restore  order 
in  the  capital. 

In  the  face  of  these  repeated  failures,  the  Spartacan  propaganda  contin- 
ued in  Germany.  Professor  Eltzbacher  wrote  in  the  Tdgliche  Rundschau: 
"Germany  should  immediately  become  communistic,  burn  all  Entente 
bridges,  and  join  forces  with  the  Russian  revolution,  which  will  purge  and 
purify  the  world."  *°*  A  typical  narrow-minded  bourgeois  asserted  that 
Spartacus  was  bound  to  rule  since  the  masses  understood  his  doctrines  as 
implying  the  right  to  plunder  the  propertied  class."'^  In  reality  the  German 
workman  was  indifferent  to  the  reasons  and  programs  of  the,  radicals,  but 
he  was  profoundly  affected  by  the  constant  reiteration  of  the  Spartacan  and 
Independent  slogan  :  "We  alone  can  save  Germany,  which  has  been  betrayed 
and  ruined  by  the  Social  Democrats  and  the  bourgeoisie." 

German  Communist  risings  had  occurred  in  the  Rhineland,  Westphalia, 
the  Hanseatic  Republics,  Thuringia,  Saxony,  and  several  industrial  centers 
of  eastern  Prussia  and  Bavaria.  Except  in  Berlin  and  Munich  they  had 
failed  to  threaten  seriously  the  coalition  government.  At  the  end  of  spring, 
1919,  the  national  interest  was  diverted  from  internal  affairs  to  the  drama  of 
Versailles.  Political  Germany  became  absorbed  in  the  great  question  of 
the  conclusion  of  peace. 


""  Berlin  Press  Review,  May  4-5,  1919. 

**"  A.  R.  A.  Bulletin,  Confidential,  No.  3. 

*"'  Gustav,  "Das  Programm  f  iir  eine  biirgerliche  Gegenrevolution." 


\ 


THE  ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  TREATY   OF  PEACE  143 


IX. 

THE  ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  PEACE. 
The  German  Attitude  Toward  Peace 

The  goal  of  the  German  armies  under  Hindenburg  and  Ludendorff  had 
been :  "The  victory  of  our  banners,  the  welfare  of  our  Fatherland,  a  peace 
worthy  of  the  sacrifices  which  our  people  had  made."*"*'  These  able  leaders 
at  least  entertained  no  delusions  concerning  the  peace  terms  which  the 
allied  and  associated  powers  would  impose  upon  a  defeated  Germany. 
Indeed  the  higher  officers  of  the  German  army  were  fully  aware  of  the 
magnitude  of  their  military  defeat  and  of  their  escape  by  the  signing  of  the 
armistice  from  a  debacle  which  would  have  made  Napoleon's  disastrous 
retreat  from  Moscow  seem  insignificant.  Having  themselves  partially 
approved  of  the  Pan-German  plans  of  conquest,  the  German  officers 
naturally  expected  that  allied  militarists  would  insist  upon  the  partition  of 
Germany.  Consequently  pessimism  and  despair  pervaded  those  who  in 
1914  had  exultingly  shouted  "Vae  VictisV  It  is  true  that  military  propa- 
gandists raised  the  cry  of  the  treason  of  the  country  toward  the  army  ;  but 
this  camouflage  deceived  no  one  but  uninformed  civilians.*"'^ 

On  the  other  hand  German  public  opinion  in  the  winter  of  1918-1919 
gave  unmistakable  evidences  of  a  lack  of  national  understanding  of  the 
real  military  and  political  situation  resulting  from  the  German  defeat. 
The  press  and  government  carefully  concealed  from  the  people  the  fact 
that  Germany  had  accepted  as  a  peace  basis  the  fourteen  points  of  President 
Wilson  zvith  the  reservations  demanded  by  France  and  England.  Conse- 
quently the  civilian  population  expected  a  peace  of  justice  based  upon  a 
debatable  interpretation  of  the  fourteen  points,  which  soon  became  in  the 
eyes  of  the  masses  the  symbol  of  Germany's  national  recovery.  Thousands 
asserted  that  the  German  nation,  undefeated  on  the  battlefield,  had  broken 
off  the  unequal  struggle  with  a  world  of  enemies  in  order  to  secure  those 
equitable  terms  of  peace,  which  America  had  generously  offered.  The 
average  German  publicist  was  profoundly  ignorant  of  the  widening  gulf, 
which  had  separated  Germany  since  1914  from  the  rest  of  the  civilized 
world,  and  he  was  also  unaware  of  the  great  moral,  political,  and  economic 
problems,  which  the  Entente,  during  the  course  of  the  world  conflict,  had 
attempted  to  solve.  On  New  Year  Day,  1919.  the  Lusitania  Medal  was 
still  publicly  displayed  in  the  Wilhelmstrasse,  almost  within  the  shadow  of 
the  former  American  Embassy. 


'  Hindenburg,  "Aus  Meinem  Leben,"  78. 
Noske,  "Von  Kiel  bis  Kapp,"  I. 


144 


THE    GERMAN    REVOLUTION 


Even  after  the  revolution  there  was  not  an  adequate  realization  by  the 
Germans  of  the  problem  of  their  war  responsibility  and  war  guilt,  which 
was  of  course  the  determining  factor  in  allied  psychology.  Pan-Germans 
boldly  asserted  that  Germany  was  not  guilty  of  having  provoked  the  world 
war.  Dietrich  Schaefer  of  Berlin  placed  the  blame  for  the  conflict  upon 
Germany's  enemies. **^^  The  revelations  of  Kurt  Eisner,  however,  stirred 
the  German  world  profoundly,  and  were  followed  by  an  announcement  of 
Kautsky's  study  of  the  documents  in  the  Berlin  Foreign  Office.  Professor 
W.  Foerster  was  among  the  first  German  intellectuals  to  take  a  definite 
stand  on  the  question  of  Germany's  guilt. '*'"'  Dr.  Alfred  Fried,  a  pacifist, 
in  his  work,  "Auf  hartem  Grund,"  asserted  that  Germany  planned  the 
world  war,  and  that  even  after  the  revolution  nothing  was  done  to  break 
with  this  old  military  tradition,  which  had  ruined  the  nation. 

The  German  peace  agitation  was  therefore  founded  upon  an  almost 
total  misconception  of  the  seriousness  of  the  international  situation. 
Neither  the  internal  nor  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Scheidemann  ministry 
gave  evidences  of  the  necessity  of  solving  such  problems  as :  militarism, 
war  guilt,  or  Germany's  relation  to  Poland  and  Russia.  A  general  con- 
fusion prevailed  at  Berlin  concerning  the  actual  conditions  under  which 
France  and  England  had  agreed  to  make  peace.  Count  Max  Montgelas 
and  Count  Bernstorff  both  denounced  any  peace  proposals  which  should 
not  be  strictly  in  accordance  with  the  fourteen  points.*^"  Kautsky  looked 
to  Wilson's  foreign  policy  as  the  only  hope  which  the  millions  of  Germans 
had  of  escaping  from  a  foreign  yoke.*^^  Meanwhile  despatches  from  Paris 
indicated  that  the  final  terms  of  peace  would  be  almost  unbearable. 

The  Question  of  German-Austria 

During  the  period  of  the  armistice  German  public  opinion  was  pro- 
foundly concerned  with  the  expected  allied  proposals  for  peace.  The  ques- 
tions of  the  war-guilty,  cessions  of  territory,  reparations,  military  occupa- 
tion, and  future  reorganization  were  freely  debated.  Among  these  many 
problems,  the  solution  of  which  were  vital  to  the  nation,  none  was  more 
widely  discussed  than  the  question  of  German  Austria.  As  early  as 
November,  1918,  the  National  Assembly  of  Austria  had  voted  in  favor  of 
an  eventual  union  with  Germany.  The  partisans  of  the  union  of  Austria 
and  Germany  raised  the  question  in  both  lands.  The  election  decree  of  the 
German  provisional  government,  issued  November  30,  1918,  provided,  in 
case  of  a  union  of  the  two  states,  for  the  admission  to  the  German  National 


'  "Die  Schuld  am  Kriege." 

'  Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  October,  1919,  117. 

'Berliner  Tageblatt,  March  30,  1919. 

'  Kautsky,  "Die  Wurzeln  der  Politik  Wilsons." 


THE  ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  PEACE  145 

Assembly  of  all  members  of  the  Austrian  parliament  who  had  been  elected 
by  universal  suffrage.*^^  From  the  extreme  left  to  the  extreme  right,  and 
irrespective  of  their  former  attitudes  toward  the  Great  German  question, 
all  German  political  parties  welcomed  the  admittance  of  Austria  as  a 
federal  state  of  the  Reich.  Government,  press,  and  publicists  advanced  the 
principle  of  self  determination  as  governing  this  case.  At  the  moment  of 
the  break-up  of  Austria-Hungary,  the  majority  of  German  Austrians 
favored  the  plan  of  joining  Germany.  To  Austrian  publicists  there  seemed 
but  three  possible  policies :  the  formation  of  a  federal  state  composed  of 
former  members  of  the  Austrian  Empire ;  the  formation  of  a  customs 
union  with  Czecho-Slovakia,  Poland  and  Jugo-Slavia ;  or  union  with  Ger- 
many."^ A  small  minority  offered  vigorous  opposition  to  the  union  of 
Austria  with  Germany,  and  demanded  that  the  red,  white,  and  red  colors 
of  the  Babenberg  dukes  should,  from  October  31,  1918,  on,  wave  over  a 
free  and  independent  Austria.*^* 

The  union  of  Austria  with  Germany  would  have  brought  about  the 
realization  of  the  Great  German  policies  of  1813  and  1848.  It  would  have 
compensated  the  Reich  for  the  loss  of  Alsace-Lorraine  and  the  German 
Polish  lands,  and  would  have  united  all  branches  of  the  German  nation  in 
one  federal  state.  Germany's  desire  to  solve  this  problem,  which  had 
existed  since  1740,  was  sincere,  and  her  statesmen  of  all  parties  believed 
that  the  revolution  at  least  would  lead  to  the  union  of  all  Germans  in  one 
commonwealth. 

The  two  able  Austrian  statesmen,  President  Seitz  and  Chancellor  Ren- 
ner,  who  directed  the  policies  of  the  Danube  Republic,  were,  however,  more 
cautious  in  their  attitude  toward  unification.  Certain  Austrian  leaders 
believed  that  a  general  agitation  for  union  with  Germany  would  result  in 
the  granting  by  the  Entente  of  more  favorable  terms  for  Austria.  All 
parties  were  agreed,  however,  that  Austria  could  not  exist  as  a  separate 
state  if  the  proposed  peace  terms  of  the  Allies  were  carried  out. 

The  German-Austrian  Minister  in  Berlin,  Dr.  Ludo  Hartmann,  declared 
in  April,  1919,  that  a  peace  conference  could  not  permanently  separate  the 
two  nations,  and  that  history  would  destroy  the  artificial  diplomatic  picture 
which  was  being  painted  at  Paris.  "The  decision,"  he  added,  "is  near  at 
hand.  Until  then,  however,  every  German  must  raise  his  voice  in  favor  of 
that  commandment  of  justice  and  of  necessity  which  is  called  Greater 
Germany. "*^° 


*"  Triepel,  "Grossdeutsch  oder  Kleindeutsch." 

*"*  Rosenfeld,  "Wilson  und  Oesterreich." 

"*  Succovaty,  "Zwei  Fragen  iiber  Deutschosterreichs  Zukunft." 

*"  Verdross,  "Deutsch  Oesterreich  in  Gross-Deutschland." 


146  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 


Peace  Plans  and  Negotiations 


Not  only  did  the  foreign  policy  of  the  Republic  envisage  the  union  with 
Austria,  but  it  also  looked  forward  to  the  restoration  of  the  lost  colonies. 
Dr.  Solf  was  the  champion  of  Germany's  right  to  recover  her  colonies,  and 
in  a  series  of  political  pamphlets  he  defended  the  former  imperial  colonial 
policy  and  advocated  the  restoration  of  at  least  a  portion  of  the  former 
African  and  Pacific  possessions  of  Germany.  The  German  Socialists  and 
Catholics  also  favored  the  maintenance  of  a  German  colonial  empire.*^® 
Germans  themselves  had  been  before  1914  the  greatest  critics  of  the  im- 
perial colonial  system.  During  the  war  and  the  period  of  the  armistice 
Germany  was  accused  of  infamous  crimes  in  the  conduct  of  its  colonial 
governments.  Although  the  Germans  made  many  blunders,  both  in  Africa 
and  in  the  Far  East,  the  results  of  their  colonization  policies  compare 
favorably  with  those  of  the  principal  European  powers.  Germany 
was  not  to  lose  her  colonies  because  of  her  failure  as  a  colonizing  power, 
but  for  economic,  political,  and  naval  reasons,  which  the  allied  and  asso- 
ciated powers  could  not  ignore. 

Above  all,  Germany  hoped  that  the  League  of  Nations  would  enable  her 
to  escape  from  the  natural  consequences  of  her  defeat  in  the  world  war. 
The  Prussia  of  Frederick  the  Great  had  produced  strangely  enough  the 
immortal  work  of  Kant  on  peace,  and  the  Prussia  of  1918  developed  with 
incredible  rapidity  a  group  of  pacifist  organizations  which  as  early  as 
December  8,  1918,  met  in  Berlin  and  pledged  the  new  republic  to  the 
League  of  Nations  and  a  peace  of  justice.  Schiicking,  Helene  Stoecker, j 
and  Elisabeth  Rotten  appealed  to  the  conscience  of  the  world  for  a  just 
peace. *^^ 

Eduard  Bernstein  then  published  an  able  work  on  the  peace  question, 
while  Minister  Erzberger  had  as  early  as  September,  1918,  issued  a 
scholarly  work  on  the  problem  of  the  League  of  Nations.  His  carefully 
prepared  bibliography  of  German  works  on  the  subject  illustrates  the 
interest  taken  even  in  imperial  Germany  in  the  project  of  a  league.*^®  The 
sudden  enthusiasm  after  the  armistice  for  the  league  of  nations  was  largely 
of  course  the  result  of  a  national  effort  to  secure  favorable  terms  of  peace. 
Notes  of  warning  were  sounded  too.  Publicists  declared  that  the  league 
would  very  probably  become  a  Trust  of  the  Victors,  which  would  endeavor 
to  rule  the  world.*^**     Prince  Maximilian  von  Baden  stated  on  February  3, 


*"  Solf,  "Germany's  Right  To  Recover  Her  Colonies."  Solf,  "Kolonialpolitik, 
Sozialdemokratie  und  Kolonien." 

*"  Schiicking,  "Durch  zum  Rechtsfrieden."  Schiicking,  "Internationale  Rechts- 
garantien." 

"'  Erzberger,  "Der  Voelkerbund." 

"»  Kuttner  in  "Das  Neue  Reich,"  Nr.  2. 


THE  ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  PEACE  147 

1919,  that  either  the  Entente  would  establish  a  world  rule,  or  it  would 
develop  a  new  universal  political  tendency  in  the  league  of  nations.*^" 

Although  Germany  had  negotiated  with  the  victorious  powers  con- 
cerning armistice  extensions,  food,  Haller's  army,  and  other  problems,  it 
was  not  until  April,  1919,  that  the  formal  invitation  was  extended  to  the 
nation  to  send  delegates  to  a  peace  conference  at  Versailles.  By  that  time 
German  public  opinion  had  become  pessimistic  of  a  final  settlement,  while 
the  allied  discussions,  telegraphed  to  Germany  week  after  week,  convinced 
the  conservative  and  liberal  classes  that  nothing  would  be  too  extravagant 
or  fantastic  for  the  Allies  to  demand  from  the  Fatherland. 

The  first  exchange  of  diplomatic  notes  resulted  in  an  awkward 
demarche  by  Germany,  and  the  American  break  with  Italy  warned  the 
nation  that  Wilson  was  having  difficulties  in  carrying  through  his  modified 
program.  Although  the  National  Assembly  passed  a  resolution  urging 
the  government  to  refuse  to  sign  a  peace  detrimental  to  the  German  people, 
the  Foreign  Office  was  well  aware  of  the  nature  of  the  terms  of  the  Allies, 
and  was  preparing  data  in  an  effort  to  secure  their  modification  at  Ver- 
sailles.*" 

As  the  time  approached  for  the  German  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
Count  Brockdorff-Rantzau,  to  depart  for  Paris,  members  of  the  National 
Assembly,  such  as  the  Centrist  Pfeiffer  as  well  as  former  annexionists, 
made  veiled  threats  of  a  future  war  of  revenge  in  case  the  peace  terms  were 
unsatisfactory.*"  The  Independents  at  once  took  up  the  gauntlet  of  the 
coalition  parties,  denounced  the  criminal  idea  of  a  war  of  revenge,  and 
advocated  the  signing  of  peace  even  if  Wilson  failed  to  carry  through  his 
program.  Here  are  the  beginnings  of  that  internal  political  strife  over 
peace,  which  was  destined  to  hamper  the  German  delegation  in  its  negotia- 
tions and  to  prevent  the  carrying  out  of  that  policy  of  passive  resistance 
upon  which  the  cabinet  of  Scheidemann  had  staked  its  existence. 

Kautsky  not  only  criticized  the  personnel  of  the  German  peace  delega- 
tion, especially  Landsberg,  but  he  also  accused  the  government  of  creating 
a  jingoistic  public  opinion,  which  was  opposed  to  signing  peace.  Harden 
wrote :  "The  men  now  in  power  refuse  to  publish  the  incriminating  docu- 
ments, hoping  that  the  Hohenzollerns  upon  their  return  will  keep  their 
places  for  them,  or  at  least  bestow  pensions  on  them." 


*^  Preussische  Jahrbilcher,  March,  1919. 

*"  Materialien  Betreffend  die  Waffenstillstandsverhandlungen,  Teil  VIII.  A.  R.  A. 
Bulletin,  Confidential,  No.  4.  The  authentic  delegation  propaganda  which  Germany 
endeavored  to  present  at  the  Peace  Conference  included  over  sixty-seven  titles.  In 
1919  the  German  Foreign  Office  also  reissued  certain  war  propaganda  works  which 
were  still  of  value  in  setting  forth  Germany's  position. 

'"/i.  R.  A.  Bulletin,  Confidential,  No.  4. 


148  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

The  author  of  J'accuse  opposed  the  plan  of  a  plebiscite  on  the  allied 
peace  terms,  and  declared  that  the  present  government  must  assume  the 
responsibility  for  their  acceptance  or  rejection  by  Germany.  Bernstein 
criticized  the  socialistic  and  pseudo-democratic  press  for  persisting  in  the 
methods  of  the  old  regime.  Breitscheid  wrote  that  the  terms  of  peace 
would  be  severe,  since  Germany  1iad  been  defeated  in  a  war  which  her 
leaders  frivolously  perpetrated,  ruthlessly  conducted,  and  recklessly  pro- 
longed until  the  complete  catastrophe.  Considering  the  past  of  politicians 
like  Scheidemann,  David,  Landsberg  and  Erzberger,  he  added  that  the 
Entente  could  not  trust  Germany.*^^ 

Reaction  to  the  Conditions  of  Peace 
On  May  8  the  terms  of  peace  of  the  allied  and  associated  powers  were 
received  in  Berlin.  Scarcely  had  the  German  press  disseminated  the  prin- 
cipal allied  demands  than  a  wave  of  protest  arose  from  the  entire  nation. 
Had  the  Allies  destroyed  Prussia,  reestablished  the  kingdoms  of  West- 
phalia and  Hannover,  and  restored  the  confederation  of  1815,  they  could 
not  have  added  to  the  crushing  efifect  of  the  peace  terms  upon  the  German 
people.  The  first  act  of  the  Berlin  government  was  to  publish  proclama- 
tions to  the  nation  and  East  Prussia  attacking  the  hard  terms,  while  thou- 
sands of  the  people  of  the  capital  gathered  before  the  headquarters  of  the 
American  Military  Mission.  For  hours  these  mobs  shouted :  "Where  are 
our  fourteen  points  ?  Where  is  Wilson's  peace  ?  Where  is  your  peace  of 
justice?"*^* 

Wurttemberg,  Baden,  and  other  States  issued  proclamations  attacking 
the  treaty.  All  political  parties  except  the  Independents  rejected  the  allied 
proposals,  and  appealed  to  their  followers  for  support.  The  directorate  of 
the  Majority  Socialists  ^sued  a  proclamation  to  the  Socialists  of  all  lands 
stating  that:  the  proposed  terms  make  the  German  workers  slaves  of 
foreign  capitalists  for  years ;  that  they  are  a  death  sentence  and  a  mockery 
of  the  fourteen  points ;  and  that  as  they  contain  the  seeds  of  new  wars  they 
will  not  establish  permanent  peace.  "Proletarians  of  all  lands,"  concluded 
the  appeal,  "unite  your  strength  in  order  to  prevent  a  peace  of  force. "*^^ 
The  German  Democratic  Party  voted  at  once  that  it  would  not  sign  the 
treaty.*-® 

From  all  Germany  protests  were  forwarded  to  the  capital.  National 
mourning  was  proclaimed  for  a  week.  Protest  meetings  were  held  in  the 
principal  cities,  while  in  Silesia  and  West  Prussia  the  population  was  in  a 
state  of  desperation. 


*^  A.  R.  A.  Bulletin,  Confidential,  No.  6. 
*"  Berliner  Tageblatt,  May  9,  1919. 
"•  Vorwaerts,  May  10,  1919. 
*^' Berlin  Press  Review,  May  11,  1919. 


THE  ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  PEACE  149 

The  National  Assembly,  which  had  hitherto  feared  to  meet  in  the  capi- 
tal, was  convened  on  Monday,  May  12,  in  special  session  in  the  New  Aula 
of  the  University  of  Berlin.  Amid  the  applause  of  all  parties  except  the 
Independent  Socialists,  Scheidemann  announced:  "The  treaty  is,  accord- 
ing- to  the  conception  of  the  national  government,  unacceptable."  Haase 
replied  that,  although  the  treaty  violated  the  principle  of  the  self  determina- 
tion of  nations  and  contained  unbearable  economic  demands,  the  German 
nation  demanded  peace.  He  added :  "The  blame  for  this  catastrophe  rests 
with  the  German  and  Hapsburg  militarists,  who,  in  the  imperialistic  over- 
heated atmosphere  of  the  summer  of  1914,  kindled  the  flames  of  the  world 
war.  All  those  also  bear  the  blame  who  supported  the  war  policy  of  the 
former  government,  who  prolonged  the  war,  and  who  even  after  the 
armistice  have  prevented  all  traces  of  the  old  regime  from  being  swept 
away.  .  .  .  The  world  revolution  will  everywhere  bring  about  the 
freeing  of  the  proletariat,  and  thus  the  emancipation  of  humanity.  It  will 
also  bring  about  the  revision  of  the  treaty  of  peace  which  is  now  forced 
upon  us." 

The  spokesmen  of  all  the  other  German  political  parties  denounced  the 
peace  terms  of  the  allied  and  associated  powers  and  refused  to  accept  them. 
Hermann  Mueller  (Breslau),  Social  Democrat,  said  in  part:  "We  must 
make  up  our  minds  that  this  peace  is  nothing  more  than  the  continuation  of 
the  war  with  other  means.  It  is  truly  a  genuine  product  of  a  half  year's 
secret  diplomacy.  Who  in  the  entire  world  will  believe  that  a  new  era  of 
international  law  will  begin  with  this  peace?  What  has  become  of  all  those 
ideals  under  which  the  associated  governments  conducted  their  crusade 
against  Kaiserism  and  Militarism  ?"  Groeber  declared  in  the  name  of  the 
Centre  Party  that  the  treaty  violated  the  fourteen  points  of  Wilson,  that  it 
was  not  a  peace  of  justice  and  that  it  destroyed  politically,  economically, 
and  culturally  one  of  the  great  nations  of  the  world.  Haussmann,  Demo- 
crat, exclaimed:  "If  our  army  and  our  workmen  had  known  on  the  fifth 
and  the  ninth  of  November  that  the  peace  would  look  like  this,  the  army 
would  not  have  laid  down  its  arms  and  all  would  have  held  out  until  the 
end."  Count  von  Posadowsky-Wehner,  Nationalist  leader  and  statesman, 
declared  without  a  word  of  apology  for  the  treaties  of  Brest-Litovsk  and 
Bucharest:  "In  the  history  of  diplomatic  records  there  is  a  notorious 
treaty,  the  so-called  Methuen  Agreement  which  England  concluded  with 
Portugal,  and  this  infamous  treaty  which  completely  destroyed  the  Portu- 
guese industry  was  regarded  heretofore  as  the  classic  example  of  brutal 
power  and  perfidy.  ...  If  these  peace  terms  are  forced  upon  us,  they 
will  become  dragons'  teeth,  sown  by  our  enemies  in  German  soil,  and  from 
these  dragons  armed  warriors  will  arise  in  the  future  who  will  restore  to 
us  our  freedom."*"     Dr.  Stresemann,  the  leader  of  the  German  People's 


*"  Berliner  Tageblatt,  May  13,  reported  that  Posadowsky-Wehner  cited  the  Mis- 
souri Compromise  as  the  classic  example  of  an  infamous  treaty. 


150 


THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 


Party,  said :  "We  are  defeated,  but  whether  or  not  we  will  be  despised  and 
will  add  to  all  our  other  losses  that  of  our  honor,  depends  alone  upon  our- 
selves." Professor  Count  zu  Dohna  of  Koenigsberg,  the  author  in  1917  of 
"Participation  of  the  Representatives  of  the  Nation  in  the  Conclusion  of 
Peace,"  declared  that  the  treaty  was  treason,  a  breach  of  pledges,  and  the 
rape  of  a  defenseless  state.  Finally  Fehrenbach,  destined  as  a  future 
premier  to  accept  this  treaty,  exclaimed:  "The  German  people,  the  most 
peaceful  folk  in  the  world,  had  no  part  in  this  war.  It  only  had  a  desire 
for  a  modest  place  in  the  sun.  It  did  not  wish  to  oppress  any  other  people 
and  only  claimed  for  itself  that  which  it  did  not  begrudge  to  others.  .  .  . 
The  blame  for  the  causes  of  the  war  rests  on  the  shoulders  of  our 
enemies.  .  .  .  Mcmorcs  cstote,  inimici,  exoriare  aligtns  ossibns  nostris 
iiltos.  .  .  .  However,  the  German  women  in  the  future  will  also  bear 
children,  and  these  children,  who  will  grow  up  in  bondage,  will  be  able  to 
double  their  fists,  to  break  their  slave  chains  and  to  absterge  the  disgrace 
which  rests  upon  Germany."*^^ 

Not  only  was  this  meeting  of  the  National  Assembly  the  most  dramatic 
in  its  career,  but  it  w^as  a  formal  commitment  of  the  government  to  the 
policy  of  rejecting  the  allied  proposals  unless  thoroughly  revised.  The 
moderate  tone  of  the  party  leaders  then  became  more  violent  in  the  national 
forum.  Reactionary  and  liberal  opinion  urged  extreme  measures,  includ- 
ing rejection  at  the  cost  of  enemy  occupation.  "Let  the  Entente  march  in 
and  occupy  Germany,"  became  the  slogan  of  wide  classes  of  permans. 
President  Wilson  was  called  a  hypocrite,  an  assassin,  an  Indian.   \ 

German  statesmen  and  publicists  united  in  denouncing  the  treaty. 
Friederich  Stampfer,  editor  of  the  Vorwacrts,  said  that  only  a  treaty 
involving  a  new  world  principle  could  be  signed  by  Germany.  Lichnowsky 
urged  its  rejection.  Erzberger  called  it  a  demoniacal  piece  of  work. 
Fehrenbach  uttered  veiled  threats  against  it.  Prince  Maximilian  opposed 
acceptance  of  the  terms.  Stresemann  urged  national  revenge  for  this 
additional  humiliation.  Protests  against  specific  provisions  of  the  treaty 
were  made.  Groeber  of  the  Centre  Party  correctly  declared  that  the 
financial  conditions  were  the  w^orst  feature  of  the  treaty.*'®  Noske  pro- 
tested against  the  delivery  to  the  Entente  of  140,000  milch  cows,  and  the 
reduction  of  the  German  army.-*'"  Before  a  great  assemblage  in  the 
Koenigsplatz,  Berlin,  Miss  May  Beveridge,  who  claimed  to  be  a  full- 
blooded  American  woman,  said:  "Only  a  just  peace  is  possible;  any  other 
peace  is  a  dishonor  to  all  mankind.  If  the  men  at  Versailles  cannot  bring 
about  this  peace,  I  must  appeal  to  the  masses  of  the  proletariat  to  bring 


'  Nationalversammhmg,  39  Sitzung,  Montag  den  12  Mai,  1919,  1081-1111. 

'Berliner  Tageblatt,  May  13,  1919. 

*  Berlin  Press  Review,  May  15,  18.  1919. 


THE  ACCEPTANCE  OF   THE  TREATY   OF   PEACE  151 

about  peace,  freedom,  and  fraternity. "*^^  Colonel  Emerson,  an  expatriated 
American,  denounced  the  treaty  and  asserted  that  Germany  had  the  right 
of  self  determination.  Finally  President  Ebert  issued  through  the  Ameri- 
can press  representatives  in  Berlin  a  direct  appeal  to  America,  as  follows : 
"The  political  demonstration  which  I  herewith  direct  through  you  to  the 
American  public  signifies  the  moral  declaration  of  war  by  the  New  Ger- 
many on  the  entire  remaining  system  of  old  international  politics." 

From  the  eighth  of  May  to  the  conclusion  of  peace  the  Berlin  populace 
demonstrated  almost  daily  before  the  American  Military  Mission  Head- 
quarters on  the  Pariser  Plats.  Neither  the  French  nor  the  British  missions 
were  disturbed  by  the  Berlin  masses,  but  the  American  mission,  owing  to 
the  spontaneous  feeling  of  the  people  as  well  as  to  the  work  of  government 
agitators,  was  continuously  molested  by  various  groups  of  demonstrators. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  Pan-Germans  incited  the  Berlin  masses  against  the 
Americans.*^^  The  chief  of  police  of  Berlin  finally  cautioned  the  citizens 
against  any  form  of  demonstration  before  the  allied  missions.  It  was  not, 
however,  until  May  thirtieth  that  the  government  showed  its  hand  when 
Noske,  who  had  allowed  the  illegal  demonstrations  against  peace  to  take 
place,  prohibited  them  for  the  future  and  ordered  a  strict  watch  kept  over 
all  meetings  indoors.*^^ 

As  early  as  May  twenty-first  the  Independent  Socialist  Party  held  a 
great  mass  meeting  in  favor  of  peace  in  the  Lustgarten.  Adolf  Hofifmann, 
Wurm,  and  Haase  addressed  the  radical  proletariat.  To  the  masses  Haase 
shouted :  "For  the  future  the  treaty  means  nothing  more  than  a  scrap  of 
paper."*^*  The  Freiheit  wrote:  "Compared  with  Brest-Litovsk,  the  terms 
are  rather  moderate."  "A  gradual  growth  of  moderate  opinion  in  France 
and  England,"  said  Kautsky,  "will  eventually  rectify  the  unjust  peace 
terms.""^ 

The  Independents  insisted  that  the  political  parties  which  had  sup- 
ported Germany's  war  policy  should  also  conclude  peace  after  a  dispas- 
sionate examination  of  the  allied  terms.  When  the  military  authorities 
seemed  to  favor  an  armed  rising  against  the  Entente,  the  Independents 
denounced  the  plan  of  the  General  Stafif  as  a  preparation  for  the  counter 
revolution.  A  bitter  press  controversy  sprang  up  between  the  Majority 
Socialists  and  the  Independents  over  the  question  of  rejecting  the  peace 
terms.  Throughout  Germany  the  Independents  supported  their  leaders. 
They  pointed  out  that  if  the  treaty  were  not  signed,  a  new  hunger  blockade 


*"^  Berlin  Press  Review,  May  16,  1919.    Berliner  Zeitimg  am  Mittag,  May  13,  1919. 
"'  Vorwaerts,  Berliner  Tageblatt,  and  Berlin  Press  Review  for  May  14,  1919. 
*"  Berlin  Press  Review,  May  31,  1919. 
"*  Berlin  Press  Review,  May  21,  1919. 
*"A.  R.  A.  Bulletin,  Confidential,  No.  7. 


152  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

would  be  proclaimed,  that  the  importation  of  raw  materials  and  the  restora- 
tion of  the  economic  life  would  be  rendered  impossible,  that  more  territory 
would  be  occupied  by  the  Allies,  and  that  the  German  prisoners  would  be 
kept  indefinitely  in  France.  The  Berlin  Congress  of  Councils  favored 
signing  the  peace.  Bernstein  wrote  :  "The  nation  must  make  an  objective 
study  of  the  allied  terms  of  peace.  These  demands,  although  they  hit 
Germany  hard,  do  not  lack  real  justification.  Germany  must  make  repara- 
tion for  much  devastation,  confiscation,  and  destruction.  Her  objections 
must  be  untainted  with  nationalism."*^" 

Not  only  the  Independents  objected  to  the  jingo  policy  of  the  govern- 
ment, but  wide  circles  of  the  bourgeoisie  also  favored  signing  the  peace. 
In  Die  IVcit  am  Monfa^^,  von  Gerlach  denounced  the  plan  of  passive  resist- 
ance. Count  Reventlow  also  warned  the  nation  against  a  policy  of  des- 
peration, and  declared  that  a  national  Bolshevist  uprising  was  inadvisable 
because  of  the  military  and  naval  strength  of  the  Allies.  The  German 
cabinet,  which  had  committed  itself  to  the  policy  of  rejection,  now  feared 
the  movement  of  non-acceptance  was  beyond  its  control  and  therefore  pro- 
posed the  plan  of  a  national  referendum.  The  coalition  parties  supported 
the  plan,  which  Bernstein  himself  said  was  feasible.  In  the  Vorwaerts, 
Stampfer  proposed  a  national  referendum  if  a  refusal  to  sign  was  agreed 
upon  by  the  government.  The  Koelnische  Zeitung  on  the  other  hand  con- 
demned the  policy  of  the  referendum,  and  stated  that  the  government  must 
assume  the  responsibility.  Harden  also  asserted  that  the  government  must 
conclude  peace  with  the  Entente,  but  he  hoped  for  a  revision  of  the  articles 
concerning:  the  Saar  valley;  the  admission  of  Germany  to  the  League  of 
Nations ;  and  German  cooperation  in  the  all-powerful  reparations  com- 
mission.*^^ 

During  the  critical  period  following  the  receipt  of  the  allied  peace 
terms,  the  government  and  the  three  Socialist  parties  were  in  close  touch 
with  Russia.  An  armed  Bolshevist  rising  was  one  of  the  possibilities  of 
escape  from  the  terms  of  Versailles,  which  was  carefully  studied  by  Ger- 
many. In  the  National  Assembly  threats  of  universal  revolution  were 
uttered,  and  the  peace  committee  voted  to  resume  friendly  relations  with 
Soviet  Russia.*^* 

For  their  part,  the  soviet  leaders  prepared  to  join  hands  with  a  Bol- 
shevist Germany  which  would  defy  the  Entente.*^^  Chicherin,  commissary 
for  foreign  affairs,  issued  a  proclamation  condemning  the  treaty  and 
expressing  Russia's  sympathy  with  the  enslaved  German  proletariat.     The 


'A.  R.  A.  Bulletin,  Confidential,  No.  8. 
A.  R.  A.  Bulletin,  Confidential,  No.  9. 
^  A.  R.  A.  Bulletin,  Confidential,  No.  7. 
'  Erhart,  "Dieser  Friede  Wird  Kein  Brest-Litovsk." 


THE  ACCEPTANCE  OF   THE  TREATY   OF   PEACE  153 

Isvestia  called  the  treaty  the  most  cruel  one  ever  dictated  by  imperialistic 
rapacity  and  hatred.**"  These  Bolshevist  advances  were,  however,  unsuc- 
cessful, since  the  heart  of  the  German  scheme  for  escape  was  passive  and 
not  active  resistance  to  the  Entente. 

Within  a  few  days  after  the  German  courier  reached  Berlin  with  the 
copy  of  the  allied  proposals  for  peace,  the  press  department  of  the  German 
Admiralty  had  phototyped  and  distributed  thousands  of  reproductions  of 
the  full  text  to  German  officials.  The  German  Union  for  a  League  of 
Nations  also  reproduced  the  text.  Germany  was  thus  flooded  with  full 
information  concerning  the  allied  demands.  It  was  this  wide  publicity  and 
the  general  despair  of  official,  business,  and  intellectual  classes  which 
accounted  for  the  momentary  acceptance  of  the  policy  of  passive  resistance 
by  the  nation.  Delbrueck  wrote  in  May  in  the  Preussische  Jahrbuecher: 
"Purposeless  is  every  appeal  to  humanity,  but  also  every  reference  to  the 
vitality  of  our  nation.  We  are  disarmed,  starved,  dead,  sick,  and  power- 
less ;  besides  we  are  fighting  among  ourselves  and  strike  when  we  should 
work.  A  peace  which  takes  away  territory  inhabited  by  Germans,  which 
makes  Germans  the  serfs  of  the  victors,  a  peace  which  annexes  German 
Alsatians  and  deprives  Germany  of  colonies,  would  not  be  permanent  even 
if  Germany  would  sign  it,  because  it  is  unnatural.  The  government  which 
signed  a  peace  of  force  would  be  overthrown  by  the  revolutionary  ele- 
ments, and  Bolshevism  would  be  established  in  Germany."**^ 

While  advocating  non-acceptance  of  the  treaty,  the  cabinet,  the  peace 
committee  of  the  National  Assembly,  and  the  peace  delegation  worked  with 
extreme  rapidity  and  efficiency  in  preparing  the  counter  proposals  which 
were  to  be  made  to  the  Entente.  After  a  conference  at  Spa  between 
Brockdorff-Rantzau  and  Scheidemann,  Dernburg,  and  Erzberger,  the  Ger- 
man counter  proposals  were  submitted  to  the  Allies  on  May  28,  and 
immediately  afterward  published  in  Germany.  Public  opinion  regarded 
these  as  the  utmost  limit  of  concessions,  but  the  press,  with  few  exceptions, 
supported  them.  The  Deutsche  Tagcszcitung  attacked  the  financial  con- 
cessions, while  the  Taegliche  Rundschau  held  the  counter  proposals  to  be 
as  unacceptable  as  the  original  demands  of  the  Entente.  The  Frankfurter 
Zeitung  stated  that  the  federal  government  and  the  several  states  had 
agreed  upon  a  common  attitude  in  case  peace  was  not  signed.  The  Vor- 
waerts  advocated  the  rejection  of  the  treaty  unless  the  original  terms  were 
modified.**^ 

The  government  now  fully  realized  that  the  attitude  of  the  Independ- 
ents was  ruining  their  peace  policy.     Consequently  they  naively  sought  to 

**\A^R.  A.  Bulletin,  Confidential,  No.  8. 
***  Preussische  Jahrbiichcr,  May,  1919. 
**'A.  R.  A.  Bulletin,  Confidential,  No.  10. 


154  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

influence  allied  and  neutral  opinion  by  using  the  Wolff  Telegraph  Bureau 
for  propaganda  purposes.  The  Allies  were,  notwithstanding,  well  aware 
of  the  plans  of  the  Independents  and  of  the  real  internal  situation. 
Although  Haase  had  asserted  in  May  that  the  Independents  would  not  take 
over  the  government,  sign  the  treaty,  and  then  be  chased  away  by  Noske's 
guards,  he  announced  nevertheless  in  June  that  if  the  Allies  advanced  into 
Germany  the  Independents  would  form  a  government  and  sign  the 
treaty."^  The  Independents  now  demanded  the  publication  of  all  official 
documents  on  German  war  guilt  and  the  trial  of  the  guilty  persons  by  a 
German  court.*^*  The  Freiheit  stated  that  a  refusal  to  sign  the  peace 
terms  would  mean  the  dismemberment,  dissolution,  and  devastation  of 
Germany. 

Meanwhile  the  campaign  for  the  rejection  of  the  treaty  continued  in 
Germany.**^  Although  the  radical  press  accused  the  reactionaries  of  wel- 
coming an  Entente  invasion,  the  principal  newspapers  of  the  country  urged 
a  policy  of  passive  resistance.  In  the  Tageblatt,  Minister  Dernburg  urged 
the  rejection  of  the  treaty.  In  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung,  Professor  Quidde 
advocated  a  policy  of  passive  resistance,  declaring  that  Germany  should 
sign  nothing,  pay  nothing,  deliver  nothing,  and  declare  a  general  strike. 
Finally  Count  Reventlow,  in  the  Tagcsseitnng,  proposed  the  rejection  of 
the  treaty. 

It  was  the  policy  of  the  government  to  suppress  all  agitation  for  the 
acceptance  of  the  terms  of  the  Allies,  but  the  Independent  campaign  made 
this  an  impossibility.  Ebert  informed  the  nation,  through  the  Deutsche 
Allgemeine  Zeitung,  that  peace  could  only  be  signed  by  the  National 
Assembly  and  the  House  of  States,  and  that  both  bodies  supported  the 
government's  policy  of  rejecting  the  original  allied  terms.  Brockdorfif- 
Rantzau  said  that  unless  the  terms  were  modified,  they  should  be  refused, 
making  it  incumbent  on  the  Allies  to  govern  Germany.**® 

It  was  not  until  June  17  that  the  final  demands  of  the  Allies  were  known 
throughout  Germany.  Certain  important  modifications  of  the  original 
proposals  were  made,  but  the  mantle  note  with  which  these  were  presented 
to  the  German  peace  delegation  left  no  doubt  in  German  minds  concerning 
the  temper  of  the  allied  and  associated  powers.  Summing  up  all  the 
charges  which  the  Allies  had  brought  against  imperial  Germany  since  1914, 
this  mantle  note  was  a  moral  declaration  of  war  against  a  civilization 
which  had  condoned  the  Belgian  atrocities,  the  aerial  bombardment  of  open 
cities ;   and  unrestricted  submarine  warfare. 


**' Freiheit,  June  16,  1919. 
***  A.  R.  A.  Bulletin,  Confidential,  No.  10. 

"*  Helfferich,  "Die  Friedensbedingungen,"  is  an  important  study  of  the  conditions 
of  peace  which  influenced  public  opinion. 

"*A.  R.  A.  Bulletin,  Confidential,  No.  11;  A.  R.  A.  Bulletin,  No.  16. 


THE  ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  PEACE 


155 


The  effective  answer  of  the  Allies  to  the  German  plan  of  passive  resist- 
ance was  made  in  the  decision  to  reestablish  the  blockade  in  case  Germany- 
refused  to  accept  the  terms  of  peace.  At  the  seventeenth  of  May  meeting 
of  the  Supreme  Economic  Council  there  was  a  complete  discussion  of  all 
measures  which  should  be  undertaken  if  it  became  necessary  to  reimpose 
the  blockade  upon  Germany.  At  the  same  time  the  American  Relief 
Administration  continued  the  shipment  of  food  to  Hamburg-,  although  it 
was  uncertain  whether  or  not  Germany  would  sign  the  peace  treaty.  "For 
four  years  the  German  authorities  officially  stated  that  the  blockade  was  a 
failure  and  that  the  food  supply  of  the  German  people  was  satisfactory."*^^ 
During  the  peace  negotiations  the  German  government  suddenly  main- 
tained that  the  allied  blockade  had  caused  the  death  of  eight  hundred  thou- 
sand German  civilians.  Although  this  official  report  was  obviously  an 
exaggeration  and  did  not  take  into  account  the  character  of  war  work,  the 
scarcity  of  fuel,  the  lack  of  sufficient  clothing,  and  the  reduction  of  the 
medical  profession,  there  is  no  doubt  that  in  the  spring  of  1919  Germany 
would  have  been  starved  to  death  by  a  new  allied  blockade. 

Acceptance  of  the  Allied  Ultimatum 

The  climax  of  the  peace  drama  occurred  not  in  the  Gallery  of  Mirrors 
at  Versailles  but  in  the  Theater  of  Weimar.  Brockdorff-Rantzau  returned 
to  Weimar  from  Paris  with  the  final  demands  of  the  Entente,  and  the 
Scheidemann  cabinet,  which  had  staked  its  existence  upon  the  securing  of 
fundamental  concessions  from  the  Allies,  was  now  face  to  face  with  the 
failure  of  its  peace  policy.  A  conference  of  the  majority  parties  indorsed 
the  chauvinistic  stand  of  the  cabinet,  but  it  could  not  escape  from  the  fact 
that  the  German  people  demanded  peace.  Negotiations  by  the  cabinet 
with  the  parties  were  commenced,  but  an  acceptable  peace  formula  could 
not  be  agreed  upon.  In  Berlin,  three  reactionary  papers,  Krens  Zeitung, 
Lokal  Anseiger,  and  Tac^liche  Rundchau,  and  the  Socialist  Vorzvaerts  and 
Democratic  Tagchlatt  all  united  in  demanding  the  rejection  of  the  treaty. 
On  the  other  hand  the  Vossische  Zeitung  declared :  "Signing  means  at 
least  that  the  realm  can  be  kept  together;  rejection  means  disintegration 
and  terror  without  end.  This  is  not  the  time  for  placing  hopes  in  the 
miracle  of  foreign  help." 

The  Independent  Socialist  Party  led  the  fight  in  the  assembly  for  the 
acceptance  of  the  allied  terms.  Opposed  vigorously  by  the  Democrats, 
German  Nationalists,  and  the  Liberals,  they  were,  however,  able  to  weaken 
the  opposition  of  Majority  Socialists  and  Centrists  to  peace.  By  accusing 
the  conservatives  of  planning  a  counter  revolution,  they  gained  additional 

"'  Dr.  Alonzo  E.  Taylor,  "A  New  Sample  of  German  Psychology"  in  A.  R.  A. 
Bulletin,  No.  10. 


156  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

proletarian  support.     Shortly  after  one  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  June  20 
the  Scheidemann  cabinet  resigned.*** 

The  strength  of  the  opposition,  as  had  been  apparent  for  some  time, 
shattered  the  policy  of  rejection  which  Scheidemann  in  a  spirit  of  adventure 
had  advocated  to  the  last.  Neither  the  extreme  right  nor  the  extreme  left 
were  in  a  position  to  take  over  the  government,  and  a  new  ministry  was 
formed  without  the  Democrats  by  the  Socialists  and  Catholics.  Thus  the 
two  political  parties  which  in  the  old  days  used  to  be  called  the  enemies  of 
the  empire,  assumed  control  of  Germany.**^  The  program  of  the  new 
cabinet  remained  the  same  as  that  of  the  Scheidemann  government.  The 
appointments  to  office  in  the  ministry  were : 

Minister  President Bauer 

Foreign  Affairs Hermann  Miiller 

Interior Dr.  David 

Finance .Erzberger 

Treasury , Dr.  Mayer 

Economics Wissell 

Food Schmidt 

National  Defense Noske 

Posts Giesberts 

Communications  and  Colonies Dr.  Bell*^° 

The  work  of  the  government  and  National  Assembly  at  Weimar  was 
concealed  by  an  enormous  amount  of  camouflage  which  deceived  the  Ger- 
man people  concerning  the  serious  situation  into  which  the  Scheidemann 
cabinet  had  plunged  the  country.  At  no  period  had  the  cabinet  been  able 
to  command  the  undivided  support  of  even  the  three  coalition  parties.  At 
Weimar,  the  South  German  States  had  counselled  acceptance  of  the  terms 
of  peace,  while  the  Rhine  territories,  face  to  face  with  invasion  or  con- 
tinued occupation,  denounced  the  policy  of  passive  resistance.  The  minis- 
ters of  food  and  of  economics  both  rendered  reports  advocating  the  signing 
of  peace  and  the  majority  of  the  commanding  generals  urged  the  accept- 
ance of  the  terms  of  the  Entente. *^^ 

On  the  afternoon  of  Sunday,  June  twenty-second,  the  new  Minister- 
President,  Bauer,  announced  to  the  National  Assembly :  "In  the  name  of 
the  government  of  the  Reich,  I  declare  therefore  that,  in  consideration  of 
all  existing  circumstances  and  on  the  condition  of  ratification  by  the 
National  Assembly,  we  will  sign  the  treaty  of  peace.     .     .     .     We  will 

**'A.  R.  A.  Bulletin,  Confidential,  No.    13;  Berliner   Tagebktt,  June  26,   1919. 
***  Preussische  JahrbUcher,  August,  1919,  298. 
*'^  Nationalversammlung,  40  Sitzung.     Sonntag  den  22  Juni,  1919. 
"'  Scheidemann,  "Der  Zusammenbruch,"  243-251,  contains  that  minister's  defense 
of  his  policy,  as  well  as  Erzberger's  memorandum  in  favor  of  signing  the  treaty. 


THE  ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  TREATY  OF  PEACE  157 

authorize  the  signing  of  the  treaty  in  the  following  form :  The  government 
of  the  German  Republic  is  ready  to  sign  the  treaty  of  peace  without  never- 
theless recognizing  thereby  that  the  German  people  were  the  authors  of 
the  war  and  without  assuming  any  responsibility  according  to  Articles  227 
to  230  of  the  treaty  of  peace."  The  motion  of  Schulz-Groeber :  "The 
National  Assembly  is  in  accord  with  the  signing  of  the  treaty  of  peace," 
was  then  debated  by  the  party  leaders.  It  finally  carried  by  a  vote  of  237 
to  138,  with  five  deputies  not  voting.  A  resolution  of  confidence  in  the 
government  was  then  adopted  by  a  vote  of  235  to  89,  with  69  deputies  not 
voting. 

Thereupon  the  Bauer  government  sent  a  note  to  the  Entente  offering  to 
sign  the  treaty  of  peace  with  reservations  concerning  German  responsibility 
for  the  war  and  the  surrender  of  those  accused  of  violations  of  the  rules  of 
land  and  naval  warfare.  This  offer  was  promptly  rejected  by  the  Allies, 
who  stated  that  the  treaty  must  be  accepted  in  its  entirety  or  rejected. 
General  Maercker  now  called  upon  Noske  to  proclaim  himself  Dictator  of 
Germany  and  reject  the  treaty.  The  National  Assembly  was,  however, 
again  convened  on  Monday  afternoon,  June  23,  and  at  last  the  government 
proposed  the  unconditional  acceptance  of  the  treaty.  Bauer  said  in  part : 
"Only  a  period  of  four  short  hours  separates  us  now  from  the  recommence- 
ment of  hostilities.  We  could  not  be  responsible  for  a  new  war  even  if  we 
had  arms.  We  are  defenseless."  A  motion  authorizing  the  government 
to  sign  the  treaty  was  then  carried  by  a  rising  vote,  which  the  President 
announced  to  be  the  large  majority  of  the  Assembly.  The  great  German 
peace  offensive  was  over  and  there  remained  only  the  formalities  of  notifi- 
cation, signing,  and  ratification.  A  proclamation  to  the  German  army 
stated :  "In  the  hour  of  deepest  misfortune  for  the  Fatherland,  the  German 
National  Assembly  thanks  the  German  military  forces  for  their  self- 
sacrificing  defense  of  their  country."*"^ 

The  mantle  note  with  the  final  terms  of  the  Allies  had  repeated  all  the 
accusations  made  against  the  Germans  since  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  but 
the  people,  whom  it  forced  into  submission,  were  not  the  warlike  Teutons 
of  the  national  rising  of  1914,  but  a  war-weary  and  half-starved  nation, 
which  was  torn  by  conflicting  class  struggles  and  state  interests.  Internal 
unity  had  become  practically  non-existent.  While  the  South  German 
States  threatened  the  national  government  with  a  separate  peace,  the  idea 
of  the  Rhine  Confederation  appeared  again  in  German  history.  Georg 
Bernhard,  von  Gerlach,  Harden,  Bernstein,  and  the  Independents  led  the 
attack  which  forced  the  government  and  majority  parties  to  accept  the 
peace  terms  of  the  Allies. *°^ 


'  Nationalversammlung,  41  Sitzung,  1139-1142.    Maercker,  op.  cit.,  289. 
'  Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  July  19,  142. 


158  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

The  oppressive  conditions  of  the  peace  imposed  upon  the  German 
Republic  in  1919  are  unparalleled  in  European  history.  They  are  in  a 
large  measure  the  cause  of  that  unrest  in  Central  Europe  which  followed 
the  armistice.  Their  revision  is  demanded  not  only  by  the  necessity  of 
maintaining  normal  economic  and  political  conditions  in  Central  Europe, 
but  also  by  the  dictates  of  humanity.  The  verdict  of  the  allied  world  that 
Germany  should  make  restorations,  reparations,  and  guarantees  for  the 
damage  done  to  France  and  Belgium,  is  just.  Nevertheless  the  peace 
treaty  goes  far  beyond  this  and  practically  enslaves  the  German  people. 
Summing  up  the  German  view  Hermann  Oncken  writes :  "The  peace  of 
Versailles  has  for  the  German  nation  only  one  single  content:  oppression, 
pillage,  death."  '*^* 


*"  Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  March,  1920,  359.  Oncken's  "Weltgeschichte  und 
Versailler  Friede"  is  an  able  and  extensive  discussion  of  the  consequences  of  the 
peace. 


THE  ADOPTION  OF  THE  REPUBLICAN   CONSTITUTION  159 


X. 

THE  ADOPTION  OF  THE  REPUBLICAN  CONSTITUTION 
The  Provisional  Constitution 

The  constitutional  history  of  the  German  revolution  is  that  of  the  transi- 
tion from  imperial  to  republican  government.  Revolutionary  as  are  the 
changes  in  the  new  constitution,  it  altered  neither  the  social  relations  of  the 
people,  nor  the  federal  character  of  the  Reich.  As  the  most  recent  interpre- 
tation of  republican  government  by  a  great  people,  the  underlying  philos- 
ophy of  the  constitution  of  1919  is,  however,  of  interest  to  the  democracies 
of  the  world. 

The  agitation  for  constitutional  reform  antedated  the  revolution,  and 
was  a  result  of  the  democratic  movement  in  Germany,  which,  in  the  course 
of  the  struggle  with  the  western  democracies,  gained  the  support  of  the 
majority  of  the  armies  and  the  people  of  the  empire.  When  Prince  Maxi- 
milian attempted  to  found  a  Hberal  empire  in  October,  1918,  he  made  con- 
stitutional reform  one  of  his  fundamental  policies.  His  last  official  act  was 
to  announce  the  Kaiser's  abdication  and  the  convening  of  a  constitutional 
convention.  A  decree  of  the  revolutionary  council  of  the  people's  commis- 
sioners, which  was  issued  on  November  12,  1918,  informed  the  German 
people  that  elections  would  soon  be  held  for  a  constitutional  assembly.  In 
the  face  of  the  universal  demand  for  a  constitutional  convention,  the  Inde- 
pendent Socialist  leaders  in  the  provisional  revolutionary  government  were 
forced  to  abandon  their  policy 'of  postponing  the  reorganization  of  the  fun- 
damental laws  of  Germany. 

On  November  30,  1918,  the  Council  of  the  People's  Commissioners 
issued  a  decree  announcing  the  date  of  the  elections  as  February  16,  1919, 
and  establishing  the  electoral  regulations  for  the  same.  The  decree  was 
countersigned  by  Dr.  Preuss,  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Interior,  who  was 
already  preparing  the  draft  of  a  provisional  constitution.  Among  the  im- 
portant provisions  of  this  electoral  law  were  the  following: 

"The  members  of  the  constitutional  German  convention  will  be  elected  in 
universal,  direct,  and  secret  elections,  according  to  the  principles  of  propor- 
tional representation. 

"Entitled  to  vote  are  all  German  men  and  women  who  on  election  day 
are  twenty  years  of  age,  i.  e.,  born  before  January  19,  1899.  .  .  .  Soldiers 
are  entitled  to  vote  and  take  part  in  political  meetings.  .  .  .  One  deputy 
is  to  be  elected  for  approximately  every  one  hundred  fifty  thousand  inhab- 
itants in  each  electoral  district.     Registration  lists  are  to  be  drawn  up  in 


160  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

each  district  and  the  right  to  vote  exercised  only  in  the  district  where  the 
citizen  is  registered."  "'^ 

At  the  third  session  of  the  National  Assembly  on  Feburary  8  Dr.  Preuss 
in  presenting  the  draft  of  a  provisional  constitution  said :  "  'We  shall  create 
a  constitution  for  Germany,  for  the  entire  people.  The  calling  and  the  au- 
thorization for  this  creative  work  are  found  in  the  sovereignty  of  the  nation. 
Germany  will  be  one:  one  realm,  ruled  by  the  will  of  its  people  with  the 
cooperation  of  all  of  its  parts  ;-it  also  lies  with  this  assembly  as  a  part  of  its 
mission  to  bring  about  this  cooperation  of  the  state  governments.  Although 
doubts  exist  about  many  questions,  there  is  no  doubt  about  the  demand  for 
national  unity ;  it  is  the  demand  of  the  entire  nation.  It  wishes  unity,  it  will 
have  unity.'  With  these  words  Heinrich  von  Gagern  once  greeted  the  first 
constitutional  national  convention  of  the  German  people  in  Saint  Paul's 
Church  at  Frankfort.  ...  At  that  time  the  work  of  the  Frankfort  Na- 
tional Assembly  was  wrecked  largely  by  the  resistance  of  the  dynastic 
powers  in  Germany.  Any  such  resistance  has  been  effaced  today  by  the 
revolution."  After  explaining  the  important  provisions  of  the  provisional 
constitution,  Dr.  Preuss  asked  the  assembly  to  adopt  the  act  in  order  to 
create  a  power  which  could  act  with  legal  authority  at  home  and  abroad. 

In  the  first  great  constitutional  debate  which  occurred  on  February  10, 
the  leaders  of  the  majority  parties  supported  this  provisional  measure.    Dr. 
von  Pregar,  the  Bavarian  Minister,  declared  in  the  name  of  the  govern- 
ments of  Bavaria,  Wiirttemberg,  and  Baden  that  this  act  was  not  to  be 
regarded  as  a  final  settlement  of  the  question  of  state  rights.    Dr.  von  Del- 
briick,  as  the  spokesman  of  the  German  Nationalists,  declared :  "We  believe 
that  the  credit  of  the  future  government  with  the  hostile  foreign  states  would 
be  considerably  increased  if  this  act  is  not  only  quickly  but  also  if  possible 
unanimously  adopted."    The  Independents  attempted  to  amend  the  meas- 
ure.    They  attacked  the  provision  which  maintained  secret  diplomacy  and 
objected  to  the  absence  from  the  text  of  the  words  "revolution"  and  "repub- 
lic".    They  even  attempted  to  bestow  upon  the  Central  Council  of  the 
Workmen's  and  Soldier's  Councils  the  right  to  review  the  work  of  the 
National  Assembly.     Especially  bitter  were  the   Independent  attacks  on 
Article  4  of  the  Act,  which  provided  that  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  sev- 
eral states  could  not  be  altered  save  with  their  consent.    After  a  protracted 
debate  the  provisional  constitution  was  finally  adopted  by  the  great  majority 
of  the  Assembly,  which  then  unanimously  authorized  the  President  of  the 
Assembly,  Dr.  Eduard  David,  to  sign  the  new  fundamental  law  of  the 
republic. *^^ 

*"  Von  Volkmann  und  Boettger,  "Revolutions— Bibliothek,  Band  II :    Die  Wahl- 
ordnung  des  Rates  der  Volksbeauftragten." 

*^  Nationalversammlung,  4  Sitzung.  Montag  den  10  Februar,  1919,  17-36. 


THE  ADOPTION  OF  THE  REPUBLICAN   CONSTITUTION  161 

The  important  provisions  of  the  temporary  constitution  were :  The  Na- 
tional Assembly  should  draw  up  the  permanent  constitution  and  other  urgent 
laws  for  the  Reich,  which  should  require,  however,  the  consent  of  a  Com- 
mittee of  the  States.  This  committee  should  consist  of  representatives  of 
those  German  state  governments  which  possess  democratic  constitutions. 
Each  state  should  have  one  representative,  and  the  larger  states  one  for 
every  million  inhabitants.  Thus  Prussia  should  have  nineteen  votes  out  of 
a  total  of  fifty-eight.  In  case  of  a  conflict  between  the  National  Assembly 
and  the  Committee  of  the  States,  the  Provisional  President  of  the  Reich 
should  have  power  to  refer  the  question  to  a  vote  of  the  people.  The  Presi- 
dent should  be  elected  by  the  Assembly  and  should  hold  office  until  his  suc- 
cessor should  be  chosen  under  the  provisions  of  the  permanent  constitution. 
He  should  be  the  chief  executive  of  the  nation  and  should  appoint  a  minis- 
try, responsible  to  the  Assembly,  which  should  conduct  the  national  govern- 
ment. The  provisional  government  of  the  council  of  the  people's  commis- 
sioners was  thus  superceded  by  a  cabinet  government,  which  enjoyed  the 
confidence  of  the  majority  parties  of  the  constitutional  convention. *^^ 

Constitutional  Problems 

After  the  adoption  of  the  provisional  national  constitution,  the  several 
states  of  Germany  drew  up  fundamental  laws,  which  established  democratic 
frames  of  government.  In  many  states  the  form  of  government,  with  the 
exception  of  the  monarchical  powers,  was  little  altered  by  the  revolution, 
and  all  the  states  maintained  their  former  administrative  systems.  Even 
after  the  flight  of  the  dynasties  and  the  revolution,  the  dififerences  between 
states  and  the  conflicting  theories  of  state  rights  continued  to  influence  the 
political  situation.  As  in  1848,  the  German  states  in  1919  prevented  the 
political  unification  of  the  German  people.  Only  in  Prussia  was  there  a 
strong  movement  toward  disunity. 

The  attempt  to  divide  the  former  Prussian  kingdom  is  of  tremendous 
importance  to  the  constitutional  history  of  the  German  revolution.  Had 
it  succeeded  the  democratic  Germany  of  the  future  would  have  developed 
without  the  conservative  traditions  of  the  Prussia  of  Bismarck  and  Moltke. 
After  the  November  revolution  a  considerable  body  of  Rhenish  Prussian 
Catholics,  and  a  stronger  group  of  particularists  in  the  Rhineland,  wished  to 
destroy  that  Prussian  unity  which  had  been  welded  by  the  Ilohenzollerns 
in  the  fires  of  two  centuries  of  warfare.  This  movement  was  everywhere 
aided  by  the  French  army  of  occupation. ^°**     "Los  von  Berlin"  became  a 


"'  Ibid. 

*"*  Schulte,  "Frankreich  und  das  linke  Rhcinufcr,"  is  an  excellent  study  of  French 
plans  of  expansion  and  contains,  p.  356,  a  prophetic  summary  of  French  imperialistic 
aims.  General  Mangin,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  French  Army  of  Occupation, 
planned  in  1919  a  revolution  to  establish  a  Rhineland  Republic.  In  the  proclamations 
issued.  Dr.  Dorten  of  Wiesbaden  was  announced  as  the  President  of  the  Rhineland 
Republic.     This  movement,  however,  was  a  failure. 


162  THE    GERAIAN    RriVOLUTION 

popular  cry  from  the  Belgian  border  to  the  Elbe.  Bismarck  had  believed 
that  only  the  Hohenzollern  dynasty  held  such  different  cities  as  Cologne 
and  Koenigsberg  in  one  state,  and  many  Germans  now  thought  that  reli- 
gious, political,  and  economic  differences  would  result  in  the  division  of 
Bismarck's  kingdom  of  blood  and  iron.''^^  The  astonishing  fact  was,  how- 
ever, that  the  majority  of  the  people  in  every  Prussian  province  were  deter- 
mined to  maintain  the  unity  of  the  Prussian  state.  Was  it  not  Prussian 
efficiency  which  had  caused  the  political,  cultural,  and  economic  develop- 
ment of  the  Reich F  Was  it  not  Prussianism,  with  its  power  of  organiza- 
tion, which  had  alarmed  all  the  powers  of  Europe  and  created  that  national 
army  which,  for  the  first  time  since  the  days  of  Napoleon,  had  sought  to 
master  the  European  continent?  The  revolutionists  who  planned  to  parti- 
tion Prussia  were  blind  to  the  patriotism  of  conservatives,  liberals,  and  even 
the  Prussian  democrats  and  socialists. 

Notwithstanding  these  facts,  the  question  of  the  partition  of  Prussia  was 
agitated  for  months  before  it  became  apparent  that  the  old  militaristic  state 
would  retain  its  former  boundaries.  Delbriick  asserted  that  the  internal 
necessity  for  the  continuation  of  Prussia  did  not  exist,  although  he  recog- 
nized that  the  people  were  opposed  to  the  absorption  of  Prussia  in  a  unified 
state.-**^"  Jacobi  acknowledged  the  necessity  of  destroying  the  Prussian 
heo-emony  in  Germany,  yet  he  favored  the  maintenance  of  a  federal  state. 
Oddly  enough,  he  admitted  the  truth  of  an  allied  accusation  against  Germany 
in  stating:  "Until  1918,  the  empire  was  indeed  fundamentally  nothing  more 
than  an  extended  Prussia."  *"  Professor  Binding  also  declared  that  while 
the  competition  between  the  Reich  and  Prussia  must  cease,  the  federal  state 
should  be  the  goal  of  the  constitution  makers.**^-  The  result  of  this  agita- 
tion, which  was  carried  on  by  thousands  of  Prussian  leaders,  was  that  all 
hopes  of  dividing  Prussia  failed.  Prussia  remained  with  her  old  Bismarck- 
ian  internal  boundaries.''*'^ 

It  required  a  half  year's  work  by  the  National  Assembly  before  the 
draft  of  the  permanent  constitution  was  completed.  Committees  of  the 
convention,  the  committee  of  the  states,  the  political  parties,  and  the  national 
government  all  discussed  the  innumerable  projects  and  compromises.  In 
general  a  Democratic-Social  Democratic  line  of  development  was  followed 
by  the  constitution  makers.  In  order  to  preserve  internal  peace  impor- 
tant concessions  were  made  to  the  Catholics  in  the  school  and  religious  ques- 
tions.    The  preamble  of   the  constitution  reads:   "The   German   People, 

*"  Rachfahl,  "Preussen  und  Deutschland,"  43. 

*^  Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  January,  1919,  131-135. 

*"  Jacobi,  "Einheitsstaat  oder  Bundesstaat,"  36. 

**-  Binding,  "Die  Staatsrechtliche  Verwandlung  des  Deutschen  Reichs." 

^"Huebner,  "Was  Verlangt  Deutschlands  Zukunft  v.  d.  Neuen  Reichsverfassung?" 


THE  ADOPTION  OF  THE  REPUBLICAN   CONSTITUTION  163 

united  in  all  their  parts,  and  inspired  by  the  will,  to  renew  and  strengthen 
their  Reich  in  freedom  and  justice,  to  maintain  peace  at  home  and  abroad 
and  to  promote  social  progress,  have  adopted  this  constitution."  The  First 
Principal  Part  of  the  constitution  deals  with  the  following  subjects:  the 
National  Government  and  States;  the  Reichstag;  the  National  President 
and  National  Government;  the  National  Council;  National  Legislation; 
National  Administration;  and  Administration  of  Justice.  The  Second 
Principal  Part,  entitled  Fundamental  Rights  and  Duties  of  Germans,  con- 
tains: The  Rights  of  the  Individual;  Community  Life;  Religion  and  Reli- 
gious Societies;  Education  and  Schools;  Economic  Life;  and  Transitional 
and  Final  Provisions. 

The  Economic  Council  System 

Throughout  the  document  the  influences  of  the  former  imperial  consti- 
tution are  visible.  Indeed  many  of  the  provisions  are  copied  in  a  general 
way  from  the  great  constitutional  work  of  Bismarck,  and  several  articles 
are  taken  bodily  from  it.  However,  the  new  constitution  introduces  several 
new  and  important  provisions  to  the  science  of  government.  Of  special 
interest  are  those  articles  which  pave  the  way  for  economic  development, 
regulate  business,  and  establish  the  economic  council  system.  "The  Reich 
may  by  law,"  according  to  Article  156  of  the  Constitution,  'without  detri- 
ment to  the  right  of  compensation  and  with  a  proper  application  of  the 
regulations  relating  to  the  right  of  expropriation,  transfer  to  public  owner- 
ship private  business  enterprises  which  are  adapted  for  socialization."  By 
creating  a  Reichswirtschaftsrat,  or  National  Economic  Council,  beside  the 
future  Reichstag,  the  constitution  laid  the  foundation  for  revolutionary 
changes  in  the  national  economic  life.  The  possibility  of  the  future  socializa- 
tion of  the  means  of  production  and  distribution  was  thus  legally  assured  to 
the  German  people.    Article  165  reads  as  follows : 

Workmen  and  employees  are  qualified  to  cooperate  on  equal  terms 
with  their  employers  in  the  regulation  of  wages  and  conditions  of  work  as 
well  as  in  the  entire  economic  development  of  the  forces  of  production. 
The  organizations  of  both  groups  and  the  agreements  between  them  will  be 
recognized. 

The  workmen  and  the  employees  receive  for  the  protection  of  their  social 
and  economic  interests  legal  representation  in  the  workmen's  shop  councils, 
in  the  district  workmen's  councils  organized  for  each  economic  area,  and  m 
a  National  Workmen's  Council.  ^ 

The  district  workmen's  councils  and  the  National  Workmen  s  Council 
meet  together  with  the  representatives  of  the  employers  and  with  other 
interested  groups  of  the  people  in  district  economic  councils  and  in  a  Na- 
tional Economic  Council  for  the  purpose  of  performing  all  required  eco- 
nomic tasks  and  cooperating  in  the  execution  of  the  laws  of  socialization. 
The  district  economic  councils  and  the  National  Economic  Council  are  to 
be  so  organized  that  all  important  vocational  groups  are  represented  therein 
according  to  their  social  and  economic  importance. 


164  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

Drafts  of  laws  of  fundamental  importance  relating  to  social  and  eco- 
nomic politics  before  introduction  shall  be  submitted  by  the  National  Gov- 
ernment to  the  National  Economic  Council  for  an  expert  opinion.  The 
National  Economic  Council  has  itself  the  right  to  propose  such  measures 
for  enactment  into  law.  If  the  National  Government  does  not  approve 
them,  it  shall  nevertheless  introduce  them  into  the  Reichstag,  together  with 
a  statement  of  its  own  position.  The  National  Economic  Council  may  have 
its  bill  presented  by  one  of  its  own  members  to  the  Reichstag. 

Control  and  administrative  functions  within  assigned  areas  may  be 
delegated  to  the  workmen's  councils  and  to  the  economic  councils. 

The  regulation  of  the  organization  and  functions  of  the  workmen's 
councils  and  the  economic  councils  as  well  as  their  relation  to  other  autono- 
mous social  bodies,  is  exclusively  a  right  of  the  Reich. 

The  establishment  of  a  National  Economic  Council  of  three  hundred 
twent}'-six  members  is  an  attempt  to  do  away  with  the  conflict  between 
socialism  and  privilege.  It  is  also  a  splendid  example  of  a  statesmanlike 
effort  to  take  German  politics  out  of  business.  The  result  of  this  movement 
has  been  the  creation  of  a  conservatism  which  sprang  from  the  ultra  revo- 
lutionary demands  of  1918.  The  National  Economic  Council  will  undoubt- 
edly play  an  important  part  in  the  rehabilitation  of  German  industry  and 
commerce. 

Results  of  the  Compromises 

As  a  convention  of  intelligent  patriots  capable  of  reorganizing  a  shat- 
tered state,  the  Weimar  Assembly  compares  very  favorably  with  the  French 
National  Assembly  which  met  at  Bordeaux  in  1871.  During  the  half 
year's  work  of  the  German  constitutional  convention,  the  nation  recognized 
however  in  its  dilatory  policies  the  methods  of  the  former  Reichstag  debat- 
ing society,  and  became  therefore  almost  indififerent  to  the  great  constitu- 
tional compromises.  Many  Germans  thought  that  the  prompt  adoption  of 
the  temporary  constitution  was  an  indication  of  the  practical  ability  and 
statesmanship  of  the  National  Assembly.  The  patriots  assembled  at  Wei- 
mar evinced,  however,  an  uncontrollable  desire  to  debate  extraneous  issues 
rather  than  to  complete  the  political,  economic,  and  social  reorganization  of 
the  Fatherland.  At  an  hour  when  every  constructive  piece  of  statesmanship 
would  have  contributed  to  the  national  recovery,  this  Assembly  consumed 
months  of  valuable  time  debating  such  questions  as :  the  family  and  mar- 
riage; titles  of  nobility  and  orders;  the  law  of  bastard  children;  capital 
punishment;  and  the  artistic  appearance  of  postage  stamps.*®*  A  great 
debate  took  place  over  the  question  of  the  national  flag.  Finally  the  colors 
of  the  Jena  University  Burschenschaft  of  1815,  the  later  black,  red,  and 
gold  flag  of  1848,  were  chosen  as  the  standard  of  the  republic. 

After  violent  debates  and  in  the  face  of  the  opposition  of  Conservatives, 
Liberals,  and  Independent  Socialists,  the  constitution  was  adopted  on  July 


*'^  Delbriick  in  Preussische  Jahrbucher,  August,  1919,  295. 


THE  ADOPTION  OF  THE  REPUBLICAN   CONSTITUTION  165 

31,  1919,  by  a  vote  of  262  to  75.  Bauer,  President  of  the  National  Ministry, 
then  announced  on  behalf  of  the  government :  "Ladies  and  gentlemen !  As 
a  result  of  your  vote  the  Constitution  of  the  German  Republic  has  become 
the  supreme  law  of  the  land.  It  is  the  true  birth  certificate  of  the  free  state 
which  from  now  on  will  establish  the  form  of  our  national  existence.  A 
new  era  begins ;  may  it  also  be  a  better  one.  Today  we  set  foot  once  more 
upon  firm  ground  after  an  almost  five-year  march  through  the  sea  of  blood 
and  hate  and  privation.  We  take  hold  together  irrespective  of  our  party  or 
our  view  of  life,  and  together  we  must  begin  a  new  national  existence.  Not 
even  in  this  solemn  hour  will  I  attempt  to  conceal  the  disunion  of  our  people. 
The  experiences  of  war  and  peace  have  divided  us ;  we  are  grouped  in  hos- 
tile political  parties.  .  .  .  We  could  not,  however,  separate  even  if  we 
wished,  since  the  treaty  of  peace,  like  an  unbreakable  chain,  has  bound  us 
together."  *^^ 

If  the  National  Assembly  had  adjourned  after  the  ratification  of  the 
peace  treaty  on  August  9,  and  the  national  elections  had  then  taken  place, 
German  political  life  would  have  escaped  from  the  upheavals  of  1920.  Un- 
completed, however,  was  the  task  of  restoring  to  a  semblance  of  order  the 
financial  and  economic  life  of  the  nation.  Therefore  the  National  Assembly 
did  not  adjourn  but  attempted  an  impossible  program  of  reform.  In  spite 
of  its  failures,  however,  it  gave  to  the  German  Nation :  peace  and  a  repub- 
lican constitution.  While  its  debates  reveal  much  wasted  efifort,  lack  of 
practical  political  sense,  and  indifference  to  the  national  ills,  its  leaders 
were  after  all  men  of  high  ideals  and  patriotism.  Dr.  Preuss,  the  father 
of  the  political  reorganization  of  Germany,  aptly  stated :  "The  organization 
Qi_ law,  political  freedom,  and  social  justice  have  been  the  leading  thoughts 
of  the  Weimar  Constitution." 


'  Nationalversammlung,  71  Sitzung,  2193. 


166  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 


AFTER  THE  REVOLUTION 

The  National  Assembly  remained  in  session  for  over  a  year  subsequent 
to  the  conclusion  of  peace.  Over  its  constitutional  work,  great  as  it  wsls, 
hung  the  baleful  shadow  of  the  Peace  of  Versailles.  As  a  contribution  to 
modern  political  theory,  the  new  republican  frame  of  government  con- 
tained but  one  great  constructive  achievement :  the  anchoring  of  the  indus- 
trial council  idea  in  the  constitution.  Thus  the  Spartacans  and  Independ- 
ents were  encouraged  to  continue  their  revolutionary  attacks  upon  the 
democratic  republic.  On  the  other  hand  the  conservatives  and  liberals, 
who  continually  denounced  the  November  revolution,  did  not  cease  their 
anti-democratic  agitation,  which  had  as  its  goal  the  restoration  of  the 
monarchial  principles  of  government.  Hands  were  not  wanting  to  raise 
the  red  banner  of  January  and  the  black,  white,  and  red  of  the  former 
empire  against  the  black,  red,  and  gold  of  the  republic. 

The  economic  collapse,  universal  social  unrest,  and  national  indigna- 
tion over  the  terms  of  peace,  favored  the  development  of  a  counter  revolu- 
tion. Possessing  able  leaders  and  propagandists  among  the  bureaucrats, 
army  ofticers,  and  agrarians,  as  well  as  efficient  organs  of  public  opinion, 
large  party  funds,  and  a  devoted  following,  the  monarchists  prepared 
quietly  but  effectively  to  overthrow  the  republic.  Helfferich's  attack  on 
Finance  Minister  Erzberger  had  exposed  the  questionable  practices  of  that 
official  and  consequently  discredited  the  government.  There  was  also 
widespread  discontent  with  the  National  Assembly  and  the  Prussian 
Assembly  for  their  failure  to  finish  their  appointed  work  and  adjourn. 
Many  army  officers  and  conservatives  sincerely  believed  that  the  welfare 
of  the  Fatherland  demanded  the  overthrow  of  the  coalition  governmnt  of 
Socialists,  Catholics,  and  Democrats.  Noske,  Minister  of  National 
Defense,  was  totally  unaware  of  the  conspiracy  formed  by  his  immediate 
subordinates.  The  Kapp  rebellion  of  the  spring  of  1920  was  the  first 
determined  efifort  of  the  German  militarists  and  royalists  to  recover  con- 
trol of  the  Fatherland.  Their  success  would  have  placed  Germany  in  the 
control  of  reactionaries ;  prevented  any  attempt  at  the  rational  socialization 
of  industries;  and  marked  the  beginning  of  an  era  of  political  revanche. 
They  failed  because  their  rising  was  premature,  but  at  every  crisis  in  the 
future  history  of  the  republic  the  man  on  horseback  with  the  imperial 
banner  will  be  present. 

Aided  by  a  general  strike  and  the  loyalty  of  the  nation  at  large,  the 
Ebert  government  put  down   the  Kapp  rebellion  in   five  days.     Unfor- 


AFTER    THE    REVOLUTION  167 

tunately  for  Germany  the  attempt  of  the  monarchists  was  followed  by  a 
communist  rising  in  various  German  cities.  That  the  government  had 
been  negligent  in  dealing  with  reactionary  plots  was  beyond  a  doubt.  The 
rebellion  of  the  communists  and  the  sending  of  troops  into  the  neutral  zone 
led  to  renewed  allied  pressure  against  Germany  and  to  those  excesses  of 
French  imperialism  culminating  in  the  occupation  of  Frankfort.  The 
formation  of  a  new  German  ministry  under  Hermann  Mueller  resulted  in 
fresh  negotiations  with  the  Allies,  the  suppression  of  the  communists  and 
the  election  of  the  first  Reichstag  of  the  republic. 

The  second  national  election  since  the  revolution  was  held  in  June 
without  serious  disorder.  The  Majority  Socialists  elected  one  hundred 
and  ten  deputies,  a  loss  of  fifty-five  seats.  The  Centre  elected  eighty-eight 
deputies,  losing  but  two  seats.  The  Democrats,  the  third  party  of  the 
Mueller  coalition,  were  decisively  defeated,  by  a  loss  of  thirty  seats,  which 
reduced  their  strength  to  forty-five.  The  German  People's  Party,  the  old 
National  Liberals,  elected  sixty-one  deputies,  a  gain  of  thirty-nine,  while 
the  German  Nationalists,  the  former  conservatives,  elected  sixty-five,  a 
gain  of  twenty-three  seats.  The  largest  increase  was  made  by  the  Inde- 
pendent Socialists,  who  elected  eighty  members  to  the  Reichstag,  a  gain  of 
fifty-eight  seats.  The  Communists  secured  but  two  seats,  and  all  other 
minor  parties  nine  seats. 

The  election  was  a  triumph  for  the  German  extremists.  The  great  gains 
of  the  German  Nationalists  and  the  German  People's  Party  show  that  the 
conservative  and  liberal  elements  are  still  powerful  factors  in  Germany. 
Their  successes  indicate  that  the  barometer  of  the  reaction  is  rising  in  Ger- 
many, and  they  thus  become  a  possible  danger  to  the  peace  of  Europe.  On 
the  other  hand  the  rise  of  the  Independent  Socialist  Party  indicates  the 
vital  force  of  Marxian  socialism  and  the  discontent  of  a  considerable  body 
of  the  German  working  classes  with  the  failure  of  the  government  to  carry 
out  the  revolutionary  program  of  socialization.  The  very  growth  of  the 
Independents  by  the  adhesion  of  the  extremists  foreshadowed,  however, 
their  coming  dissolution.  Originally  a  party  opposed  to  the  democratic 
and  war  policies  of  the  Majority  Socialists,  it  found  itself  in  the  hour  of 
triumph  lacking  a  definite  policy  toward  Russian  Bolshevism,  and  handi- 
capped by  the  feud  of  1917  with  the  Majority  Socialists.J 

Although  the  Majority  Socialists  remained  the  largest  party  in  the 
Reichstag,  they  refused  to  form  a  coalition  government  without  the  sup- 
port of  the  Independents,  The  latter  declined,  however,  the  invitation  to 
join  forces  with  the  bourgeoisie.  Under  the  leadership  of  Constantin 
Fehrenbach,  a  Catholic  statesman,  a  coalition  of  Centre,  People's  Party, 
and  Democrats  was  then  formed.    With  the  creation  of  this  ministry,  the 


168  THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 

nation  entered  upon  an  era  of  republican  parliamentary  government.  The 
great  experiment  in  democratic  self-government  by  the  German  people  had 
begun,  and  it  remained  to  l)e  seen  whether  this  nation,  which  had  often 
boasted  of  its  kiiltur,  had  been  able  to  arrive  at  tliat  plane  of  political 
development  which  the  western  European  and  Anglo-Saxon  democracies 
had  reached  in  the  nineteenth  century. 

Obviously  it  needed  only  able  leaders  and  a  dramatic  incident  to  unite 
the  German  communists  under  the  banner  of  sovietism  and  make  them  a 
real  menace  to  German  democracy.  That  contingency  occurred  in  the 
summer  of  1920  when  the  Bolshevist  invasion  of  Poland  seemed  to  presage 
the  triumph  of  Lenine  and  Trotzki.  From  the  Rhine  province  to  East 
Prussia  all  ranks  of  German  communists  welcomed  the  advance  of  the 
soviet  armies  toward  the  German  borders  as  a  fulfillment  of  the  Russian 
promise  to  aid  in  the  formation  of  a  German  soviet  system.  To  the  transit 
by  the  Allies  of  war  material  through  Germany  to  Poland,  they  raised 
vigorous  objections.  Strikes,  demonstrations,  and  uprisings  indicated 
that  the  German  Socialists  and  even  sections  of  the  bourgeoisie  favored  a 
policy  of  benevolent  neutrality  toward  the  Soviets.  The  workmen's  organi- 
zation for  the  control  of  railway  men  menaced  the  coalition  government  of 
Fehrenbach  with  revolt  if  it  did  not  accede  to  their  demands.  So  serious 
became  the  menace  of  the  proletariat  toward  the  bourgeois  government  that 
conservative  elements  began  uniting  for  defense  in  the  coming  struggle. 
Many  Germans  regarded  the  Bavarian  Eimvohnerwehr,  popularly  called 
Orgesch,  as  the  only  German  force  capable  of  preventing  the  triumph  of 
Bolshevism. 

There  is  a  striking  resemblance  between  the  Russia  of  1917  with  its 
provisional  government  struggling  with  the  soviet  of  workmen  and  sol- 
diers' councils  and  the  Germany  of  1920  combatting  the  forces  of  com- 
munism. There  is  also  an  analogy  between  the  readiness  of  the  Russian 
Socialists  of  1917  to  surrender  to  the  soviet  demands  and  the  recent 
capitulation  of  the  majority  of  the  Independent  Socialists  to  the  German 
communists. 

Nothing  reveals  the  strength  of  German  communism  after  the  revolu- 
tion so  clearly  as  the  party  congress  of  the  Independents  at  Halle.  Before 
it  convened  Soviet  Russia  delivered  the  ultimatum  that  Independent  Ger- 
man Socialism  must  accept  the  twenty-one  theses  of  Lenine  embodied  in 
the  platform  of  the  Second  Congress  of  the  Third  Internationale.  The 
result  was  a  violent  struggle  within  the  Independent  party.  Dittmann, 
Kautsky,  and  other  leaders  refused  to  join  the  Bolshevists  and  were  fol- 
lowed by  many  Independent  groups  in  industrial  centres.  At  Coblenz  the 
American  military  authorities  wisely  refused  to  allow  the  Independents  to 


AFTER   THE    REVOLUTION  169 

join  the  Third  Internationale  under  the  Moscow  conditions.  Daumig  and 
Hoffman,  however,  supported  the  Bolshevists.  Lenine  then  denounced 
in  the  Rote  Fahne  his  opponent,  Dittmann,  stating:  "It  is  quite  natural 
that  Kautsky,  Dittmann,  and  Crispien  are  dissatisfied  with  Bolshevism;  in 
fact  it  would  be  regreftul  if  Bolshevism  gave  satisfaction  to  such  people. 
It  is  only  natural  that  such  bourgeois  democrats — they  do  not  differ  from 
our  Mensheviki — are  very  often  to  be  found  in  the  bourgeois  camp  during 
the  decisive  struggle  between  proletariat  and  bourgeoisie.  The  executions 
seemed  to  have  aroused  Dittman's  special  indignation.  It  is  only  a  matter 
of  course  that  revolutionary  workers  execute  Mensheviks  which  fact 
naturally  can  not  please  Dittmann." 

Again  the  Russian  Bolshevists  pleaded  with  the  Spartacans  to  proclaim 
the  terror  as  the  only  method  of  spreading  the  world  revolution.  Trotzki 
wrote  to  his  German  sympathizers :  "We  will  take  the  sword  in  hand ;  we 
will  arm  the  others."  In  the  final  session  in  August,  1920,  of  the  Third 
Internationale,  Sinovieff  exclaimed:  "I  am  convinced  that  the  second  con- 
gress of  the  third  internationale  will  be  the  predecessor  of  the  international 
congress  of  Soviet  Republics." 

The  result  of  this  Bolshevist  propaganda  was  that  the  Independent 
party  definitely  split  into  a  democratic  and  communist  group.  This  latter 
group  immediately  affiliated  with  the  successors  of  the  Spartacans  and  the 
small  communist  labor  party.  After  two  years  of  struggle  with  the 
organized  forces  of  German  Social  Democracy,  the  Communists  at  last 
secured  control  of  a  party  organization  and  party  machinery.  The  Spar- 
tacan  movement  of  Liebknecht  and  Luxemburg  in  the  last  days  of  the 
empire  had  become  the  Communist  Party  of  German  in  the  second  year 
of  the  republic.  It  aimed  at  the  establishment  of  the  soviet  system  in 
alliance  with  Bolshevist  Russia  and  held  before  the  German  masses  the 
prospect  of  escaping  from  the  international  obligations  of  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles  by  means  of  the  world  revolution.  Opposed  to  communism, 
however,  were  the  loosely-organized  forces  of  German  democracy  and  the 
well-trained  groups  of  conservatives  and  monarchists.  Their  combined 
strength  was  sufficient  to  remove,  after  two  years  of  insurrections,  this 
danger  to  the  German  Reich. 

Meanwhile  the  republic  attempted  to  carry  out  as  far  as  possible  the 
provisions  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  although  it  made  constant  efforts  to 
bring  about  the  revision  of  that  treaty  by  the  allied  powers.  Two  years 
after  the  revolution  the  German  Foreign  Minister  Simons  said :  "It  is  not 
a  policy  of  revenge  or  prejudice  which  can  save  Germany,  but  a  policy  of 
right."  The  German  financial  policies  failed  however  to  satisfy  the 
demands  of  France,  and  the  question  of  reparations  remained  the  chief 
difficulty  between  the  Reich  and  the  allied  powers. 


170 


THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 


A  great  civilized  nation  of  sixty  millions  living  in  the  heart  of  Europe 
and  freed  from  the  menace  of  militarism,  is  certain  notwithstanding  the 
indebtedness  for  reparations  to  recover  from  the  effects  of  the  world  war 
and  to  assume  a  new  and  l)etter  place  among  the  leading  states  of  the 
world.  Meinecke  in  his  work.  "After  the  Revolution,"  states:  "The  most 
important  task  is  to  realize  at  last  the  aspirations  of  German  idealists  and 
Prussian  reformers  of  a  century  ago  and  to  cause  even  the  lowest  strata  of 
society  to  be  permeated  by  that  civil  virtue  which  flows  from  the  moral 
liberty  of  the  individual."  *"*' 


Meinecke,  "Nach  der  Revolution,"  8. 


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Die  Schlachten  im  Sommer  1918,  an  der  Westfront.    Berlin,  1921. 


INDEX 


Abdication  of  the  Federal  Princes,  56-57. 

Abdication  of  the  Kaiser :  Effect  of  x 
President  Wilson's  Notes,  25 ;  Views 
of  the  Majority  Parties,  42;  Visit  of 
Drews  to  General  Headquarters,  41; 
Bavarian  Socialist  Demands,  36;  Ulti- 
matum of  Majority  Socialists,  41  ; 
Policy  of  Prince  Max,  40-41 ;  Inter- 
fractional  Committee's  Demand,  42; 
Conclusion  of  Conference  of  Field 
Officers,  Spa,  November  9,  43;  Proc- 
lamation of  Prince  Max,  November  9, 
43 ;   Effects,  44. 

Agriculture,  16. 

Alexander  Square,  97,  127. 

Alsace-Lorraine,  21. 

American  Relief  Administration  :  Char- 
acter of  German  Relief,  116-117; 
Foodstuffs  Delivered,  117-118;  Danzig 
Mission,  February  11,  1919,  118-119; 
Food  Shipments,  155. 

Allied  and  Associated  Powers :  Sign 
Armistice,  27;  Extend  Period  of  Ar- 
mistice, 115;  Negotiations  at  Ver- 
sailles, 147;  Ultimatum,  June,  1919, 
155-156. 

American  Expeditionary  Force,  8,  10. 

American    Military    Mission,    150-151. 

Amnestj',  Political,  26. 

Annexationists,  17,  147. 

Anti-Semitism,  100. 

Antwerp-Metz  Line,  9. 

Armistice  Negotiations,  24,  25,  45. 

Armistice,  of  November  11,  1918,  27,  74. 

American  Red  Cross,  136. 

Armistice  Period :  Article  16  of  Armis- 
tice Convention,  118;  Article  26  of 
Armistice  Convention,  115;  Article  8 
of  Armistice  Convention,  January  16, 
1919,115;  Treves,  115;  Spa,  February 
6,  1919,  115;  Brussels,  March  13,  1919, 
115-116. 

Army,  Imperial :  Situation  at  Close  of 
1917  Campaigns,  7;  March  Offensive, 
8;  Offensives  of  April,  May,  and  June, 
8;  Second  Battle  of  the  Marne,  8;  Au- 
gust 8,  9 ;  Retreat  of  the  Western 
Forces,  9;  Effect  of  Propaganda,  10- 
11;  Request  for  an  Armistice,  23; 
The  Stab  in  the  Back,  13  ;  Mutinies  in 
North  Germany,  34,  37-38 ;  Mutiny  of 
Munich  Garrison,  35-36 ;  Mutiny  of 
Berlin  Garrison,  47-50 ;  Return  of 
Field  Armies  after  Armistice,  74-76; 
Demobilization  of,  76-78;  Frontier 
Guards  in  the  Rhine  Districts,  133 ; 
Hindenburg's  Command,   133. 


Army,  Revolutionary :  New  Forma- 
tions, 128;  Cadres  of  Old  Army,  128; 
Free  Corps,  127;  Marine  Division, 
Berlin,  127 ;  Republican  Guards,  Ber- 
lin, 128;  Augusta  Regiment,  128;  174 
Lorraine  Regiment,  128 ;  Plan  of  Vol- 
unteer People's  Army,  December  12, 
1918,  130;  Decree  of  January  19,  131; 
Reichswehr,  131,  132;  Free  Corps  of 
Lettow,  Huelsen,  Reinhardt,  and  Liitt- 
witz,  129,  131 ;  Guard  Cavalry  Rifle 
Division,  132;  German  Defense  Divis- 
ion, 132  ;  Land  Rifle  Corps,  132  ;  Pots- 
dam Free  Corps,  132 ;  Strength  at 
Conclusion  of  Peace,  133 ;  Strength, 
February  1,  1920,  133. 

Atrocities,  154. 

Auer,  Bavarian  Socialist,  139. 

August  4,  1914,  61. 

August,  8,  1918,  9. 

Austria,  Republic  of,  144-145. 

Austria-Hungary,  Collapse  of,  26. 

Austrian  Peace  Offensive,  September, 
1918,  21. 

Baden,  107. 

Belgium,  16,  18. 

Bank  Strike  in  Berlin,  137. 

Barth,  Emil,  19,  29,  46.  IZ,  84. 

Bauer,  Colonel,  9,  12. 

Bauer,  Gustav,  45,  156-157,  165. 

Bauer,  Cabinet,  156. 

Bavaria  :  Revolutionary  Movements  since 
January,  1918,  35-37 ;  Election  of  Jan- 
uary 12,  1919,  107. 

Bernstein,  Eduard,  68. 

Bernstorff,  Count,  17,  144. 

Beveridge,  May,  150. 

Bela  Kun,   135. 

Bell,  Minister,  109,  156. 

Berlin,  Revolt  of,  November  9,  44-53. 

Berlin  Conference  of  November  25,  1918, 
83. 

Berlin  Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Council 
Meeting,    November    9,    1918,    52-53 
Meeting,    November    10,    1918,    80-81 
Proclamations,   80,   82;     Meeting,    No- 
vember    19,     1918,     81 ;     Conference, 
November  22,  1918,  82. 

Bernstein,  Eduard,  11,  70,  146,  157. 

Bethmann-Hollweg,    Chancellor   von,    14, 

16,  62-63. 
Binding,  Professor,  162. 
Bismarck,  15,  38,  56,  161-162. 
Bloc,  Reichstag,  22. 


182 


THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 


Blockade,  Allied.  16,  111-112,  117,  151. 
Bochn.  General  von,  76. 
Bread  Ration,  114-115. 
Breitscheid,  Publicist,  148. 
Brest-Litovsk  Treaty,  21,  63,  151. 

Bolsheviki:  In  Revolution  of  1905,  78; 
In  Revolution  of  1917,  78-80,  119-120; 
Dictatorial  Methods,  121 ;  Constitution 
of  Soviets.  121  ;  All-Russian  Central 
Council,  121 ;  Supreme  Council  for 
t'olitical  Economy,  121. 

Bolshevism,  11,  41,  119-124. 

Braun,  von,  Representative  at  Brussels, 
116. 

Bremen  Revolt,  33. 

British  Army,  9. 

Brockdorff-Rantzau,  Count,  109,  147,  155. 

Brussels  Convention,  115-117. 

Bucharest  Treaty,  21,  63. 

Bulgaria,  Collapse  of,  11. 

Bundesrat,  25. 

Cables,  111. 

Capelle,  Admiral  von,  29. 

Capital  and  Labor,  111-114. 

Catholic  Church,  35. 

Censorship,  73. 
•^  Centrists,  99-100,  101-103. 

Charles,  Emperor  of  Austria.    (See  Karl.) 

Chicherin,  Soviet  Commissary  for  For- 
eign Affairs,  152. 

Christian    People's     Party.       (See    Cen- 
trists.) 
VClass  Struggle,  58-59,  61. 

Clemenceau,  Georges,  83,  93. 

Coal,  136. 

Coalition  of  Majority  Socialists  and  In- 
dependents, 54,  72. 

Coblenz,  168. 

Cohen-Reuss,  Delegate,  86-87. 

Colonies :  Criticisms  of  Imperial  Sys- 
tem, 146 ;  Loss  of  Possessions,  146 ; 
Attempts  to  Regain,  146. 

VCommunist  Party  of  Germany :     Origins 
in  Spartacan  Movement,  64-66,  91-93 
Growth    in    1919,    111,    122,    125-126 
Failure  of  Policies,  95,  97-98,  129-130 
Union   with   Left   Wing  of    Independ- 
ence,  169. 
Commerce,  111-112,  115,  116-119. 

Conditions  of  Peace:  Allied  Delibera- 
tions over,  147;  Delegation  at  Ver- 
sailles,   147-148;     Terms    Received    in 

■/Berlin,  148;  German  Reaction  to,  149- 
152. 


Congress  of  Workmen's  and  Soldiers' 
Councils  :      First   Congress,   December, 

1918,  83,  85-89 ;  Second  Congress,  April, 

1919,  138-139. 
Conservatives,  99. 

Constitution  of  the  Empire :  Amendments 
of  October,  1918,  21 ;  Proclamation  of 
October  28,  26. 

Constitution,  Provisional  Weimar,  159- 
161. 

Constitution  of  the  Republic,  1919:  First 
Principal  Part,  163 ;  Second  Principal 
Part,  163 ;  Importance  of  Article  156, 
163;  Text  of  Article  156,  163;  Com- 
promises, 164-165  ;   Estimate  of,  165./ 

Cotton,  119. 

Crown  Prince  of  Bavaria.  (See  Rup- 
precht.) 

Crown  Prince  of  Germany.  (See  Fred- 
erick William.) 

Cunow,  Heinrich,  70. 

Czecho-Slovakia,  Food  Shipments,  116. 

Daumig,  Deputy,  46,  91. 

Danes,  25. 

Danzig,  118-119. 

David,  Eduard,  62,  110,  156,  160. 

Deetjen,  Colonel,  96. 

Defeatism,  7,  11. 

Delbriick,  Hans,  123,  153. 

Delbriick,  Dr.  von,  160. 

Demobilization  Office,   110,  112. 

Dictatorship,  Military,  7,  12,  17,  21-22. 

Dittmann,  Deputy,  29,  46,  51,  73,  168-169. 

Dohna,  Professor  Count  zu,  150. 

Dorten,  Dr.,  161. 

Drews,  Minister,  4. 

Duewill,  Hamburg  Independent,  32. 

Easter  Program,  1917,  21. 

East  Prussia,  148. 

Ebert,  Friedrich,  26,  50,  51,  54-55,  60,  73, 
88,  108-109,  151. 

.Economic  Democracy,  35. 
Economic  Reorganization,  111-112. 
Eichhorn,  Robert,  94. 
Eisner,  Kurt,  35-37,  63,  144. 
Electoral  Reform,  Prussian,  21. 
Eltzbacher,  Professor,  142. 
Empire,  Fall  of,  15-22. 
Ernst,  Eugen,  94. 
Erzberger,  Mathias,  27,  45,  63,  110,   146, 

156,  166. 
Essen,  21. 
Falk,  General  von,  33. 


INDEX 


183 


Fatherland  Instruction  System,  7,  9. 
Fatherland  Party,  18. 
Fehrenbach,  Minister,  150,  167. 
Ferdinand,  King  of  Bulgaria,  22. 
Finances:      Empire,    112-113;     Republic, 

113-114. 
Food,  114-119. 

Foerster,  Professor  W.,  9,  83,  144. 
Flanders,  18. 
Foch,  Marshal,  8,  9,  26. 
Forstner,  Captain  von,  29. 
Foss,  Admiral,  29. 

Fourteen  Points,  14,  143,  146,  148-149. 
Food  Administration,  20. 
France,  117. 
Frank,  Ludwig,  62. 
Freedom  of  the  Press,  26. 
Frciheit,  151. 

French  Army,  War  Losses,  117. 
Frederick  II,  Grand  Duke  of  Baden,  22. 
Frederick    William,     Crown     Prince    of 

Germany  and  Prussia,  8,  42,  43. 
Freedom  of  the  Seas,  45. 
Freytag-Loringhoven,  General  von,  9. 
Freytagh-Loringhoven,  Baron  von,  120. 
Fried,  Dr.  Alfred,  144. 
Frightfulness,  112. 

General  Headquarters,  7,  14,  17,  21-22,  74. 
General  Staff,  10,  11,  46,  151. 
General  Strike  of  January,  1918,  11,  19. 
General  Strike  of  March,  1919,  127-129. 
German  Army.     (See  Army.) 
German  Austria.     (See  Austria.) 
German  Democratic  Party,  103. 
German  National  People's  Party,  99-100. 
German  Officers'  Alliance,  77. 
German  People's  Party,  99,  100-101. 
Giesberts,  Minister,  109,  156. 
Gothcin,  Georg,  17,  40. 
Groeber,  Deputy,  45,  149. 
Groener,  General,  14,  41,  42. 
Haase,   Hugo,   13,  19,  46,  62-63,  7X  149, 

151. 
Haller's  Army,  118. 
Hamburg  Points,  127. 
Hamburg  Revolt,  32,  ii. 
Hanseatic  Oligarchies,  Fall  of,  32-34. 
Hartmann,  Dr.  Ludo,  145. 
Hasardspieler,  13. 
Haussmann,  Minister,  31,  45,  149. 
Harden,  Maximilian,  18,  147,  152. 


Heine,  Wolfgang,  62. 

Helfferich,  Karl,  166. 

Hertling,  Count,  Chancellor,  22. 

Hindenburg,  Field  Marshal  von,  7,  12,  25, 
39,  41. 

Hindenburg  Line,  9. 

Hindenburg  Program,  16. 

Hintze,  Admiral  von,  12,  41. 

Hipper,  Vice  Admiral  von,  29. 

Hoffmann,  Minister-President,  139-142. 

Hoffmann,  Adolf,  99,  151. 

Hoffmann,  General  von,  95. 

Hohenzollern,  House  of,  38,  46,  55. 

Hoover,  Herbert,  115. 

Hungary,  Formation  of  Bolshevist  Gov- 
ernment, 135. 

Imperialism,  7-14. 

Indemnities,  158,  169. 

Independent  Socialists  :  Secession,  March 
1917,  from  Social  Democratic  Parties 
18,  63  ;  Revolutionary  Agitation  of,  51 
Alliance  with  Majority  Socialists,  54 
Withdrawal  from  Government,  90 
Peace  Policy,  1919,  150-155;  Party 
Congress  at  Halle,  169. 

Internal  Collapse,  15-27. 

Internationale,    Second    Congress    of    the 

Third,  168. 
Italian  Army,  7. 

January  Spartacan  Revolt,  88-98. 
Jacobi,  Professor  Erwin,  162. 
J'accusc,  148. 
Joffe,  Ambassador,  120. 
Junkers,  21. 
Jutland,  Battle  of,  28. 
Kapp,  Wolfgang,  18,  66. 
Kapp  Rebellion,  166. 

Karl,  Emperor  of  Austria,  King  of  Hun- 
gary, 9. 
Kautsky,  Karl,  66,  70,  144,  151. 
Kessel,  General  von,  46. 

Kiel  Revolt :  Mutiny  of  Third  Squadron, 
31 ;  Ultimatum  of  Mutineers,  31 ;  Rev- 
olutionary Government,  32. 

Kienthal  Conference,  1916,  120. 
Koeth,  Minister,  110. 
Kolberg,  G.  H.  Q.  at,  44. 
Krupp  Works,  21. 
Kiiltur,  167. 
Kun,  Bela,  135. 
Kuttner,  Erich,  60. 
Lamprecht,  Karl,  39. 


184 


THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 


Landsbcrg.  Otto,  72>,  86,  109. 
Lassalle,  Ferdinand,  62. 
League  of  Nations,  153. 
Ledebour,  Georg,  46,  51,  94. 
Legien,  Karl,  61. 

Lenine,  Nikolai,  121-122,  168-169. 
Lequis,  General.  90. 
Lettow-Vorbeck,  General  von,  131. 
Lew.  Spartacan  Leader,  91. 
Liebknecht,  Karl,  64,  84-88,  91-98. 
Linsingen,  General  von,  46-48. 
Los  von  Berlin,  161. 
Ludendorff,  General,  7,  23,  25,  39. 
Ludwig  III,  King  of  Bavaria,  35,  2i7. 
Luebeck,  Revolt  of  November  5,  2)2). 
Luedemann,  Delegate,  87. 
Luettwitz,  General  von,  96. 
Liisitania,  143. 

Luxemburg,  Rosa,  65,  8^89,  91-98. 
Macedonian  Front,  22. 
Alaercker,  General,  136-138. 
Magdeburg,  136-137. 
.  Majority  Socialists,  52,  104-105. 
March  Rebellion,  125-130. 
MalinofT,  Minister-President,  22. 

Mangin,  General,  161. 

Marloh,  Lieutenant,  129. 

Marne,  Second  Battle  of,  8. 

Marshall,  General  von,  41. 

Marx,  Karl,  58,  65. 

Marxism,  58-68. 

Maximilian,   Prince  of   Baden,   Chancel- 
lor, 22,  25,  39-44,  45,  146-147. 

Mayer,  Minister,  156. 

Mehring,  Franz,  91. 

Merchant  Marine,  115. 

Meinecke,   Friedrich,    17. 

Mierfeld,  Deputy,  22. 

Military  Defeat,  7-14. 

Minor  Communist  Uprisings,  135. 

Mittel  Eiiropa,  15,  39. 

Moltke,  Field  Marshal  von,  15. 

Moltke,  Helmuth  von.  Chief  of  the  Gen- 
eral Staff,  12. 

Monarchies,  Fall  of  German,  1918,  56-57. 

Alonarchists,  166. 

Montgelas,  Count  Max,  144. 

Moral  Collapse,  17. 

Mudra,  General  von,  76. 

Muhlon,  Dr.,  148. 

Muller,  Hermann,  63,  149,  156,  166. 


Miiller,  Richard,  81,  85. 
Munich,  Revolt  of  November,  1918,  35-36. 
Munich   Commune:      Murder   of    Eisner, 
February   21,    1919,    139;     Ministry   of 
Hofifmann,  139  ;    Communist  coup  d'etat, 
April  6,  1919,  139;    Excesses  of  Com- 
munists,  140;    Attack  of    New  Army, 
141-142. 
National   Assembly:     Decisions  to  Con- 
voke,    83.     8^87;     Election.     99-107; 
Convocation  at  Weimar,   107;    Organ- 
ization,  Preliminary   Constitution,   108; 
Election  of  President,  109;    Formation 
of     Scheidemann     Ministry,     109-110; 
Meeting  of   May   12,   1919,   in   Berlin, 
149_150;  Question  of  Acceptable  Peace 
Formula,    156-157;    Fall    of    Scheide- 
mann   Cabinet.    155-156;    Bauer    Min- 
istry, 157;  Acceptance  of  Treaty,  June 
23,   1919,   157;   Adoption  of   Constitu- 
tion.    164-165;     Kapp     Putsch,     166; 
Muller  Ministry,  167;  Dissolution,  167. 
National  Election,  1919,  105-107. 
National  Election,  1920,  167. 
Nationalism,  60. 

National  Union  of  German  Officers,  77. 
Naumann,  Friedrich,  15. 
Navy :     High  Seas  Fleet,  28  ;    Mutiny  of 
1917.  28;    Plan  of  Operations,  October 
28,  1918,  29;    Mutiny  in  Schillig  Road- 
stead,  26,   30;     Landing   at   Kiel,    31; 
Landing  at   Hamburg,  32;    Occupation 
of   Bremen,  ZZ ;    Landing  at  Luebeck, 
Z2) ;    Revolution  at  Wilhelmshaven,  34 ; 
Kiel    Canal,    34;     Demobilization,    77; 
Surrender  of  the  Fleet,  77. 
Neuring,  Saxon  Minister  of  War,  138. 
Ninth  of  November,  44-52. 
Noske,  Gustav,  31,  95-98,   109,   128-130, 

156 
Oven,  General  von,  141. 
Oncken,  Hermann,  15,  158. 
Pacifists,  144,  146. 

Pan-Germans  :   Organization,  13,  17;  Gen- 
eral Demands,   18;    Criticisms  of   Na- 
tional  Policy,  29;    Proposed  Dictator- 
ship,  27;     Demand    Resistance   to  the 
Last,  56  ;   War  Responsibility,  144.  -- 
Payer,  Vice  Chancellor  von,  13,  21,  22. 
Parties  During  Revolution,  99. 
Peace  Plans,  146-148. 
Peace  Conference.     (See  Versailles, 

Treaty  of.) 
Pershing,  General  John  J.,  7. 
Plessen,  General  von,  41,  42. 
Poland,  118-119. 
Police  Forces,  133. 


INDEX 


185 


Polish-German  Frontier  War,  118-119. 

Posadowsky-Wehner,  Count  von,  149. 

Potato  Crop,  114,  118. 

Preuss,  Hugo,  108-109,  160,  165. 

Prisoners  of  War:  Allied,  114;  Ger- 
man, 152. 

Proclamations :  Empire,  October  28, 
1918,  26 ; '-'Empire,  November  4,  1918, 
26 ;  Empire,  November  4,  45  ;  Empire, 
November  6,  Armistice  Negotiations, 
45;  Empire,  November  9,  Abdication 
of  Kaiser,  50;  Provisional  Govern- 
ment of  Ebert,  November  9,  51 ;  Pro- 
visional Government  of  Ebert,  Novem- 
ber 11,  54;  Six  Commissioners,  No- 
vember 12,  New  Government,  73 ;  Six 
Commissioners,  November  12,  Army, 
74-75 ;  Six  Commissioners,  November 
30,  National  Elections,  101-102;  Six 
Commissioners,  January  21,  Convoca- 
tion of  National  Assembly,  107. 

Profiteers,  7,  20. 

"Proletarians  of  All  Lands  Unite,"  71. 

Propaganda,  Allied,  10,  11. 

Propaganda,  German,  7,  10-11,  20-21,  154. 

Provisional  Government  Before  First 
Congress  of  the  Councils  :  Establishes 
Authority  Over  Reich,  53-54;  Recog- 
nized by  Army  and  Navy,  54-55 ;  Con- 
ference of  November  25,  1918,  with 
Federal  States,  83;  Summons  First 
Congress  of  the  Councils,  82;  Attempt 
at  Anti-Revolutionary  Coup  d'Etat,  84. 

Prussia,  107,  161-162. 

Radfck,  Karl,  91,  93,  95. 

Railways,  114. 

Rathenau,  Walther,  11,  69. 

Red  Soldiers'  Alliance,  127. 

Reform  Movement  of  1918,  21,  22,  25. 

Reichsbank,  114. 

Reichstag  of  the  Empire :  Session  of 
August  4,  1914,  62;  Session  of  De- 
cember 9,  1915,  62-63. 

Reichstag  of  the  Republic :  Election  of 
June,  1920,  167;  Ministry  of  Fehren- 
bach,  167. 

Reinhardt,  Colonel,  95. 

Religious  Freedom,  73. 

Renner,  Karl,  145. 

Reventlow,  Count,  152. 

Rhineland,  161-162. 

Rote  Fahne,  126. 

Rote  Soldaten,  89. 

Royal  Palace,  Berlin,  53,  126. 

Ruhr  District,  136. 


Rumania,  IS. 

Rupprecht,  Crown  Prince  of  Bavaria,  8. 

Russia  :  Revolution  of  1905,  78 ;  Work- 
men's Deputies  Councils,  78;  Revolu- 
tion of  1917,  119-121;  German  Policies, 
1918-1919,  81,  87,  91,  93,  122,  124. 

Saxony,  107,  137-138. 

Schaefer,  Dietrich,  17,  144. 

Scheer,  Admiral,  28,  29,  34. 

Scheidemann,  Philip,  9,  17,  26,  40,  45,  51, 
60,  61,  73,  95,  98,  109-110. 

Scheidemann  Cabinet,  109,  155-156. 

Schcidcmaenner,  93. 

Scheuch,  General,  90. 

Schiffer,  Minister,  109. 

Schleswig,  25. 

Schliefifen  Plan,  15. 

Schmidt,  Minister,  109,  156. 

Schmidthals,  Counsellor  von,  43. 

Schools,  163. 

Scholze,  Spartacan  Leader,  95. 

Schiicking,  Walther,  146. 

Schulenhurg,  Count,  41. 

Schulte,    Aloys,    161. 

Schumacher,  Hermann,  17. 

Schwerin :  Mutiny  of  86th  Ersatz  Bat- 
talion, 34;   Fokker  Works,  34. 

Seekt,  General  von,  134. 

Seitz,  Karl,  145. 

Self-Determination,  145. 

Shipping,  115-117. 

Shop  Steward  System,  78. 

Silesia,  118. 

Simons,  Minister,  169. 

Six  Commissioners,  72. 

Socialism,  58-68. 

Socialization:  General  Plan  of,  66-67; 
Attitude  of  Socialist  Factions  Toward, 
67-68  ;  Rathenau's  Theory  of,  69 ;  Op- 
position to,  69-71. 

Solf,  Dr.  W.,  16,  45,  63,  146. 

Souchon,  Admiral,  31. 

Soviet  Russia.     (See  Russia.) 

Spa,  41-44. 

Spahn,  Deputy,  63. 

Spartacans :  Attacks  Throughout  Ger- 
many, November-December,  1918,  33 ; 
Demonstration  in  Berlin,  December  8, 
1918,  84. 

Spartacus,  65. 

Spartacan  Alliance:  Organization  by 
Liebknecht  of,  64;  Convention,  De- 
cember 30,  1918,  91 ;    Platform,  92-93. 


186 


THE   GERMAN    REVOLUTION 


Spartacan  Uprisings,  84. 

Speaker's  Offensive,  7,  21. 

Stampfer,  Friederich,  150. 

■'State  and  Revolution,"  122. 

Stephani,  Major  von,  96. 

Strescmann,  Dr.,  101,  149. 

Submarine  Warfare,  112,  154. 

Supreme  Council,  147. 

Supreme  Economic  Council,  155. 

Tirpitz,  Admiral  von,  18,  34. 

Trade  Unions,  61,  79. 

Trotzki,  Leon,  169. 

Ukraine,  75,  114. 

Ukraine  Fiasco,  114. 
V  Unemployed,  26. 

Untcr  den  Linden,  96. 

Uprising  of  December  6,  1918,  84. 

Uprising  of  December  23,  1918,  90. 

Uprising  of  January  5,  1919,  94. 

Uprising  of  March  3,  1919,  127. 

Vae  Victis,  14,  130. 

Vater-Magdeburg,  Independent  Leader, 
19. 

Versailles,  Treaty  of :  Beginnings  of 
Negotiations,  143,  147;  Conditions  of 
Peace  of  Allied  and  Associated  Pow- 
ers, 148 ;'  Reaction  to  Terms,  148; 
Counter   Proposals,   153;    Allied  Ulti- 


matum,   155-156;     Unconditional    Ac- \ 
ceptance,  157-158;    Revision,  169. 

Vogtherr,  Deputy,  29,  51. 

Vorzvaerts,  21,  50,  53. 

Wages,  16,  112. 

Walz,  Lieufenant,  46. 

Wangenheim,  Konrad  Frhr,  von,  18. 

War  Credfls,  15,  61-63. 

War  Industries,  18,  111-112. 

War  Information  Library,  11. 

War  Ministry,  8,  134. 

Weimar,  107-108. 

Wels,  Commandant,  90. 

Weltpolitik,  122. 

Wemyss,  Admiral  Sir  Rosslyn,  115. 

White  Book,  1919,  14. 

Wilhelmshaven,  ii. 

William   11,   German   Emperor,   King  of 
Prussia,  7,  21,  28,  34,  39-44,  48-49,  60. 

Wilson,  Woodrow,  14,  16,  22,  27,  40,  147. 

Wissel,  Minister,  109,  156. 

Wolfif  Telegraph  Bureau,  154. 

Wolzogen,  Baron  von,  43. 

Workmen's  and  Soldiers'  Councils,  78-84. 

Wrisberg,  General  von,  11. 

Wuerttemberg :  Abdication  of  King,  56; 
Election  of  January  12,  1919,  107. 

Zimmermann  Note,  17. 


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